A Comparative Historical Analysis of Policy Trajectories in U.S. Bilingual Education and Islamic Religious Instruction in Germany (1965-2010): The Varying Influences of Anti-Immigrant Populism
Introduction
In “Why Islam is Like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States,” Aristide Zolberg and Long Litt Woon argue that Islam and Spanish pose cultural threats to the privileged positions of Christianity and English in Western European states and the U.S., respectively.[1] This rests on the notion that Western European states are culturally rooted in Christianity and the U.S. in English.[2] The increased, concentrated presence of immigrant populations with different languages and/or religions threatens established understandings of cultural identities.[3] Issue areas concerning the incorporation of Islam and Spanish subsequently become areas of political contestation.
This study puts Zolberg and Woon’s assertion to the test, treating U.S. bilingual education (BE) and Islamic religious instruction (IRI) in Germany as comparable issues of political incorporation in which national debates over cultural identity (concerning the incorporation of Spanish and Islam, respectively) are central to policy debates. Bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction are education policy areas involved in the incorporation of second languages and Islam, respectively, and/or the political incorporation of those who speak and practice these non-native cultural amenities. Issues of national cultural identity and what the incorporation of these foreign entities means for national cultural identity are central aspects of the policy debates.
Viewing policy trends historically in these two issue areas since the 1980s, they contradict what theory suggests concerning the histories and characteristics of the two main target groups of these policies, Mexican-Americans and Turkish-Germans.
Mexican-Americans and Turkish-Germans are the main targets of U.S. bilingual education and Islamic religious instruction in Germany, respectively. They are the largest immigrant groups in their respective countries and their interest groups have played leading roles in advocating for policy arrangements in these two issue areas. The history of Mexican immigration dates back to Anglo-American western expansion in the nineteenth century (as the present-day U.S. southwest was formerly Mexico).[4] Political incorporation and entrenchment of Mexican-Americans dates back to the 1920s. For German Turks, on the other hand, their history of immigration to Germany only dates back to the early 1960s and political entrenchment and incorporation to the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Since the 1980s, however, policy trends in bilingual education have experienced policy rollback while those in Islamic religious instruction reveal moderate policy expansion. Theory suggests that immigrant groups with longer histories of immigration and greater levels of political incorporation and political entrenchment should be well positioned to secure/defend favorable policy outcomes in issue areas of interest.[5] This is the central puzzle of the study.
Two Variables of Focus and the Main Argument
Analysis focuses on two variables: How elites have historically viewed these issues (elite agreement versus elite disagreement); and the openness versus closeness of the policymaking system (how easy is it for outsiders to influence the policy process). This essay argues that Turkish interests are better positioned in Germany because of elite support for IRI and Germany’s closed, corporatist policymaking system. Turkish interests have been better positioned in Germany to attain their policy interests in religious instruction, situated in a setting characterized by corporatist interest intermediation and historic elite support for religious instruction as a means of integration. Prospects for Mexican interests, on the other hand, have been less favorable in the U.S.: Mexican interests operate within the laissez faire, competitive, political marketplace of American pluralism where bilingual education has been a historically polarizing issue among elites.
Because of the legacy of the Third Reich, Germany’s history of institutionalized church-state relations, international human rights pressures, and post 9/11 security concerns, consensus has emerged among German elites that Islamic religious instruction is a viable tool for integrating Muslim youth.[6] Within such a political setting and building on the punctuated equilibrium theory of Baumgartner and Jones,[7] this study argues that German corporatism allows for the maintenance of consistent sets of policy actors and policy venues in service of a particular understanding: Islamic religious instruction is a means to integrate Muslims and the Islamic faith. This encourages institutional gatekeepers (the education ministry, Christian religious interests) to pursue the incorporation of palatable Muslim interests into the corporatist policymaking regime. Interest intermediation in the more open, pressure politics of American pluralism combined with historic elite disagreement concerning bilingual education results in the legitimation of new actors, venues, and policy understandings. This allowed for the legitimation of challenges to governing policy regimes[8] (anti-immigrant populism, fiscal concerns, program efficacy/ accountability), which after the 1970s resulted in policy rollback.
Elite Views in Comparison
Concerning elite views, in the U.S., bilingual education has been a polarizing issue going back to the nineteenth century when practiced by German immigrants.[9] Since the 1970s, advocacy groups championing English Only policies have emerged on the political scene. The major groups include U.S. English, Pro English, English First, and Official English. And anti-immigration groups, cultural conservatives, and most Republican political elites have often (although not always as Republican political elites make evident) allied with these English Only groups in issues of interests. On the German side, [for the reasons mentioned above] since the 1990s, the major political parties at the national level have all expressed public support for Islamic religious instruction. Additionally, neither of the far-right nor anti-immigrant parties have expressed a public platform concerning Islamic religious instruction.
Differing National Policymaking Structures
When looking at the differing policymaking structures, the U.S. system is the more open and plebiscitary[10] than the German policymaking system. In German corporatism, para-public institutions have near monopoly power in their policy spheres of influence.[11] This is important as polls have found majorities with anti-immigrant sentiments in both the U.S. and Germany. However, because of American plebiscitary politics and Germany’s “semi-sovereign state,”[12] anti-immigrant populism has had more of an effect on policy outcomes in the American setting than in the German.
Immigration Politics is Local
Nevertheless, immigrant politics is local. Immigrants concentrate in localities. This being the case, immigration politics is facilitated by the relevant local institutional structures and local political contexts.[13] This especially pertains to education and thus is pertinent for these two issue areas.
