Episode 139: The German-Polish Relationship amid Changing European Security Challenges
Jeff Rathke
President of AGI
Jeffrey Rathke is the President of the American-German Institute in Washington, DC.
Prior to joining AGI, Jeff was a senior fellow and deputy director of the Europe Program at CSIS, where his work focused on transatlantic relations and U.S. security and defense policy. Jeff joined CSIS in 2015 from the State Department, after a 24-year career as a Foreign Service Officer, dedicated primarily to U.S. relations with Europe. He was director of the State Department Press Office from 2014 to 2015, briefing the State Department press corps and managing the Department's engagement with U.S. print and electronic media. Jeff led the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur from 2011 to 2014. Prior to that, he was deputy chief of staff to the NATO Secretary General in Brussels. He also served in Berlin as minister-counselor for political affairs (2006–2009), his second tour of duty in Germany. His Washington assignments have included deputy director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs and duty officer in the White House Situation Room and State Department Operations Center.
Mr. Rathke was a Weinberg Fellow at Princeton University (2003–2004), winning the Master’s in Public Policy Prize. He also served at U.S. Embassies in Dublin, Moscow, and Riga, which he helped open after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mr. Rathke has been awarded national honors by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as several State Department awards. He holds an MPP degree from Princeton University and BA and BS degrees from Cornell University. He speaks German, Russian, and Latvian.
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Justyna Gotkowska
Centre for Eastern Studies
Justyna Gotkowska is Deputy Director at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and head of the Security and Defence Department. Formerly, she was Coordinator of the OSW’s Regional Security Programme and analyst in the Department for Germany and Northern Europe. She is a graduate of the Institute of Applied Linguistics at the University of Warsaw and of European Studies at the RWTH Aachen University. She was visiting scholar at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies and at the University of the Bundeswehr Munich. She regularly participates in multinational research projects, including at Think Visegrad, Estonia’s ICDS, and Germany’s DGAP.
The European security landscape is shifting. The United States is pressuring Europe to manage the defense of its region, and many NATO allies have growing doubts about the long-term reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, even as Russia continues aggression at NATO’s doorstep. German Chancellor Merz has articulated the goal for the Bundeswehr to be the strongest military in Europe. How does this ambition sit with one of Germany’s most important European partners—Poland? Justyna Gotkowska joins The Zeitgeist to discuss how Poland is adjusting to these changes. She discusses Polish views on German-Polish relations, how Poland is reassessing its security partnerships, and the fault lines within Polish defense and strategic thinking.
Host
Jeff Rathke, President, AGI
Guest
Justyna Gotkowska, Deputy Director and Head of the Security and Defence Department, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
Transcript
Jeff Rathke
I’m very pleased to have our listeners with us for the first episode of The Zeitgeist in 2026. Thanks for joining us. And today we have as our guest, Justyna Gotkowska. Justyna, thanks for being with us.
Justyna Gotkowska
Jeff, thank you for having me.
Jeff Rathke
Justyna Gotkowska, for those of you who don’t know her already, is the deputy director of the Center for Eastern Studies, a Polish think tank that is focused on security and defense and other issues related to Central and Eastern Europe. She is also an expert on German defense and security policy, and I thought this would be a great opportunity for us to talk about German-Polish relations, how they are evolving, and what that means in the context of the challenges for European and transatlantic security.
If we start from that point, maybe just 60 seconds to set the stage. We are speaking on January 9, and I think it’s important to point out the date, because so much has been happening already this year. We have, just in the past week, seen the U.S. seizure of Venezuelan President Maduro and uncertainty about the way forward in Venezuela. We’ve seen a ramping up of the Trump administration’s pressure on Denmark about the status of Greenland and Donald Trump’s desire to incorporate Greenland into the United States. We’ve seen a meeting this week in Europe of the so-called Coalition of the Willing, which involved an announcement by the United Kingdom and France about their willingness to station their armed forces in Ukraine after a settlement or a ceasefire in that conflict, and Germany being willing to be part of that, although at least at this stage not with German troops in Ukraine. And we’ve seen solidarity from the six leading European countries, not only the UK, France, Germany, but also Poland, Spain, and Italy, solidarity with Denmark about the fact that Greenland’s status could only change with the consent of the people of Greenland and Denmark and that Greenland is part of Denmark. And then lastly, perhaps, the meeting of the so-called Weimar Triangle, Poland, France, and Germany, this week, a meeting that took place in Paris among the foreign ministers, and a reminder of the importance of those three in setting Europe’s course. Oh, and by the way, just this week also, the EU decided to move ahead with their free trade agreement with Mercosur, which would create the largest free-trade zone in the world, although one where there was some divided opinion, including Poland, which was overruled or outvoted in supporting that agreement. With the Trump administration pursuing its interests ever more vigorously and audaciously, you might even say, this activist phase, what does this mean for Poland, for Europe, and in particular, Poland’s relations to its key European partners? That’s where we stand.
