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AGI Profiles: Johann Wadephul

Marlon Demandt
Halle Foundation/AGI Intern
Marlon Demandt is a fall 2025 Halle Foundation Intern at the American-German Institute and a second-year graduate student in International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School, where he is a Fulbright and DAAD Scholar. His concentration focuses on the intersection of technology and international affairs, with a regional emphasis on China. Originally from Heidelberg and raised in Munich, he earned a Bachelor of Science in Political Science with a focus on technology, data science, and economics from the Technical University of Munich (TUM). During his undergraduate studies, he completed exchange semesters at Sciences Po in France and Seoul National University in South Korea and was selected as a scholar of the LSE German Symposium.
Alongside his studies, Marlon has gained professional experience in finance, consulting, and public policy. He has held roles at Alvarez & Marsal, Miller & Meier Consulting, KPMG, Fortlane Partners, and Possible Digital. He was also part of the founding team of a German IoT startup, interned with a Member of the Bundestag, and recently served as a research assistant to Professor Hope M. Harrison at GWU’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies.
His research interests include the evolution of Germany’s security landscape vis-à-vis Russia amid shifting U.S. foreign policy, as well as the role of technology in geopolitics within the triangular dynamic of Sino-American, transatlantic, and German-Chinese relations.
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Dr. Johann Wadephul hails from northern Germany, a region whose people are often described as taciturn and reserved. Defying that cliché, he chose a career in politics, where speaking out is essential. Now, as foreign minister, he carries this blend of northern pragmatism and political eloquence onto the international stage, representing Germany in some of the most consequential debates of our time.
Wadephul has served as Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs since May 2025 and holds a permanent seat on Germany’s newly established National Security Council. While the Union of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) has been a constant force in German politics, participating in twenty of twenty-five governing coalitions since 1949, it has been nearly sixty years since a Christian Democrat last led the Foreign Ministry. Long considered a secondary office, the ministry’s renewed prominence signals a shift in global strategy and reflects Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s ambition to transform Germany from a “sleeping middle power” into a “leading middle power,” with foreign and security policy at the core. In Wadephul’s inaugural address to the heads of German missions, he greeted his colleagues with the typical northern “Moin”—a local collegial greeting—and set out a foreign policy agenda he described as pragmatic, built on the triad of security, freedom, and prosperity.
A Lawyer by Profession, a Security Policy Expert by Training
Born in 1963 in Husum, a town on the North Sea coast of Schleswig-Holstein, Wadephul joined the CDU after completing Gymnasium, Germany’s academic high school, in 1982. He then served for four years in the Bundeswehr’s Army Air Defense and re-enlisted as a reserve officer in 2023, now holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel—an experience he says greatly benefits his work as Foreign Minister. Trained as a lawyer with a specialization in medical law and social legislation, he graduated from the Christian-Albrechts-University in Kiel, passing his second state examination in 1995 and earning a doctorate in law in 1996. After graduation, he practiced law and held various leadership roles within the CDU in his home state, including serving as Secretary General of the CDU Schleswig-Holstein, before winning a Bundestag seat in 2009.
Since then, Wadephul has built a significant career in foreign and security policy, serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee, the European Affairs Committee, and the Defense Committee in the Bundestag. Most recently, as deputy chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, he was responsible for foreign and security policy and often accompanied then-opposition leader, now chancellor, Friedrich Merz on foreign trips, most notably to Kyiv in December 2024. Wadephul and Merz are widely regarded as closely aligned on foreign policy, with the foreign minister describing them as “singing from the same hymn sheet and sharing the same views.” Their close professional working relationship has developed since the 2021 election, with Wadephul increasingly serving as one of Merz’s key advisers on foreign affairs. His consistent support for the party leader has likely strengthened his own position and bolstered his nomination for foreign minister. While other prominent CDU foreign policy figures such as Roderich Kiesewetter and Norbert Röttgen—who had to some extent been replaced by Kiesewetter as the CDU/CSU’s defense spokesperson—were also considered, neither commanded the same degree of personal trust or substantive alignment with Merz. Especially Kiesewetter, a former Bundeswehr Colonel, is often described as a foreign policy hardliner, particularly on Russia and German defense spending, and lacked the political pragmatism Merz appeared to favor. Kiesewetter’s dissent during the controversial migration vote with the extreme right Alternative for Germany (AfD) of January 2025 reinforced the perception that he was not fully aligned with Merz course. Another strategic consideration may have been the looming coalition with the Social Democrats (SPD), which would almost certainly ensure that the widely popular Boris Pistorius remained defense minister. In that context, appointing a hardliner such as Kiesewetter would have likely complicated cooperation with the SPD’s comparatively softer stance on Russia and risked unnecessary friction within the coalition.