This study will subsequently look at five local cases across the two nations, creating policy narratives for each state/Bundesland in the two issue areas from 1965-2010. The local cases were chosen according to partisanship while controlling for one of the two aforementioned variables and choosing cases in which the second variable is varied. This allows for intra-national comparisons of the effect of one of the variables. The conclusion will look at how the two variables play out when the national cases are compared internationally.
Case Selection
The U.S. cases were chosen according to partisanship and degree of openness of the policymaking systems. Elite views in the two cases, California and Texas, mirror one another over the period of study. California is the left-leaning, more open policymaking system because of the presence of the voting initiative; Texas is the right-leaning, less open policymaking system because of its lack of the voter initiative. The German cases were chosen according to partisanship and elite views concerning religious instruction; all three German cases have closed, corporatist policymaking contexts. The following are the German cases chosen: North Rhine-Westphalia is the more left-leaning (governed by SPD 1966-2005; CDU from 2005) with elite support for religious instruction; Bavaria is the more right-leaning (governed by CSU since 1957) with elite support for religious instruction; Berlin is the left-leaning (governed by the SPD for the period of study) with elite ambivalence for religious instruction.[14]
U.S. Cases: The Effect of Policymaking Structures on Policy Trajectories
The Era of Elite Agreement and Policy Expansion
As mentioned, elite views toward bilingual education in California and Texas mirror one another over the period of study. From 1965 to 1975, there was elite support for bilingual education when the problem of educating second language students was seen as a civil rights issue—providing equal education opportunity. This included bipartisan support for the pedagogical approach as well as support from education and pedagogical scholars. From 1978 forward there was elite disagreement concerning bilingual education. In the post 1978 period, conservative political elites opposed bilingual education and pedagogical scholars became increasingly divided concerning whether the approach improved educational outcomes from English language learners.
Through the early 1980s, policy trajectories in bilingual education in California and Texas were also similar. During the period from 1965 to 1975, the interaction of policy venues at the local, state, and federal level led to expansive policy at the state level by the mid-1970s. Early local experimentation and Chicano advocacy led to state laws, HB 53 in California and HB 103 in Texas, both of which overturned governing English Only legislation, permitting the use of native language in instruction in local programs. Local successes in California and Texas as well as continued Chicano lobbying at the federal level helped spawn national legislation: the Bilingual Education Act (BEA) of 1968. Latino advocacy groups and political elites from Texas and California played major roles in the crafting and passage of BEA 1968, which provided limited funds to support local bilingual education programs.[15] Lobbying of the executive by the same players helped bring about the 1970 OCR Memorandum[16]; lobbying of the legislature led to the reauthorization of BEA 1974 and the Equal Education Opportunity Act of 1974[17]; and suits by second language litigants brought to the judiciary led to the Lau Ruling in 1974/1975[18] and the subsequent Lau Remedies of 1975.[19] Additionally, high profile federal and state reports (issued by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and California Advisory Committee, respectively) criticized California’s and Texas’ treatment of its Limited English Proficient (LEP) population.[20] These executive and judicial ordinates mandated that localities had a legal responsibility to address the needs of their linguistic minority student populations and the Lau Remedies called for that remedy to be bilingual education. High profile reports added political pressure for localities to address these issues. The cumulative political and legal pressures resulted in expansive bilingual education law in California and Texas in the form of the Bilingual Education and Training Act of 1973[21] in Texas and Chacon-Moscone Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976 in California. Not only did these programs have the end goal of English acquisition, but they also called for bilingualism, multiculturalism, and cultural enrichment—all progressive by today’s standards.
The Era of Elite Disagreement and the Divergent Effects of Varying Policymaking Structures
After 1978, elite agreement began to dissolve—part of the political backlash against liberal government interventionism—as the policy dimension focus shifted from equal education opportunity to the fiscal impacts of bilingual education and the programs’ efficacy in improving education outcomes for linguistic minorities. Officials sympathetic to those opposing bilingual education began to assume positions in the various policy venues of influence (the Office of the President, Congress, state legislatures, the executive branch, and/or the courts)—providing forums for challenges to existing bilingual education policy arrangements—at the federal and then eventually at the state level in the 1980s. High profile national studies[22] questioned the efficacy of bilingual education beginning in the late 1970s. Both the judiciary and federal government began to relax their mandates on bilingual education policy.
