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The Case for a German Grand Strategy
Frederik Fink
Halle Foundation/AGI Intern
Frederik Fink is a summer 2025 Halle Foundation Intern at the American-German Institute. Originally from Frankfurt, Germany, he recently completed a bachelor’s degree in history and international relations at King’s College London. His studies focused on the intersection between history and international politics as well as U.S. and UK foreign policy and national security and Russian politics and culture. His undergraduate thesis examined Germany’s policy toward the Western European Union (WEU), analyzing it through the lens of the agency-versus-structure dichotomy.
Frederik has a particular interest in the evolution of German foreign and security policy as well as the dynamics of German-U.S. relations. In 2022, he volunteered with Mission Siret, delivering humanitarian aid to southern Ukraine.
The early morning hours of February 24, 2022, shocked many German citizens and politicians. War on the European continent had been perceived as a relic of the past; the notion of the “end of history,” heralded in 1989, was shattered into pieces by the Kremlin.
In response, the German government attempted a course correction—most notably through the proclamation of the Zeitenwende—to restore coherence and direction in its foreign and security policy. Since then, both Chancellors Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz have continued to work, albeit both with some drawbacks, to rearm Germany and re-establish its strategic posture. To do so, Germany needs a grand strategy. It is a fundamental component of statecraft, as it reconciles, or at least attempts to reconcile, “a state’s highest objectives with its finite resources.”[1] In these turbulent times, it has emerged as an indispensable instrument for governments to navigate geopolitical uncertainty and systemic disruption. Additionally, grand strategy helps to utilize taxpayers’ money efficiently, makes the state more likely to achieve its core duties, and, in the face of danger, allocates resources effectively.
Thus, Germany needs a grand strategy to assert a “degree of control and coherence in [its] dealings with a very unruly world.”[2] This will not only require strategic clarity but also tough prioritization and sustained engagement with the public.
A Break with the Past
However, formulating a grand strategy would be a novelty for post-war Germany. During the Cold War, fundamental questions regarding security and the future of the Federal Republic of Germany had to be decided with the victorious powers of World War II, who were Germany’s allies. The indelible trauma of the NS-regime compounded the dearth of strategic thinking. After reunification, the belief in a peaceful, post-historical world further diminished the perceived need for strategic foresight or the use of force. Instead, officials placed their bets on multilateralism and international norms and rules.
Despite a shortage of grand strategic documents, figures like Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Schmidt recognized the imperative of thinking strategically. For Schmidt, strategic thinking in government was essential because “a readiness for reality is necessary if our will for peace is to prevail.” Maintaining the cold peace and ensuring the prosperity of West Germany could not be achieved through hopes and illusions. Instead, it was the “rational realization of possibilities instead of emotional imaginations.”[3] This clear-eyed approach should serve as the foundation for a future German grand strategy.
The Integrated National Security Strategy: Is It a Grand Strategy?
The Scholz cabinet acknowledged the importance of thinking strategically in their 2021 coalition agreement and attempted to write a national security strategy. Published in 2023, it is the result of political compromises between three parties that traditionally diverged starkly on questions of foreign and security policy. According to Paul Lettow, such a grand strategic document “should start with laying out the most critical national interests: the physical security of the nation and its people,” as well as “the maintenance of the country’s constitutional system and values.”
Based on Lettow’s definition, the traffic light coalition attempted—but fell short of—those objectives as well as the overarching strategy to achieve them. As Marina Henke points out, Germany’s national security strategy includes copious vague (and sometimes conflicting) goals without clearly addressing the trade-offs between them. For example, the government’s goal is to protect Germany and its allies. Concurrently, it aims to increase domestic prosperity through expanding social spending—pulling resources in opposing directions and straining fiscal resources.
Additionally, Germany’s national security strategy does not include a thorough threat analysis or assess the intentions of China and Russia. It describes Russia as the greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic space for the foreseeable future; however, Thomas Dörfler observes that the strategy lacks a detailed analysis of that threat.
Are Parliamentary Democracies Able to Do Grand Strategy?
The difficulty of defining priorities and addressing trade-offs raises the question of whether parliamentary democracies can write grand strategy. Sweden proves that it is possible. Sweden’s National Security Strategy begins by accentuating that “no task is more important for central government than protecting Sweden’s freedom, peace, and security.” It continues that it is the “vital national security interest… to safeguard Sweden’s security, democratic form of governance, freedom, independence, sovereignty, and freedom of action.” In addition to naming Russia as the most existential threat to Sweden, the strategy characterizes Russia as a nation considering itself to be in permanent conflict with the Western world; Russia does not conceal its aspiration to establish a new European security architecture based on spheres of influence by exploiting fissures between NATO and EU members. These are far more profound observations than those encapsulated in the German national security strategy.
Building an Effective Strategy Document
Chancellor Merz’s head of chancellery Thorsten Frei announced that the government will update the national security strategy. What core principles should guide such a strategy?
First, avoiding strategic trade-offs undermines effective policymaking. When leaders fail to acknowledge what must be sacrificed to reach specific goals, they risk promoting unrealistic expectations. In the enduring “guns versus butter” debate, Chancellor Merz has been seeking to strike a balance between competing financial-political priorities. However, any meaningful rearmament will require cuts in social spending, as it runs the risk of jeopardizing Germany’s creditworthiness.
