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The Ukraine War and the German Election
Jeff Rathke
President of AGI
Jeffrey Rathke is the President of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC.
Prior to joining AICGS, Jeff was a senior fellow and deputy director of the Europe Program at CSIS, where his work focused on transatlantic relations and U.S. security and defense policy. Jeff joined CSIS in 2015 from the State Department, after a 24-year career as a Foreign Service Officer, dedicated primarily to U.S. relations with Europe. He was director of the State Department Press Office from 2014 to 2015, briefing the State Department press corps and managing the Department's engagement with U.S. print and electronic media. Jeff led the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur from 2011 to 2014. Prior to that, he was deputy chief of staff to the NATO Secretary General in Brussels. He also served in Berlin as minister-counselor for political affairs (2006–2009), his second tour of duty in Germany. His Washington assignments have included deputy director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs and duty officer in the White House Situation Room and State Department Operations Center.
Mr. Rathke was a Weinberg Fellow at Princeton University (2003–2004), winning the Master’s in Public Policy Prize. He also served at U.S. Embassies in Dublin, Moscow, and Riga, which he helped open after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mr. Rathke has been awarded national honors by Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as several State Department awards. He holds an M.P.P. degree from Princeton University and B.A. and B.S. degrees from Cornell University. He speaks German, Russian, and Latvian.
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German Chancellor Olaf Scholz lost a confidence vote in the Bundestag on December 16, setting the stage for an early election expected on February 23, 2025. This was the culmination of the political impasse sparked by Scholz’s November 6 firing of Finance Minister Christian Lindner, who also leads the Free Democratic Party, one of three parties in Scholz’s ultimately unworkable coalition. Lindner’s firing came one day after the U.S. presidential election, and while Donald Trump’s victory did not cause the collapse of the German government, the looming new administration in Washington amplified the fundamental disagreements in the Berlin coalition; the sense of national frustration with a stagnant, underperforming economy; and the uncertainty about how Trump may reorient American policy toward Europe.
Russia’s war on Ukraine and on the European security order is one of the central challenges facing Berlin, and Germany’s support for Ukraine will be a key issue in the campaign. The outcome will directly affect the international diplomacy around the war, since Berlin is the largest source of support to Kyiv in Europe. Will Germany be able to sustain or expand the resources dedicated to Ukraine? Will it be able to help build European commitment and insure against American disengagement? And will it be able to contribute in a meaningful timeframe, when it may be months before a new government takes office, well after Donald Trump’s first 100 days?
Chancellor Scholz visited Kyiv on December 2, his second visit since the Russian invasion. It was a symbolic visit, as the chancellor brought no new financial or security commitments—he highlighted Germany’s robust support since 2022 but did not move on key questions for Ukrainian President Zelensky such as longer-range weapons or new prospects for Ukraine’s NATO ambitions. This stance reflects Scholz’s electoral strategy: to take credit for the German role supporting Ukraine and to promise continuity without delivering qualitatively new aid. In this sense, he is responding to the anxiety in large parts of the German population about an escalation of the war; against that backdrop, it is little wonder that Russian threats and messaging consistently invoke the specter of Russian nuclear weapons or allegations that NATO members are becoming parties to the conflict. Scholz’s bet is that his positioning as the sober, reasonable “peace chancellor” will eventually hit the sweet spot with the public: resolute without being risky.
The collapse of the German government raises another question—whether German assistance will continue to flow to Ukraine even in the absence of a 2025 budget, since Scholz has no majority in the Bundestag. This triggers provisional fiscal measures (known as Vorläufige Haushaltsführung) that were detailed on December 16 by Finance Minister Jörg Kukies (who succeeded Lindner). The measures are expected to run through the first half of 2025, and the minority government will be restricted to spending at 90 percent of the level that had been envisioned in the draft budget for 2025. Kukies will have the authority to approve deviations from that rule; what this will mean for aid to Ukraine is not yet clear. In 2024, the German government allocated approximately €7.5 billion for Ukraine, primarily for military and humanitarian assistance. However, this amount was already expected to decrease in 2025 to around €4 billion in aid. Given the urgency of the conflict in Ukraine and the potential for new developments in the early months of 2025 as the Trump administration takes office, the impact of the fiscal constraint on German aid may require Scholz and his finance minister to take extraordinary action.
