Dangerous Liaisons? State-Business Relations, U.S. Tech Statecraft, and Implications for Germany and Europe
Speaker: Jakob Hensing, DAAD/AGI Research Fellow
Moderator: Peter Rashish, Vice President and Director of the Geoeconomics Program, AGI
The openly displayed proximity between President Trump and prominent tech executives has drawn considerable attention on both sides of the Atlantic. A significant development for American politics more broadly, for foreign interlocutors it especially raises the question of implications for the United States’ use of technology policy in pursuit of national security and foreign policy objectives—in short, U.S. tech statecraft.
For Europe, not only does it matter greatly how the United States positions itself in the global competition over artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies with transformative potential. Far-reaching reliance on U.S. technology providers also renders Europe potentially vulnerable to U.S. tech statecraft measures, whether over disagreements on tech policy or through linkages to other domains such as trade.
This talk explores the relations of power and influence between the second Trump administration and key tech firms and how they manifest themselves in the evolving U.S. tech statecraft agenda, with a focus on international AI policy. On this basis, it discusses resulting risks and opportunities from a German and European vantage point.
Dr. Jakob Hensing is a DAAD/AGI Research Fellow. His permanent position is at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, where he focuses on the intersection of economic and security policy. His work explores how power and security considerations are reshaping the global economy, especially in terms of competition and collaboration on emerging technologies. Previously, he worked for more than five years as a management consultant at McKinsey & Company and at Orphoz Public, McKinsey’s dedicated public sector branch in Germany. He holds a doctorate in politics and a master’s in international relations from the University of Oxford, as well as a bachelor’s degree in integrated social sciences from Jacobs University Bremen.
His research at AGI focuses on the interplay between the U.S. government and the tech sector in shaping and implementing technology-related measures to advance national security and foreign policy objectives—in short, U.S. techno-economic statecraft. It seeks to understand how the positions and expertise of industry stakeholders feature in the U.S. policy process, also with a view to enabling allies such as Germany to engage constructively and to benefit from learnings for their own management of the public-private interface in an era of global technology competition.
Jakob’s most recent GPPi study titled “Action Potentials: Neurotechnology, Brain-Computer Interfaces, and Implications for Germany’s and Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy,” appeared in August 2025. His writing and commentary have featured in Foreign Policy, Wirtschaftswoche, and Newsweek, among others.
Event Summary
This AGI webinar examines how the rise of the tech right, Donald Trump’s return to office, and intensifying U.S.-China competition shape U.S. tech statecraft and Europe’s position within it. The session challenges the European assumption that the U.S. tech sector is politically monolithic, ideologically aligned with Trump, and ready to weaponize Europe’s digital dependencies. It argues that the sector is more fractured and remains primarily driven by business interests, that its political influence is subject to significant limitations and complications, and that key U.S. actors view technology predominantly through the lens of competition with China. All of this makes a major weaponization of European dependencies unlikely. Europe should focus less on avoiding U.S. technology and more on how it can better leverage transatlantic tech ecosystems to generate wealth and distinctive European strengths in order to improve its strategic position.
High-profile displays of proximity between Trump and leading tech executives, including large dinners and bilateral meetings, have contributed to the European perception of an alliance between the Trump administration and what is described as the “tech right.” This group embraces accelerationism, which argues that technological progress has been too slow and should be sped up significantly. Accelerationists claim that existing bureaucratic and democratic institutions are misaligned with this goal and need to be disrupted or replaced and that regulations must be rolled back. From a European viewpoint, the interventions of figures such as Elon Musk, particularly his public support for the German Alternative for Germany (AfD), reinforce the belief that this political tendency is deeply hostile not only to EU technology regulation but to the European democratic project more broadly.
These concerns have merged with a broader European debate about economic and technological vulnerability. Earlier discussions focused on dependencies vis-à-vis China. Yet since Trump’s return, many Europeans now view exposure to U.S. technology as a concern that is at least similarly urgent. This shift rests on two assumptions. The first is that the tech right represents a dominant position within the U.S. tech industry. The second is that public proximity between Trump and tech executives implies unified political purpose and real influence over U.S. policy. However, both assumptions are questionable and obscure other features of the political economy of U.S. tech statecraft that strongly reduce the likelihood of major weaponization of European tech dependencies.
