After the U.S. Midterm Elections, a Transatlantic Narrative Shift?

Peter S. Rashish

Vice President; Director, Geoeconomics Program

Peter S. Rashish, who counts over 30 years of experience counseling corporations, think tanks, foundations, and international organizations on transatlantic trade and economic strategy, is Vice President and Director of the Geoeconomics Program at AICGS. He also writes The Wider Atlantic blog.

Mr. Rashish has served as Vice President for Europe and Eurasia at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, where he spearheaded the Chamber’s advocacy ahead of the launch of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Previously, Mr. Rashish was a Senior Advisor for Europe at McLarty Associates, Executive Vice President of the European Institute, and a staff member and consultant at the International Energy Agency, the World Bank, UN Trade and Development, the Atlantic Council, the Bertelsmann Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund.

Mr. Rashish has testified before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia and has advised three U.S. presidential campaigns. He has been a featured speaker at the Munich Security Conference, the Aspen Ideas Festival, and the European Forum Alpbach and is a member of the Board of Directors of the Jean Monnet Institute in Paris and a Senior Advisor to the European Policy Centre in Brussels. His commentaries have been published in The New York Times, the Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest, and he has appeared on PBS, CNBC, CNN, NPR, and the BBC.

He earned a BA from Harvard College and an MPhil in international relations from Oxford University. He speaks French, German, Italian, and Spanish.

Last week’s U.S. midterm congressional elections evinced stronger than expected voter dissatisfaction with the second Trump administration’s performance. That dynamic should create space for public debate on a wider set of issues and receptiveness to an expanded range of policy positions.

Yet comfortable Democratic majorities in the House and Senate will not of themselves revive the faltering transatlantic economic relationship, which has been burdened by U.S. tariffs, energy price shocks, and funding Ukraine’s response to Russia’s invasion. A look at voter dynamics, however, suggests that the playing field has changed in a way that should produce a more constructive conversation about the value of cooperation with like-minded partners, including the European Union.

What is clear after last week is that several issues—affordability, the competitiveness of renewable energies vs. fossil fuels, rising electricity costs linked to data centers, climate, and security—have become unsiloed in the minds of the U.S. public. They are now viewed as a package that links domestic, trade, and foreign policies.

A Gallup poll taken just before the election revealed that voters’ top five concerns were the economy, healthcare, the situation in Iran, income and wealth distribution, and gas prices. The Iran war, a national security matter, is the main reason for rising costs at the pump, which in turn is a major contributor to concerns about affordability.

Trade policy in the form of the U.S. administration’s sharp tariff increases, especially on Canada, the country’s second-largest trading partner on a single-country basis, has also driven up prices. These levies impacted northern-tier states that trade heavily with Canada like Maine and Ohio, where the Democrats flipped Senate seats, as well as Michigan, a contested swing state won by President Trump in 2024 that the Democrats held last week.

In such a political context—where voters will welcome international engagement if it helps alleviate domestic economic concerns—Democrats and Republicans who argue that cooperation with Europeans will facilitate this task should find interested listeners.

While the competitive challenge from China was not a top voter concern, the country’s manufacturing overcapacity (which it exports to the United States, Germany, and other European countries on the back of generous government subsidies) and technology rivalry are likely to become more acute during the next Congress. Add to that dependence on China for critical minerals that power military technologies, semiconductors, and electric vehicles, and the connection between affordability and economic security will come more into focus.

So will the reality that without cooperation from friends and allies like the EU there is no achieving key U.S. national interests. Bipartisan majorities favor the United States taking an active role in international affairs, and for the first time since 2012, there is no daylight between Republicans and Democrats on the issue.

In such a political context—where voters will welcome international engagement if it helps alleviate domestic economic concerns—Democrats and Republicans who argue that cooperation with Europeans will facilitate this task should find interested listeners. Reducing energy costs through diversification of fuel sources (including increased use of renewables), promoting the long-term health of U.S. and European manufacturing through more secure and sustainable supply chains, and efficiencies and innovation achieved through joint investments in the defense industry are some of the possible areas for common efforts.

None of these things can be achieved by Congress alone. But as they move up the political ladder, they can help create a new transatlantic narrative and lay the groundwork for enhanced cooperation over time.