Security, National Interests, and Economic Priorities
As foreign minister, Wadephul has positioned himself as outspoken and direct, sharply criticizing the previous Scholz government’s hesitant foreign policy, particularly its stance toward Russia, which he denounces as an actor willing to upend Europe’s security order and a direct threat to Germany. His security outlook is also shaped by his upbringing in Schleswig-Holstein, a region acutely aware of its frontline role in rising tensions with Moscow. The state’s Baltic Sea coast hosts critical ports, roads, and railways that sustain German deployments to the Baltics, making the Russian threat tangible. Two years ago, Wadephul gained a firsthand perspective on these dynamics when he participated in the NATO exercise “Griffin Storm” in Lithuania as part of his reserve service, an experience he said left a lasting impression on him.
This security-focused perspective underscores the sharp contrast with his predecessor, Annalena Baerbock (Alliance 90/The Greens), who faced persistent criticism from conservatives and the far-right AfD for her feminist foreign policy and development agenda. Wadephul, described by Politico as a “veteran conservative and defense policy expert,” is setting a different course and has pledged to pursue a foreign policy purely guided by security, national interests, and economic priorities.
“The Future of Europe is Being Decided in Ukraine”
In an address to his staff at the Foreign Office, Wadephul stressed that “the future of Europe is being decided in Ukraine.” His firm stance includes a clear condemnation of Russia’s aggression and initial opposition to any territorial concessions, declaring that “violence must not be allowed to shift borders.” As the war continues, however, he acknowledged that Ukraine may ultimately have to prepare for certain compromises. He has pledged to work toward ending the conflict and expressed hope that the recent Gaza peace initiative will serve as a signal for renewed U.S. efforts under Trump to push Russia back to the negotiating table. To sustain a future peace, Wadephul has openly discussed the need for security guarantees for Ukraine, stressing that Germany must play a central role. Aware of the sobering reality of the state of Germany’s defenses, he admitted that the country will most likely not be able to send troops but will instead provide financial aid, technical assistance, and military equipment.
This pragmatic stance reflects how much Wadephul’s position on Russia has hardened since before the war. In 2021, he defended the continuation of Nord Stream 2 construction, presenting it as a stabilizing interdependence in line with Germany’s long-standing “Wandel durch Handel” (change through trade) approach—now merely a pipedream. In a guest essay in Der Tagesspiegel at the time, he stressed Russia’s European identity and called for diplomacy that balanced firmness with cooperation on shared interests. That perspective shifted dramatically with the full-scale invasion. In recent statements, Wadephul has urged stronger pressure and sanctions on Moscow, warning that Russia must be reminded of the economic and political power the free world can unleash, if provoked further.
