A Zeitenwende in Germany’s Israel Policy?

Jack Fornasiero

Program Associate

Jack Fornasiero is the Program Associate at AGI. He coordinates AGI grants, seminars, workshops, and conferences. Before joining AGI, he served as a legislative intern for the offices of Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Congresswoman Susie Lee. He completed an executive office and communications fellowship with Meridian International Center in summer 2022 organizing cultural exchanges and the annual Meridian Chiefs of Mission Summit in partnership with the U.S. Department of State.

Mr. Fornasiero received his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and German Studies from Wayne State University with university and departmental honors. From 2019 to 2020, he took part in Wayne State University’s Junior Year in Munich Program where he matriculated at the Ludwig-Maximilians Universität-München for two semesters, studying intensive German language, classic German literature, modern-day German politics, and NSDAP history in Bavaria. In addition to his studies in German, he has also completed coursework in Italian language and history.

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jfornasiero@aicgs.org | 202-505-6790

Former Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 2008 speech in the Israeli Knesset set a lasting foreign policy precedent by declaring that Israel’s security was a matter of German Staatsräson—a fundamental German “reason of state.” Rooted in the indescribable suffering of the Jewish victims during the Holocaust, this commitment to Israel’s security has since guided German foreign policy and undergirded German continuity as one of Israel’s largest arms suppliers, a diplomatic partner, and a supporter of strong economic ties. Merkel’s Staatsräson formulation has shaped the framework for German leaders’ responses to developments in the Middle East and guided German interaction with one of its most important international partners.

Nearly two years after the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks, Germany is facing mounting pressure to address Israeli actions amid worsening civilian conditions in Gaza. As European peers have taken sharper approaches to pressure Israel for a change in its prosecution of the war and German public opinion becomes increasingly skeptical of Germany’s support for Israel, Chancellor Friedrich Merz has balanced the Staatsräson principle  with growing critiques of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. Is Germany’s Israel policy reaching a genuine Zeitenwende, or turning point? Recent developments and Merz’s remarks suggest a more critical tone, but German policymakers are finding new avenues to apply pressure without fundamentally rewriting the special German-Israeli relationship, guided by the Staatsräson.

Merz’s Evolving Direction

Throughout his political career, Friedrich Merz has maintained support of Israel, aligned with the prevailing consensus among German policymakers. He notably echoed his fellow Christian Democrat (CDU) Angela Merkel’s Staatsräson in calling for renewed support for Israel directly following the October 7 Hamas attacks, when he was leader of the opposition. Merz criticized then-Chancellor Scholz and his coalition’s response to the Hamas attacks, claiming that the government was failing to approve certain arms deliveries to Israel and not doing enough to support Israel.

Following the collapse of Scholz’s traffic light coalition in November 2024, Merz campaigned on Germany’s longstanding support for Israel. After the election, Merz told Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that he would “find ways and means” to host him in Germany—despite an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court on a charge of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

In May 2025, after Merz took office as chancellor and as reporting on widespread starvation in Gaza grew, his position took a turn. He accused Israel of violating international humanitarian law and stated that Israeli actions in Gaza could no longer be justified as a fight against Hamas terrorism. Since then, famine conditions reported by the World Health Organization have received increasing international attention. By July 28, Merz reaffirmed German commitments to Israel but explicitly called on Israel “to improve the catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza immediately, comprehensively, and sustainably.”

Splintering Approaches among Allies

In response to the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Gaza, and frustrated more generally with the Israeli government’s policies toward the Palestinians, the United Kingdom and France have pivoted toward recognizing Palestinian statehood in an effort to pressure the Israeli government to meet the needs of civilians in the enclave, induce progress toward a ceasefire, and underscore the goal of a two-state solution as an international consensus. Because of these changes, Germany is becoming increasingly at odds with its European partners. Growing European divergence risks isolating Berlin in its Israel policy.

What came as a greater surprise to many were U.S. President Donald Trump’s statements acknowledging starvation in Gaza during a trip to Scotland, putting him at odds with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and signaling a shift in U.S. attention. Merz has also steadily increased the pressure as he announced airlifts of aid to Gaza on July 28, a sign that Germany may set new expectations of the Israeli government if conditions in Gaza do not improve. A change in U.S. rhetoric about the conflict may be creating space for German policymakers to follow suit.

Germany’s relationship with Israel differs from that of the United States, but Merz is responding to the same political pressures as Trump. In the German case, Merz and his cabinet hope to push Israel to take responsive measures to the humanitarian crisis while also protecting the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship and preserving Germany’s Staatsräson.

Increasing Public Disapproval

German public opinion toward the Israeli government has worsened noticeably in recent years. According to polling by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, favorable views of Israel in the German public have declined by 10 points, down from 46 percent in 2021 to 36 percent in 2025. Their research also found that 59 percent of Germans have a negative perception of the Israeli government.