Though influential, tech-right ideas are not representative of the sector as a whole and ultimately not a central determinant of most companies’ practical policy priorities. It is true that many firms have adopted broadly accelerationist rhetoric and highlighted AI’s transformative potential. Public discussion of catastrophic AI risks has become less prominent, even if these concerns continue to exist privately. However, within this broad disposition, concrete policy preferences are still mainly shaped by tangible business interests. Nvidia, for example, has focused on advocacy for continued exports of its technology to China, which it argues also serve U.S. strategic interests. Other firms have concentrated on garnering support for major investment projects, containing regulatory initiatives in the United States itself, or promoting specific technologies.
While some U.S. companies oppose foreign regulation and have urged the U.S. government to push back against measures such as the EU AI Act, Digital Services Act (DSA), or Digital Markets Act (DMA), many firms have simultaneously tried to reassure European policymakers. They have recognized that Europe’s digital-sovereignty agenda is politically entrenched. Firms have begun offering products they describe as sovereign versions tailored to European demands. This reflects a broader concern within the industry that Europe may view U.S. companies as unreliable or subject to political pressure.
Turning to the question of influence, there are several channels through which the tech sector interacts with the administration. First, campaign financing through Super PACs matters in the U.S. system, but this is not unique to tech and provides only abstract influence. Second, direct interactions between Trump and senior tech executives can be significant; a meeting between Trump and the CEO of Nvidia is cited as leading to changes in export control rules. At the same time, these interactions are marked by strong deference from tech leaders, who appear to treat Trump as the key decision-maker and to be highly aware of the potential impact of political or regulatory interventions on their business prospects.
A third channel of influence is through resonance with the political base. Tech-right ideas circulate through platforms such as X and reach important audiences. Yet the relationship between the MAGA coalition and big tech is unstable. Some populist actors are openly hostile toward tech firms. Steve Bannon has repeatedly denounced what he calls a “broligarchy” and has even called for the arrest of certain tech executives. Other figures advocate a populist revolt against corporate and tech elites. This creates a complicated political environment for firms that rely on public sentiment while remaining vulnerable to political attacks.
Fourth, various senior administration officials have backgrounds in venture capital and are part of the same networks as key individuals in the tech right, and substantial number junior officials share these ideas. While especially the former aspect is a relevant channel of policy influence, the administration’s broader bureaucratic capacity has been weakened by internal interventions, which limits the extent to which ideological alignment translates into policy impact.
The most important form of influence is how tech firms shape the solution space for U.S. technology policy. The administration’s AI strategy, including the AI Action Plan and the executive order on exporting the American AI stack, is based on assumptions that originate in leading AI labs and hyperscalers. These assumptions are that advanced AI is achievable in the near term, compute is the key constraint, and government policy should focus on removing obstacles so that U.S. technology can advance and spread quickly, with further expansion of U.S. firms’ global market share despite growing Chinese competition widely being seen as critical.
Ultimately, almost all U.S. discussions on technology policy are currently refracted through the lens of an “AI race” with China, to which Europe is seen as largely peripheral. Concerns about European regulation exist but are balanced by industry fears that aggressive political opposition could backfire. To the extent that this issue reaches political salience, this mainly occurs where it overlaps with concerns about censorship of free speech and “woke” bias that animate other parts of Trump’s coalition.
The Trump administration has already attempted to exert pressure on Europe to achieve changes in tech regulation and may do so again in the future, but it is unlikely for this to take place through a major weaponization of U.S. tech dependencies. Broader economic and security linkages are more plausible instruments of coercion. The tech sector has an interest in maintaining European market access, as well as to sustain its trustworthiness in the eyes of partners across the globe. What Europe should anticipate are further U.S. efforts to entrench the use of American technologies, including through initiatives like the tech-prosperity deal already concluded between the United States and the UK. Consolidation in the U.S. AI stack will make it harder for Europe to select individual suppliers.
Instead of guarding against an unlikely form of U.S. coercion, Europe should strengthen its broader economic and military capacity and build on its existing strengths that will also help manage interdependence with the United States more strategically. European capabilities in chipmaking equipment, including ASML and its German suppliers, are already possibly the strongest technological choke point in the world. Europe should focus more on value creation in areas such as AI for industry, where it has real advantage. This will often be achieved most effectively by using U.S. cloud and other AI infrastructure, rather than by nurturing European alternatives for all layers of the AI stack. If Europeans decide politically that they do want to apply particular requirements for technology providers in sensitive areas such as public services and public data, they should establish clear principles rather than overly complex frameworks. Europe’s task is not to detach from U.S. technology but to better leverage transatlantic ecosystems to strengthen its resilience within a more coercive global environment.
This event is supported by the DAAD with funds from the Federal Foreign Office.
