Martin Falbisoner via Wikimedia Commons
AGI Asks: What Will Change in Transatlantic Relations after the Midterms?
Alexander Privitera
AGI Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Alexander Privitera a Geoeconomics Non-Resident Senior Fellow at AGI. He is a columnist at BRINK news and professor at Marconi University. He was previously Senior Policy Advisor at the European Banking Federation and was the head of European affairs at Commerzbank AG. He focuses primarily on Germany’s European policies and their impact on relations between the United States and Europe. Previously, Mr. Privitera was the Washington-based correspondent for the leading German news channel, N24. As a journalist, over the past two decades he has been posted to Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, and Rome. Mr. Privitera was born in Rome, Italy, and holds a degree in Political Science (International Relations and Economics) from La Sapienza University in Rome.
Bryant Trick
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
After a thirty-year career with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Department of State, Bryant Trick has demonstrated expertise in the development and implementation of U.S. trade policy from an insider’s perspective, as well as an understanding of international trade, transatlantic relations, Europe, and Korea grounded in actual practice. As Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the Middle East from 2023 to 2026, he was a key player in transatlantic trade relations under administrations of both parties. Prior to that role, Trick served twice as the Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Korea and as the Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Market Access, where he played significant roles in trade negotiations ranging from the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, to the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, and many others. During his time in the U.S. Foreign Service, Trick was Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Austria, Germany, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein Affairs, and served in the U.S. Embassies in Seoul, Berlin, and Kyiv. He has an MA in international relations from the University of Southern California and speaks fluent German.
Jackson Janes
President Emeritus of AGI
Jackson Janes is the President Emeritus of the American-German Institute in Washington, DC, where he has been affiliated since 1989.
Dr. Janes has been engaged in German-American affairs in numerous capacities over many years. He has studied and taught in German universities in Freiburg, Giessen and Tübingen. He was the Director of the German-American Institute in Tübingen (1977-1980) and then directed the European office of The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Bonn (1980-1985). Before joining AICGS, he served as Director of Program Development at the University Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh (1986-1988). He was also Chair of the German Speaking Areas in Europe Program at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, DC, from 1999-2000 and is Honorary President of the International Association for the Study of German Politics .
Dr. Janes is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Atlantic Council of the United States, and American Purpose. He serves on the advisory boards of the Berlin office of the American Jewish Committee, and the Beirat der Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ZfAS). He serves on the Selection Committee for the Bundeskanzler Fellowships for the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.
Dr. Janes has lectured throughout Europe and the United States and has published extensively on issues dealing with Germany, German-American relations, and transatlantic affairs. In addition to regular commentary given to European and American news radio, he has appeared on CBS, CNN, C-SPAN, PBS, CBC, and is a frequent commentator on German television. Dr. Janes is listed in Who’s Who in America and Who’s Who in Education.
In 2005, Dr. Janes was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany, Germany’s highest civilian award.
Education:
Ph.D., International Relations, Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, California
M.A., Divinity School, University of Chicago
B.A., Sociology, Colgate University
Expertise:
Transatlantic relations, German-American relations, domestic German politics, German-EU relations, transatlantic affairs.
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Jeff Rathke
President of AGI
Jeffrey Rathke is the President of the American-German Institute in Washington, DC.
Prior to joining AGI, Jeff was a senior fellow and deputy director of the Europe Program at CSIS, where his work focused on transatlantic relations and U.S. security and defense policy. Jeff joined CSIS in 2015 from the State Department, after a 24-year career as a Foreign Service Officer, dedicated primarily to U.S. relations with Europe. He was director of the State Department Press Office from 2014 to 2015, briefing the State Department press corps and managing the Department's engagement with U.S. print and electronic media. Jeff led the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur from 2011 to 2014. Prior to that, he was deputy chief of staff to the NATO Secretary General in Brussels. He also served in Berlin as minister-counselor for political affairs (2006–2009), his second tour of duty in Germany. His Washington assignments have included deputy director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs and duty officer in the White House Situation Room and State Department Operations Center.
Mr. Rathke was a Weinberg Fellow at Princeton University (2003–2004), winning the Master’s in Public Policy Prize. He also served at U.S. Embassies in Dublin, Moscow, and Riga, which he helped open after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mr. Rathke has been awarded national honors by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as several State Department awards. He holds an MPP degree from Princeton University and BA and BS degrees from Cornell University. He speaks German, Russian, and Latvian.
