Steffen Prößdorf via Wikimedia Commons
Chancellor Merz’s Key Choices on German Foreign and Security Policy
Phyllis Berry
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Phyllis Berry is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American-German Institute. She was the National Intelligence Officer for Europe from June 2021 until March 2025. She also served at the National Intelligence Council as Acting NIO for Europe from July 2017 through April 2018, Deputy NIO from April 2018 through July 2020, and senior advisor on governance for the NIC’s Strategic Futures Group during 2015-16. She authored the European futures papers for the 2017 and 2021 NIC Global Trends reports. From late 2014 to mid-2015 she was Director for Ukraine at the National Security Council. Dr. Berry has a Ph.D. in comparative politics from Georgetown University and has taught European comparative politics, French politics, German politics, and comparative leadership.
This is the second of a three-part series addressing German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s approach to foreign and security policy and initial actions, the key issues Merz faces through the end of the year, and his efforts to reform the foreign and security policy process in Germany.
So far, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has largely stuck to the foreign and security policies of the previous government while improving its presentation and coordination with European counterparts. Germany, however, is facing key decisions in the coming months concerning Ukraine’s future, the shape of Germany’s armed forces, a new European security architecture, and the ability of the EU to advance the region’s political coherence and global influence. The chancellor will almost certainly need to go beyond current policy to address these issues and build political support to show that Germany is ready to take substantive action to defend Ukraine and increase Europe’s ability to act more assertively.
Ukraine
As Merz has repeatedly emphasized, Russia’s continued war on Ukraine remains Europe’s most urgent security threat, while U.S. efforts to secure a deal to end the conflict are forcing European governments to provide a concrete plan on how they will support Ukraine whatever the outcome. Merz has been publicly supportive of Trump’s diplomatic efforts while questioning Russia’s motivations and emphasizing the need for a ceasefire as soon as possible. On August 28, Merz publicly dismissed the likelihood that Zelenskyy and Putin would meet any time soon, and Merz has repeatedly lobbied Trump to respond to continued Russian strikes with new sanctions. Germany has also participated in Coalition of the Willing talks about how to support Ukraine should a ceasefire or peace deal be struck.
- If a ceasefire is achieved, the pressure on Germany to participate in any coalition effort will be enormous. Merz has said publicly that Germany will fulfill its responsibilities but has previously excluded the possibility of sending German troops to Ukraine, and he would have to overcome considerable skepticism within his Social Democratic (SPD) coalition partner and his own Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary caucus and parties to do so. In addition, the issue of German provision of Taurus long-range missiles—which Merz once publicly demanded be supplied to Ukraine but now avoids discussing—could re-emerge as a possible element of a security guarantee for Ukraine in which the missiles would be supplied should Russia break a future ceasefire agreement.
- In the more likely case that the war continues, Merz and other European officials will need to consider how best to support Ukraine, particularly if the United States fails to impose significant new penalties on Russia. Pressure to supply Taurus missiles would likely increase in this situation. The need to make up for the lack of new U.S. funding will probably also force Germany to reconsider its opposition to transferring Russian sovereign funds held in Belgium or at least to support moving assets to an EU special fund that could gain greater returns to help fund Ukraine.
- Berlin and Paris are proposing stronger EU sanctions aimed at Russian energy in the nineteenth round of EU sanctions now being discussed. This effort would close gaps and target third parties facilitating Russian energy sales but only partially addresses White House demands that Europe stop relying on Russian energy, even indirectly, and impose tariffs on China and India for their purchase of Russian oil. How hard and how far Berlin will push for new sanctions will be an important indicator of the degree of change in Germany’s approach to Ukraine.
With the United States moving away from providing Ukraine military assistance, Berlin also will need to ramp up its military support. Since May, the government has shifted its approach to more joint ventures with Ukraine, along with directly financing Ukrainian production—the so-called Danish model that leverages Ukraine’s ability to produce weapons less expensively while also aiding its economy. In May, Berlin signed an agreement to fund the production of long-range unmanned strike drones in Ukraine, with Germany providing components for their production. At the same time, Germany is part of the NATO-coordinated effort to finance the purchase of U.S. weaponry for Ukraine, and Germany is the largest European provider of U.S. Patriot anti-aircraft systems to Ukraine. The question of how to balance these two efforts will almost certainly be tied to the prospect of continued U.S. support for Ukraine.
Strengthening the Bundeswehr
Bundestag passage this fall of draft legislation to modernize the Bundeswehr would represent a significant step forward in realizing Merz’s goal of revitalizing the German armed services, but differences over the reintroduction of conscription as well as the need for further bureaucratic reform could slow the process. Germany has promised NATO to increase its armed forces from its current size of just over 180,000 soldiers to 260,000 troops and move from its current stable of 35,000 active reservists to 200,000 by around 2035.