Key German Parties’ Positions on Ukraine
There has been a broad mainstream consensus in Germany to support Ukraine, but significant differences in emphasis. Parties’ ideological orientations play a role, along with German public sentiment, which considers Ukraine the greatest foreign policy challenge facing the country, well ahead of migration, the Middle East, and China. Beyond the strong public support for aiding Ukraine, opinion on some issues is split. According to the Körber Foundation’s latest Berlin Pulse report, 47 percent of Germans support Ukraine fighting to recapture all territory currently occupied by Russia, while 43 percent support Ukraine ceding parts of its territory to Russia in an attempt to end the war. These ambiguities are reflected in the emphasis that mainstream parties place within Ukraine policy.
Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Chancellor Scholz has led a government that proudly claims credit for being the second-largest international supporter of Ukraine after the United States. He has balanced this demonstration of German resolve with a heavy dose of caution, emphasizing cool-headed diplomacy over escalation. Positioning himself as the “peace chancellor,” Scholz has suggested that opposition leader Friedrich Merz’s strong support for supplying Ukraine with weapons and equipment, especially the mid-range Taurus cruise missile, risks provoking escalation in the conflict. In particular, Scholz has taken aim at Merz, accusing him of “issuing ultimatums” to Russia. This framing feeds the Kremlin’s rhetorical focus in which everyone is responsible for escalation except Moscow through its invasion of a sovereign country. Nevertheless, it may appeal to the significant segment of the German public that is wary of military escalation and favors negotiated settlements. Scholz’s rhetoric seeks to balance maintaining public support while avoiding overt criticism from allies advocating stronger military aid to Ukraine.
Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)
In contrast, the CDU/CSU alliance—led by the likely next federal chancellor, Friedrich Merz—has taken a more assertive stance. Merz visited Kyiv on December 2 and expressed clear support for allowing Ukraine to use German-provided weapons to strike military targets inside Russian territory. Earlier this fall, Merz also called for Germany to deliver Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine if Russia did not halt its attacks on civilian targets. This stance reflects the CDU/CSU’s emphasis on Germany’s leadership role within NATO and the European Union. However, it risks alienating more cautious voters who share the SPD’s concerns about escalation. As the election gets closer, this willingness explicitly to push the boundaries of Germany’s arms delivery policies has diminished somewhat—it is not referenced in the CDU/CSU’s election program published this week, for example. In an interview during his Kyiv visit, Merz carefully advocated a stronger European effort to help Ukraine strike Russian military targets near the border, but demurred on the question of providing cruise missiles to Ukraine and called for forging a common position within Europe and with the United States. The ARD DeutschlandTrend poll from November 2024 indicates that just 30 percent of voters and only 39 percent of CDU/CSU voters favor delivering the Taurus cruise missile to Ukraine, a situation that sheds light on the evolving caution in the CDU/CSU’s own position on the issue.
Greens
The Greens have been vocal supporters of Ukraine, and chancellor candidate Robert Habeck has said that he would provide Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine if he were chancellor. The Green party has, however, avoided making the issue fundamental to cooperation within Scholz’s coalition. The readiness to raise German support to Ukraine to a new level is reflected in the views of Green voters; in the November 2024 ARD DeutschlandTrend poll, 60 percent of Green voters supported providing Ukraine with cruise missiles—the highest figure for any party.
The U.S. Election
The U.S. presidential election has exacerbated uncertainty in Germany with regard to Ukraine. The return of Donald Trump has raised significant concerns about a shift in American foreign policy, including possibly reduced support for Ukraine or an expectation that Europeans (but not Americans) would send troops to monitor an eventual ceasefire. A majority of the German public (70 percent) still sees the United States as a valuable strategic partner when it comes to dealing with the war in Ukraine. The possibility of a dramatic change in U.S. policy has sparked renewed interest in Germany in European coordination, with Merz calling for a united European position and the formation of a European contact group to accompany any diplomatic process. However, other party leaders have so far been cautious in publicly addressing how Trump’s potential victory might alter their stances.
Germany exhibits a complex mix of solidarity with Ukraine and apprehension about deeper involvement in the war. While there is deep support for sanctions against Russia and for continuing financial, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, enthusiasm for expanded military aid remains tepid. This ambivalence is mirrored in Chancellor Scholz’s cautious position as he seeks to navigate the tension between international obligations and domestic preferences and chart a path back to the chancellery from his current low point in public opinion. German leaders will have to map out quickly before and after the February 23 election a path forward if they hope to influence the U.S. approach to diplomacy toward Ukraine and Russia.