While the budget gap for 2026 is projected to be around €30 billion, the cumulative shortfall between 2027 and 2029 is expected to reach €172 billion, primarily driven by surging social expenditures. By 2029, social costs are projected to rise by €43 billion—second only to defense spending. This surge highlights the urgent need for structural reforms in key pillars such as the pension system and social security where existing pressures make reform unavoidable. A continuation of the status quo is fiscally unsustainable.
Effective communication with society must constitute the third core principle guiding the development of a new strategy.
Second, a clear understanding of threats can guide future strategic reassessments. Currently, the vague narrative of the German national security strategy—that the world is becoming more multipolar and systemic rivalry will reshape the existing international order—risks leading to misguided or ineffective strategic responses and a superficial understanding of what drives adversarial state action. Here, history can serve as a beneficial vehicle. Reflecting on his time in office, Henry Kissinger remarked that knowledge of history is essential “for understanding how different people see the world, and also for knowing something about the limits of the possible.” Indeed, policy decisions alone rarely determine the course of world affairs; more often, they are shaped by deeper, long-running historical currents and culture. This should be considered by policymakers when assessing the main adversary’s objectives and driving agenda. Cognizance of these factors can subsequently not only justify why costly decisions ought to be made, but also ascertain which means are the most effective in response to imminent threats. As Henke aptly notes, “Good grand strategy… also involves considering one’s capabilities and competencies in comparison to others.”
This has become particularly important regarding Russia, which has been waging a full-scale war for over three years against Ukraine, justifying its aggression by framing Ukraine’s independent foreign policy as a threat to its security. In its 2023 foreign policy concept, Russia reaffirmed this position by describing its actions as an effort to establish peace and stability within its “near abroad.” “Foreign influence,” ostensibly from NATO and the EU, endangers regional stability, traditional values, and its socio-economic order. These claims serve as the basis for subverting the status quo in neighbouring states. Meanwhile, Russia has significantly expanded its armed forces and begun producing weapons at a scale that exceeds the needs of its war in Ukraine, which is pointing to broader ambitions beyond the current conflict. Although its goals are partially veiled, they remain discernible yet are not reflected in Germany’s strategy.
The Populist Pitfall
However, implementing grand strategy has become more difficult due to the erosion of public support and political fragmentation. Additionally, the animosity toward experts emanating from populist forces erodes the government’s intellectual foundations and diminishes their influence in strategic debates. Consequently, as Tom Nichols warns, “if the experts as a whole are discredited, we are faced with an inexhaustible supply of quackery.” Conduits between citizens and experts are vital and instill confidence. However, “when that trust collapses, experts and laypeople become warring factions.”[4]
Accordingly, effective communication with society must constitute the third core principle guiding the development of a new strategy. It enables the implementation of strategy and, when done effectively, convinces the public of the government’s strategy. Especially in an age when false narratives, populist politicians’ sympathy for the Russian Federation, and politically motivated disinformation spread rapidly across social media, legitimizing grand strategies is essential. Grand strategy, according to Stacie Goddard, “only becomes legitimate when leaders articulate the reasons why policies are justifiable, and only if audiences accept those claims.”[5] This is also crucial for maintaining societal cohesion. In the absence of a mobilized public within which to negotiate a collective sense of purpose and construct a national identity, grand strategy remains weak and inconsistent. Ultimately, nations that lack a unified public will, strategic clarity, and internal cohesion fail to present a credible deterrent to adversaries. Therefore, the message of the German government, as economist Robin Brooks commented, “should be that the deteriorating geopolitical environment has come to stay.” Engaging think tanks, inviting citizens to dialogue sessions, and expanding projects, such as the Munich Security Conference’s “Zeitenwende on Tour,” can act as a facilitator and platform to exchange opinions and clarify policy.
Moving beyond Fear
Public support remains robust, with sixty-five percent of Germans endorsing the stipulated five percent benchmark for military expenditure and the broader program of German rearmament. This, however, should not deceive policymakers into thinking that formulating and communicating a grand strategy will be easy. Instead, they must expect domestic resistance. Assessing how to increase support for its trajectory will bolster legitimacy and clarity, which ultimately rests on analyzing Russia’s motivations and objectives.
It will require strong leadership, unpopular decisions, and constant messaging to navigate the turbulent geopolitical waters ahead and chart a new course, especially if an economic turnaround fails to materialize and the call for more social spending and rapprochement with Russia intensifies.
[1] Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy?: Power and Purpose in American Statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush (Cornell University Press, 2014), 7; Centre for Grand Strategy, Case Studies for the Integrated Review, Part II, 15.
[2] Brands, What Good is Grand Strategy, 190.
[3] Helmut Schmidt, Strategie des Gleichgewichts (Seewald Verlag, 1969), 20.
[4] Daniel W. Drezner, “Grand Strategy in a Fractured Marketplace,” in The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, eds. Thierry Balzacq, Ronald R. Krebs (Oxford University Press, 2021), 663.
[5] Stacie E. Goddard, “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy (Oxford University Press, 2021), 322.
