A Spirit *of* Reason

FESTSCHRIFT FOR STEVEN MULLER

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Edited by

Jackson Janes

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The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies strengthens the German-American Relationship in an evolving Europe and changing world. The Institute produces objective and original analyses of developments and trends in Germany, Europe, and the United States; creates new transatlantic networks; and facilitates dialogue among the business, political, and academic communities to manage differences and define and promote common interests.

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Steven Muller



TABLE OF CONTENTS

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

INTRODUCTION

JACKSON JANES

In his timeless novel, *The Magic Mountain*, Thomas Mann wrote: "A man lives not only his personal life as an individual, but also, consciously or unconsciously, the life of his epoch and his contemporaries."

Steven Muller has lived his own rich life as an individual. Yet he has also lived an epoch of world history that was marked by the worst and the best of his contemporaries. Beginning his life in 1927 in a period of time when the world seemed to be coming to its senses after engaging in the bloodiest of all wars, the first decade of his life was marked by the hopes and then the nightmares of Germany's struggle with itself. Forced to leave in 1939, Steven and his family began their new lives one year later in the United States. A decade later, Steven had become an American citizen. For the next four and half decades, Steven was not only to live his own life. He was to very consciously live the life of his epoch and help shape the lives of many contemporaries in the process.

Steven is many things to many people. He is a husband, father, and grandfather. He is that rare talent of being both a leading scholar and a gifted teacher. He embodies the fusion of the quest for knowledge and its dissemination. As can be seen in the essays in this publication, it was no accident that he was to become one of the leading figures in American higher education.

But Steven is more than that. He is a builder of bridges, not only in the academic community but also within the political arena, where he was never shy to bring insight, provoke thoughts, and push back boundaries wherever possible. He believed in and acted on the values of reason and an open mind, most especially in the relationship between the country of his birth and the country of his life.

His essays about German-American relations, Europe, and the transatlantic community contained in this volume represent the path Steven took in living through and understanding the epoch of the latter half of the twentieth century. He was continuously helping his contemporaries to be vigilant about assumptions and conclusions about the world around us. He was at times an uncomfortable dinner guest, reminding us that we have more work to do before feeling comfortable enough with our explanations and ideas. "Human reason needs only to will more strongly than fate, and she is fate," adds Thomas Mann again. Steven believes that, I think. And we all saw that happen on the streets of Leipzig, Dresden, and East Berlin in 1989.

But Steven is still more than that. He radiates the spirit of inquiry into the unknown. The same young man of twelve setting sail for a new home thousands of miles from his native Hamburg remained continually on board his own intellectual ship throughout his life, seeking out new shorelines all over the world. Yet he also returned often to his thoughts and concerns about Germany and the challenge of understanding its contradictions, surprises, its past, and its future. It was in that spirit that he founded AICGS two decades ago, hoping to offer a bridge to Germans on both sides of the Wall, again with the hope that reason could be stronger than fate. Fifteen years after the Berlin Wall fell, the work of AICGS continues in that same spirit, with an eye on a unified Germany building a unifying Europe in partnership with the United States.

A *Festschrift*, as such volumes as these are called in German, is rightly called "Fest" in that it represents a celebration. We started assembling this volume to celebrate Steven's seventy-fifth birthday, as indicated in the words of Richard von Weizsäcker. Yet in preparing it, we found the celebration was something many wanted to join, and so it took somewhat longer to complete. Yet celebrating Steven's life does not need a designated day or year. For those of us who have had the privilege of working with him, walking with him, listening, talking, and enjoying each other's company, that celebration is continuous. This volume is a humble way of expressing our gratitude.

I have had that privilege for more than twenty years. We first met each other in Washington D.C. in 1983. The first thing I remembered about Steven was the spirit in his eyes. Later, I learned that his reason held a place of equal power within him. He has given me more than he can ever know. In living my individual life, I have–very consciously–had the honor of living with my contemporary, Steven Muller. This volume is testimony to the gratitude so many of us feel for that opportunity.

01

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNIVERSITY

THE UNIVERSITY OF REASON

PETER FISCHER-APPELT

I believe I will find little opposition from among his contemporaries and colleagues when I call Steven Muller one of the great American university presidents of the second half of the twentieth century. This verdict is appropriate, although he himself, in one of the lectures reprinted here, "The University President Today: A Word for the Incumbents," thought it outmoded to use such categories of Leopold Ranke's to distinguish leading personalities from their institutions. However, for presidents who corresponded with the historic spirit of their university, "Göttingen in Baltimore," as congenially as Steven Muller did, it was true every now and then that their power of reflection, inspired in such a way, surpassed the boundaries of their institutional experience: they quickly grew to fill out their office, they thrived at their tasks for a long time, and finally they outgrew their university.

They grasped and preserved the mission of their university much more clearly than the suggestions of the *Zeitgeist*, the ups and downs of their every day lives and the distractions of their successes and occasional failures should have allowed. Their humanism contained that inconvenient component of impertinences, which required from their institution leaps into new dimensions of research and international cooperation on the brink of academic heresy. In the end, they became prophets who counted more elsewhere than at home because the horizon of their sphere of action could no longer be conciliated with that of the members and curators of their institution.

