Testing Democratic Resilience

Evidence from the United States and Germany

Speaker: Maria Skóra, DAAD/AGI Research Fellow
Moderator: Eric Langenbacher, Senior Fellow and Director of the Society, Culture, & Politics Program, AGI

As Europe and the United States confront a surge of illiberal populism and the erosion of democratic principles, the concept of democratic resilience has emerged as a significant subject of academic scrutiny. An expanding body of research indicates that in addition to the institutional framework and legal design (structural and systemic setup), democratic resilience also hinges on underlying values and norms. This actor-oriented paradigm, which examines political culture, intermediate institutions such as the media or organized interest groups, and citizen attitudes, provides a more nuanced understanding of why certain democratic regimes are more capable of withstanding assaults on democratic institutions or enduring prolonged autocratic periods than others. This presentation will first discuss various theoretical perspectives on democratic resilience. Subsequently, applying the analytical framework of four levels of democratic resilience proposed by Lührmann and Merkel, it will concentrate on selected examples from the United States as a case study to illustrate how democratic resilience works in practice. Finally, it will also compare these findings with Germany in pursuit of identifying similarities and differences between the two nations.

Maria Skóra is an independent consultant and advisor based in Berlin, serving as an Associated Researcher at the Institut für Europäische Politik and a Policy Fellow at Das Progressive Zentrum. Her multidisciplinary research examines the themes of (re)democratization, populism, and political sociology. From 2022 to 2024, she was a lead researcher at RESILIO, a project dedicated to analyzing the factors influencing the resilience of the rule of law within the EU27. Additionally, her scholarly work has concentrated on enhancing the EU’s rule of law toolbox in light of the persistent democratic backsliding evident in certain member states. Prior to her current roles, she contributed her expertise to the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform and the Hertie School. In 2019, she held the position of Visiting Fellow at the American-German Situation Room, hosted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and AGI. She holds a Master’s degree in Sociology and a PhD in Economics.

Event Summary

Theoretical Background

Democratic resilience is a democratic regime’s ability to recover from external stressors without losing or abandoning its defining principles and norms. In regimes with strong resilience, very little will change after an external stressor. In less resilient regimes, there may be internal change, and the regime will then adapt to changing conditions but still recover from the challenge. Political scientists have established two subsets of resilience: onset resilience, which is a regime’s ability to avoid an autocratic episode, and breakdown resilience, which describes the ability of a regime to avoid complete collapse once onset resilience fails. The four levels of democratic resilience are institutional powers, parties and party systems, civil society, and the electorate. The three pillars of democratic resilience are the strength of the institutions, presence of accountability measures (such as voting), and values of the citizens.

Comparative Perspectives of Democratic Resilience

There are four facets of democratic resilience: institutional performance, political accountability, intermediate institutions (such as the media and public discourse), and citizen attitudes.

Germany is a historically high-performing democracy with well-ranked institutional dimensions, indicating good institutional performance. Notable is the high level of public trust in the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Federal Constitutional Court, which is a cornerstone of German democracy. In comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court does not enjoy a similar high level of trust from the general public—a major reason being political polarization. A contributing factor to this was Donald Trump’s three Supreme Court appointments from 2017 to 2020, which cemented a conservative majority. President Trump’s governing style was marked by bending institutions to his political will and changing how political institutions typically function. During his time in office, the World Justice Project recorded a lower score in “Rule of Law” for the United States than it did for Germany. Measuring robust democracy, freedom, and other sustainable governance indicators, other think tanks and foundations recorded a higher number of institutional weaknesses and lower scores in the United States during this time than in Germany.

Political accountability is an issue for resilience in the United States and Germany. Despite his controversial past and questionable behavior while in office, Donald Trump has been the presidential nominee for the third time. Although there have been voices of dissent from outside and inside the Republican Party, the party has not been able to produce a counter-candidate or effectively stop Donald Trump from running for office. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) has also broken social norms in politics by spreading conspiracy theories, extreme opinions on minorities, and relativizing the Nazi regime. Germany displayed some political accountability through suspending a far-right candidate’s campaign for the European Parliament, but the candidate was remained a member of the EP. The party has multiple radical candidates, which it uses to mobilize voters. Party polarization and partisan conflicts in both Germany and the United States can impact good governance and lower productivity, a clear example being the 118th Congress in the United States. In Germany, there is currently a Brandmauer, or a “firewall” in place, which is a vow from the mainstream parties to not collaborate with the far-right, but it is unclear if this is possible in the long term, as support for the AfD only continues to grow.

