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The Limits and Opportunities of Reconciliation with West Germany During the Cold War: A Comparative Analysis of France, Israel, Poland and Czechoslovakia

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INTRODUCTION

The seventieth anniversaries in 2015 of the end of World War II and the Holocaust have generated renewed interest in reconciliation and the question of whether the German and European experience holds lessons for Japan and East Asia. Much of the thinking on comparative lessons, developed in the last fifteen years, has focused on an idealized notion of Germany's successful international reconciliation. In the universe of reconciliation practice, Germany indeed stands out for its consistent, continuing and comprehensive confrontation with the past. A neglected topic, however, is the reality that Germany's reconciliation with former enemies has been a long, messy and non-linear process, punctuated by crises. The work on Germany as a model for reconciliation has almost exclusively focused on the perspective and actions of the perpetrator and much less on the victims' stance. The analysis here addresses these lacunae by examining the vicissitudes in how Germany's former enemies – France, Israel, Poland, Czechoslovakia -responded to post-war Germany, culminating in their reactions to the ultimate test of reconciliation's robustness: German unification.

The chapter has three purposes: an analysis of how the governments of the four countries dealt with the German Question from 1949-1990; an examination of the approaches of societal actors to Germany in the same period (itself an under-researched topic); and an understanding of the responses to Germany's unification process in 1989-1990. Together the three arenas reveal the complexity, variety and diversity of reconciliation.

I will show that "reconciliation" was the main governmental reaction to West Germany in a divided Europe, in highly developed, institutionalized fashion for France and for Israel, and in incipient form even for Poland after 1970; that societal actors, i.e. domestic forces, were a central dimension of reconciliation with Germany for France and Israel, and were important even in Poland and, to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia; that the international context of the Cold War helped determine the opportunities and limits of reconciliation; and that attitudes to German unification in all four cases were linked to the nature of reconciliation before 1989.

By "reconciliation" I mean the process of building long-term peace between former enemies through bilateral institutions across governments and societies. Reconciliation as a complex and complicated process involves the development of friendship, trust, empathy and magnanimity (not forgiveness). This concept does not infuse peace with a vision of harmony and tension-free coexistence, but rather integrates differences. Productive contention unfolds in a shared and cooperative framework that identifies and softens, but does not eliminate, divergence. Contention is a more realistic goal than perfect peace.[1]

By the "German Question," I mean three realities of German power determined by the period

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of elaboration: before 1945, united Germany as hegemonic, expansive, and militaristic; after 1945, Germany as divided, with its western part tamed and a “civilian power;”[2] after 1989, Germany reunified in a uniting Europe with its leadership largely accepted.

GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES, 1945-1990: FROM HATE AND ANTIPATHY TO FRIENDSHIP AND ACCEPTANCE

Regarding outside attitudes to the German Question, the four decades after the Federal Republic of Germany’s founding can be divided into two periods, the first defined by negative feelings ranging from hate to antipathy occasioned by Germany’s aggressive history; the second by more positive feelings ranging from friendship to acceptance. For France[3] and Israel, the change came quite quickly – by the early 1950s and in response to the emerging Cold War, whereas for Poland and Czechoslovakia, the change in perspective came later - by the early 1970s with West Germany’s Ostpolitik and détente. In the French and Israeli cases, visionary leadership on the part of Robert Schuman and David Ben-Gurion, and their positive interactions with Konrad Adenauer, also propelled a change in attitude. West Germany’s affinity for democracy would later reinforce this developing trust.

The Early Years

In the immediate post-war period, the impact of France’s 1940 defeat and the subsequent “viciousness” of German occupation meant French officialdom exhibited a punitive attitude toward Germany, described as a “hatred of Germany that left little room for forgiveness or reconciliation.”[4]

Jews and Israel from 1945 until 1950 were largely silent about the past. The magnitude of the grief and hostility over the murder of six million Jews in the Holocaust silenced the Israelis from speaking out, and through boycott precluded their dealing concretely with Germany: “Many Israelis still identified Adenauer’s Germany with Hitler’s, rejecting any contact with it as contact with the devil,” resulting in the government’s commitment “not [to] enter into any legal or economic negotiations with any German body.”[5]

In the first two decades after World War II, West Germany and Poland were separated by mutual suspicion; the Cold War’s competing power blocs; and absolute psychological and structural non-recognition.[6] The immense Polish suffering of occupation during World War II, culminating in the loss of over six million Poles (three million of whom were Jewish), fueled a widespread antipathy toward Germany: “Every [Polish] government that wanted to elicit understanding for its policy toward Germany had to pay attention to the public’s feelings of hate, fear and rejection...deriving from the experience with Nazi terror.”[7]

The Polish government appeared to cultivate broad fears of a revanchist Germany dedicated to the return of the “Eastern territories” ceded to Poland at the end of World War II, and memories of Germany’s historical role in the denial of Polish nationhood beginning at the end of the eighteenth century. As with the Czechoslovak government, for the Polish government, the Soviet Union was the protector against a revanchist West German state.

For much of the period 1945-1989, Germans and Czechs were separated physically and psychologically because of the Cold War and because of a complicated thousand-year history of awkward co-existence in which Germany would not recognize Czech independence or nationhood and Czechoslovakia had difficulty accommodating its German minority.[8] Their mutual past was destroyed by the 1938 Munich Agreement. The subsequent German

occupation was characterized by Nazi atrocities, of which the June 1942 liquidation of the Czech village of Lidice, what Czech president Vaclav Klaus called “a monstrous crime,” was the nadir.[9] The German occupation engendered a “pathological hatred.”[10] After 1945, fears of German revanchism and aggression were widespread in Czechoslovakia, available to the Communist government to bolster state identity within the Soviet bloc

Formalized Change

France: Settlement of Historical Issues

As France realized that the Anglo-American plans for post-war West Germany were unstoppable and cooperation with the Soviet Union was unproductive, it began to pursue policies to anchor Germany bilaterally and multilaterally, and Germany complied with a consistent willingness to bind itself in European institutions. Despite the residue of fear, French early acceptance of a new Germany could be seen in the French readiness to use the term “reconciliation” both officially, for example by Robert Schuman, and unofficially, for example by Joseph Rovan.[11]

The change in official relations was expressed in three ways: (1) through formal settlement of issues resulting from history and from World War II; (2) through the institutionalization of new bilateral ties; and (3) through the development of the Franco-German tandem in the framework of the European Community (EC)/European Union (EU). Although not an obstacle to new ties, history, and the concomitant fear of German power, did not evaporate completely from official thinking after 1950. It was particularly apparent in the views of de Gaulle and of François Mitterrand, and in French policies concerning a number of issues with Germany: the Federal Republic’s place in the European Community in the 1950s and 1960s; *Ostpolitik* in the 1970s; American missiles in Germany and German unification at the beginning and end of the 1980s; German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the German position on EU Eastern enlargement in the 1990s.

