National Snow and Ice Data Center via Flickr
(De)Romanticizing Uncertainty at the Transatlantic Science-Policy Interface?
Finja Augsburg
University of Erfurt
Finja Augsburg is a DAAD/AGI Research Fellow in Fall 2025.
Finja Isabel Augsburg is a doctoral researcher and project associate at the University of Erfurt, Germany. She is affiliated with the Institute for Planetary Health Behaviour and conducts in-depth research on science communication amid socio-scientific crises. Her work connects international relations and communication studies through the co-creation of new approaches to navigating scientific uncertainty with policy and media stakeholders.
Her professional experience spans theoretical and practical work in transatlantic contexts, including positions at the Goethe-Institut Washington, DC, the U.S. Embassy Berlin’s Public Diplomacy Section, and a visiting scholar role at the University of Texas at Austin’s Center for Media Engagement at Moody College of Communication.
During her tenure at AGI, Finja will focus on the increasingly prominent scientific uncertainty surrounding socio-scientific issues, exploring its role as political dynamics and agendas shift in Germany and the United States. By synthesizing insights from recent literature and conducting interviews with science-policy practitioners, her project aims to advance understanding of the risks and opportunities uncertainty presents for sustaining transatlantic dialogue on planetary health.
She previously presented her research on the role of scientific uncertainty in science diplomacy efforts as a panelist at the 2024 DWIH Future Forum at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, and contributed to a corresponding edited volume, currently in press.
Insights from a U.S.-German Case Study
On November 21, 2025, South Carolina became the first U.S. state to sign a Joint Declaration of Intent with Germany, formalizing a new economic partnership and launching a joint working group to support the exchange of scientific information and facilitate research collaboration. This represents a hopeful signal for international scientific collaboration amid a period in which the science–policy nexus is under growing strain on both sides of the Atlantic.
At national levels, devaluation and strategic instrumentalization of science have become increasingly difficult to ignore. Internationally, long-standing structures of scientific cooperation face mounting threats from funding cuts, diverging strategic agendas, and isolationist trends among countries that once collaborated closely. Science, a central pillar of democracy, finds itself under pressure in a post-pandemic world shaped by crises, in which many of the most polarizing questions revolve around socio-scientific issues (SSI). SSI refer to societal challenges rooted in science, characterized by the absence of clear-cut solutions for policymakers and society, as in the case of climate change. Uncertainty lies at the heart of these issues, presenting navigational challenges for national and international science–policy and science–society dialogue on addressing high-stakes questions such as: When might the next pandemic emerge? Which regions are most at risk of extreme weather? Will rising sea levels cause destructive flooding in coastal areas? If yes, when and how severe? Investments in addressing these questions could play a central role in protecting the economy and public safety, yet efforts have faced significant constraints, particularly since the beginning of the second Trump administration in the United States.
Science under Pressure in Germany and the United States
President Donald Trump’s executive order on Restoring Gold Standard Science is regarded as the apex of Republican efforts to strategically weaken the science–policy interface by elevating uncertainty above other relevant considerations to justify blocking regulation.[1] Substantial cuts in funding for climate, weather, geospatial, and health research, alongside limited access to critical data resources, have strained U.S. science in numerous fields. These repercussions became not only a matter of national but international concern. European officials have warned that limited access to U.S. weather and climate data would significantly complicate efforts to prepare for extreme weather and plan future infrastructure investments.
As Europe begins to reconsider its dependence on U.S. scientific leadership, its own scientific landscape faces mounting stress, with debates over funding, alignment with political agendas, and growing mistrust toward scientific institutions. In Germany, the right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD) described scientific consensus on human-caused climate change as “politically constructed” in its 2025 federal election platform. In the United States, Trump shows a parallel stance, rejecting the dominant scientific conclusion among a majority of the world’s scientists on human-caused climate change. Another timely example is that despite strong scientific support for renewable energy, the AfD and the Trump administration both strongly support continued reliance on fossil fuels. While nearly 200 nations convened at COP30 in November 2025 without a U.S. delegation, the Trump administration introduced new proposals to roll back environmental protections and expand fossil fuel drilling.