It was not only through his fate but also through his resolve that Steven Muller became one of the most effective supporters and advocates of transatlantic cooperation. That he was perceived as such almost from the outset of his eighteen-year tenure as president of Johns Hopkins University is best shown by the collective invitation to him from all the great German scholarly and scientific organizations to give the main speech at the celebration of the United States Bicentennial in Bonn. In this speech, entitled "German Influences on the Development of American Higher Education," the mastery of writing and rhetoric, with which he is able to shed light on the memorable history of German-American academic relationship in its various phases, stands out already.

What made his reflections unique, however, is the ability to tell this story on two levels simultaneously, that of its historical appraisal and that of its future importance, and in so doing to guide the gaze to those reforms necessary on both sides of the Atlantic. When it comes down to it, these reforms should lie within one and the same perspective, namely to "once again renew the profound, animated humanism that inspired Wilhelm von Humboldt's reforms." ["den profunden, lebendigen Humanismus wieder zu erneuern, der die Reformen Wilhelm von Humboldts beflügelt hat."]

Although this perspective precisely reveals the vantage point from which Steven Muller analyzes the university as modern knowledge factory in his seminal Berlin lecture, "The Future of the University," in no way does Humboldt's idea become a cheap formula to him. By dissecting the intensifying conflict between the four main functions of today's university with anatomical precision, he lays bare the problem whether, in the long run, the university, pressured by the proliferation of growing social and governmental demands, will be able to fulfill its pivotal role as center of learning in society. As a training ground for those studying with certain career goals in mind, as an organ of governmental science policy and as a social institution in society as well as in itself, the modern university is under constant high pressure, which paralyzes its pivotal functions but can also challenge their strong power of integration.

This unresolved question, with all its ramifications and boundary conflicts, is discussed further in the essay "Research Universities and Industrial Innovation in America." For the large projects of government- and industry-dependent research, including at this time the product-related marketing strategies as well, which are conducted by capable colleges and universities in ever increasing numbers, carry within them the tendency to make the universities into bearers and partners of a new kind of commodity exchange. Opposing this, Steven Muller insists on the thesis that "The essential linkage between the universities and industrial innovation and vitality consists of people—not product-related research." It is his historically proven view that, in more recent history, it was always the formation of an excellently prepared, scientifically and technologically well-trained new generation from which government and industry, commerce and society profited most in their power of innovation. Therefore, the question whether and upon what basis the university is able to impart to its students not only the necessary specialized knowledge but also, and to the same extent, a broadly based general liberal education, runs like a red thread though all of Steven Muller's deliberations. For certain sets of values underlie all professional work and the sciences as well; however, these are themselves subject to change.

The lecture "Values and the University" evaluates this question. The traditionally religious college was once an active supporter of American values, before it was replaced by the principles of the new university that based its search for cognizance on the methods of independent reasoning (*freie Vernunft*).

Henceforth, this university carried the torch of the thinking mind into society by means of its scholars and alumni, participating however through its climate of education, if only as a silent partner, in the Judeo-Christian canon of values of the American people. Today, when these values have become caught between the millstones of insistence on religious renewal and the resignation of religious indifference, when furthermore, the inventions of the modern spirit even strengthen the disintegration of traditional behaviors and institutions like marriage and family, it seems to be inevitable that the university as well has to do its educational work in a value-free environment. If one takes a closer look or more precisely, if the enquiring mind delves into its own premises, it discovers its value-determining basis. It characterizes the thinker Steven Muller, who follows in the footsteps of Hermann Cohen, that he refers these fundamentals of the human mind in its theoretical and practical components to the creative self-discovery of reason: Freedom limited by freedom of the other, justice not as the aim of personal demand, and peace as the perspective of true, not careless tolerance. Yet none of this is suggested, or could even become significant, if it is not self-recognized. Only then will it be possible to transcend the borders of reason that consistently coagulate into convention, i.e. to newly define them without allowing them to fall under a foreign rule. This self-application of reason is the mystery and the grace of the human spirit.

Seemingly at the opposite end of the arc of tension between reason and institution, as described earlier, lies the final essay, "The Management of the Modern University." However, here too the analysis does not submerge itself in old experiences and existing rules, but rather in the anticipatory description of the consequences of those dramatic changes in the modern university that will result from the revolution of human knowledge. From

a brilliant cascade of seemingly speculative assumptions there initially emerges the hypothesis that the individual and universal use of the new information technologies must necessarily lead to dissolution of the traditional teaching mode of the university. If this development is not to entail the demise of the institution generally, then the university must achieve nothing less than to "invent itself anew" on the strength of its original educational function. This is precisely where the main thesis is positioned: The management of the modern university is the hazardous steering, configuration if possible, of the university's urgent, drastic, total transformation. Three indispensable virtues are to be remembered under the daunting but never surpassed condition of the "trial and error" method: the principle of the wholehearted discourse with a professoriate in professional agony; the principle of the immediate correction of mistakes in the face of goals not clearly fixed or visible; and the principle of an adaptive budget supervision, a competence that must be commensurate with the public accountability of an autonomous institution, but is by no means commensurate everywhere. The most important amongst the conditions for implementation of this difficult supervisory task is the continuous view of the university as a whole, combined with the best possible knowledge of its individual components. Here, the experience of university President Steven Muller shows that an independent university board of directors will be the most likely one in a position to examine the voices of academic and public critique that will accompany this process of radical change. Its task will be to support not primarily the management of the university as such but rather its view of the whole picture: "If they do, progress is possible. If they do not, progress will be arrested—as it probably should be."