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Phyllis Berry
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Phyllis Berry is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American-German Institute. She was the National Intelligence Officer for Europe from June 2021 until March 2025. She also served at the National Intelligence Council as Acting NIO for Europe from July 2017 through April 2018, Deputy NIO from April 2018 through July 2020, and senior advisor on governance for the NIC’s Strategic Futures Group during 2015-16. She authored the European futures papers for the 2017 and 2021 NIC Global Trends reports. From late 2014 to mid-2015 she was Director for Ukraine at the National Security Council. Dr. Berry has a Ph.D. in comparative politics from Georgetown University and has taught European comparative politics, French politics, German politics, and comparative leadership.
Robin Quinville
AGI Senior Non-Resident Fellow
Robin Quinville spent more than 30 years as a U.S. diplomat, serving primarily in Europe. She was a member of the U.S. delegation to two multilateral organizations (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and NATO) and also served in bilateral postings to Cyprus, Bosnia, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Germany. She spent a year in Baghdad, Iraq in 2008. In Washington, she directed the Office of Western European Affairs at the Department of State. Robin’s last diplomatic post was as Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Berlin, Germany; she returned to the United States in the summer of 2021. Following a semester as the Sol M. Linowitz Visiting Professor of International Affairs at Hamilton College in Clinton, New York, Robin became director of the Global Europe Program at the non-partisan Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. A native of California, Robin lives in Arlington, Virginia.
Stephen F. Szabo
Senior Fellow
Dr. Stephen F. Szabo is a Senior Fellow at AICGS, where he focuses on German foreign and security policies and the new German role in Europe and beyond. Until 2017, he was the Executive Director of the Transatlantic Academy, a Washington, DC, based forum for research and dialogue between scholars, policy experts, and authors from both sides of the Atlantic. Prior to joining the German Marshall Fund in 2007, Dr. Szabo was Interim Dean and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and taught European Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as Professor of National Security Affairs at the National War College, National Defense University (1982-1990). He received his PhD in Political Science from Georgetown University and has been a fellow with the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the American Academy in Berlin, as well as serving as Research Director at AICGS. In addition to SAIS, he has taught at the Hertie School of Governance, Georgetown University, George Washington University, and the University of Virginia. He has published widely on European and German politics and foreign policies, including. The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans, The Diplomacy of German Unification, Parting Ways: The Crisis in the German-American Relationship, and Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-Economics.
Democrats flipped both chambers of Congress in the U.S. midterm elections on November 3. Could the 120th Congress alter the direction of U.S. foreign policy and constrain President Trump’s agenda? What can transatlantic partners expect from a divided U.S. government? AGI experts analyze the impact of the midterms on U.S. economic, foreign, and defense policies.
Jeff Rathke
AGI President
Among the many things demonstrated by the U.S. mid-term elections is an interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy. Asked in exit polls to name the top issue facing the country, as one might expect, voters indicated that the economy was their chief concern. But the war in Iran was a “crucial” or “major factor” for 74 percent of voters, making that issue more salient than immigration/enforcement or artificial intelligence/data centers. Only the cost of living and concerns about government corruption ranked higher. Likewise, 66 percent of voters said that tariffs hurt the national economy, highlighting a penetration of trade issues into public views of economic policy.
In this installment of “AGI Asks,” the Institute’s experts offer perspectives on how the results of the midterms could affect specific aspects of U.S. policy that are significant for the transatlantic relationship: trade, defense, the global economy, and the war in Ukraine, to name just a few.
It is also valuable to think about this from another direction: what opportunities does the shakeup present to reimagine America’s foreign policy, and what role do our allies play in that discussion? Regardless of one’s normative views, the past decade has demonstrated the ability of the American political system to discard old approaches, test and contest new ones, and reconfigure institutions. While that has focused principally on domestic politics, the scope for rebuilding American understandings of its alliance relationships and the roles and interests of its main partners should not be discounted. The coming two years will forge both parties’ approaches to the post-Donald Trump era, and our allies and partners will be stakeholders in shaping future concepts of the United States’ security, economic, and foreign policy engagement.