In California and Texas, the differing policymaking structures became more evident as these divisions and the salience of new issue dimensions began to play out differently. In California, fiscal issues played out in the passage of Proposition 13, which ended property taxes (a major source of revenue for local school districts) and raised fiscal questions about the fiscal impact of adhering to California’s expansive bilingual education law.[23] In Texas, program efficacy and fiscal issues played out in debates in the state board of education and the state education agency—the state administrative arms charged with implementing state policy. Despite difficult policy negotiations, Latino advocacy networks were well entrenched in both states and the early 1980s saw the passage of bills which reauthorized the expansive bilingual education bills of the mid 1970s in California and Texas.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the emergence and relative success and failure of English Only groups to pass Official English legislation and reform bilingual education arrangements in California and Texas revealed the influence the different state policymaking structures had on policy outcomes in the era of elite division over bilingual education. In 1986, U.S. English, an English Only interest group, successfully proposed and won passage for Amendment 63, which made English the official language of California. U.S. English purposely timed the amendment proposal with the sun setting of the Chacon-Mascone bilingual education bill (scheduled to sunset in 1987). Governor George Deukmejian subsequently vetoed two reauthorization bills amid lobbying from U.S. English. Political commentators of the time noted that Prop. 63 legitimated the politics of policy rollback in bilingual education—prepping the political ground for Deukmejian’s vetoes.[24]
Administrative fiats from the State Board of Education permitted bilingual education arrangements to persist without a governing state law for the next eleven years. In the mid-1990s, however, Ron Unz’s English for the Children voter initiative campaign to end bilingual education statutorily terminated the legality of the approach with the passage of Proposition 227 in 1998.[25]
In Texas, lacking the voter initiative, English Only initiatives were not as successful, as this institutional difference in policymaking left legislators (and not the electorate through direct vote) as the main actors in policy change. Amid an entrenched Latino advocacy network, they balked at initiatives to pass English Only legislation (despite polls at the time showing substantial majority support for such policies), fearing electoral retribution from this entrenched Latino community. In the 1980s, four initiatives to pass Official English legislation (that would have made English the state’s official language) died in committee. With respect to bilingual education reform, in the 1990s, a reform effort in the Houston Independent School District (HISD) to replace bilingual education with an English Only proposal identical to California’s Proposition 227 was diluted in policy negotiations. Instead, the HISD passed a bill that ultimately expanding the bilingual education program, which English Only groups had aimed to terminate, with only minimal concessions to said English Only groups. Institutionalized negotiation within the legislative policymaking process combined with the presence of an entrenched Latino advocacy group thwarted the reform efforts of English Only proponents.
In the end, differing policymaking structures in California and Texas were decisive in the efficacy of English Only groups to influence the policymaking process. In California, the voting initiative allowed for policy rollback in bilingual education without requiring the support of conservative political officials. In Texas, lacking the voter initiative option, policy rollback required support from a majority of legislators. With Latino advocacy entrenched, this proved politically precarious, and Republican legislators (despite polls showing overwhelming support for English Only policies) balked.
German Cases: The Effects of Elite Consensus on Policymaking Structures in Closed Systems
The German cases show how the closed, corporatist policymaking system, combined with elite support for religious instruction, is a more favorable context for Turkish immigrants to achieve their policy preferences in Islamic religious instruction than is the American setting for their Mexican-American counterparts to achieve the same in bilingual education. And this is irrespective of the partisan leanings of the Bundesländer over the period of study. Nevertheless, similar to the American cases, the German cases also reveal how local settings enhance or decrease this favorability depending on how the two variables differ in the local contexts.
The German cases look at the effects differences in elite views toward religious instruction have on policy trajectories over the period of study as the policymaking systems of all three German cases can be described as closed, corporatist, and adhering to cooperative federalism in religious instruction policy—where the state policy venue had a near monopoly on policymaking (for the exception of suits brought to the courts). Specifically, the study finds that differences in elites’ historic views toward religious instruction in general and Islamic religious instruction in particular affected how policy expansion occurred.
In the two western Bundesländer, NRW and Bavaria, elites supported religious instruction as a means for integrating youth in general and Muslim youth in particular. In Berlin, elites were ambivalent toward religious instruction in general and Islamic religious instruction in particular over the period of study. This resulted in elites in NRW and Bavaria seeking arrangements outside of the Basic Law’s Article 7 III structure to provide some semblance of Islamic religious instruction. Elites in Berlin did not seek such avenues and policy expansion only occurred through court action.
Elite Consensus Concerning Religious Instruction in the Western Bundesländer
In the western Bundesländer, the Basic Law Article 7 III governs religious instruction. The article mandates that religious instruction is offered as a mandatory course.[26] Religious instruction is a confessional course taught by the religious community to believing students. Generally, the course is a course in the religion, showing how religious teachings can be applied to everyday life. In the provision of the course, the Bundesland recognizes and sanctions a religious community (provided that it meets the Basic Law criteria of designation as a religious community) to develop the curriculum, train the teachers, and deliver the course. The state funds these provisions and ultimately has the final say in substantive aspects of the course.
The recognition of Muslim religious communities, however, has been problematic. Only one Muslim community in Germany (the Ahmadiyya Muslims in Hessen in 2013), has been able to satisfy the Basic Law criteria for recognition as a religious community. This has legally relieved the western Bundesländer of providing Islamic religious instruction. Nevertheless, western Bundesländer have chosen to provide some semblance of Islamic religious instruction amid demands from their local Muslim communities. North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria serve as two examples of such western Bundesländer.
North Rhein Westphalia (NRW): Summary of Policy Developments
After two unsuccessful, initial attempts to find and recognize local Muslim communities (beginning in 1978), NRW officials established a curriculum commission[27] to provide Islamic religious instruction. The original course, “Islamic Teaching in the Context of Additional Native Language Education,” (ITCANLE) was offered in Turkish for students in grades 1 through 4. Instructors from the mother-tongue[28] portion of the curriculum delivered the course.[29] The exclusion of a recognized Muslim religious community, however, rankled the Christian churches, which disapproved of the state autonomy of this model, seeing such an arrangement as a threat to the legitimacy of state-religious corporatism as called for in Article 7 III. NRW officials responded by subsuming ITCANLE under the mother tongue curriculum—thus revoking any appearance that this was a religious instruction course.
The Turkish focus (both in language and curriculum content) encouraged state officials to develop a course more oriented to the twenty-first century Muslim population that was ethnically more diverse and not likely to return to their land of descent. NRW officials subsequently established Islamic Teaching (Islamische Unterweisung, IU) in German.[30] The course also eschewed recognizing a Muslim religious community and created a commission[31] under the direction of the education ministry to develop its curriculum.