The six lectures and writings of Steven Muller on the origin, mission, and future of the university collected here document the visionary power of an academic administrator and the analytical acumen of a scholar who has mastered the field of political science, especially in regard to aspects of political theory, comparative government and international relations. The most common denominator in these essays is the conviction, as a matter of principle, that the university can only operate in a space illuminated by the light of reason, freed from sectarianism, religious dogma and regimentation of details. To Steven Muller, the emigrant who escaped persecution, this belief in reason as the identical root of self-organization of academic education as well as civil democracy remained the cornerstone of his thoughts and actions throughout his life. He is a product of the adherence to the fertility of that intellectual symbiosis, formed in the land of his fathers when the intellectual traditions of a Maimond and an Emanuel Kant conjoined, before this symbiosis was brutally destroyed in his youth.

GERMAN INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

STEVEN MULLER

It is an exceptional privilege to have been invited today to acknowledge the great debt that higher education in the United States of America owes to the German universities. I am honored and grateful to be here. It is, however, very difficult to do justice to this task. A rich and complicated story must be told with at least an effort at brevity and clarity. I can do no more than present a sketch—a full portrait would take much too long and would surely deserve a more accomplished talent than mine.

Only two countries fundamentally contributed to the development of higher education in America: Britain and Germany. But we must note at the very outset that American higher education has been and is unique—truly American—and does not resemble the university system of either Britain or Germany. We borrowed and we adapted, but we did not imitate. This is a blessing, because at times the best of what was borrowed and adapted resulted from a splendid misunderstanding of the model—a fact that would have turned simple imitation into a disaster.

The British legacy of course came first. In the American colonies of England, colleges were very soon founded that were patterned on what then existed in Great Britain. Harvard College was founded in the Massachusetts Bay Colony as early as 1636, and the College of William and Mary in Virginia in 1693. By the time of the American Revolution whose Bicentennial is being observed this year, numerous such colleges had been founded, and many others were established as American settlement spread westward across the continent. These colleges were sometimes called universities, but they were far from that in the modern sense.

They were designed for the higher education of young men of some privilege, to prepare them primarily for two professions, the ministry and the law. Physicians at first learned their profession in proprietary schools run by established doctors, and teachers were either ministers, sometimes lawyers, or not trained at the college level. These were liberal arts colleges that taught a rigid, narrow curriculum over four years. Almost all of them were heavily under the control of a particular religious denomination. They differed from British experience in that in the United States there were so many different denominations, that their funding came therefore from religious communities and wealthy individuals to a far greater extent than from public funds, and that no community of such colleges ever came together to form the type of British university represented by Oxford or Cambridge.

By the early nineteenth century there was increasing dissatisfaction with the American colleges. It was charged that their learning was dull, restrictive, and of low quality. Their tradition ran counter to spreading democracy and to the loosening of religious orthodoxies. Above all, they produced no practical education in a new nation

that had begun a mighty process of industrial development. By 1851, the following comments from Henry P. Tappan, later President of the University of Michigan, summarize the dissatisfaction with the collegiate system of American higher education:

The Colleges of America are plainly copied from the Colleges of the English Universities. The course of studies, the President and Tutors, the number of years occupied by the course, are all copied from the English model. We have seen that in the English Institutions, the name of University alone remained, while the collegial or tutorial system absorbed all the educational functions. In America, while Colleges were professedly established, they soon assumed a mixed character. Professors were appointed, but they discharged only the duty of tutors in the higher grades of study; so that the tutors were really assistant professors or the professors only tutors of the first rank. Our Colleges also have from the beginning conferred degrees in all the faculties, which in England belongs only to the University....

We inspire no general desire for high education, and fail to collect students, because we promise and do not perform. Hence we fall into disrepute, and young men of ability contrive to prepare themselves for active life without our aid. In connection with this the commercial spirit of our country, and the many avenues to wealth which are opened before enterprise, create a distaste for study deeply inimical to education. The manufacturer, the merchant, the gold-digger, will not pause in their career to gain intellectual accomplishments. While gaining knowledge, they are losing the opportunities to gain money. The political condition of our country, too, is such, that a high education and a high order of talent do not generally form the sure guarantees of success. The tact of the demagogue triumphs over the accomplishments of the scholar and the man of genius.

Put these causes together, and the phenomena we witness and lament are explained. Our colleges are complacently neglected when they neither afford the satisfaction and distinction of a thorough and lofty education and yield no advantages in gaining wealth and political eminence.[1]

A new start was needed, and for this purpose American eyes turned to the German university. This did not happen primarily because there was reluctance to turn back once more to Britain, nor merely because there was general respect for the state of German learning. It was due primarily to the extraordinary reforms in the German universities that Wilhelm von Humboldt had achieved, beginning with the foundation of the University of Berlin in 1809 and rapidly thereafter throughout the German universities. The key to Humboldt's reforms was the famous statement that the principles which ought to permeate and dominate establishments of true scholarship were "solitude and freedom." By solitude, Humboldt meant the protection of the scholar from the pressure of practical needs and demands, permitting a total individual commitment to scholarly investigation without regard to utilitarian factors. By freedom, Humboldt did not mean the autonomy of universities, but freedom of teaching and freedom of learning: a professor should be free to teach what he wanted to teach, and a student should be free to attend whatever lectures interested him. These ideals put into practice meant a university committed to research, and research for its own sake, carried on by professors free to investigate as they chose, and by students free to study what and with whom they chose. This was the ideal of the new university which Wilhelm von Humboldt founded in Berlin.