- The coalition parties remain divided on the draft proposal’s reliance on volunteers, and Foreign Minister Wadephul (CDU) initially put a hold on the draft because of its lack of an automatic return to conscription if the Bundeswehr cannot recruit sufficient numbers. Wadephul withdrew his hold, reportedly at the behest of Merz, but CDU/CSU caucus members have insisted that they will demand changes to the legislation in the Bundestag. SPD Minister of Defense Pistorius argues that the first priority should be developing the infrastructure and personnel to train an increased number of recruits and making service more attractive, as the legislation does through increased pay and benefits. Merz has suggested that the coalition can reexamine the issue at a later date should the Bundeswehr fail to generate the requisite numbers, but renewed coalition bickering in the Bundestag would damage Merz’s efforts to show a single united security policy.
Merz now needs to show that Germany will take the steps necessary to defend Ukraine and increase Europe’s ability to act more assertively.
- The explosion in the cost of military equipment will increasingly burden Bundeswehr procurement plans and reduce what Germany gets for its spending. Germany has not been supportive of proposals for more EU-centric procurement, which is also likely to undercut the development of a truly European military industrial base. The public’s longstanding discomfort with debt suggests that resistance could grow to the government’s plan to rely heavily on borrowing, particularly if it cannot show significant increases in capabilities.
- A less discussed issue is how to increase the percentage of Bundeswehr personnel who are deployed in the field. Germany’s difficulty in staffing its brigade in Lithuania—the biggest symbol of its commitment to NATO allies—reflects this weakness. So far, soldiers are mainly stationed in Germany and rotate into Lithuania for exercises.
European Security
Merz continues to see NATO and a U.S. presence as essential to European security, and the government is prioritizing efforts to show that Germany—and Europe—will take more responsibility in NATO to address what he has called European free-riding. Merz has shown little interest in alternative security arrangements, such as shifting to a more EU-centric security architecture, and Merz sees the United Kingdom and Norway as central to European security. Merz therefore prioritizes strengthening a European core in NATO, while using bilateral and mini-lateral cooperation to address specific security challenges. Merz has highlighted improved cooperation with France and Poland bilaterally and together as the Weimar Triangle, although newly inaugurated Polish President Karol Nawrocki’s polemics against Germany could complicate such cooperation. Germany has probably most increased its defense cooperation with its northern allies. In August, a German ship for the first time patrolled the Arctic, which followed the launch in June of a new North Atlantic security partnership with Canada, Denmark, and Norway. Berlin also signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements with the United Kingdom and Norway in July.
The Role of the European Union
Merz has shown little inclination to change the substance of Germany’s approach to the EU, in which its proclamations of support for further political and economic integration belie a more skeptical, interest-based approach. For example, Merz has continued his predecessors’ skepticism toward increasing the EU’s fiscal powers, including the introduction of defense eurobonds. On migration, Germany has followed the letter of EU law to avoid directly violating EU rules but has bent them to close borders. Merz argues that Europe must improve its competitiveness and reduce EU regulation, such as by loosening environmental standards and rescinding the Supply Chain Act altogether. He has expressed support for the reform proposals of former ECB President Draghi but so far has not pushed for the completion of the single market or deepened capital markets.
Merz has promised to Europeanize Germany’s approach to China and has criticized China’s support for Russia as well as its aggressive economic tactics. Whether he will adhere to these statements is less clear, particularly in light of his close ties to German business. Merz is likely to travel to China by the end of the fall. The degree to which he speaks frankly about China’s support for Russia and predatory trade tactics and the size and nature of the delegation that travels with him will be key indicators of whether Merz will truly support Commission President von der Leyen’s harder line approach to relations with China.
The United States
Merz shocked German political observers earlier this year with his public questioning of U.S. reliability, and although he has toned down his rhetoric, he has also stated that he continues to see the United States as a less reliable partner. In interviews for the German press, he has been careful but clear that he finds President Trump’s approach to Russia troubling. At the same time, Europe’s dependence on the U.S. security guarantee via NATO and the degree of interconnections between the two economies have propelled Merz to continue to try to stay aligned with Trump. In the U.S.-EU tariff dispute, Merz has sought to protect German interests and pressed for a quick deal while opposing the use of retaliatory measures. He has defended von der Leyen’s handling of negotiations, calling the framework agreement painful but better than a trade war.
Merz has strongly supported fellow allies such as Canada and Denmark that face pressure from the United States as well as Commission efforts to pursue trade and investment agreements with other key economies. Public opinion polling indicates that Christian Democratic voters are critical of the U.S. administration and support a harder line toward Washington. U.S. demands for new concessions from the EU on trade or from NATO in support of Ukraine could lead Merz to take a more assertive stance. He reportedly was ready to support the use of EU retaliatory measures in July if a U.S.-EU trade deal had not been struck. Over the medium term, Merz will need to define how much he is willing to do to try to keep the United States in versus building Germany and Europe’s ability to act more independently.
As Merz has repeatedly emphasized, Germany’s position in the center of Europe requires it to play a leadership role in NATO and the EU. He now needs to show that Germany will take the steps necessary to enable Europe to better support Ukraine, defend European economic interests, and develop capabilities that will allow the region to better defend itself.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