The formal settlement of issues of Germany’s sovereignty and territory occurred in the 1954 Paris Agreements, and the 1956 signing of the Saar Treaty. By the next decade, Germany sought to address another domain of World War II vestiges: compensation for Nazi crimes.[12]

France: Institutionalization of Ties

The 1963 Elysée Treaty both settled the past and codified the future institutionalization of ties.[13] The treaty amplified the ongoing policy exchanges and dialogue by providing for regular meetings of heads of state and government, of foreign ministers and defense ministers and the chiefs of staff of the armed forces, and for a Franco-German Youth Office.

The development of Franco-German governmental institutions in the period 1963-1990 can be defined across two periods: 1963-1988 when, apart from governmental meetings (which were in and of themselves highly important), the Elysée Treaty seemed largely moribund; and 1988-1990, when provisions in the original Treaty were acted upon through the creation of bilateral institutions in defense, economics, finance, culture, the environment; there was the initiation of an exchange of bureaucrats serving in the other country as though they were nationals; and policy preferences demonstrated high levels of friendship and trust.

From the beginning of France’s new approach to Germany by 1950, its German policy was encased in a West European perspective, which both embedded the Federal Republic and codified the division of Germany and Europe. The 1950 Schuman Plan and Pleven Plan presented a moral antidote to the tragedy of three wars since 1870 and a practical sense of how to bind

Germany and secure France; the Assemblée Nationale's 1954 defeat of the latter plan's concrete expression, the European Defence Community, meant an even greater urgency to the EC's creation. Over the next four decades, France and Germany would start out frequently with major differences on issues of internal and external importance to the EC/EU, but would end up with sufficient agreement to articulate joint positions that advanced European integration.[14]

Israel: Partial Settlement of Historical Issues

The transformation of Israel's official attitude, like that in France, possessed both moral and pragmatic bases. Ben-Gurion argued, quoting the Bible, that Germany should not rob, pillage and murder without consequence. Israeli leaders also concluded, after exploring a variety of alternatives, that ultimately Germany was the only resource for major infusions into the fledgling, highly fragile Israeli economy. Just as France initiated the Schuman Plan to reconfigure the old structure of relations, Israel initiated change through diplomatic Notes of January 16, and March 12, 1951, asking the four powers for compensation from Germany (at this time it refused to deal with Germany directly), that helped cut through the silence, provoking Adenauer's September 1951statement to the Bundestag.

The Cold War influenced Israel's subsequent decision to deal with Germany directly: by the early 1950s, it was clear that the potential for a relationship with the Soviet Union (following the latter's early recognition of Israel) was hollow, and Israel needed international partners, even Germany.[15] Unlike the French, Israelis did not at the time, or until recently, utilize the term "reconciliation," preferring "rapprochement," "special relationship," "understanding," or "cooperation."[16] More than in the French case, history was indelible, rendering Israeli officialdom keenly sensitive to any expression of German anti-Semitism and concerned about perceived anti-Israeli policies, such as Germany's official neutral position in the 1973 OAPEC oil embargo; support for Palestinian self-determination beginning in the early 1970s; or the 1981 planned sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia. Caution toward Germany was particularly pronounced in the governments of Menachem Begin, who had actively and vehemently led the opposition to relations with Germany in the early 1950s.

As in the French case, the process of official reconciliation entailed the trio of settlement; institutionalization; and Europeanization. Israel's willingness to accept Adenauer's September 1951 offer of negotiations over restitution and reparations led to the 1952 Luxemburg Reparations Agreement that entailed the payment of reparations to the state as goods and services and payments to Jews worldwide, 40% of whom were in Israel. Categories of Jewish victims, who were omitted from compensation arrangements during the Cold War, such as slave and forced laborers, were finally addressed after unification.

Israeli grievances deriving from the Holocaust were profound, and German goods in kind and monetary payments could not reduce pain and suffering, but they did indicate to Germany's victims an acceptance of responsibility for Nazi crimes. And, a divided Germany was seen by Israelis both as punishment for the Holocaust and a reassurance that Germany was contained. Yet, while beginning a process in the early 1950s of acknowledging grievances, Germany generated new grievances over diplomatic relations, by refusing Israel formal ties until 1965 for fear that such an act would incur Arab recognition of East Germany, resulting in the severing of West German ties with Arab countries, in line with West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine that insisted the Federal Republic was the sole legitimate representative of the German nation. Germany compensated Israel for this absence of diplomatic recognition through financial aid

and arms supplies that, together with the economic ties emanating from the Reparations Agreement, were the forerunners of institutionalized ties.[17]

Israel: Institutionalization of Ties

The evolution of German-Israeli governmental institutions spans two periods: 1965-1980, when diplomatic relations facilitated the conclusion of numerous treaties and agreements; 1981-1989, when ties were consolidated and expanded to areas not previously covered.

For the sake of maintaining cordial relations with the Arab world, Germany's early development of institutional ties with the Israeli government often occurred behind closed doors or in a quiet fashion, in contrast to societal relations where friendship was openly displayed from the onset. Instead, there were secret agreements, treaties in specific areas, policy preferences and bi-national entities, all of which spawned regular visits of leaders and ministers for policy exchanges, coordination, and sometimes joint activity, and a process of trust.

As in the French case, the institutionalization of German-Israeli ties involved all areas of policy: defense, intelligence, economics, science, tourism, and culture, although the weight of history was still sufficiently heavy that by the time of German unification there was still no cultural treaty.

Ben Gurion's open policy toward West Germany beginning in the early 1950s was framed in terms of Germany's role in Western Europe. He appreciated that Israel's route to Europe would be through West Germany. He would not be disappointed. There was a number of instances in the EC/EU of Germany playing Israel's advocate, commencing with German support for Israel's attempts for a formal association with the EU in the late 1950s. Germany is credited for the dominant role in the EC's 1975 Free Trade Agreement with Israel. Politically, Germany has acted as a brake on EC policies in the diplomatic arena that have tended toward the Palestinian position, for example diluting the language of the Venice Declaration in 1980 and refusing to join the momentum for economic sanctions against Israel.