During the pandemic and beyond, scientific uncertainty created friction in public debate, as well as in political arenas that seek certainty, clarity, and unambiguous facts in order to justify policy decisions.
With Germany and the United States serving as just two of many cases, increasing pressures on science and its inherent uncertainty underscore the need to carefully reassess its role and potentials, both nationally and internationally. Key protective regulations over the past fifty years, such as the ban on chlorofluorocarbons in aerosol sprays, were implemented in the presence of scientific uncertainty.[2] On one hand, uncertainty can thus serve as a vehicle for science diplomacy, fostering dialogue, cooperation, and evidence-informed policymaking.[3] On the other hand, both sides of the Atlantic have recently experienced how scientific uncertainty can also be exploited for political instrumentalization, and for undermining trust in and legitimacy of scientific expertise.[4] Understanding this duality is essential for recalibrating the role of science in policy and society, as well as for addressing the challenges that science communication faces in the current era of crises, politicization, and polarization around SSI such as climate change.
Scientific Uncertainty: Catalyst or Constraint for International Science–Policy Collaboration?
Over the pre-pandemic decade, scientific uncertainty was increasingly characterized as a constructive resource for science-policy dialogue, policymaking, and science diplomacy. Under pandemic conditions, however, uncertainty became a focal point of political contestation and public polarization. The pandemic demonstrated that advances in scientific knowledge inevitably reveal further layers of uncertainty. Science generates new unknowns (deficient uncertainty) and new points where evidence challenges or contradicts what was previously assumed by other researchers (consensus uncertainty). What was considered true yesterday may require revision today (fundamental uncertainty). All this is not failure—it is the driving force of scientific advancement. Yet, during the pandemic and beyond, scientific uncertainty, in its different forms,[5] created friction in public debate, as well as in political arenas that seek certainty, clarity, and unambiguous facts in order to justify policy decisions, which is not surprising in itself. However, when political actors mobilize even majorities of voters around simple solutions to complex socio-scientific issues, the resulting policymaking processes are likely to be fundamentally incompatible with the way science operates and the contributions it can make. While this situation is currently observed in the United States, a similar trend could emerge in Germany with the rise of the AfD. Drawing on a U.S.-German case study of interviews with intermediaries bridging science and policy, this article offers initial reflections on the role of scientific uncertainty for national and international science–policy collaboration on socio-scientific issues.
Insights from a U.S.-German Case Study
At the time of this first analysis, nine in-depth interviews with participants selected according to strict, pre-established eligibility criteria form the data base. The sample is deliberately narrow, consisting of individuals with substantial experience in governmental and non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and foundations, who possess direct insight into transatlantic debates on SSI and are actively involved in bridging science and policy. In around one-hour-long, conversational interviews, participants reflected on the role and potentials of scientific uncertainty in U.S.-German science–policy interactions. The most common areas of expertise among the intermediaries were climate, technology/energy, health, and space.
An initial analysis of the interview material revealed three key perspectives on scientific uncertainty:
(1) Scientific uncertainty can act as a catalyst for transatlantic collaboration, yet its effects seem limited to the scientific community rather than extending across the science–policy divide. Uncertainty contributes to perseverance and collaboration within the U.S.-German scientific community, particularly through reinforced people-to-people ties as a strong backbone for science diplomacy despite governmental headwinds.
(2) At the U.S. science–policy interface, scientific uncertainty increasingly became subject to political instrumentalization and is being used to delegitimize scientific input. This dynamic complicates policy dialogue on critical socio-scientific issues with international partners and limits the catalytic potential of uncertainty for transatlantic collaboration in addressing shared challenges.
(3) A constructive approach to navigating scientific uncertainty should rely on pragmatism and emphasize the tangible benefits of national and international collaboration between science and policy. Such benefits—advancing national interests, enhancing economic outcomes, improving safety, and increasing competitiveness—can be advocated for by intermediaries when science has little or no voice.