A survey by Civey showed 51 percent of respondents opposed German weapons exports to Israel. The study also found that Germans’ interest in greater distance from Israel increased by 11 percent since the middle of 2023, from 32.9 percent to 44.2 percent. This erosion of public support, particularly discomfort with German military aid to Israel, has the potential to weaken one of the pillars of the bilateral relationship, a situation in which public opposition could begin to affect more fundamental German positions.

Potential Markers of a Turning Point

German government criticisms of Israeli conduct in Gaza have demonstrated a change in Germany’s attention toward the humanitarian crisis but have not redefined the fundamentals: supporting Israel’s security as the central principle of the relationship. What steps by German political leaders would signal an erosion of the Staatsräson principle?

Suspending Further Arms Exports

Amid rising international concerns, Chancellor Merz announced on August 8 that Germany would not approve further arms exports that could be used in the Gaza Strip. This decision followed earlier remarks by Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul (CDU) on May 27. Wadephul stated that Germany might consider actions to respond to the humanitarian crisis, citing growing discomfort within the German government with the situation in Gaza and signaling that Germany’s arms support for Israel may come with conditions in the future.

This shift from CDU leadership came after weeks of growing friction with figures in the parliamentary caucus of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the junior partner in the current coalition, who had begun to make louder calls to halt arms to Israel on account of humanitarian law violations.  The SPD’s federal party conference at the end of June 2025 agreed on a position that weapons delivered by Germany may not be used for violations of international law, calling on Israel specifically to adhere to international law in Gaza. This position stopped short of calling for a ban, but it also indicated new scrutiny on the use of German-provided weapons.

German government criticisms of Israeli conduct in Gaza have demonstrated a change in Germany’s attention toward the humanitarian crisis but have not redefined the fundamentals.

Merz’s new policy of not approving new weapons exports for use in Gaza does not extend to broader defense cooperation with Israel. It is expected that other military exports, such as submarines, which are a key component of Israel’s nuclear deterrent and strategic defense posture but unlikely to be used in Gaza, will continue. Only a total cease of military armaments that extend outside of Gaza would represent a departure from the long-held German responsibility to Israeli security.

In 2023, Germany approved €326.5 million of arms exports to Israel, which was later halved in 2024 as Germany shifted focus to supporting Ukraine. A total cessation of arms exports to Israel would be an unprecedented decision for Germany and would scrap the longstanding Staatsräson principle, but German policymakers now have space to articulate expectations for the ways in which their military support is used to achieve Israeli national security.

Revisiting the EU-Israel Association Agreement

The EU voted with a qualified majority in May to review its Association Agreement with Israel. A change in Germany’s position on the EU-Israel Association Agreement would also indicate a major shift. The Agreement provides a legal framework for the political dialogue and economic, political, and research cooperation between the EU and Israel. Article 2 of the Agreement establishes a foundation for political and economic cooperation between the EU and Israel on the basis that all parties act in the interest of human rights and democratic principles to guide their internal and international policy.

While other EU members have been vocal in their alarm of the civilian conditions in Gaza for some time, Germany opposed reviewing the Agreement. Germany also blocked one result of the review: a proposal to deny Israel’s access to the Horizon Europe research fund, which would have cut off up to €200 million in grants and investments.

Germany has declined to use the Association Agreement’s legal framework to pressure Israel. A change in German views on this would be an indicator of a hardening view, but one that would adjust German policy without altering the Staatsräson principle unilaterally.

Recognition of Palestinian Statehood

The most dramatic—and least likely—shift would be German movement toward recognition of Palestinian statehood following the announcements from France and the United Kingdom. Germany, along with the United States and Italy, remains opposed to statehood recognition without Israeli participation, which helps offset pressure on Berlin from within Europe.

Germany’s Staatsräson, rooted in historical legacy of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust, likely will continue to guide mainstream German policymakers to avoid this route, as it would raise questions about Germany’s view of the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship. Thus far, Foreign Minister Wadephul has tried to bridge the growing gap between Israel and EU members, including during a late July visit to Israel. He reiterated Germany’s support for a two-state solution negotiated by the parties, but he added that negotiations needed to begin now. Wadephul also warned against “unilateral steps,” saying that Israel needed to make clear “that it would not undertake any policy of active annexation or expulsion” in Gaza. Such moves by Israel would “force Germany to react,” he said. Wadephul left unspoken what a German reaction could entail, but actions by Israel to annex Palestinian territory would eliminate a key element of German regional diplomacy: a two-state solution.

Shift or Still Symbolic?

Germany’s provision of emergency relief to Gaza is a first step in helping respond to the humanitarian crisis, but it does not signal a departure from its traditional policy, viewing Israel’s security as a principle integral to its own national interest. As events unfold in this conflict, German political leaders will seek to avoid a situation where the fundamental partnership between Germany and Israel comes into question. This depends as well on Israeli actions to preserve the ingredients that have fostered deepening bilateral ties, especially the prospect for a two-state solution. German diplomacy to sustain these relations will play a vital role.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American-German Institute.