Poland: Incomplete Settlement of Historical Issues

France and Israel took formal initiatives in the early 1950s that demonstrated a change in attitude toward Germany, and then participated in an intricate minuet with a receptive Germany to fashion the structural basis for new relationships. In the Polish case, the government's change in perspective in the late 1960s was a response to a West German initiative, to Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* aimed at bringing about "change through rapprochement," which accepted the division of Germany and Europe but focused on mitigating some of the division's onerous consequences in the human dimension. At the 1968 SPD party conference in Nuremberg, Brandt advocated recognizing and respecting the Oder-Neisse Line (named after the Oder and Neisse rivers, forming Poland's western border with Germany after World War II).

For the development of Polish-German relations, settlement of issues and institutionalization followed the French and Israeli examples, but in a much more diluted form due to the Cold War. The third dimension of change, Europeanization, was a small factor for the Polish government (much more so for dissident groups) when the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in the mid-1970s provided an all-European venue for German-Polish dialogue.

The December 1970 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland on the Basis for Normalizing Their Relations, which acknowledged Poland as "the first

victim" of a murderous World War II, recognized the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border, but only *de facto* not *de jure*, and led to diplomatic relations.[18] The border issue was finally dealt with after unification, as were material compensation issues for Polish victims of slave and forced labor, whereas the question of expulsion of Germans from areas ceded to Poland after World War continued to complicate relations for many years after unification.

The Polish government did not have the same allergic reaction as Israelis did to the term "normalization," but did make clear that the process meant a German "moral duty" to deal with the past. The language of the 1970 Treaty did not contemplate "reconciliation," and Chancellor Brandt limited his use of the term to relations between peoples, not between states.

Poland: Partial Institutionalization of Ties

There are two discernible periods for the expansion of German-Polish institutional ties: 1970-1989, when the 1970 Treaty's new legal framework produced new institutions that were circumscribed by Polish communism; 1989 on, the beginning of the "golden years" of phenomenal bilateral growth in institutions, particularly following the 1991 Treaty.

German and Polish leaders seem to have had exaggerated expectations for the 1970s, and they were disappointed. Nonetheless, the 1970 treaty provided a framework for "constant consultations at the political level." By the end of the 1970s, "stagnation" in German-Polish relations became dominant politically and in economic affairs.[19]

Before Kohl's initiatives for German unification, the transition in Poland from communism to democracy attending the Tadeusz Mazowiecki government in August 1989 ushered in a new "breakthrough" period for German-Polish institutional relations.

Chancellor Kohl's November 1989 trip to Poland (interrupted by the fall of the Berlin Wall, but resumed) resulted in a joint German-Polish declaration announcing eleven governmental agreements that "increased considerably the possibilities for understanding and reconciliation."[20]

Czechoslovakia: Partial Settlement of Historical Issues

A real, though cautious, shift in Germany's acceptance of its history came with the conceptual and practical activities of Foreign Minister Willy Brandt, institutionalized in the April 1968 Prague visit of Egon Bahr (Brandt's trusted advisor) to Prague.[21] The Czech democratization process, crowned by the 1968 "Prague Spring," encouraged both sides, but it collapsed with the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. Reconciliation between Germany and Czechoslovakia would be retarded for two more decades.

Tentative settlement of some historical issues did occur in post-968 relations, and there was a modicum of institutionalization, but far less than in the Polish case. Europeanization of German-Czech ties would not be a concrete governmental goal until Vàclav Havel became president in December 1989.

The brutal 1968 invasion made Czechoslovakia more inaccessible to the West than any other state in the Soviet bloc. Nonetheless, after the 1970 German-Polish Treaty and the 1972 German-German Treaty, Germany was ready to approach Czechoslovakia for a new relationship. The negotiations leading to the 1973 Prague Treaty on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic were difficult due to the thorny and emotional issue of the 1938 Munich Agreement that had ceded the Sudetenland to

Germany.[22] Czechs, like Israelis, but unlike French and Polish leaders, did not warm to the term "reconciliation," preferring "straightening of ties."[23]

Although the treaty declared the Munich agreement invalid, it left the two sides to retain their own legal interpretation for the timing of that invalidition – the difference between the German *ex nunc* interpretation and the Czechoslovak *ex tunc* position, a difference that has implications for citizenship and compensation claims by Sudeten Germans through today.[24]

The 1973 Treaty was much clearer on the issue of territory: the two sides recognized the "inviolability of their common border," clarifying early a topic that bedeviled the German-Polish relationship until German unification.

It took nearly twenty years after the 1973 Treaty for Germany and Czechoslovakia to acknowledge formally their grievances in the February 1992 Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation – similar to a German-Polish Treaty of the same name from 1991. The treaty included recognition that the Czechoslovak state had never ceased to exist since 1918 and that minority rights be protected. The treaty confirmed the exclusion of property questions, leaving open once again a key historical issue.[25]

As with Poland, significant compensation issues were addressed only after German unification. And, like in the Polish case, the expulsion issue – of Germans from the Sudetenland – continued to burden ties long after unification.

Czechoslovakia: Very Limited Institutionalization

Constraints arising from the East-West divide retarded bilateral governmental institutions as much as societal ties between Czechoslovakia and Germany until 1989.

The Treaty on Mutual Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was concluded in December 1973, although its goals generally were unfulfilled. The Treaty committed the two sides to cooperation in economics, culture, science and technology, higher education, sport, and transportation, but this institutional dimension would be harder to implement than with Poland due to the doctrinaire Czechoslovak Communist government's limits on societal exchange after 1968.

Already between the end of September and early November 1989, Czechoslovakia had contributed to German unification by permitting passage to West Germany of East Germans who had fled to the West German embassy in Prague, but it would be several more months before a new government's policy toward Germany could be elaborated and the slow evolution of institutional ties through agreements and treaties could commence.

SOCIETAL RESPONSES TO GERMANY, 1945-1950: RECONCILIATION IN A DIVIDED EUROPE AND PLANS TO OVERCOME DIVISION

France and Israel

Soon after 1945, French religious actors, ahead of governmental policy, began to nurture relations with their German counterparts in the pursuit of reconciliation around a new conception of the German state. These religious, morally-driven initiatives involved both Catholic and Protestant voices. Politicians engaged in these efforts.[26] The religious activities proffered an important context for the well-known Roman Catholic interaction of Adenauer and Schuman.