It is not proper here to attempt a history of the development of the German university in the nineteenth century, but two practical effects of the spread of Humboldt's ideas must be mentioned. The first was the elevation of the faculty of philosophy, which earlier had prepared students for work in the three higher professional faculties of theology, medicine, and law, to the same level as the other three. This raising of the status of the philosophical faculty had the crucial effect that the various disciplines gathered together in this faculty were at last free to develop along their own lines. The second was the added impetus which the commitment to research gave to the seminar system of instruction. The seminar meant not only a limited research project undertaken by a small, carefully selected group of students under the direction of a professor, but also a separate room

or a number of separate rooms where the meetings are held and in which special libraries and other teaching resources are placed.

However, what American eyes found most appealing of all in the German university in the mid-nineteenth century was the leading position which Germany had achieved in the natural sciences. Here there is irony. Wilhelm von Humboldt himself had been antagonistic to the pursuit of knowledge for practical purposes or utilitarian reasons, but in the German universities reformed by his ideas the natural sciences, so closely linked to industrialization, gained prominence. This was largely due to the encouragement and financial support given to the development of the natural sciences by the Prussian and other German governments, and also to the fact that the basic idea of the Humboldtian university—the stress on pure research and the seminar system—ideally fitted the interests of the natural scientists. And it was in fact Wilhelm's brother, Alexander von Humboldt, who used his own great influence in the Prussian Court to promote the development of the natural sciences within the reformed philosophical faculties of the universities.[2]

The flowering of the natural sciences eventually created new problems within the German university system, but that is not our concern in this sketch. What we know is that shortly after the 1850s Americans saw in the contemporary German research university, with its vigorous work in the natural sciences, the inspiration for the reform of American higher education. It was not Humboldt's humanism per se that inspired Americans. It was that the university model that had evolved from his ideas was able to offer disciplined training for practical, utilitarian tasks, and was free of the domination of religious orthodoxy. Few Americans were troubled by, if indeed they were even aware of, the fact that Humboldt would have despised their concern for education in the mechanic, industrial and commercial arts and sciences; and that he would probably have failed to understand the restraints that religious orthodoxy had placed on the early American colleges. For a quick appreciation of how the German university looked to American eyes in 1851 we may again turn to Tappan, as a summary of what many other leading American educators saw and thought:

> We have spoken of the German Universities as model institutions. Their excellence consists in two things: first, they are purely Universities, without any admixture of collegial tuition. Secondly, they are complete as Universities, providing libraries and all other material of learning, and having professors of eminence to lecture on theology, law, and medicine, the philosophical, mathematical, natural, philological, and political Sciences, on history and geography, on the history and principles of Art, in fine, upon every branch of human knowledge. The professors are so numerous that a proper division of labor takes place, and every subject is thoroughly discussed. At the University every student selects the courses he is to attend. He is thrown upon his own responsibility and diligence. He is left free to pursue his studies; but, if he wishes to become a clergyman, a physician, a lawyer, a statesman, a professor, or a teacher in any superior school, he must go through the most rigid examinations, both oral and written.
>
> Collegial tuition in the German Universities does not exist, because wholly unnecessary, the student being fully prepared at the Gymnasium before he is permitted to enter the University. Without the Gymnasium, the University would be little worth.[3]

Thus, in the period after the American civil war the idea of the research university and the prominence of the natural sciences was introduced from Germany into American higher education. The impact was widespread. From the first decade of the nineteenth century Americans had begun to study at German universities. An astonishing total of more than ten thousand Americans attended German universities during the century. Leading American educational reformers traveled to Germany for inspiration. In 1868 Cornell University was founded to provide a new kind of non-sectarian and practical education, with emphasis on the mechanic and agricultural arts. The first president was Andrew D. White, who had matriculated at the University of Berlin in 1855, had served at Michigan with Tappan, and drew heavily on his German experience in building Cornell.

Charles William Eliot, who in his forty years as president beginning in 1869 remade Harvard into a university, spent most of 1863 at Marburg, and drew from there most of his ideas for the reform of Harvard.

The importation of German university ideas often met resistance, particularly when religious orthodoxy was offended. At Amherst in 1877 a German trained professor of biology was removed for teaching biology as a science and not "as an absolutely dependent product of an absolutely independent and spiritual creator." There were public protests in several places against "Germanism" which led to the establishment of German-style beer parlors on the edge of campus. Tappan, whom we have earlier quoted, made a vigorous effort as President of Michigan to reform that university along German lines, but was ousted by the faculty after a decade largely because of his "Germanic pretensions," which included the "intemperate" habit of drinking wine with meals! [4]