Phyllis Berry
AGI Non-Resident Senior Fellow
A new Democratic majority in Congress will be unlikely to have a significant impact on U.S. policy toward Ukraine until there is a change in the presidency, and heightened White House-congressional battles over foreign policy could place Ukraine in a difficult position as it seeks to avoid a total breakdown in relations with the Trump administration. Democratic Senate leaders are signaling their intention to provide Ukraine with new financial and military assistance, and according to a recent Financial Times report, Democrats will seek to insert increased aid to Ukraine in the Senate version of the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act. They are also promising greater congressional scrutiny of administration policy toward Ukraine and Russia, particularly regarding the president’s waiver of many energy and economic sanctions on Russia and reported business deals between Russia and Trump supporters or family members. Trump’s post-midterm hosting of sanctioned Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev at the White House suggests, however, that Trump will continue to ignore Congress and legislation that already has appropriated aid to Ukraine and provided for increased sanctions and tariffs on Russia. His appointment of Stephen Miller as White House chief of staff also strongly suggests the president will take a combative rather than cooperative approach to dealing with a Democratic congressional majority. Kyiv will try to stay out of this battle, but Trump has punished states for actions taken by others.
A Democratic majority that is ready to use the authority provided to it in the Constitution can have some impact, however, and this impact could increase with consistent and targeted pressure. Once in power, the Democrats can use their power over funding to offer deals that trade increased support for Ukraine with higher-priority administration goals. They also will be in a better position to highlight the value that Ukraine is making to transatlantic security, the lessons it can offer in military innovation, and the questionable dealings the administration is making with Russian officials. Oversight works better with control of both houses of Congress and puts the Democrats in a stronger position to use the courts to force the White House to respect congressional legislation. A different secretary of defense might be less hostile to Ukraine, and an end to the Iran war might make possible more weapons deliveries (even if paid for by Europe). In all these cases, the Democrats are likely to be most effective if they can rally U.S. public support for Ukraine, incentivize Republicans to join these efforts, and dissuade U.S. business from participating in proposed Trump administration-led energy and other business deals with Russia. As Europeans and Ukraine have shown, the administration does not have all the cards, and its hand is weaker since the midterms.
Jack Janes
AGI President Emeritus
The 2026 midterm elections served as a major repudiation of the Trump administration in both domestic and foreign policy. The landslide victory of the Democrats in the Senate and the House of Representatives can now provide more leverage over the president, but it is also likely going to generate more conflicts and gridlock over budgets, appropriations, and legislation. Democratic majorities can challenge Trump’s policies, but the president retains enormous authority over diplomacy, trade, and national security. And Trump will be relentless in securing his legacy by remaining active and using his powers, particularly in the foreign policy arena.
There is little reason to think Trump will significantly change his critical views with respect to transatlantic relations. Frictions over trade, tariffs, and demands for more responsibility of Europeans in NATO for their own security will continue. Trump remains the president and the commander-in-chief, and we can expect that he will exercise that power with limited deference to the Congress, as he has done in the past. His recruitment of Stephen Miller as his chief of staff only underscores that.
The Democratic majority in the House and the Senate may defend funding for Ukraine and scrutinize policy toward Russia. They can also use their powers to implement sanctions and military aid and use oversight to control foreign policy personnel.
But the battle between the White House and the Congress will also involve a larger continuing debate between and within the Republican and Democratic arenas concerning the parameters of foreign policy, the purpose of national interests, and the role of the United States in global affairs. A consensus about how, when, where, and why the United States and Europe still need each other will remain in contention in Washington over the remaining Trump era and well beyond, regardless of who succeeds Donald Trump in the White House.
Europeans will be confronting similar questions and challenges about their relations with a United States that is in an unpredictable and uncertain transition period at home and abroad in the concluding era of Trump.
Alexander Privitera
AGI Non-Resident Senior Fellow
The biggest mistake international partners and adversaries could make is to underestimate a weakened president. Donald Trump now has nothing to lose. His obsession with tariffs as a weapon of choice is intact, even though the tool has lost some of its potency. Trade partners, including Europeans, could try to chip away selectively at the brittle trade wall erected against them. If managed carefully, the next two years could even be less confrontational. For Europeans this means avoiding unnecessary fights but also being more assertive in standing their ground if provoked by the administration. By losing support in Congress, Trump can also kiss goodbye to his attempts to reshape the composition of the Board of the Federal Reserve. The independence of America’s central bank is largely intact after two years of relentless presidential attacks. It will be even harder to challenge it in the next two. But some longer term trends will not be reversed. Europe will continue to pursue a new trade model that is more protectionist. China will persist in addressing its own domestic challenges by trying to flood the world with its products. The United States will soon discover whether or not the economic blessings of AI will become a curse that will undermine the recent American growth story. While it is certainly true that the much-feared total breakdown of international commerce has been averted, the underlying tensions remain. Ultimately, thanks to Trump, the ideology that underpinned globalization, based on a shared belief that open trade would benefit everyone, is dead. This is his main geoeconomic legacy. It will outlive his presidency.