Religious leadership was not a catalyst for German-Israeli relations in the same way that it was for France and Germany, partly because there were no religious counterparts, but spiritual connections did develop through the Societies for Christian-Jewish Cooperation, created in the late 1940s. Major moral recognition of Germany's crimes by political and societal leaders was sometimes delivered in a spiritual setting.[27]

In both the French and Israeli cases, these early morally-based efforts were accompanied by societal interaction in a broad range of fields that pre-dated the institutionalization of governmental ties following the 1963 Franco-German treaty and the 1965 establishment of German-Israeli diplomatic relations. The societal activity constituted a public demonstration of the desire for change in relations with the other country and a challenge to its own government to act.   There were five features of societal connections, which were later boosted by being enshrined in official frameworks):

(1) The institutions were not ad hoc, but existed with regularity and

over time and involved regeneration; (2) they spanned every area of societal life from culture to economics, from science to trade unions, from sports encounters to religious organizations, from city, town and municipal twinnings to youth exchange, from German political foundations to individual party ties, from friendship associations to academic connections; from history organizations to think tanks;(3) they often had as patrons government or former government officials;(4) they maintained independent agendas, even when they received government funding; and(5) they showed solidarity with the bilateral partner in times of official crisis.[28]

Poland and Czechoslovakia

Walled off from the West, societal networks with Germany were limited for Poland and Czechoslovakia. The situation was particularly dire for Czechoslovakia after the quashing of the Prague Spring when Czech society became hermetically sealed from Western Europe. Despite constraints, some societal ties with West Germany were possible, especially for Poland, on the part of both dissident voices and those who worked within the communist regimes. Non-governmental engagement previewed official political relations in Poland. Two areas were exemplary: religion, and politics.[29]

German and Polish religious (both Catholic and Protestant) efforts for reconciliation in the 1950s and 1960s - involving both visits of Poles to Germany and publications - were criticized by expellee groups, German politicians, and media, and by the Polish government, but "the spiritual dialogue … could not be stopped."[30] A key Polish actor in the anti-communist opposition after 1956 was the Club of Catholic Intellectuals (KIK*)*, led by figures such as Mazowiecki and Bartoszewski, who later became Prime Minister (1989) and Foreign Minister (1995; 2000) and shaped Poland's new, post-communist German policy. KIK interacted with the secular, leftist, post-1968 opposition movement.

The iconic Polish religious initiative regarding Germany was the November 18, 1965 letter from the Polish Catholic bishops, inviting the German bishops to the millennial celebration of Christianity in Poland; recognizing the suffering of Poles and also the expellees; and especially granting forgiveness and asking for forgiveness.

According to Willy Brandt, official and lay church initiatives between Germany and Poland amounted to a "process of psychological relaxation" that smoothed Germany's political journey eastward.[31]

The underground political press in Poland and in exile offered opinions on German-Polish relations in a variety of publications, and espoused a political realism that contributed to Foreign Minister Skubiszewski's post-1989 concept of "community of interests" (*Interessengemeinschaft*) between Germany and Poland. Poles also published in German newspapers, and there was an active relationship between German and Polish journalists.

Writers, religious or otherwise, challenged the communist interpretation of Germany as revisionist and amnesiac; identified a new, open, democratic West Germany; addressed the Polish expulsion of Germans; and viewed German unification as a desirable goal. They also insisted on recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. There was often an all-European framing to the resolution of the German Question.[32]

Small, but important connections evolved between German and Czech churches – both Catholic and Protestant – during communism.[33] And, despite the rigidities of post-1968 communism, a Czech dissident movement did survive. Soon after Charta 77's inception, members of the Czechoslovak dissident movement, like its Polish counterpart, began to reflect on Germany, culminating in the 1985 Prague Appeal that endorsed Germany's right to self-determination and unification.[34] Jiří Dienstbier's early 1980s concept of a united Europe revolved around German unification and Václav Havel saw the resolution of the German question – in the form of a confederation – as the heart of a process dissolving the two-bloc European system.[35] Dienstbier, as Foreign Minister, and Havel, as president, would be key architects of the Czech response to German unification.[36]

While German societal actors were supportive of Czech and Polish dissidents in times of crisis, the German government was not, preferring not to damage its relationship with the Soviet Union. German sent numerous care packages to Poles to ease the hardship of the 1981 initiated martial law and, individual German trade unions (less so the umbrella organization) expressed support for the Solidarnošc union movement. Chancellor Schmidt, however, opposed both western sanctions against the Polish regime and moral or political solidarity with Solidarnošc.

German media printed Czech dissident writings, such as the Charta 77 principles, but the German government was not as forthcoming. Havel commented two decades later: "I still vividly recall how, in the early seventies, a number of my West German colleagues and friends avoided me for fear that contact with me—someone out of favor with his government—might needlessly provoke that government and thereby jeopardize the fragile foundations of nascent détente."[37]

The dissident positions of Poles and Czechs toward Germany, which focused on the potential and acceptance of German unification, ran parallel to "official" societal connections that mainly evolved from the 1970 and 1973 treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia respectively and accepted the division while seeking to improve personal ties.

REACTIONS TO GERMAN UNIFICATION: A MIXTURE OF HESITATION AND ENDORSEMENT

In all four countries, there was no clear-cut reaction to German unification, but rather an awkward combination of reluctance and acceptance, at times amounting to contradiction.

France

President François Mitterrand characterized French and German differences over recognition of the German-Polish border (one of the key challenges of German unification) as “putting to the test Franco-German friendship.”[38] Many other aspects of German unification - especially its timing, process and the European institutional framework - tested the robustness of Franco-German post-war ties.

There were three kinds of reactions in France: among the political elite; between official statements and actions; and between officialdom and public opinion.

Beyond the initial surprise, the French official reaction was “controlled.” Mitterrand’s “prudent” reaction after the breaching of the Berlin Wall became clearly supportive by the end of November 1989 when he characterized German unification as “normal, legitimate… and in the direction of history.”[39] Others, like Valéry Giscard dEstaing, were much more concerned. Mitterrand was not without worries, particularly over the triad of pacing, Europeanization and internationalization of unification.

Mitterrand’s increasingly affirmative statements stood in apparent contradistinction to some of his actions, particularly his visit to Kiev in early December and his visit to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) later that month, both viewed conventionally as efforts to challenge unification. However, others have viewed these events as expressions of his triple concern, not of a fundamental opposition to German unity.[40]

French public opinion was broadly in agreement with German unification, without the shades of opinion apparent in officialdom. By March 1990, a large majority of 62% was not concerned by evolving German unity, and a further 31% was “scared” just a “little.”[41]

By March 1990, Mitterrand deemed “the principle of reunification indisputable,” and in September 1990 he insisted: “I can send the best wishes of France to the Germans, who are preparing to celebrate a great moment of their history. The deep understanding between France and Germany is a reality.”[42] Reconciliation had ultimately trumped reluctance, as demonstrated at the 56th Franco-German summit that same month. Joint bilateral actions continued in a variety of fields, including the agreement on a treaty for the development of the common TV channel ARTE (October 1990); common overtures to the EU Council presidency on Common Foreign and Security Policy (December 1990); renewed plans for economic and monetary union in the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992); and on making the Franco-German military brigade the basis of a Eurocorps (in place by October 1993).