Attempts at Recognizing a Religious Community at the Bundesland Level
By the late 1990s, the lack of a recognized religious community led Muslim parents and students to work with the Islamic Association of Germany (Dachverände Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) and Central Association of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD) with the intent of forming a religious community to provide religious instruction per Article 7 III by the 2000-2001 academic year. Their application, however, was denied. In response these umbrella organizations filed a lawsuit in 1998. In 2005, the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court) ruled that peak associations could serve as religious communities per Article 7 III. However, the court left it to a lower court to rule on whether the Islamrat or ZMD satisfied the Article 7 III criteria.[32]
In 2000, the Bundesland organized a round table consisting of the major Muslim organizations to discuss Islamic religious instruction. After the largest group, DITIB, failed to attend the meeting, the Bundesland abandoned the idea of a roundtable on religious instruction.[33]
The CDU Takeover and Its Attempt at Developing an Article 7 III Islamic Religious Instruction
From 1966 to 2005, Social Democrats controlled the government of North Rhine Westphalia. In 2005, a CDU government came to power promising to establish Islamic religious instruction along the Article 7 III criteria.[34] However, their interim plan of first consulting with local Muslim communities in Cologne and Duisburg offended lead Muslim organizations (who felt they were being ostracized). The CDU abandoned its Article 7 III plans and expanded Islamic Teaching (which they had renamed Islamkunde).
Teacher Training
In 2004, the University of Münster in NRW hired its first professor, Dr. Muhammad Kalisch, to chair the Religion of Islam Department, making him the first Muslim Theologian in Germany.[35] The program aims to train thirty potential Islamic religious instruction teachers. Its goal is to train enough instructors to teach all Muslim students in NRW.[36]
After expressing his belief that the Prophet Muhammad never existed, he lost support within the Muslim community and among many German scholars of Islam. There was some fear among observers that the German project of creating a home-grown Islam had been put in jeopardy. University officials eventually settled on allowing Kalisch to maintain his post but stripped him of his teaching responsibilities—so that Islamic religious instruction instructors would not be exposed to his teachings.[37] This is indicative of German elites commitment to not only incorporating Islam but in doing so in a manner that facilitates buy-in from the Muslim community. Kalisch claimed that he was only exposing the religion to honest intellectual interrogation (as has been done with Christianity).[38] This would appear to be within a university’s mission of intellectual inquiry. Nevertheless, University officials saw maintaining buy-in from the Muslim community as equally important and subsequently pursued maintaining their support.
The Current Status of IRI in NRW
To date, NRW has adopted the largest implementation of religious instruction in Germany. Through 2007, a form of Islamic religious instruction was implemented at 130 schools (out of 5,000 total for NRW), with plans to expand the program to 200 schools by 2010.[39] As of the 2012-2013 school year, Islamic religious instruction (Islamunterricht) via their curriculum commission will be offered statewide. This made NRW as the first state to offer Islamic Religious instruction on a state-wide basis.[40]
Bavaria
Similar to NRW, Bavaria is governed by Article 7 III and also enjoys elite support of religious instruction in general and Islamic religious instruction in particular. Additionally, similar to NRW, Bundesland officials have been unable to find a Muslim community to recognize (a 2001 effort by Bundesland officials proved unsuccessful) but have made accommodations to provide some form of religious teaching in Islam in response to demands from the Muslim community.[41]
In 1985, amid demands by the Muslim community, the Bavarian education ministry implemented the first program. After unsuccessfully making overtures to find a Muslim corporate representative, school officials, the Turkish Consulate, and Turkish parents partnered to develop a curriculum for a course that would be subsumed within the mother tongue portion of the general curriculum for grades 1-4 in isolated localities.[42]
The next iteration, “Islamic Religious Instruction for Turkish Pupils of Islamic Belief” (IRITPIB) (Islamische Religiöse Unterweisung für Türkishe Schüler Muslimishen Glaubens), relied on guidelines provided by the Turkish Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs. Originating in 1987 and instructed in Turkish by Turkish teachers,[43] the program now offers courses from grades 1 through 9. As of the 2005-2006 academic year, 13,023 Muslim students of Turkish origin participated in the mother-tongue classes.[44]
The Introduction of Islamic Religious Instruction in German (IRIG)
From 2001, religious instruction in Bavaria expanded with the addition of an Islamic religious instruction class in German.[45] Islamic Religious Instruction in German (IRIG) (Islamische Religiöse Unterweisung in deutscher Sprache) was developed under the direction of the Bavarian education ministry.[46] Beginning as a pilot project in five schools in the 2001-2002 academic year, the program would eventually expand to thirty-five schools.[47]
The Erlangen Pilot Project
In the 2003-2004 academic year, Islamic Education (IE) (Islamunterricht) was implemented in the city of Erlangen. This program would develop the most toward adhering to Article 7 III requirements.[48] The pilot was the result of collaboration between the Islamic Religious Community of Erlangen (Islamische Religiongemeinschaft Erlangen), academics from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, and the Bavarian Education Ministry.[49] The Bundesland implemented the pilot program in Erlangen and worked with the Unified Association of the Islamic Community in Erlangen to offer Islamic religious instruction at two local schools.[50] The pilot eventually expanded to include arrangements in Nüremberg, Fürth, Bayreuth, and Munich. These would all assume similar three-way partnerships between local officials, academics, and local religious communities under the aegis of Bundesland officials. And adhering to the Article 7 III corporatist requirement, the recognized local Muslim umbrella groups were given full autonomy concerning the curriculum.