The single most direct, dramatic and far-reaching translation of the German university idea to the United States occurred in 1876 with the opening of The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. The founding president was Daniel Coit Gilman, who had studied at Berlin in 1854 and 1855. Gilman returned to Germany in 1875 in preparation for the founding of the new university, and visited a number of German universities, most notably Strassbourg, Freiburg, Goettingen and Berlin. The Johns Hopkins University under Gilman was the first new American university explicitly founded as an institution committed to advanced study and research along German lines. Many of the early faculty at Johns Hopkins had been students at German universities, including Ira Remsen, the first professor of chemistry and second president of the university, who studied at Munich, took his doctorate at Goettingen in 1870, and taught at Tubingen; William E. Story, professor of mathematics, who took his doctorate at Leipzig in 1875; Basil L. Gildersleeve, the first professor of classics, who studied at Berlin and Bonn and took his doctorate at Goettingen in 1853; and Henry A. Rowland, the first professor of physics, who studied in Berlin. The Johns Hopkins University was nicknamed "Goettingen in Baltimore" and was the first American university to offer systematic study for the doctorate degree in various disciplines. It may therefore be said that the hundredth anniversary this year of the founding of Johns Hopkins marks the centennial of the modern research university in the United States.

Despite its nickname, however, The Johns Hopkins University was not a German university. Gilman had stated, "We did not undertake to establish a German university, nor an English university, but an American university, based upon and applied to the existing institutions of this country." In the simplest terms what happened in American higher education was that the collegiate sector remained, but that there was superimposed upon it research-oriented instruction at the graduate and professional level, which is post-baccalaureate in that it follows the college years, rather than replacing them. The collegiate pattern still shows evidence of its British roots, but university graduate and professional patterns owe most to the nineteenth century German university as Americans saw it. The German experience was also used to liberate the American university from religious influence, ever since Cornell, Johns Hopkins, Chicago and the great state-owned universities were explicitly established as non-sectarian institutions.

A word must now be said about the present status of the whole of higher education in the United States, which in its diversity and complexity defies analogy to any other country's system of higher education and is indeed most difficult even to describe. In 1975, nearly 9 million American students were enrolled in approximately 2,750 institutions of higher education. American high schools graduated 3.1 million students in 1975, of whom 1.8 million entered higher education—approximately 60 percent. However, of the 2,750 institutions, only 336 are universities that offer graduate and professional instruction leading to the doctorate, as well as the first four years of collegiate undergraduate instruction. Another 547 institutions may be called either colleges and universities, but primarily offer collegiate undergraduate instruction as well as some additional study for the master's degree, which is a one-or two-year graduate degree that falls short of the doctorate and is usually

given in practical fields ranging all the way from nursing, teaching or engineering to journalism or accounting. Then there are 847 four-year institutions, usually called colleges, that offer only collegiate undergraduate instruction leading to the bachelor's degree, received upon completion of the undergraduate college curriculum. And finally, just over a thousand of the institutions of higher education in the United States offer only the first-two years of collegiate undergraduate instruction. These are called junior colleges or community colleges. Their graduates may go on with their education after the first two years at another institution, but most of them enter the labor force after their two years, without a college degree, because the two-year institutions specialize in vocational training. Of the nearly 9 million students in American higher education in 1975, almost 2 million were enrolled in the two-year institutions, which are currently the fastest-growing sector of higher education in the United States. Six million students were enrolled for the four-year undergraduate collegiate programs, and one million in graduate programs beyond the bachelor's degree. Accordingly, what is somewhat confusing for Americans and usually totally confusing to others is that the majority of young Americans "go to college," but that what this means differs so much, depending on the type of institution in which they are enrolled. By the same token, there are now more than 500,000 persons teaching in American institutions of higher education and all are called professors; but there are obvious real differences between a professor at Harvard, Yale or Johns Hopkins, who is usually a research scholar of the first order, and a professor at a junior or community college, who normally devotes effort to teaching and may do little or no research. The three ranks of professors—assistant professor, associate professor, and full professor—tend to distinguish the length of time involved in the individual's career rather than research attainment: even an assistant professor at a research university is expected to be a research scholar, while research is not expected of a full professor at a community college.

The financing of American higher education is also extremely diverse and difficult to explain to non-Americans. The federal government of the United States does not directly provide dollars to any college or university except the military academies which it owns and operates. However, the federal government makes available great sums of support for research each year, most of which is received by the research universities—just about half of the annual budget of The Johns Hopkins University, for example, consists of federal research dollars. The federal government also provides large annual payments to students for all sorts of purposes—to assist students who could not otherwise afford higher education at all, and to encourage students to study in specialized areas such as medicine or foreign language and area studies at the graduate level. These federal dollars normally come to the colleges or universities through the student who pays fees with this federal assistance.

The fifty states support state universities and colleges directly, but of the 2,750 institutions of higher education some 1,500 are privately supported, meaning that they are not owned or directly financed by any government. Some of the oldest universities are private, such as again Harvard, Yale or Johns Hopkins, and so are most of the four-year colleges. But it would not be true to say that the best institutions of higher education are private—such state-owned universities as California or Michigan are among the best. Of the two-year institutions, the majority are owned and financed by local governments, either in cities or counties. However, to add to the confusion, the governments of the states now often assist cities and counties with the financing of these two-year institutions, and also have begun to make small annual payments to private colleges and universities in their states, but without actually taking authority over them. One generalization that is true of American higher education is that private colleges or universities cost much more to attend than public institutions, but even this truth is offset to some degree by the fact that private colleges and universities spend significantly more than public institutions on financial aid to their students.