I’d be interested in starting, Justyna, with your assessment of how important those factors, or perhaps other factors, are in the context for Polish foreign relations right now.
Justyna Gotkowska
Definitely, there is a lot of uncertainty in Poland right now about the course of U.S. security and foreign policy, especially after the publication of the National Security Strategy and, of course, after the intervention in Venezuela, Poland sees that the strategic outlook of the U.S. is changing quite deeply. It has opened a lot of debates about Polish foreign security and defense policy, its relations with the U.S., its future relations with other allies, including Germany, France, and the UK, but also in the Nordic-Baltic region, and of course about our own military power, ability to act and to navigate in this increasingly uncertain world. Still, for Poland, the U.S. is the main ally that has guaranteed our security after our integration into NATO, and an ally that has sent the majority of foreign troops that are right now stationing in a rotational manner in Poland. We have very good relations with the United States. The highest number of U.S. troops in Poland, it’s around 10,000 troops. We are aware that the U.S. is providing critical enablers for our security, for the security of the northeastern flank, and for collective defense operations in the region: command and control; strategic transport; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics; and many others. The sheer presence of the U.S. troops is as a major deterrence factor vis-a-vis Russia. But Poland is also aware about the priorities that the U.S. has stated publicly, historically, but also in the National Security Strategy about the will of diminishing its military presence in Europe, and we are preparing for that on a national level and also in NATO by, first of all, investing in our own defense with the goal of reaching 5 percent of GDP for defense expenditure 2026 by motivating our allies in European NATO countries to spend more and to cooperate more to take responsibility for their part and their share of the task within collective defense planning in NATO. We are much more active in the European Union in various projects, programs that are allowing us to spend more on defense and that are allowing us to integrate in EU arms industrial projects. We are also cooperating more and more with Nordic Baltic countries because we see them as the ones who perceive threats and challenges in this very similar way as we do, that are ready and willing and able to react to any Russian military incursions in the region. And of course, there is the last pillar of cooperating with the main allies, France, Germany, and the UK, of tightening military relations, political and industrial onset of industrial relations. But here I think there is more of a debate in Poland, as it is right now, about the future of the cooperation of the U.S., what the U.S. actually wants with regard to Europe, what kind of relations it wants with its allies, what kind of relations it wants with Russia, and what will be the final stance of the U.S. with regard to the end of the Ukrainian-Russian war.
Jeff Rathke
Thanks, that’s a very comprehensive overview. There are a number of really intriguing aspects of that I’d like to explore in a little bit of detail. As you mentioned, Poland, faster or earlier than a number of its European allies, began reinvesting in a major way in its own defense. It took countries like Germany a little bit longer to get on that bandwagon. Poland has also bet heavily on the relationship with the United States. How deep does the uncertainty go now within Poland or within, let’s say, defense and security policy circles inside or outside government about the implications of the new U.S. strategic priorities?
Justyna Gotkowska
I think that the Polish political scene and experts are divided in how to assess the implications of the new course and security and defense, foreign and security policy of the United States. On the one hand of the political scene, I think, within the ruling government especially, one sees that the U.S. is strategically changing its outlook and goals within the international relations, that it doesn’t want to serve anymore as guarantor of the liberal international order, that it starts to think in spheres of influence, with the Western Hemisphere being a kind of sphere of influence of the U.S., and that it wants to achieve some kind of strategic stability with other strategic competitors like China and Russia. The nearing of the end of the liberal international order is perceived as a dangerous one for Europe and for Poland, in particular. Poland and Europe in general were a beneficiary of this order. We have entered the EU, we have entered NATO. We are a small country relying on international law and on limitations that were set through the international law with the U.S. as a security provider, as a guarantor of this international liberal order, and we have functioned quite well in multilateral organizations. And from this perspective, the renouncement of this order by the U.S. and the thinking of the Trump administration in terms of spheres of influence is perceived as something that can endanger Polish security, sovereignty, that can induce countries like Russia, like China, to check or to challenge the U.S. even more, they did so far in achieving their goals with regard to creating some buffer zones in central-eastern Europe or northern Europe, and that this new stage of international relations is something that will mean for Poland a lot of challenges, a lot of uncertainty, and we’ll have very turbulent, difficult times ahead of us.