The Establishment of Teacher Training for Islamic Religious Instruction
The University of Erlangen initially introduced a visiting professorship for Islamic Religious Teaching (Islamische Religionslehre) in 2002. In 2006, the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg appointed Dr. Harry Harun Behr to chair the newly established program of Islamic religious instruction, the Interdisciplinary Center for Islamic Religious Teaching (Interdisziplinaeres Zentrum fuer Islamische Religionslehre) (IZIR).[51] Behr became the second Muslim Theologian in Germany (second to Kalisch in Münster).[52] Since its inception, the program has been training thirty teachers per year.
Berlin: Introduction
Contrary to NRW and Bavaria, Turkish interests are in a slightly different institutional and political setting in Berlin. The former two states are governed by Article 7 III, making religious instruction a mandatory course in these Bundesländer. Although Bundesland officials were unable to find lead Muslim organizations to serve as corporate representatives per Article 7 III, elite agreement and the closed policymaking setting facilitated the political and institutional leeway for state officials to make accommodations to provide some semblance of religious instruction in Islam.
Religious instruction in Berlin is not governed by Article 7 III but is instead offered as a voluntary course. The Bremen Clause of the Basic Law exempts Berlin from the provisions of Article 7 III. Nevertheless, the Article 7 III corporatist paradigm was still influential in the development of policy arrangements, and as a result, prevailing policy arrangements in religious instruction closely resemble those of Bundesländer governed by Article 7 III.[53]
Despite policy arrangements resembling those of Article 7 III, elite debate concerning the status of religious instruction in Berlin had not been settled. After reunification, there was nationwide debate concerning the place of religious instruction in modern Germany amid the perceived secularization of the German population. In Berlin, the debate split the parties, with the CDU and religious groups favoring an Article 7 III compulsory religious education arrangement and the SPD, Green, FDP, and Left parties favoring voluntary religious instruction with a corresponding ethics course option.[54] In the end, Berlin settled on permitting religious communities to use public schools to provide voluntary religious instruction courses while also maintaining ethics and philosophy courses on a voluntary basis.[55] This debate has yet to be settled as the Pro Reli voter initiative makes evident: 51 percent of the electorate narrowly voted to maintain the existing system in a 2008 voter referendum.[56] Subsequently, because of elite ambivalence, policy negotiation between Berlin officials and lead Turkish organizations was less creative or experimental and more contentious than in NRW and Bavaria.
Policy Development in Berlin
Despite the Bremen Clause exemption, the education ministry enjoys similar monopoly power over religious instruction as in western Bundesländer. From the early 1970s, the Berlin state began heavily subsidizing religious communities and permitting them to use public school space to provide religious instruction courses. Bundesland officials allocate the space and control the distribution of subsidies for the provision of religious instruction. In awarding the aforementioned, the Berlin state education ministry first (informally) recognizes these religious communities. This created an unofficial process of state recognition for religious communities (sanctioned by the Berlin state[57]) to provide religious instruction.[58]
By the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim population had grown substantially in Berlin. At this time, Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) began a twenty-year campaign to provide religious instruction at public schools in Berlin—campaigning for the same recognition and state subsidies that other religious communities enjoyed. Considered an extremist group by Germany’s constitutional authorities as well as the Turkish state,[59] the Berlin education ministry rejected three applications from the IFB to provide religious instruction beginning in 1980.[60] The ministry ruled that the IFB did not satisfy the requirements of a religious community according to Berlin law. Meanwhile the IFB continually rewrote its charter and submitted unsuccessful applications in 1983 and 1987 in addition to the aforementioned application in 1980.[61] The 1987 rejection kicked off IFB appeals to the administrative court in 1987, 1993, 1997, and 2000.[62] An appellate court overturned the 1997 decision, ruling that the lower court had wrongly used Article 7 III criteria to assess IFB’s legitimacy as a Muslim religious community.[63] Following unsuccessful appeals by the Bundesländer, the Berlin education ministry granted IFB the authority to provide voluntary religious education classes.[64] Beginning with the 2000-2001 academic year, the IFB began providing Islamic religious instruction in Berlin public schools. As a result, the IFB became the first Muslim organization to be formally recognized as a religious community according to Berlin law.[65] IFB-provided religious instruction (on a voluntary basis) expanded to thirty-seven schools, serving around 4,000 Muslim students by the 2004-2005 academic year.[66]
Thus, the question of religious instruction in Berlin was left unresolved even as informal policy arrangements evolved similarly to Article 7 III configurations. Subsequently, amid demands from the Muslim community for religious instruction, Berlin officials reacted differently than those in NRW and Bavaria, forgoing alternative policy arrangements when the IFB candidacy proved untenable. This is particularly evident when comparing Berlin and NRW—both (mostly) governed by the SPD during the period under investigation. Ultimately, it was the courts (and not Berlin education ministry officials) who granted the IFB the right to provide religious instruction and receive state subsidies.
The latter speaks to the favorable elite setting in Germany. In his article, Claus Hofhansel argues that the German courts are increasingly siding with Muslim interests in their claims to provide Islamic religious instruction according to Article 7 III.[67] Thus, the courts appear to be a favorable venue for Muslim interests to achieve their policy goals. The American courts had also been favorable venues for bilingual education advocates in the 1970s, coercing states to adopt expansive policy. However, since the 1980s, the courts have grown more ambivalent toward bilingual education as the default pedagogical approach for LEP students.
