Operation Plan Germany

Tim Stuchtey

Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security; German University of Digital Science

Dr. Tim H. Stuchtey is a Geoeconomics Non-Resident Senior Fellow at AGI. He is the executive director of the Brandenburgisches Institut für Gesellschaft und Sicherheit (BIGS), a homeland security think-tank based in Potsdam, Germany. He is also Professor for Economics of Cybersecurity at the German University of Digital Science in Potsdam. He has served as Director of AGI's Business & Economics Program. He works on various issues concerning economic policy, the economy of security, the classic German ‘Ordnungspolitik,’ and the economics of higher education.

Dr. Stuchtey studied economics with a major in international trade and international management and graduated in 1995 from the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster. In 2001 he earned a Ph.D. from the Technische Universität Berlin in economics, which he obtained for his work in public finance and higher education policy. He worked as an economist for the German Employers Association and as a university administrator both at Technische and Humboldt-Universität Berlin. He was also the managing director for the Humboldt Institution on Transatlantic Issues, a Berlin-based think tank affiliated with Humboldt-Universität.

He has published a number of articles, working papers, and books on the security industry, homeland and cybersecurity issues, higher education governance and finance and on other questions of the so-called ‘Ordnungspolitik.’

Defense Is More Than Tanks and Drones

Roughly a year ago, the German government took a significant step in the realm of homeland defense by adopting the classified “Operationsplan Deutschland” (Operation Plan Germany). This document outlines a sobering yet critical roadmap: how Germany must function domestically in the event of a full-scale war with Russia. It details logistical support by Germany for military allies, the protection and maintenance of infrastructure, and the continued operation of the economy under the strain of war. In essence, it paints a picture of a nation on a war footing. Yet disturbingly, almost no tangible progress has been made since its unveiling.

Despite the clear urgency, efforts to modernize Germany’s critical infrastructure to meet the demands of war remain stagnant. The Operation Plan calls for the country to prepare its railways, roads, and bridges to ensure that heavy military equipment—especially from NATO allies arriving through Dutch and Belgian ports—can be swiftly and efficiently transported to the eastern front in Poland and the Baltics. This is a crucial cog in NATO’s deterrence machinery. But without shovels in the ground and asphalt being laid, the plan remains theoretical, not operational.

Even before being elected as chancellor by the Bundestag, in a landmark political move, Friedrich Merz and his conservative bloc partnered with the Social Democrats and Greens to amend the German constitution, effectively nullifying the debt brake that has long constrained federal spending. This multiparty cooperation has opened the financial floodgates, enabling the new government to pour resources into defense without having to reform Germany’s overburdened social state. Merz has just recently agreed to raise defense spending to an unprecedented 5 percent of GDP—3.5 percent for core military functions and 1.5 percent for hardening national infrastructure.

This financial commitment is a necessary foundation, but it will be meaningless without a radical overhaul of how Germany builds. Its bureaucratic red tape and glacial permitting processes are infamous. Projects that should take months routinely take years, sometimes decades (just remember the Berlin airport). If Germany is to be combat-ready by 2029—the date by which military planners expect Russia could be poised to challenge NATO territory—it must act now to streamline regulations and slash red tape. Infrastructure projects related to national security must receive fast-track status. Ministries must coordinate instead of competing. Approvals must be granted swiftly. The clock is ticking.

But the responsibility to prepare for potential conflict cannot rest solely on the shoulders of the government or the Bundeswehr. National defense in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society effort. Every German must be prepared to play a role. And they need to be (made) aware of this.

Companies, in particular, need to assess and prepare for their wartime responsibilities. The Operation Plan Deutschland should not be treated as an obscure state document for military insiders. It must become a living document, embedded in the fabric of civil society. Human resources departments should identify which of their employees are reservists who may be called to serve; which are essential to keep factories, supply chains, and services running; and which can assist in facilitating the movement of allied forces through Germany. Business continuity plans must incorporate scenarios of armed conflict, cyberattacks, and the disruption of logistics. Industry must become an active participant in national resilience planning.

The same goes for civil society and individuals. Public awareness campaigns, civil defense training, and widespread information on what to expect and how to act during a crisis must become part of Germany’s strategic culture. Instead of shying away from the possibility of war, Germans must face it with clarity and purpose. This is not fearmongering; it is deterrence. Demonstrating to Moscow that Germany is not only willing but fully prepared to defend its territory and support its allies reduces the likelihood that Putin will ever make such a gamble.

National defense in the twenty-first century is a whole-of-society effort. Every German must be prepared to play a role.

History teaches us that wars are often born from miscalculations. The greatest contribution Germany can make to peace in Europe is to eliminate any ambiguity about its resolve and readiness. Russia must know that any move against NATO will be met with overwhelming force, unity, and capability. That message begins with Germany.

Europe cannot rely solely on American might for its security. The burden must be shared, and Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and logistical backbone, must lead by example. Its strategic location makes it indispensable in any NATO response. If Germany’s infrastructure fails, the alliance falters.

Therefore, the Merz government’s ambition must be matched by execution. Defense is more than buying tanks and drones. It is preparing bridges and rails, educating citizens, empowering companies, and reengineering bureaucracy for speed. Only then can Operation Plan Germany transform from an ambitious concept into a functional shield.

If Germany acts now with purpose and unity, we may never have to see the plan in action. That is the essence of deterrence. But if it hesitates and allows bureaucracy, apathy, and denial to reign, we risk waking up one day to find that time has run out.

The year 2029 is closer than it seems. Germany must rise to meet it—not with fear but with fierce, collective resolve. Defense, after all, begins at home.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American-German Institute.