This brief look only at the surface of the overall structure of American higher education now helps us to put some perspective on the impact in the United States of the nineteenth century German university. The major result was the creation of the American research university, and thereby the great flowering of academic science in the United States. The American research university is only a hundred years old. While it is only one type of institution of higher education in the United States and is represented by only some one hundred true and complete examples among more than 1,700 institutions, it is, of course, the institution which trains candidates for doctoral degrees at the graduate level. It is also the home of most major academic research and science. It owes its inspiration to the German university and came into existence primarily by imposing the superstructure of academic research and graduate doctoral instruction on the existing and still surviving collegiate institution that had been adapted from British experience.

Having said this, however, we should also note at least a few of the major differences that exist between the university in Germany and the university in the United States. Perhaps most notably, the United States has never had a formally structured pre-college or university curriculum in the schools. The closest equivalent is that most high schools advise those of their students who intend to proceed on to higher education (also now called post-secondary education) to take certain courses required by the better, or more selective, colleges and universities. But in fact almost every American high school graduate can attend a college or university–the choice he or she will have to make is what level or quality of institution rather than the opportunity per se to do so. The result is that of the millions of American students in higher education, only a minority have the American university experience. The majority have only a collegiate experience, and there is no German or European equivalent I know of to the diversity of institutions and levels by and at which the collegiate experience is offered in the United States. Even those American students who enroll in an American university have the collegiate experience for four years. They either have it in the university and stop there; or they have it at a college or in a university and then proceed in a university to graduate or professional instruction. Thus for example a Harvard, Yale or Johns Hopkins graduate may only have a collegiate bachelor's degree from one of those universities–the difference between that and any college bachelor's degree program being only that in the university college instruction is offered, or at least directed, by a university faculty. It is fairly common for an American student to earn both the bachelor's and an advanced degree at one university, but it is at least as common to earn the bachelor's degree at one institution and then attend one or more universities for graduate or professional instruction.

In terms of direct contrast between the German and the American university, two related differences are most striking. The first is that the American university, state-owned or private, is essentially autonomous from government, unlike the German university. This difference is most evident in that American universities make and execute their own budgets, with very little participation by state governments even in the case of the state-owned universities. State governments usually fund the universities annually by means of lump-sum appropriations rather than line-item decisions. University faculty and other employees of state universities are paid by the state through the university and are not civil servants.

The second big difference follows from the first, in that American universities have centralized, permanent management cadre autonomous within the university, because most of the budget and management functions, which in Germany are executed for the universities by government, are in the United States done within the university itself. In these respects the major American universities are almost equally autonomous and alike, whether state-owned or private. They all now tend to receive funds from federal, state and private sources; and the state-owned American universities receive their federal and private funds directly, not through their state governments. One obvious consequence is that the American university president is at least as much,

or more, a manager as an academic leader; and that he has more authority vis-a-vis the faculty than the German *Rektor*, because the American university president–if competent–has the authority of centralized budgeting under his control and is not selected or appointed by the faculty. Instead he is chosen by a Board of Trustees or Regents who hold him accountable above all for the financial and business management of the university, and who will consult faculty and also students when selecting a president but feel relatively free to make their own choice.

One other difference that developed early in the American university adaptation of its German inspiration lies in the fact that the senior professor in the United States never developed the great authority he at least used to have in Germany. Quite rapidly in the American university the academic department became the vital unit of academic organization and administration; and American academic departments operate as a rule as a collective leadership of the tenured professors in the field, and are only sometimes and rarely dominated by a single senior member. Here perhaps the British legacy of parliamentary democracy proved stronger than the German model–most American departments now elect their chairmen for limited terms and are intolerant of a dominant personality–which is not to deny, of course, that they are often afflicted with intense personal rivalries, conflicts and open battles among their members.

One might now end this sketch quite promptly were there not one more major way in which the German universities contributed to the universities of the United States–in this case the German universities of the twentieth rather than the nineteenth century. Over many years a number of distinguished German scholars did indeed come individually to the United States on occasion to settle and carry on their work there. But nothing approached the flood of academic talent that flowed out of Germany in the 1930s and vastly enriched other countries, most of all the United States, and particularly its higher education and its science. The facts are well-known but hard to document, because those who came were not only Germans but also scholars from other lands who had been educated or held appointments at German universities, and because one must be aware that children came as well as their parents. One should not even attempt to cite names, but the recollection of Albert Einstein may be impossible to avoid, and how else would a Mommsen have come to Cornell or a Kissinger to be the Secretary of State of the United States after years of some prominence at Harvard.

What must be recognized is how enormous this enrichment was for the American universities–one of whom, the New School of Social Research in New York, was virtually founded with an entire faculty of émigré professors from Germany. In certain academic fields the arrival of the academic refugees made possible great new American developments–psychology had always depended heavily on German research and prospered especially, as did sociology and physics. Psychoanalysis was only begun in the United States after the emigres had arrived, applied mathematics and molecular biology took on a whole new life; and musicology, political science, and architecture are at least three other disciplines that were vastly transformed for the better. This is no doubt a painful subject to bring up here today, and I am sorry, but it would simply not be possible to avoid it in any discussion of the impact of the German on the American university.