Ultimately, the elite consensus in NRW and the elite ambivalence in Berlin were based on their varying historical contexts and the subsequent demographic developments in relation to religion.[68] This resulted in state officials from the same party taking opposite routes when faced with leading Muslim organizations that were not to their liking.
Conclusion
The five case study sections of this study treat policy trajectories in the individual local cases as well as subjecting these analyses to intra-national, cross-local comparisons. This reveals how variations in the local contexts with respect to the open/closeness of the policymaking systems and/or variation in elite relations affect policy prospects for Mexican and Turkish interests in the U.S. and Germany, respectively. But how do the two factors—elite views and policymaking structure—render national differences in policy trajectories?
The Value of Elite Consensus within a Closed Policy Setting
Although Turkish successes in securing religious instruction policy arrangements in North Rhine Westphalia and Bavaria were more modest than those of their Mexican-American counterparts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the favorable German setting proved more long-lasting for Turkish-Germans, extending through the period under study. Policy expansion in the two German Bundesländer with elite agreement in support of Islamic religious instruction, NRW and Bavaria, differed from the account of policy trajectories in California and Texas during the respective period of elite agreement. Policy trajectories were also expansive, but lacking the multiple venues of the American system, expansion was more iterative and locally isolated.[69] In this sense, policy expansion in NRW and Bavaria was similar to the period in the late 1960s in the U.S. before venue shifting to and issue expansion across the federal venues and the courts legitimized bilingual education interests (at the state and federal level) and won federal and judicial mandates which then forced the states to enact more expansionary policy. Nevertheless, iterative, locally-spread expansion in NRW and Bavaria continued for the entire period of the study as opposed to the ten-year window of substantial expansion in the American setting. Moreover, the commitment is there from elites to continue this moderate, iterative expansion.[70]
Finally, in the German cases covered, anti-immigrant populist movements have basically no influence on the policymaking processes. This speaks to the closed nature of policymaking in Islamic religious instruction, but also to elite agreement concerning religious instruction. German anti-immigrant groups/ right-wing groups express opposition to asylum law and immigration law. However, Islamic religious instruction is not in their purview. This differs from the American cases where English Only groups often garner support from generally anti-immigrant groups. And the latter usually express a position on bilingualism.
In total, despite the longer period of immigration and the greater degree of political incorporation and entrenchment of Latino advocacy, proponents of bilingual education have a tougher road to navigate to attain their policy preferences. Proponents of Islamic religious instruction can count on a policymaking system that insulates the policymaking process from anti-immigrant sentiment and an issue area that enjoys broad-based elite support. Thus, despite the similar presence of anti-Muslim sentiment in Germany to the anti-Latino immigrant sentiment in the U.S., Turkish interests operate from a more favorable position in Germany.
Dr. Girma Parris was a DAAD/AGI Research Fellow in July and August 2015. He is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy at the University at Albany, SUNY.
[1] Aristide R. Zolberg and Long Litt Woon, “Why Islam is like Spanish: Cultural Incorporation in Europe and the United States,” Politics and Society, Vol. 27 (1999): 5-38.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999).
[5] Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); John Mollenkopf and Jennifer Hochschild, “Immigrant Political Incorporation: Comparing Success in the United States and Western Europe,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 2010): 19-38; Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); FAdam D. Sheingate, “Agricultural Retrenchment Revisited: Issue Definition and Venue Change in the United States and European Union,” Governance , Vol.13, No.3 (2000): 335-363; Hermann Kurthen and Barbara Schmitter Heisler, “Immigrant Integration: Comparative Evidence from the United States and Germany,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 2009): 139-170.
[6] Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
[7] Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
[8] Policy regimes refer to a set of ideas, interests and institutions that structure governmental activity in a particular issue area. It consists of a power arrangement (an alignment of interests and governmental actors around an issue); a policy paradigm (how an issue is conceptualized—how its problematized, its target populations, and alternatives of legitimate policy responses); and a policymaking arrangement (institutional and procedural arrangements for making decisions and policy implementation) (McGuinn, 2006 p. 206)
[9] James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999).
[10] Joseph Cooper, “From Congressional to Presidential Preeminence: Power and Politics in Late Nineteenth Century America and Today,” in Congress Reconsidered (2009): 361-393.
[11] Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks,” in Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. John H. Goldthorpe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984): 60-81; Peter Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in Western Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple, 1987).
[12] Katzenstein (Ibid.) referred to the policy monopolies resulting from the divvying up of issues areas which were governed by the concertation between the state and recognized interests as a semi-sovereign state.
[13] Jeannette Money, “No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced Industrial Countries,” International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997): 685-720; Ruud Koopmans, “Migrant Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation Among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 30, No.3 (2004): 449-470.
[14] There is no right-leaning German state with elite ambivalence for religious instruction where Islamic religious instruction is an issue.
[15] James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999).
[16] This was a directive from the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) mandating districts to make accommodations for LEP students. See James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999). The 1970 OCR memorandum prepped the legal context for judicial developments that would transform bilingual education in the states. See Texas Education Agency, “Academic Performance of Elementary Students with Limited English Proficiency in Texas Public Schools,” Policy Research Report no. 10 (1998), http://www.tea.state.tx.us/acctres/Spec_PRR_10_1998.pdf.
[17] This act permitted citizens to bring civil action when they were denied equal educational opportunity. See James Crawford, “Hard Sell: Why is Bilingual Education So Unpopular with the American Public,” in Bilingual Education: An Introductory Reader, Vol. 61, eds. Ofelia Garcia and Colin Baker (Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2007): 150.