Israel

The traces of a distinction in French official attitudes to unification between emotion and pragmatism became a stark contrast in the Israeli case. As in the French case, Israeli reactions mirrored the bifurcation between antipathy and acceptance in the period 1945-1950. The division forty years later in Israel occurred at the official level, particularly between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. It also took place within public opinion.

In an interview with American public television in mid-November 1989, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir emphasized the indelibility of the past and the Jewish fear of German power:

> The reunification of Germany for us, it's a very grave matter … All of us remember what the Germans did to us when they have been united and strong, strong militarily. And the German people, the great majority of the German people decided to kill millions of Jewish people…if they will have the opportunity again and they will be the strongest country in Europe and maybe in the world, they will try to do it again. I don't know if it's true, if it's a based fear, but anyhow anybody could understand it.[43]

Shamir subsequently "exchanged angry letters" with Kohl over unification.[44] In this Israeli perspective, November 9 (the day the Berlin Wall was breached) symbolized the oppression and degradation of Jews by Germans in *Kristallnacht* (Night of the Broken Glass pogrom 1938), a step toward the Holocaust, and not the liberation of East Germany. Incorporation of the historically anti-Israel East German state could infect West German attitudes. Germany's right to self-determination could lead to a similar right for Palestinians that could impact the Jewish state's survival.[45]

Remembrance was also uppermost for Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens, who declared in February 1990: "If I wasn't foreign minister today, my feet wouldn't touch German soil," but he also dwelt on the future, arguing that [i]f a united Germany is a democratic Germany…fully conscious of the responsibilities that it has toward the Jewish people, a country that will contribute to strengthening democracy throughout the world, then I don't think there's a danger to be concerned about." The implication was that Israel would benefit from the disappearance of the undemocratic GDR, which had actively opposed Israel's right to exist in its extensive relations with the PLO, including military training. Arens also saw German unification as "inevitable."[46]

Arens' comments provoked considerable public criticism in Israel, from the right, from the left, and from the media.[47] Yet, a majority (almost 67%) of the Israeli public was either neutral (40.4%) or positive (26.3%) toward unification, with a minority expressing decidedly negative views (33%).[48]

Mitterrand's focus on dealing with the GDR directly at the beginning of the process of German unification was even more pronounced in the Israeli case, and meant the reemergence of a compensation issue tabled by the Cold War. Starting in January and running through July 1990, Israel and the GDR began discussions over diplomatic relations and the Israeli 1951 claim for reparations against all of Germany, which had been satisfied only by the Federal Republic. The negotiations aborted when West Germany insisted that no East German promises be made to Israel, and that financial payments to Israel in the Luxemburg Agreement and thereafter had fulfilled Germany's obligations. Israel complied, as it was "not interested in straining its positive relations with Bonn." [49]

By March 1990, Shamir's position on unification had softened. While still expressing apprehensions in light of the past, Shamir recognized all that West Germany had done for Israel over the decades, including in the European Community, and articulated a desire in improved relations and in Germany's future advocacy for Israel in the broader Europe.[50] Germany was responsive and pushed hard for Israel's interests, culminating in Israel being granted special status with the EU at the 1994 Essen summit and in the subsequent Israel-EU Association Agreement.

Bilaterally, a time of renewal and refinement of arrangements and regulations ensued, tailored to a new post-cold war era. There were important agreements on social security and youth

exchange, economics, culture, and defense, including the 1992 exchange of military chiefs of staff and the 1993 joint declaration on cooperation in economics and technology. Reconciliation had clearly survived disagreement over unification (and the subsequent Gulf War).

Poland

German unification was a source of major discussion and some division in Poland's domestic politics, but as the process unfolded, anxiety grew universally, and was reflected in Polish public opinion's concern about German unity.[51] Poland's very initial positive response to the East German revolution soon turned to disappointment as Kohl refused to recognize the German-Polish border, the key issue for Poland, before formal unification. The disappointment was particularly deep as Poles believed firmly that the political transformation of the Polish political system and Polish society had inspired East Germans to seek freedom. As in the French and Israeli cases, the Polish reactions were both emotional and pragmatic.

Prime Minister Mazowiecki had an opportunity for an early positive response to the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the November 14, 1989, joint Polish-German declaration, Poland had committed itself to "reconciliation" with Germany, but after Kohl's foot-dragging on the Oder Neisse line, by spring 1990 Mazowiecki clearly had changed his view: "Mazowiecki, who had until this time...a reputation of favoring reconciliation with Germany" demanded Polish inclusion in the 2 plus 4 negotiations (the negotiating framework for German unification) on the border issue and European security.[52] He also suggested that Soviet troops should remain in Poland for the time being, as a way to cajole West Germany.

In early December 1989, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski supported the idea of unification, but assumed, as French and Israeli leaders did, that it would not be immediate: ''A reunited Germany will not be created tomorrow or the day after tomorrow,'' Skubiszewski said. ''Fears and concerns appearing every now and then, including in Poland, are unjustified, although alertness is recommended.'' [53]

At the beginning of February, Skubiszewski's position was becoming clearer: basic support for the idea coupled with major reservations about the process. "I am not suggesting" he wrote "that anyone should question Germanys' right to self-determination if both sides of the German-German border are for unification. But it's not just a question of the [principle] but also its realization ... The whole process requires great care." Referencing the contribution to Franco-German reconciliation of territorial settlements over Alsace Lorraine and the Saar, Skubiszewski insisted on the primacy of Germany recognizing the German-Polish border. He also emphasized the importance of European integration and new European security arrangements to house a unified Germany.[54]

By the spring, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski "broke with the moderated approach he held toward the unifying FRG," floating the notion that relations with the USSR were as important to Poland as relations with Germany as a way to provoke West German compliance on the border.[55]

The logjam between Poland and Germany was largely broken by the June 1990 joint declaration of the West German Bundestag and the East German Volkskammer on final recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. *De jure* recognition would come after unification, in the November 1990 German-Polish border treaty, which re-committed Germany and Poland to reconciliation. The Good Neigborliness and Friendly Cooperation Treaty followed in June 1991, laying out the policy and societal paths for the realization of reconciliation and the German

commitment to Poland's accession to European institutions, meaning the EU and NATO. In a separate letter, the foreign ministers noted that the treaty excluded citizenship and property questions.