There is also a fundamental thought prompted by this experience. I cannot, of course, speak for the German universities. But for the American universities, it is both fitting and necessary to look back once more in fullness at what we received from the nineteenth century universities of Germany and especially at von Humboldt's ideals. Thanks largely to German inspiration, the United States now has magnificent research universities that are free from sectarian religious dogma, and that are most distinguished by splendid work in science and the application of science to the problems of society. That represents a great achievement and is a great deal to be grateful for. But the soul of the American university is troubled. The Bible asks us what our profit is in worldly gain if we lose our soul. Von Humboldt's university was intended to have purity and to maintain a vital distance

between the world of the scholar and the world of affairs. Perhaps in his idealism that distance was too great. Certainly it was never realized. But for the American university that vital distance has shrunk to almost nothing, and that is in my view an excess in the other direction.

The university at its best must be a humanist institution committed to those truths that are timeless, both in science and for humanity. In addition to research, training, and service to society, the university must be the sanctuary of human reason and of the absolute integrity of human and scientific truth. For the American university the greatest challenge is not only to maintain and advance what we have become, but also to recultivate the profound, underlying humanism that animated the reforms of von Humboldt. Not his distance, but some distance, needs in the United States to be restored between the university and society. To serve humanity best, the university must remain free to some degree even of the society in which it serves. That is the greatest lesson to be learned from the renaissance of the German university in the nineteenth century, which in turn shaped the rise of the American university. We in America must always—and urgently—remember that lesson.

And now I must ask you to accept this regrettably inadequate sketch as it is. Perhaps you will allow me to conclude with a very few personal words. I take great pride in the fact that I represent here today The Johns Hopkins University, which best symbolizes the inspiration that Americans drew from the German universities a century ago when the American research university came into being. I am aware of the irony in that to a small degree I represent also that second, involuntary contribution of the 1930s, because I would perhaps have attended a German university had my family and I not emigrated from Hamburg in 1939. I wish to thank you for this rare opportunity to speak my mother tongue in public in the land of my fathers—and I hope that I have done the German tongue no violence from which it will not recover. I would like you to know that this occasion today is for me personally a deeply treasured, unforgettable, and most moving event, for which I am forever beholden to the Wissenschaftsrat, the Max Planck Institutes, the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Rektoren Konferenz. And finally, for myself and on behalf of all of American higher education, I would like to salute and express fraternal greetings and best wishes to the German universities of today: may universities in Germany and in the United States continue to prosper and serve mankind, in brotherhood, in freedom, and in a peaceful world!

Address at German Celebration of U.S. Bicentennial, Bonn, 1976.

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RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION IN AMERICA

STEVEN MULLER

Ever since the mid-1970s, a belief that the future well-being of the American economy depends on a renewed national commitment to technological and/or industrial renovation has become more pronounced and widespread. Those who profess this belief usually invoke the innovative character of past American economic development and then assert that in recent years the United States has begun to lose the role of international leadership in industrial, scientific and technological innovation. In this context the idea also is advanced that American research universities have been vital contributors to innovation in science and technology in the past; and that therefore a successful recommitment to such innovation depends essentially on leading participation by American research universities. As usual, when a majority of the public subscribes to beliefs and ideas, there is some truth in them; but no one simple truth. Some reflections on the relationship of the modern American research universities to innovation in science and technology may help to sift out reality from unwarranted assumptions and reduce some confusion.

The Foundations of the Contemporary University

It is certainly true that the contemporary major research universities are distinguished by a great emphasis on science, and increasingly on technology as well. But the extent to which these universities are the fountainhead of innovation in science and technology is at least arguable. And on the record, major research universities have *not* been a major—not even a significant—direct source of new products for the marketplace. The major research universities do perform research, but they remain primarily teaching institutions, and their chief role is to develop and train human talent. The vital link between the major research universities and the advancement of science and technology in the United States, therefore, can be discovered mainly in the pool of talent which the universities both harbor and produce.

Today it is difficult to remember the only very recent origin of much that is taken for granted in the contemporary American university. As of now, for example, no one would argue that the whole university is dedicated to the spirit of free inquiry. Yet the fact is that this tradition is scarcely more than a century old—precisely as old, by no coincidence, as the scientific character of the modern university. In its beginnings, the university of course was already committed to knowledge and truth, but the knowledge was received knowledge, and the truth

revealed rather than to be discovered. For centuries, the university as an institution was tied inextricably to established religion, and served primarily to refine and transmit established knowledge and to train human minds to function within the confines of God's word and established faith.

Thus, when Wilhelm von Humboldt achieved the reform of the Prussian university in the early nineteenth century by insisting on freedom of teaching and learning, he had in mind a highly specific concept of freedom: freedom from religious orthodoxy. And—as important—learning took on a second meaning, beyond the original definition of absorbing all that was already known: learning began to mean inquiry as well. It is useful to note that von Humboldt's reforms were of course achieved only with the support of the Prussian government; and that the statesmen of Prussia supported him explicitly because they wanted to foster their state's industrial development. The Prussian government perceived the linkage between scientific training in the universities and the application of science to and in industry; and so they sponsored the emergence of the research university. Ideas that had earlier been heresy—that truth required proof rather than faith, that knowledge could be advanced by discovery, that to question the wisdom of the past was not only legitimate but indeed necessary, and that facts were so objective that *no* known fact was sacred—these ideas were now embraced within the university. Professors and their students were set free to search for the new and to seek proof for discovery.