On the right of the political scene, on the other hand, you have a very different explanation or analysis of the situation we are in right now . The U.S. intervention in Venezuela is perceived as a U.S. success and as pushing out Russian and Chinese influences from a country in a U.S. neighborhood and setting limits and boundaries to the actions, activities of these two countries in Latin America. A very successful one, a show of force on the part of the U.S. together with seizing or chasing the tankers carrying Venezuelan oil with the Russian banner. All this is perceived as a comeback of a U.S. that is much more willing to act, that is much more assertive and aggressive in going against strategic competitors. Of course, this U.S. has a different attitude, a different stance towards Europe. It’s more skeptical towards the EU, and I think the skepticism is shared by parts of the right side of the political spectrum in Poland, but not only. And I think people still are convinced that the U.S. will be partnering with countries like Poland, especially under governments that are to the right of the political scene, and that good bilateral relations can be maintained, can be continued, and will be guaranteeing Polish security and deterrence vis-a-vis Russia.
You have two different perspectives in Poland on the U.S. and its recent actions, U.S. National Security Strategy. One that is focused on the end of the liberal international order and its systemic implications for Poland, and the other one that is focused on effectivity of the U.S. measures and implementation of U.S. goals and foreign and security policy and the effect it may have on deterring strategic adversaries like Russia or China.
Jeff Rathke
Of course, with the uncertainty around American strategic priorities, Poland’s relationships inside Europe become more important, as you already mentioned. And even if there is a variation or perhaps different views among the major political forces in Poland, it seems evident to me that both the government as well as the opposition in Poland see a value in strengthening those European relationships. Is that a fair assessment?
Justyna Gotkowska
I think that we have a debate in Poland about the EU as well. As I said previously, I think there is a lot of uncertainty about and divisions in assessing the pillars of the Polish foreign and security policy that somehow guided our actions in the past. And now, since Poland is a frontline country and feels the heat from the Russian-Ukrainian war, feels the hybrid warfare and hybrid actions very strongly that are directed at us against Russia, we feel all these changes in international relations much more. We start to question these pillars of Polish foreign and security policy. I think the EU as an organization that we entered 2004 is also being questioned a bit, meaning, how the EU functions and whether such an EU as we have it now can survive in the world that is determined by countries, by powers that are striving for their spheres of influence. Whether the EU can survive with its regulatory measures in economic areas, meaning energy policy, climate protection policy, pretty restrictive ones that also limits economic development in the EU. I think there is a tension between those who are arguing for more integration and those who are arguing that the EU should be more subsidiary, meaning the nation states should take over some competencies, some policies that were given to the EU institutions and whether the EU should change its policy in some areas in order to survive and in order to function well and in order not to restrict also ideologically, and this is what you’re hearing from the right side of the political spectrum also in Poland, governments that are built by right-wing parties.
Jeff Rathke
That brings us perhaps to Germany and the bilateral relationship between Poland and Germany. And as we started off, Germany has over the last few years, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and especially since the re-election of Donald Trump and the election of Friedrich Merz as chancellor, you’ve seen a dramatic raising of the level of ambition in defense. Germany will reach the 3.5 percent of GDP spending target before the end of the decade. It’s already spending well above 2 percent. Is this renewed German seriousness about defense welcomed without exception in Poland? How does Poland see the trend in German security policy, especially in light of the more challenging circumstances?
Justyna Gotkowska
Just as I depicted the discussion about the role of the U.S., the relations with the U.S., and the future of the European Union, we also have a debate about Germany and Poland. The stances towards Berlin differ depending in the Polish political spectrum. I think that the liberal side or liberal-center parties see the change that especially the Merz government introduced into German foreign and security policy, the acknowledgement to spend 3.5 percent, the pronunciations about building, developing the strongest military in Europe, and the very different rhetoric towards Russia and towards Ukraine. Huge support for Ukraine, perceiving Russia as a threat and challenge, also to German and European security is well-perceived and acknowledged, and the willingness is there to cooperate with such a German government and to see it as an ally in strengthening European security and deterring Russia, in supporting Ukraine, and in giving or reacting to the changed U.S. policy towards Europe. But on the other side of the political spectrum, or to the right, there is still a lot of skepticism toward Germany. The German narrative about being the strongest European country with regard to security and defense in the future is perceived with some kind of uncertainty or skepticism due to historical experiences, difficult Polish-German history, the Second World War, but not only. In general, Poles are suspicious how long this change of policy in Germany may last. And of course, many are waiting what will happen after the next parliamentary elections and whether we should rely on—
Jeff Rathke
You mean you mean the parliamentary elections in Poland?
Justyna Gotkowska
In Germany. With the AfD rising in German opinion polls, the question is how that will affect the coalition building after the next parliamentary elections in Germany and what changes that might bring to German foreign and security policy, relations with Russia, Ukraine, the United States. So that shapes the perceptions; this distrust and difficult, unresolved historical issues are still there. And this has an effect on discourse on Germany that is still, I would say, characterized by a lot of mistrust, intense on, I think, the parties on the right wing. Parties on the right side of the political spectrum are unwilling to treat Germany as a strategic ally, with which one wants to form strategic cooperation in terms of military and industrial links. That is somehow projected and planned for years to come. And therefore, Germany is treated as, in general, as one of important allies within NATO. We cooperate strongly with Germany in NATO. But with regard to increasing bilateral ties, military and arms industrial ties, there are some reservations.