His view on China has also shifted. While Germany’s 2023 National Security Strategy described China as partner, competitor, and systemic rival, Wadephul goes further, explicitly linking Beijing to the war in Ukraine by accusing it of aiding Russia’s war effort. He has urged China to use its influence to end the conflict and condemned its increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
Staatsräson and the Gaza Dilemma
Because of its past, Germany remains, as John Kampfner described in Politico, “confused and paralyzed in its approach to the Middle East”. The CDU/CSU traditionally emphasizes strong support for Israel, and Germany is the second-largest supplier of arms to the country. While Wadephul firmly upholds Israel’s right to self-defense, he has increasingly expressed concern about the humanitarian situation in Gaza––a sentiment that aligns with growing public criticism of Israel’s military campaign, as reflected in recent surveys. The SPD, Germany’s center-left coalition partner, has also adopted a more critical stance, calling for the recognition of a Palestinian state and exerting pressure on the Union, which has so far expressed opposition to it. Chancellor Merz, hitherto a staunchly pro-Israel leader, has questioned whether Israel’s actions can realistically achieve its stated war aims of eliminating Hamas and freeing hostages. However, he remains one of the few European leaders opposed to Palestinian statehood and has voiced little open criticism of Israel’s leadership. Wadephul has largely followed Merz’s line, offering cautious criticism within the broader conservative framing. In September, the foreign minister described the worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza as “becoming more unbearable each and every day” and called Israel’s attack on Hamas targets in Qatar as “unacceptable.”
Wadephul has also acknowledged the scale of destruction in Gaza and the need for reconstruction and a durable peace. Speaking in Paris in October 2025, he emphasized the urgency of delivering aid and reiterated that the long-term goal must ultimately be a two-state solution. A strong proponent of international institutions, he has proposed UN peacekeeping missions and the development of a legal framework for postwar governance. He has also highlighted Germany’s role in Gaza’s reconstruction, an idea that has found support across both CDU/CSU and SPD. Following the signing of the twenty-point peace deal in Egypt, Wadephul, in true northern-German fashion, only cautiously celebrated the agreement, calling it a historic day but emphasizing that it can only be the beginning and that Hamas must be disarmed and excluded from future political influence. He urged Palestinians to distance themselves from the organization and “cast off terror” to secure a better future for Gaza.
Rooted in Germany’s historical responsibility rather than mere partisan politics, it remains to be seen whether the self-imposed commitment to Israel’s security—framed as the Staatsräson and particularly emphasized by conservatives—will evolve into a reassessment of Israel’s policies in Gaza and Germany’s role in supporting a future two-state solution.
“One Has to Be a Transatlanticist”
“Decades-old certainties have evaporated. Our transatlantic relationship is changing,” the foreign minister acknowledges. Still, belief in the United States as an indispensable partner in security and trade endures. Wadephul remains a firm advocate of NATO, insisting that “one has to be a transatlanticist.” Even as ties with Washington face deep strain under the second Trump administration, Germany’s relationship to the United States and commitment to NATO, voiced in classic CDU tone, appears non-negotiable for the foreign minister. Notably, Wadephul was among the first to publicly raise the prospect of increasing military spending goals to 5 percent of GDP, an unprecedented leap from the current level just above 2 percent. His commitment to NATO reflects his broader support for international organizations, particularly the EU and UN, and his emphasis on international law and multilateral institutions. He also backed Germany’s bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, though he concedes that the Council today is paralyzed, more a stage for disputes than a forum for decisions. With international law under strain and multilateralism faltering, Wadephul frames NATO and transatlantic cooperation as essential anchors of German foreign policy.
Without Freedom, Everything is Nothing
For Wadephul, freedom is not an abstract value but the central pillar of his foreign policy, anchoring prosperity, security and Germany’s role in the world. He views freedom as both political liberty and strategic resilience, warning against dangerous dependencies and underscoring prosperity as a prerequisite for security. Quoting Sebastian Haffner in September this year, he reminded heads of German missions abroad that “freedom is never comfortable—but without it, everything is nothing.” Yet Germany’s freedom and resilience are increasingly under threat: from Russia’s war of aggression, China’s coercive policies, an isolationist America, fragile multilateral institutions, and the rise of extremist parties at home and throughout Europe. Whether Wadephul can confront these uncomfortable truths and usher in a more confident German foreign policy, rooted in freedom, security, and prosperity, remains uncertain. The window of opportunity is wider than in decades past, but the headwinds are equally strong. What is certain is that the moment calls for German leadership, especially in Europe, and a new course in foreign policy.