[18] The Lau ruling by the Supreme Court made it the law that the failure to provide language assistance to LEP students amounted to denying them meaningful access to education—a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. See page 5 of Texas Education Agency, “Academic Performance of Elementary Students with Limited English Proficiency in Texas Public Schools,” Policy Research Report no. 10 (1998), http://www.tea.state.tx.us/acctres/Spec_PRR_10_1998.pdf.
[19] In 1975, U.S. Commissioner of Education Terrel Bell enumerated the Lau Remedies which provided districts with guidelines for implementing the Lau ruling in district policy. See Elizabeth Fenner, “Future of English Language Learner Education: The Need for Dedicated Advocacy through Litigation and Legislation,” Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy 18 (2012): 92 and James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999): 46. These OCR guidelines discouraged the use of ESL (arguing that ESL did not facilitate the “affective nor cognitive development of students”) and favored the use of bilingual education programs (including bicultural, multi-cultural, and multilingual programs) to meet the prescriptions offered in the Lau ruling. See Elizabeth Fenner, “Future of English Language Learner Education: The Need for Dedicated Advocacy through Litigation and Legislation,” Texas Hispanic Journal of Law and Policy 18 (2012): 92; Rebecca P. Fralick, “A Comparative Study of Fourth-grade English-language Learners who Participated in a Transitional Bilingual Model, a Dual Bilingual Model, Or English-only Instruction in a Selected South Texas School District,” PhD dissertation, University of Houston (2007): 16; and James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999): 46.
[20] Laurie Olsen, “The Role of Advocacy in Shaping Immigrant Education: A California Case Study,” The Teachers College Record, Vol. 111, No. 3 (2009): 817-850; Richard A. Navarro, “The Problems of Language, Education, and Society: Who Decides,” Advances in Bilingual Education Research (1985): 289-313.
[21] U.S. v. State of Texas 1971/72 played a decisive role in policy expansion. As part of Judge Justice’s desegregation ruling, he ordered the implementation of a bilingual-bicultural program. The Bilingual Education and Training Act was a response to this ruling.
[22] The most politically damaging was the American Institute for Research (AIR) report of 1978 (this will be discussed further below). The report evaluated 16 bilingual education programs nationwide and claimed that bilingual education with the goal of teaching bilingualism interfered with improving student achievement in school (Fralick, 2007 17; Crawford, 1998 55). Although the evaluations indicated an improvement in the self-perceptions, attendance, and cultural understandings for LEP students, the report could not consistently find higher educational achievement resulting from these programs (Fralick, 2007 16).
[24] Sandor Czegledi, “The Remnants of Bilingual Education in the ‘Golden State,’ 6 Years after Proposition 227,” 14; James Crawford, Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999): 62; Laurie Olsen, “The Role of Advocacy in Shaping Immigrant Education: A California Case Study,” The Teachers College Record, Vol. 111, No. 3 (2009): 826
[25] James Crawford, “Language Politics in the U.S.A.: The Paradox of Bilingual Education,” Social Justice, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Fall 1998): 50- 68 and Bilingual education: History, politics, theory, practice. Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services (Los Angeles: Bilingual Education Services, Inc., 1999); Laurie Olsen, “The Role of Advocacy in Shaping Immigrant Education: A California Case Study,” The Teachers College Record, Vol. 111, No. 3 (2009).
[26] Students can elect to choose an ethics course instead and after the age of 14 can opt out of religious instruction entirely.
[27] The commission consisted of school administrators, Turkish teachers, scholars of Islam, religious instruction educators, Muslim teachers, and Muslim and non-Muslim scientists in cooperation with the Universities of Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, and al-Azhar in Cairo. See Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 106;
Friedhelm Kraft, “Muslim Children and the Right to Religion,” in Germany and Slovenia: Socioeconomic and Political Approaches, eds. Bogomil Ferfila and Stefan Dehnert (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, 2012), 6; Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 33.
[28] This course (as did the mother tongue curriculum in general) operated under the then held assumption that the Turkish immigrants would eventually return to Turkey. See Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 33, http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/9270/Dromgold,%20Michelle%20-%20Spring%20’10%20(P).pdf?sequence=1
[29] Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 33; Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 106.
[30] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010); Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 33-34.
[31] The commission was made up of representatives of the school administration, Turkish teachers, scholars of Islam, and religion educators. See Friedhelm Kraft, “Muslim Children and the Right to Religion,” in Germany and Slovenia: Socioeconomic and Political Approaches, eds. Bogomil Ferfila and Stefan Dehnert (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, 2012), 6. In drafting the curriculum, the group also sought buy-in from religious congregations and Muslim associations. This circle of consultation would later expand to include the Islamic theological faculties, the Turkish state (via the Office of Religious Affairs), and German representatives from the Muslim World Congress.
[32] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 200.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007), 228; Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 107.
[36] Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007), 228.
[37] Andrew Higgins, “Professor Hired for Outreach to Muslims Delivers a Jolt,” The Wall Street Journal, 15 November 2008 (accessed 8 September 2015).
[38] Ibid.
[39] Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007), 228.; Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 34.
[40] Link, Christoph. “Der Koran kommt ins Klassenzimmer.” Stuttgartner Zeitung.de July 13, 2012 (accessed December 11, 2015)
[41] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010).
[42] Dana L. Simel, “Exclusionary Christian Civil Religion for Jewish and Islamic Students in Bavarian Schools,” Comparative Education Review, Vol. 40, No. 1, Special Issue on Religion, (February 1996): 33; Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 35.