Perseverance and Collaboration within Science
Initial interview results suggest that scientific uncertainty can act as a catalyst for transatlantic collaboration, yet its effects seem limited to the scientific community rather than extending across the science–policy divide. Interviewees noted that the ongoing need for new evidence and data through shared open questions (e.g., on climate change) reinforces ties within national scientific communities and sustains international collaboration. This allows for continued predictions on future scenarios such as extreme weather events, pandemics, and food security challenges, despite the lack of support from the U.S. administration. Interviewees particularly emphasized the long-standing and solid people-to-people ties that characterize U.S.-German relations and will continue to form the backbone of transatlantic science diplomacy.
Less optimism was expressed regarding the role of uncertainty as a catalyst for collaboration between science and policy spheres, particularly in the U.S. context. Interviewees emphasized that in the absence of science–policy dialogue challenging prevailing political narratives on the urgency, risks, and navigation of SSI, such as climate change, uncertainty cannot function as a constructive catalyst. In most cases, however, it reinforces divides and prompts delegitimization.
Tension and Instrumentalization at the Science-Policy Interface
The strategic use of science for political objectives is not new. However, the contradiction between the devaluation, demonization, and delegitimization of science on the one hand and the selective use of agenda-supporting scientific input despite uncertainty on the other has intensified in the United States to a level that complicates transatlantic dialogue and common ground. Interviewees noted that policymaking has traditionally been built on the predictability and stability of scientific information, an approach that does not account for the existence of uncertainty. However, the COVID-19 pandemic exposed limitations of this perspective on the global stage, underscoring the need for reassessment. In reaction, some administrations adapted their processes to better incorporate scientific input and its inherent uncertainties, while others strategically exploited these uncertainties to generate public expectations that science, by its very nature, could never fully satisfy. Examples raised in the interviews were the Trump administration’s framing of “following the science” and its Gold Standard for Science.
Pragmatism implies framing international collaboration on issues shaped by scientific uncertainty not as an act of goodwill or amicability but as a means to advance national interests, protect wealth, and strengthen competitiveness.
Interviewees described the science–policy dialogue on SSI in Germany, under the current government, as comparatively robust. They noted that policymakers show a greater openness to engaging with abstract and long-term questions and to incorporating scientific uncertainty into their deliberations. The application of the precautionary principle in climate policy—where preventive action is taken despite incomplete evidence—was highlighted as a concrete example. By contrast, interviewees characterized the current U.S. administration as prioritizing policies expected to yield visible, short-term wins within its tenure. In such a context, uncertainty introduces complexities that are incompatible with prevailing decision-making patterns and expectations for immediate effects. Scientific uncertainty was characterized as a complicating factor that blurs the evidentiary basis for policy decisions, thereby encouraging the sidelining of issues characterized by long-term or uncertain risks and potentials, such as climate change. The approach employed in this sidelining process has been described by one interviewee as a “we’ll be fine” narrative in U.S. climate discussions.
These observations on scientific uncertainty raise an uncomfortable question of deromanticization: Has the United States reached a point where uncertainty can no longer serve a constructive function at the science–policy interface? If so, what lessons can be drawn for effectively navigating and communicating uncertainty in the future, particularly given the possibility of similar political shifts in Germany? And have the limits of science diplomacy in bridging the diverging decision-making frameworks and policy priorities of Germany and the United States already been surpassed? Interviewees expressed varying levels of optimism in response, yet nearly all suggested a pragmatic approach to scientific uncertainty as the most viable path forward for Germany and the United States.
A Path Forward: Pragmatic Approaches to Navigating Uncertainty
The interview results suggest that the most promising path to navigate science–policy cooperation on SSI with high uncertainty, both nationally and across the Atlantic, is a pragmatic one. Reasoning behind this included the observation that uncertainty, for instance in predictions, is broadly accepted in other domains such as economics, but remains politically and publicly contentious in more polarizing climate and health science. Some interviewees noted that, if communicated carefully, an ethos of “we don’t know, and that’s okay” could help normalize uncertainty in these critical areas. Further reflecting on pragmatism at the level of communication, interviewees noted how U.S. scientists have reframed the foci and aims of their projects to align with the national agenda, thereby safeguarding both research and international collaboration.