If the Polish political leadership was now convinced that unification could have bilateral and European benefits for Poland, the public's fear expressed over German unification (in fall 1990, 49% had no trust in Germany and 21% had little trust) was not yet assuaged: "Sixty-two percent of Poles said that the burden of World War II had a very or somewhat strong influence on Polish views of the Germans."[56]

Czechoslovakia

The Solidarity movement in Poland and the changes in government in the summer of 1989 had been an inspiration to East Germans in search of freedom. Czechoslovakia provided a physical conduit for East Germans fleeing West. And, like the new Polish prime minister and foreign minister (Mazowiecki and Skubiszewski), the new Czech political leadership of President Havel and Foreign Minister Dienstbier that resulted from the November-December Velvet Revolution was immediately supportive of German unification. The leadership's support would not waver, but, as in other countries, there was division within the political class. And, as in Poland, important segments of public opinion were anxious.

One of Havel's first acts as President was to visit Germany, both East and West, where his lack of concern about the fact and the speed of unification was noteworthy: "[Europe] need have no fear of a democratic Germany…It can be as large as it wants."[57] In Warsaw a few weeks later, he elaborated and reiterated his all-European perspective:

> It is hard to imagine an undivided Europe containing a divided Germany, just as it is hard to imagine a united Germany in a divided Europe … both unification processes should take place at the same time -- and as quickly as possible … [You] are justifiably less trusting of the Germans than I am … [in my trip to Germany] I resolved … to spread trust in today's distrustful world.[58]

Just before Christmas in 1989, the German and Czech foreign ministers had gathered at the German-Czech border to ceremoniously cut the barbed wire separating the two countries. As in Poland, "foreign political (sic) thinking represented a continuity of dissident ideas."[59] The reconciliation actions of Havel and Dienstbier, accompanied by their statements of regret over the excesses of Czechoslovakia's 1945 expulsion of Sudeten Germans, were met with disdain in various parts of the political class.[60]

Both Poland and Czechoslovakia saw German unification in a European context, but differed over the international framework to resolve outstanding issues (border for Poland; claims for Czechoslovakia). Because of the Czech leadership's unique desire for speed in German unification, Dienstbier did not push, as Skubiszewski had, for unresolved issues to be addressed through the 2 plus 4 process, and put his faith in a bilateral German-Czech process - began in summer 1990 and concluded with the 1992 German-Czechoslovak Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Cooperation - which was hotly debated in parliament and in the media.[61] As with the Polish-German Treaty, there was a commitment to reconciliation in principle and practice. However, there was an exclusion of the claims of Czech victims of Nazism and of Sudeten German. Like its Polish counterpart, the German-Czech treaty committed the parties to work for Czechoslovakia's inclusion in institutions like the European Union and NATO.

The 1997 German-Czech Declaration would improve on the 1992 treaty, and would provide a genuine path to reconciliation, but with many twists and turns, largely over historical issues of compensation and expulsion.

The concerns of a variety of political parties as this process of reconciliation evolved were mirrored in public attitudes toward Germany. By the time of the 1992 treaty, "three quarters of the Czechs surveyed agreed with the statement that the Germans have a 'superior attitude towards the Czechs,'" increasing the concern of two years earlier in the process, when 22% of those polled were against unification, 22% had no response, 19% were indifferent and only 37% of respondents were for unification.[62]

CONCLUSION

As a result of the burgeoning Cold War, France and Israel transformed their initially negative attitudes towards West Germany into positive, institutionalized ties of friendship and trust. Reconciliation was the answer to the historical German Question. While presenting a means to contain and embed Germany, this approach also brought material benefits to both countries. For France, the embedding of Germany additionally took place through European institutions, especially the EC and EU, which became priorities also for Israeli foreign policy. Reconciliation did not mean all historical issues had been settled, especially for Israel, and disagreement accompanied and authenticated reconciliatory ties.

For Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Cold War, and long, complicated and often agonizing histories, dictated extensive separation from West Germany, particularly for Czechoslovakia after 1968. Détente facilitated the treaties of 1970 and 1973, which began a process of rapprochement, not reconciliation. The higher degree of elementary German-Polish institutionalization after 1970 meant the official, institutionalized path to reconciliation with Germany was much more rapid after 1989 than was the case for Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic. The historical issue of borders was settled early, in 1973, in the case of Czechoslovakia, but as a *de jure* matter only after unification for Poland. Other historical dimensions of the German Question, such as compensation and expulsion, still have exercised the power to disrupt (not derail) well into the 21st century.

For France and for Israel the official process of reconciliation with Germany was aided considerably by the catalytic initiatives of societal actors, especially religious and spiritual groups. These institutionalized societal networks spanned all manner of human interaction.

The special role of the church in communist Poland permitted some important formal and lay religious connections with West Germany aimed at reconciliation. A hint of such ties was also present in Czechoslovakia before 1968. More general dissident movements in both countries managed some contact with West Germany, and in the 1970s and 1980s were ahead of Western political forces in identifying the probability of German unification and endorsing it. "Official" societal connections, more marked in Poland, provided a basis for massive expansion after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Division characterized the approach to German unification in all four countries, with different combinations of opposition and support. Even though French and Israeli officials displayed some initial, emotion-tinged hesitation, pragmatism won out and by early spring governments firmly endorsed German unification. Reconciliation and years of personal and bureaucratic interaction and habits of cooperation trumped discord. Public opinion in both countries was supportive,

surprisingly so in Israel, a testament to the robustness of non-governmental reconciliation built over the previous four decades.

Both Czech and Polish leadership immediately endorsed German unification, putting into practice ideas elaborated during the dissident year of communism. Polish support transformed into concern once the border issue was neglected by Germany. The Czech singular desire for a fast pace in the unification process came back to haunt the country when it became clear that this approach put off settlement of the outstanding question of German compensation to Czech victims of Nazism.

The connection between pre-1989 views and post-1989 leadership practice can also be discerned for public opinion, but in a negative sense. The many years of separation and unfamiliarity with Germany on the part of the general public in Poland and Czechoslovakia probably contributed to the apprehension about German unification reflected in surveys.

France and Israel pursued remarkably similar approaches to West Germany during the Cold War that facilitated Germany's rehabilitation, and ultimately, its unification. Poland and Czechoslovakia were able to develop a comparable process of institutionalized reconciliation only after 1989, but its roots can be detected in the pre-1989 attitudes of dissidents toward Germany.

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[1] On Germany's post-war external reconciliation with France, Israel, Poland and Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic, see: Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012).