There are similar trends in both countries in media, public discourse, and other intermediate institutions, where there has been an erosion of the traditional media and media markets. Both countries are targets for misinformation, with Germany being the biggest target in Europe. In the United States, trust in the media is at a historical low. Independent journalists in both countries have experienced hostility and attacks from fringe parties, which has a negative impact on public discourse and the people’s trust in the media. Media is critical for citizens to create their political opinions, and threats to it impact overall democratic resilience.

Finally, citizen attitudes offer insights into the strength of a democracy. Partisan polarization in both countries has risen. In the United States, the two-party system contributes to this polarization. Candidates in recent election cycles have built their platforms upon divisions within society, mobilizing the electorate through differences instead of policies. Research shows that this way of doing politics also has an impact on human interactions outside of politics. Polarization is not as extreme in Germany, where members of different parties typically do not harbor exceedingly negative feelings toward each other, with the exception of the AfD, which is perceived negatively and highly alienated. The majority of Americans and Germans view elections as a meaningful way to contribute to politics and voter turnout has increased significantly in both countries—though this does not always guarantee a democratic outcome.

In conclusion, the political institutions in Germany seem to be more resilient than in the United States, but this could be attributed to the fact that German institutions have not been adequately tested. The rise of charismatic right-wing politicians and radical movements such as MAGA or the AfD is a symptom of a larger issue with democracy and a result of deficiencies in the system—these people and movements are not the root cause of but rather contributing factors to democratic decline. The impact of these deficiencies can be observed through voter behavior in both countries, and if eroding social and cultural dimensions of democracy are combined with certain systematic and institutional weaknesses, the regime(s) may not be able to withstand autocratic episodes and risk democratic decline. The weaknesses need to be addressed now, and Europe cannot become complacent.

Discussion

A focal point of the discussion was democratic decline and steps that can be taken to create a more resilient democracy. In Germany, democracy remains strong, but certain large-scale policies such as border closures and restrictions on protests about climate or global conflicts reveal new deficiencies that raise concerns about the state of democracy. At the local level, signs of democratic decline in certain regions of Germany have not yet affected the legislative process. In recent regional elections, many voters supported fringe parties as a protest against the federal government. This mirrors behavior in structurally weak regions of the United States, where dissatisfaction and a desire for change often drive protest votes. While this behavior primarily impacts local areas, it is symptomatic of broader systemic challenges.

To combat these issues and strengthen democratic resilience, it is essential for citizens to vote for politicians committed to democratic values. Without this commitment, there is little that can prevent politicians from passing unconstitutional measures. Recognizing democracy as a dimension of citizen resilience, establishing a strong legal framework for social media and ensuring political accountability are key strategies for maintaining robust democracies. Measures such as content moderation on social media to curb disinformation and responsible voting to hold politicians accountable are crucial steps.

The United States scores lower than Germany on many democracy indexes, raising the question of whether the difference is due to the two-party system versus the multiparty system. Parliamentary systems, like Germany’s, tend to perform better on democracy indicators than presidential systems. A key strength of Germany’s multiparty system is its ability to isolate fringe parties, something more difficult to achieve in the United States. While the number of political parties may contribute to these differences, other factors are at play. The United States is a large, federal system and has only recently allowed full participation of its electorate, meaning its democratic structures are still evolving. Additionally, the concentration of power in the presidential office emphasizes the importance of electing leaders with a deep commitment to democratic values.

Social media has a role in eroding democracy in Germany and the United States. The AfD, for instance, has the largest social media following of any German political party and uses these platforms to mobilize voters. In both countries, radical organizations exploit social media to spread conspiracies and disinformation. While social media itself is not the cause of disinformation, it serves as a powerful tool for amplifying it. The economic incentives behind spreading such content—driven by ad revenue and platform engagement—further complicate the issue. The EU is addressing this challenge by implementing regulations that require platforms to moderate dangerous content and allow legal action against non-compliant companies.

Finally, the discussion turned to voter behavior, examining how Donald Trump repeatedly secured the Republican presidential nomination despite opposition within the party, and whether similar dynamics could arise in Germany. In Germany, political parties have broadened their stances on certain issues to appeal to wider audiences, but this approach risks shifting the political discourse. Adopting fringe ideas or rhetoric often backfires, as voters may prefer the original, more radical party. There is no single profile of a Trump or AfD voter—fringe support comes from both struggling regions concerned about access to resources and economically strong areas worried about losing what they have. Economic uncertainty plays a central role, but cultural factors and views on policy issues also influence voter behavior.

This event is supported by the DAAD with funds from the Federal Foreign Office.