However, given the critical state of science in the United States and signs of growing strain in Europe, a more progressive, gains-oriented pragmatism was emphasized to navigate current and future political headwinds facing science and its inherent uncertainties.
National differences
The interview results suggest that pragmatism must take different forms, depending on the national context. In Germany, more straightforward approaches to normalizing uncertainty may still be feasible. In the United States, however, the science–policy interface was described as significantly strained and divided, and cooperation was characterized as following a utility calculation, proceeding only when the immediate benefits are perceived to outweigh the complications posed by uncertainty. This approach was described in reference to disagreements between President Trump and Texas Republicans over the state’s wind energy developments. Despite uncertainties in precise output predictions, Texas Republicans appear to support wind energy and direct their criticism at the president, instead of the science, for creating fear and uncertainty around the issue.
Transatlantic collaboration
The interview results suggest that to advocate for international collaboration on issues shaped by high and potentially instrumentalized scientific uncertainty, pragmatism implies framing such collaboration not as an act of goodwill or amicability but as a means to advance national interests, protect wealth, and strengthen competitiveness. This baseline is likely to resonate with administrations on both sides of the Atlantic. Meeting these pragmatic affordances, the ongoing U.S.-German Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) was discussed in the interviews. GRACE satellites have monitored global water-mass shifts since 2002 and provide critical data that help address key uncertainties in climate-change questions for Germany, the United States, and beyond.
Preliminary Conclusion
The initial results presented in this article reveal critical yet constructive perspectives on navigating scientific uncertainty at the transatlantic science–policy interface. Interviewees, experts bridging science and policy in Germany and the United States, suggested observing where symbolic political devaluation and the instrumentalization of scientific uncertainty clash with a desire for progress, competition, and economic benefit. Where this clash occurs, an opportunity arises to reintroduce uncertainty as a constructive resource rather than a justification for dismissing scientific input. By identifying and leveraging such leeway through their analytical awareness and strategic timing at the science-policy interface, intermediaries play a central role as mediators of uncertainty, particularly in contexts where science is left with little or no voice.
Taking into account current and potential future strains on the science–policy interface on both sides of the Atlantic, the interview results suggest a final note: If there is a chance for revived or sustained dialogue on the central questions motivating this article—such as when and how the next pandemic might emerge, which regions are likely to face extreme weather, or whether rising sea levels will trigger severe flooding—it may not be achieved through romanticization or deromanticization but through a pragmatization of scientific uncertainty.
[1] Stephan Lewandowsky, “Trojan Gold: New US ‘Standard’ Is Another Veiled Attack on Science,” Science 390, no. 6770 (2025): eaeb9857, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aeb9857.
[2] Lewandowsky.
[3] C Schuster and A. M. Scheu, “Wie beeinflusst die Kommunikation wissenschaftlicher Unsicherheiten Vertrauen in Wissenschaft? [How Does Communicating Scientific Uncertainties Affect Trust in Science?],” Transfer Unit Wissenschaftskommunikation, 2023.
Emily Swan, “Motivations for Cooperation in the 2018 Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement,” 2023, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4765265.
Joan Leach, “The Role of Science Communication in International Diplomacy,” in Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn?, ed. Lloyd S. Davis and Robert G. Patman (World Scientific, 2015).
[4] Schuster and Scheu.
Abel Gustafson and Ronald E. Rice, “The Effects of Uncertainty Frames in Three Science Communication Topics,” Science Communication 41, no. 6 (2019): 679–706, https://doi.org/10.1177/1075547019870811.
[5] Gustafson and Rice.
Supported by the DAAD with funds from the Federal Foreign Office (FF).