[43] Teachers are trained in Turkey and supervised by the Bavarian education ministry using Turkish textbooks also approved by the ministry. See Friedhelm Kraft, “Muslim Children and the Right to Religion,” in Germany and Slovenia: Socioeconomic and Political Approaches, eds. Bogomil Ferfila and Stefan Dehnert (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, 2012), 5; Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 103.
[44] Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 35.
[45] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 202; Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 35.
[46] In this second iteration the ministry acted more independently with decreasing influence from the ministry of education and Cultural Affairs in Turkey as the program matured.
[47] Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 103; Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 35. For the purposes of comparative research, IRIG was only offered in schools which offered IRITPIB and an ethics course as well. See Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 103. By 2004, the program had expanded to grades 1-5 and to secondary schools participating in the pilot in 2005. See Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 35.
[48]: 103.
[49] Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 35.
[50] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 202; Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007): 229; Michelle Dromgold and Cathy Schneider, “Islamic Religious Instruction in German Public Schools,” 2010, p. 37.
[51] Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007): 229; Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 104.
[52] Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007): 229.
[53] In addition to religious instruction offered as a voluntary course, the other variation from NRW and Bavaria was that the religious community was completely responsible for its provision (differing from the western Bundesländer where the state was more of an active partner in the provision of the course). See Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 202.
[54] Christine R. Barker, “Church and State: Lessons from Germany?” The Political Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2004): 173.
[55] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 202; Christine R. Barker, “Church and State: Lessons from Germany?” The Political Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2004): 172.
[56] In 2005, legislation was passed making ethics a mandatory course, but leaving religious instruction as voluntary. Church groups protested what they interpreted as a second class status for religious instruction, arguing that religious instruction also needed to be compulsory. This reignited debate concerning religious instruction policy—what role did religious instruction play in modern Germany—setting stage for the Pro Reli campaign. See Christine R. Barker, “Church and State: Lessons from Germany?” The Political Quarterly, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2004): 172.
[57] Hence, Berlin can be characterized as a comparably closed policymaking system in religious instruction. The Pro Reli initiative was about the role religious instruction should play in the Bundesland (as a voluntary or compulsory course). However, the education ministry maintained monopoly power over actor entry throughout the study (for the exception of the brief period between the 2000 Administrative court ruling and the amending of the education constitution). This, thus, made Berlin as closed a policymaking system as the NRW and Bavaria.
[58] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 202.
[59] German constitutional authorities claim the IFB are associated with Islamische Gemeinschaft- Millî Görüş e.V. (Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 203). Millî Görüş has been classified by the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) as an extremist organization. See Friedhelm Kraft, “Muslim Children and the Right to Religion,” in Germany and Slovenia: Socioeconomic and Political Approaches, eds. Bogomil Ferfila and Stefan Dehnert (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, 2012), 7. It is supposedly also linked to Turkey’s Islamist Welfare Party. See Katherine Pratt Ewing, “Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship between ‘Church’ and ‘State’ in Germany and France,” Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 4 (Fall 2000): 47. The Welfare Party (renamed the Virtue Party after it was banned in Turkey in 1998) controlled the Turkish government for a brief period and aimed to replace Turkey’s laicism with a church-state policy more favorable to Islam.
[60] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 202.
[61] Katherine Pratt Ewing, “Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship between ‘Church’ and ‘State’ in Germany and France,” Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 4 (Fall 2000): 46.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 203; Katherine Pratt Ewing, “Legislating Religious Freedom: Muslim Challenges to the Relationship between ‘Church’ and ‘State’ in Germany and France,” Daedalus, Vol. 129, No. 4 (Fall 2000): 48.
[64] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010): 203.
[65] Dan-Paul Jozsa, “Islam and Education in Europe With Special Reference to Austria, England, France, Germany and the Netherlands,” Deliverables D1. 2 and D1. 3 (2007): 104.
[66] Friedhelm Kraft, “Muslim Children and the Right to Religion,” in Germany and Slovenia: Socioeconomic and Political Approaches, eds. Bogomil Ferfila and Stefan Dehnert (Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, 2012), 8; Ahmet Yukleyen, “State Policies and Islam in Europe: Millî Görüş in Germany and the Netherlands,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 (March 2010): 451.
[67] Claus Hofhansel, “Accommodating Islam and the Utility of National Models: The German Case,” West European Politics, Vol. 33, No.2 (March 2010).
[68] In NRW, a majority of the population was church-affiliated (compared with Berlin where only a minority of the population was church affiliated).
[69] For example, in NRW, the expansion has been most substantial of the German cases. However, this has only meant NRW has implemented 200 programs out of a total of 5,000 schools. Even compared to bilingual education’s limited reach (never rising above 30 percent of the student body nationally), this is still paltry. Perhaps if advocates successfully venue shifted to the courts (in both cases) to force the Bundesland to adopt a Muslim lead organization at the Bundesland level, the pace of expansion might quicken. See Albrecht Fuess, “Islamic Religious Instruction in Western Europe: Models of Integration and the German Approach,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 2007).
[70] The German Federal Ministry for Education and Research has recently granted 20 million over the next 5 years to the following universities to educate the much-needed 2,000 Islamic theology teachers to guarantee a nation-wide coverage in schools: Münster/Osnabrück, Tübingen, Frankfurt/Gießen, and Erlangen-Nürnberg. During the period of elite agreement in Texas and California as well as with the federal Bilingual Education Act and its subsequent reauthorizations, funds were allocated for teacher training. However, teacher shortages remained a perennial issue even during this period of elite agreement and worsened during the period of elite disagreement after the 1970s.
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