Jeff Rathke
And if I understood correctly, these fall mainly along partisan lines in Poland.
Justyna Gotkowska
This was mainly along partisan lines, but I think also in liberal-center parties, you have this mistrust vis-a-vis Berlin, since Scholz’s government after 2022, has not acted decisively enough vis-a-vis Russia or with regard to support to Ukraine. That was highly criticized in Poland. This is an experience that we have had until 2024, with the German elections being held in early 2025, and with Merz’s government only changing decisively the stance of Germany with regard to support to Ukraine military deliveries and even the discussion on security guarantees, as well as on an increase of the defense spending, that was changed by the Merz government. And we have only one year of this government, which has a minor majority in the Bundestag, and a lot of domestic problems, and I think this is also perceived in Poland. I think this German rhetoric on Germany being the strongest European ally that might take some responsibility from the U.S. is generally not so well received in Poland, since on the one hand we acknowledge that Germany does more with regard to security and defense. But we don’t want Germany that dominates in this field in Europe. We don’t want to feel dependent on Germany since Germany has conducted in the past policies vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine that were simply a strategic mistake and are perceived as such in Poland. And these were just a few years ago.
Jeff Rathke
We’ve talked a bit about the differences within the Polish political system. It’s important, especially because of the Polish constitution and the shared responsibility of the president and the prime minister, and especially now with the president coming from the right side of the political spectrum and the government being sort of center-left. These differences are important. It sounds like these misgivings that you’ve described in Poland, they can fall into two categories. One is whether Germany is actually able to become the strongest conventional military force in Europe, as Friedrich Merz has described that aspiration. And then the second is whether that’s a good thing. But both of those are present, it seems, from the way you’ve described this. If I could take our last round to expand this to the European level. I don’t mean so much to the European Union, but what we’ve seen when we look at Germany’s diplomacy since the Russian invasion, and especially since the Merz government took over, is an increasing German reliance on minilateral or plurilateral formats. You have the partnership with the UK and France, so the so-called E3, but there’s also the E5, which brings in Italy and Poland. You also have intensified German cooperation in the Nordic-Baltic region, especially with the Nordic countries, Germany’s deployment in Lithuania. If there’s skepticism about the European Union within the Polish system, as you described, what is the right configuration from a Polish perspective to ensure a robust European security posture, but without raising the risks of one country—that is, Germany—dominating the security scene? Is there one of these many formats that from a Polish point of view is ideal? What kind of German diplomacy would Poland like to see for its own interests and for European interests?
Justyna Gotkowska
From the Polish perspective, it’s very important to continue what we are doing within NATO, meaning the creating or developing the so-called European pillar in NATO, meaning the European countries taking over the responsibility for conventional defense within the alliance. I think the roles there and tasks are clearly divided within the NATO planning process. All NATO countries have agreed to that, and we all know who does what. This is quite clearly divided, and the roles are assigned. But this is on the military level. And here, clearly, the fact that the U.S. is and will be diminishing its military footprint in Europe in the conventional sphere somehow makes this process become true much, much faster than we have thought. But let’s hope that we will be able to achieve that.
But on the other hand, on the political level, it’s quite important to shape the discussions about strategic issues and security and defense areas in Europe in a participatory way. I think Poland expects to be included into the discussions of the E3 group together with representatives from the Nordic-Baltic countries. The E5 format, or E5 plus format with NATO representatives and EU representatives, is perceived in Poland as the right one to talk about strategic issues in European defense. And hence, we dislike formats like E3 to talk directly to the U.S. or with Ukraine on issues that have an impact on our security and on the security of the northeastern flank. There is still a lingering mistrust in Poland with regard to such formats, having in the past some bad examples of big Franco-German discussions with Russia. And hence, Poland would like to be included in these discussions together with Nordic-Baltic representatives.
Jeff Rathke
Thank you, Justyna. That’s a great overview of the shifting foreign policy landscape in Europe and how Poland looks at it. I thank you for that. There’s so much more we could talk about. You’ve highlighted the rise of the far-right AfD in Germany, and I think, the antagonism between other European right-wing parties toward the AfD is something that doesn’t get as much appreciation or visibility here in Washington. But we’ll save that for another time, because you’ve been very generous already in this half hour with your time. We’ll wrap it up there and save more for later. Thank you so much, Justyna Gotkowska, for being our guest today and for helping us understand better the Polish view of German security and defense policy, and also what it means for Europe more broadly.
Justyna Gotkowska
Thank you so much.
Jeff Rathke
And we look forward to having all of our listeners with us on the next episode of The Zeitgeist.