[2] This chapter deals only with West Germany. For France's relationship with the GDR, see: Ulrich Pfeil, *Die '"anderen"Deutsch-französischen Beziehungen: die DDR und Frankreich 1949-1990* (Cologne; Böhlau, 2004). For the Israeli-GDR (non) relationship, see: Angelika Timm, *Jewish Claims Against East Germany: Moral Obligations and Pragmatic Policy* (Budapest: CEU Press, 1997). For Poland's relations with the German Democratic Republic in this period, emphasizing the ambiguous nature of ties, see: Sheldon Anderson, *A Cold War in the Soviet Bloc. Polish-East German Relations, 1945-1962* (Boulder: Westview, 2001). For Czech-GDR connections, see: Jan Pauer, "1968: Der 'Prager Frühling' und die Deutschen," and Oldrich Tuma, "1989: Zusammenbruch zweier kommunistischer Regime," in Detlef Brandes, Dusan Kovac and Jiri Pesek, eds., *Wendepunkte in Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen, Tschechen und Slowaken 1848-1989*, vol. 14, Veröffentlichungen der Deutsch-Tschechischen und Deutsch-Slowakischen Historikerkommission (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007).

[3] Some analysts date the change in French attitudes earlier. See Dietmar Hüser: "Charles de Gaulle, Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman et l'Allemagne 1944-1950. Conceptions – Actions – Perceptions," *Francia*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1996; and Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, "France and the German Question, 1945-1955," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, summer 2003.

[4] F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe, 1945*-1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), Prologue, 2, and 32.

[5] Tom Segev, *The Seventh Million. The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 190-91. On Israeli policy in the post-war period, see also: Lily Gardner Feldman, *The Special Relationship between West Germany and Israel* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984).

[6] For a Polish view on West Germany, see: Mieczyslaw Tomala, *Deutschland von Polen gesehen. Zu den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen, 1945-1990* (Marburg: Schüren, 2000), chapters 7, 11, 12, 18.

[7] Dieter Bingen, "Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen nach 1945," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 5-6/2005, January 31, 2005, 10.

[8] For a brief history, see:; Jürgen Tampke, *Czech-German Relations and the Politics of Central Europe. From Bohemia to the EU* (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Introduction and chapters 1-3.

[9] Czech News Agency, "Czech President Recalls Lidice's Impact on Czech-German Relations," June 10, 2007.

[10] Milan Hauner, "The Czechs and Germans: A One-Thousand-Year Relationship," in Christian Soe and Dirk Verheyen, *The Germans and Their Neighbors* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 267.

[11] On the centrality of reconciliation for Schuman, see his "Foreword" in Frank Buchman, *Remaking the World* (London: Blandford , 1961), 346-7. Joseph Rovan, a German Jew who emigrated to France in 1933, survived Dachau, and became one of the architects of post-war public attitudes toward Germany, framed the immediate post-war period as a journey of "reconciliation." See his essay "La réconciliation franco-allemande après 1945," in *Cadmos*, vol 12, no. 46, summer 1989.

[12] For the Paris Agreements and Saar Treaty see: Auswärtiges Amt, *40 Jahre Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine Dokumentation* (Bonn: Aktuell, 1989), pp. 75, 98.

[13] For the Élysée Treaty, see Auswärtiges Amt, *40 Jahre Aussenpolitik*, 147

[14] Douglas Webber, ed., *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union* (Routledge: London and New York: 1999); Gisela Hendriks and Annette Morgan, *The Franco-German Axis in European Integration* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2001).

[15] Gardner Feldman 1984, 66-76.

[16] Gardner Feldman 2012, 135.

[17] For the saga of diplomatic relations, see Hannfried von Hindenburg, *Demonstrating Reconciliation: State and Society in West German Foreign Policy Toward Israel, 1952-1965* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007).

[18] The text of the 1970 treaty is in: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Mieczyslaw Tomala, eds., *Bonn-Warschau 1945-1991* (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1992), 222-224.

[19] Peter Bender, "Normalisierung wäre schon viel," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* no. 5-6 (January 31, 2005), 3; Bingen, *Die Polenpolitik der Bonner Republik*, 113-198; Bingen, "Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen nach 1945," 12-13; Jacobsen and Tomala, *Bonn und Warschau*, 40, 313-17.

[20] Jacobsen and Tomala, *Bonn und Warschau*, 501-510.

[21] Pauer, "1968: Der 'Prager Frühling.'"

[22] December 7, 1973 report of Hajek and Niznansky, "Signing of FRG-Czechoslovak Treaty: The Thorny Road to Normalization," http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/21-5-41.shtml (accessed May 8, 2008); Willy Brandt, *People and Politics: The Years 1960-1975* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), 415.

[23] Gardner Feldman 2012, 297.

[24] Cornelia Neubert, "Czech Relations with Germany in the Era of Transition: Political Actors in the Process of Reconciliation with Germany," paper at the 4th Annual Graduate Student Conference "Defining Europe: Directions and Boundaries for the 21st Century, Georgetown University, Center for German and European Studies, October 23-25, 1998. The text of the 1973 treaty is in: Auswärtiges Amt, *40 Jahre Aussenpolitik*, 296-7.

[25] Text of the 1992 treaty, United Nations, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol. 1900, I-32374 (2001), 69-80. See also: Neubert, "Czech Relations with Germany," 13.

[26] Frédéric Hartweg, "Introduction. Quelques réflexions sur les protestantismes allemand et français et leurs relations," and Daniela Heimerl, "Les églises évangéliques et le rapprochement franco-allemand dans l'après-guerre: le conseil fraternal franco-allemand," *Revue d'Allemagne* 21: 4, October-December 1989. Johannes Thomas, "Editorial," *Dokumente, Zeitschrift für den deutsch-französischen Dialog,* 51: 5, October 1995; "Das Dokument. Rückblick auf 50 Jahre Dokumente," *Dokumente* 51:5, October 1995. Michael Kißener, "Die deutsch-französische Freundschaft. Aspekte einer Annäherungsgeschichte," *Historisch-politische Mitteilungen*, 11, 2004, 194-98. See also, Michael Kißener, "Der Katholizismus und die deutsch-französische Annäherung in den 50er Jahren," in Corine Defrance, Michael Kißener, Pia Nordblom, eds., *Wege der Verständigung zwischen Deutschen und Franzosen nach 1945. Zivilgesellschaftliche Annäherungen* (Tübingen: Narr Franke Attempto, 2010). Jacqueline Piguet, *For the Love of Tomorrow: The Story of Irène Laure* (London: Grosvenor, 1985).

[27] Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Role of Non-State Actors in Germany's Foreign policy of Reconciliation: Catalyst, Complements, Conduits, or Competitors?" in Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, *Non-State Actors in International Relations: The Case of Germany* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), 19-20. President Theodor Heuss' statement on collective shame, for example, was published by the Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation in Wiesbaden in December 1949 (Gardner Feldman 1984, 47, fn.2).