Robin Quinville
AGI Non-Resident Senior Fellow
The “blue wave midterms” have flipped both the House and Senate; few would have bet on that a year ago. The outgoing Republican Congress rubber-stamped the president’s agenda (when it engaged at all). January’s Congress, by contrast, will want to exercise its power. It will demand accountability from administration officials and flex its budgetary authority.
The sigh of relief from across the Atlantic was audible last Wednesday—but the trajectory of Trump’s foreign and defense policy won’t change quickly. The 2025 National Security Strategy remains the administration’s ideological blueprint. The Pentagon’s Force Posture Review—expected by the end of the year—is expected to shift assets both within Europe and from Europe. And while Allies (especially Germany) will focus on how many U.S. troops remain and where they are stationed, it is also U.S. capabilities that will count. And the midterm election results will not send the Force Posture Review’s authors back to their keyboards (though they might see Secretary Hegseth transition into a different line of work).
The midterm results were a protest against conditions at home, not abroad. Foreign policy mattered when it caused consequences domestically: high gas prices as a result of the Iran war, inflation as the result of new tariff barriers. The Trump White House won’t cave preemptively to the incoming Congress, especially on foreign policy. It is more likely to double down by using its executive authority. So it will be up to Congress to hold officials to account, to question force posture decisions where they undermine NATO’s capabilities, and to query foreign policy adventurism. A robust delegation to the Munich Security Conference—including new members of both the House and Senate—would be an outstanding way to kick-start discussion of transatlantic concerns. I’ll bet the MSC is already on it.
Steve Szabo
AGI Senior Fellow
The main takeaway for Europeans is keep calm and carry on. A recent Bertelsmann Stiftung poll found that while European publics have little trust in the United States as an ally, both European and American publics want to see deepened transatlantic cooperation. While the relationship will improve, there are many reasons to think that the positive impact of the congressional elections will be limited. First, there is the issue of getting through the last two years of the Trump presidency, a time where the president will still have important influence on American foreign policy. The Congress will be able to limit the damage—and perhaps even reverse it—on tariffs and will make any further prosecution of the war in Iran difficult if not impossible. Support for Ukraine will increase. Much of the completely unnecessary frictions with Europeans and with Canadians will abate.
The damage done to America’s image and American credibility is substantial. Europeans, especially younger generations, can rightly ask if America will be reliable as a partner over the next decade or two. The foreign and security policy agencies have experienced purges of some of the best and most experienced diplomats, intelligence analysts, and military officers. This will take a long time to repair. The massive budget deficits left by Trump legislation will sharpen tradeoffs in funding defense and other key foreign policy areas.
While U.S. policy will rediscover the strategic and economic value of its partners, Europeans must stay the course toward building strategic autonomy.
Bryant Trick
AGI Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Despite the magnitude of change in congressional representation wrought by the mid-term elections, I expect only marginal changes in transatlantic trade relations. First of all, the Trump administration did not work through or with Congress on its trade agenda even when the Republican Party held strong majorities in both houses, and the administration will likely be even more inclined to act according to its interpretation of executive authority under a more oppositional Congress. Second, while many Democratic candidates criticized what they viewed as the capriciousness and price effects of the administration’s tariffs, as well as the disadvantages of placing tariffs on our historic allies, trade is nevertheless the policy area with perhaps the strongest bipartisan consensus. Democratic members of Congress are, in general, similarly disenchanted with the trade liberalization policies of previous decades, and a Democratic-led Congress will be similarly sympathetic to the idea of protecting U.S. industries, particularly ones with heavily unionized workforces. While a Democratic-led Congress may seek to pass legislation to rein in some of the president’s tariff authorities, in particular in relation to European and other allies, and may attract enough Republican support to cross the filibuster threshold, it will be much more difficult to gain a veto-proof majority—if this is even something the Democratic leadership wants to spend political capital on.
Focusing specifically on transatlantic trade relations, there will probably be less congressional pressure on the administration to push for changes in EU legislation and policies related to digital trade and sustainability (e.g., the Digital Markets Act, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive), as well as EU AI regulation, as many Democrats are more sympathetic to such legislation and efforts to regulate “big tech.” However, the administration’s positions on those issues were formed and pursued independently of Congress (even while they enjoyed strong support from Republican members), so the lessening of congressional pressure on those issues will not necessarily bring about changes in U.S. policy or a reduction of U.S. pressure on the EU.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. Government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