[28] For details of societal connections between France and Germany and between Germany and Israel, see Gardner Feldman 2012, 84-86, 95-101, 154-67, 138-143.

[29]Basil Kerski, "Die Rolle nichtstaatlicher Akteure in den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen vor 1990," Arbeitsgruppe: Internationale Politik, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, January 1999; and Waldemar Kuwaczka, *Entspannung von unten. Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des deutsch-polnischen Dialogs* (Stuttgart: Burg Verlag, 1988).

[30] Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "Bundesrepublik Deutschland – Polen. Aspekte ihrer Beziehungen" in Jacobsen and Tomala, *Bonn und Warschau*, 1992, 36; Władysław Bartoszewski, *Und reiß uns den Haas aus der Seele. Die schwierige Aussöhnung von Polen und Deutschen* (Warsaw: Deutsch-Polnischer Verlag, 2005), 113-115,123-131, 152-54, 163-166.

[31] Brandt, *People and Politics*, 181.

[32] Annika Frieberg, "The Project of Reconciliation: Journalists and Religious Activists in Polish-German Relations," doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 2008.

[33] Milan Hauner, "Charter 77 and Western Peace Movements (1980-84)," paper presenetd at "Peace Movements in the Cold War and Beyond," international conference, London School of Economics, London, February1-2, 2008, 3, 11, 12. Landeszeitung (Zeitung der Deutschen in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien), "Deutsch-tschechische Nachbarschaft muss gelingen," April 7, 2002 at: http://www.landeszeitung.cz/archiv/2002/index.php?edt=10&id=03 (accessed January 26, 2009). "Geschichte und Ziele," at http://www.ackermann-gemeinde.de/index.php?id=23&L=0; "Die Ackermann-Gemeinde im deutsch-tschechischen Dialog" at: http://www.ackermann-gemeinde.de/index.php?id=307&L=0 ; and "Erklärung tschechischer und deutscher Katholiken zum 40-Jahres-Gedenken von 1945" at: http://www.ackermann-gemeinde.de/index.php?id=208&L=1 (accessed January 26, 2009). Deutsche Bischofskonferenz,"Worte der Versöhnung," Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, Bonn, September 5, 1990.Karl Kardinal Lehmann, "Europa bauen, den Wandel gestalten. Das Christentum und die Grundlagen Europas. Ein Blick in Vergangenheit, gegenwart und Zukunft," (Stuttgart: Robert Bosch Stiftung, 2004), 35. Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, "Teil 2: Tschechische und deutsche Versöhnungsinitiativen," in *Der trennende Zaun ist abgebrochen. Zur Verständigung zwischen Tschechen und Deutschen*, 1998 at: http://www.ekd.de/print.php?file=/EKD-Texte/tschechen_1998_tschechen2.html (accessed January 22, 2009).

[34] Taku Shinohara, "Historical Consciousness and Civil Ethics: Debating the 'Painful Past' and Reviving 'Central Europe' among Dissident Circles in the 1980s," in Tadayuki Hayashi and Hiroshi Fukuda, *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, no. 15 (Hokkaido: Slavic Research Center, 2007).

[35] Hauner, "Charter 77," 10-15; Václav Havel, "Anatomy of a Reticence," April 1985, a speech to be delivered in his absence at a peace conference in Amsterdam, at: http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val=4_aj_esej.html&typ=HTML (accessed April 15, 2008).

[36] Cornelia Neubert, "Czech Relations with Germany," 6-10.

[37] Havel's speech, read in his absence, for the Peace Prize of the German Booksellers Association, October 15, 1989, http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=eseje&val=8_aj_esej.html&typ=HTML (accessed April 15, 2008).

[38] François Mitterrand, *De l'Allemagne, de la France* (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1996), 154.

[39] Quoted in Frédéric Bozo, *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).112-13, 125.

[40] For the conventional view of Mitterrand's obstructionism see: Jean-Pierre Froehly, "Mitterrand und die Deutsche Vereinigung. Annäherungsversuch an den Kern der Debatte, *Dokumente*, vol. 54, no 6, December 1998. For the alternative view, see: Bozo, Prologue, 134-37, 139-43.

[41] Jean V. Poulard, "The French Perception of German Unification," in Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, ed., *Germany After Unification. Coming to Terms with the Recent Past* (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1996), 163. See also Bozo, 113.

[42] Quoted in Poulard, 160-61.

[43] Transcript, Mac Neil/Lehrer Newshour, WNET New York, November 15, 1989, 5.

[44] Jerusalem Post, "Shamir's World," *Jerusalem Post*, March 3, 1990.

[45] Yves Pallade, *Germany and Israel in the 1990s and Beyond: Still a "Special Relationship"?* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2005), 250-51.

[46] Quoted in Associated Press, "Unified Germany: Dilemma for Israel," Associated Press, February 20, 1990; Los Angeles Times, "Germany No Threat, Israel Says," *Los Angeles Times*, February 15, 1990; Pallade, op. cit., 251.

[47] Karin Laub, "Arens' Acceptance of Reunification of Germany Creates a Furor in Israel," *Associated Press*, February 20, 1990.

[48] Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, *The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 82.

[49] Timm, *Jewish Claims Against East Germany*, 186-93; Pallade, 251-56.

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[52] Peter Merkel, *German Unification in the European Context* (University Park, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 340. The text of the joint declaration is in Jacobsen and Tomala, 501-10.

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[54] The text of Skubiszewski's February 7, 1990 article is in Jacobsen and Tomala, 510-18.

[55] Joshua B. Spero, *Bridging the European Divide: Middle Power Politics and Regional Security Dilemmas* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 116-20. For details of Polish reactions to German unification, see: Artur Hajnicz, *Polens Wende und Deutschlands Vereinigung. Die Öffnung zur Normalität 1989-1992* (Paderborn:Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995, particularly chapter V). On the long-term consequences of German unification for Poland, see: Anna Wolf-Poweska, "The Berlin Republic from a Polish Perspective: The End of the German Question," in Dieter Dettke (ed), *The Spirit of the Berlin Republic* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).

[56] Markovits and Reich, 112-13.

[57] Quoted in Serge Schmemann, "Upheaval in the East: Havel in Germany," *New York Times*, January 3, 1990.

[58] Speech to the Polish Sejm and Senate, Warsaw, January 25, 1990 at: http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=324_aj_projevy.html&typ=HTML (accessed December 5, 2012).

[59] Neubert, 8.

[60] Neubert, 10-11.

[61] Neubert, 14-18.

[62] Markovits and Reich, 115-16