In the United States the modern research university was not fully established until the opening of The Johns Hopkins University in 1876, with an explicitly acknowledged debt to the ideas of von Humboldt. Within a few years thereafter, graduate research programs began to sprout throughout American higher education, atop the established collegiate foundations. Even before then, however, the government of the United States had also perceived the linkage between the education of talent and national development. The Morrill Act, enacted during the Civil War in 1862, fostered the establishment of colleges specifically to educate talent in the agricultural and mechanical arts, so that farming and production could spread more effectively across a whole continent. The land-grant colleges were not founded as research universities, even though they later became such; but the emphasis on the practical and applied in their founding set their professors and students free as well from the old rigidity of religious orthodoxy and received knowledge.

The devices that symbolize the industrial and technological revolution of the nineteenth and twentieth century —whether one thinks of the steam engine, the cotton gin, automobile, the telephone, the telegraph, the radio, the airplane—were not developed within or by the university. Indeed, the more venerable of these devices were invented before the university as an institution had itself been transformed by science. But the application, maintenance and continued refinement of such devices throughout the American economy depended upon a pool of trained talent which was—and is—a product of the American research university. That statement requires amplification. But before that amplification can be most effectively performed, it is necessary to observe a major second stage in the evolution of the major research university in the United States—its mobilization into national service.

Transformation by Mobilization

Until the Second World War, the American research university as an institution became progressively more scientific, but it did not grow hugely in size, nor did it develop significant new ties to the industrial community. The most interesting evolution of the period occurred so quietly and naturally that no one ever seems even to have remarked upon it: namely, the hiring of Ph.D.s by industry. Before the 1890s, there were in effect no American Ph.D.s, and the degree was introduced to mark the highest level of advanced preparation for an academic career. However, even before the outbreak of the Second World War, industry had begun to develop research departments and laboratories and, to staff these, had also begun to hire Ph.D.s, and to use

professors of science and engineering as consultants. Thus, the high quality of the research done, for example, by AT&T or Dupont did not depend on close relationships to one or more particular universities as such, but rather on the fact that their leading scientists were drawn from the most advanced university graduates and had the same level of training as future professors.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, the mobilization of the whole nation inevitably also included the universities, but this time mobilization went far beyond the traditional call of students to the colors and the enlistment of physicians, nurses and other specialists into service. Technology played an unprecedented role in the war effort. Not only were university specialists called to work on technologically sophisticated projects, but universities were requested to sponsor new laboratories to do research for military purposes. Nor was this a short-term effort. While the Second World War as such ended in 1945, it was followed immediately by the so-called Cold War and the Korean War; and in fact the period of national mobilization lasted fully for at least thirty years—until the closing of the Vietnam War. To a significant extent, mobilization still persists into what is now a fifth decade. In addition to university laboratories, government laboratories were established in large number and variety, and these too drew on the Ph.D.s coming out of the university graduate schools for research staffing.

As defense technology kept on widening to include space, chemical and biological warfare, electronics, and virtually all materials, the concept of the national interest irresistibly expanded to include the whole range of science and technology within the university. Public investment by government in the growth and development of university science and technology came to be regarded as a perfectly natural—indispensable—ingredient of national security. First millions, soon billions of dollars annually were appropriated for this purpose. At the same time, access to higher education was being expanded by means of a succession of Congressional enactments and appropriations. As a result, existing colleges and universities grew greatly in size and new colleges and universities were established. In the quarter century between 1945 and 1970, American higher education more than tripled in size and capacity, and within the major research universities the federal government became the established patron of advanced research and training over the entire range of fields in science and technology.

The Government-University Partnership in Research

Selected aspects of the way things were done in the process, or of the way in which matters turned out, appear worthy of comment. For example, it can be noted that the interaction between representatives of government and the university community began in the 1940s, on an extraordinarily high level of mutual trust and commonality of purpose. The Second World War was—at least after Pearl Harbor—a “popular” war in the United States. Subsequently there was widespread consensus that the best way to counter Stalinist expansionism and avoid renewed global war and the use of nuclear weapons was to create effective deterrent capacity. Cooperation in the national interest was not then controversial. Motives, in other words, were not initially in question. As a result, problems that might otherwise have led to long and vexed negotiations were settled quickly and effectively to get the job done. An enduring network of personal connections between individuals in government and in university science grew in this agreeable climate and helped later to lubricate relationships after some friction began to develop.

It must be assumed that the high degree of mutual trust at the outset had much to do with the easy adoption of the peer review system in the distribution of increasingly vast amounts of government-sponsored research. There is, in retrospect, a near-miraculous purity in the concept that the best way to assure the funding of good science is to allow good scientists to review applications and select the best. And—most of all—it is worth noting that it was possible for government to deal directly with university scientists and technology experts themselves,

with only relatively minor involvement on the part of the universities or institutions. It is more than doubtful whether university administrations could have motivated professors to cooperate with government nearly as effectively as was in fact the case because the motivation arose within the professoriate itself. In any event, it was primarily professorial initiative combined with the appeal of the national interest that largely swept the institutional university along in its train.

In the well-known story of the growth of government-sponsored university research, the involvement of industry is seldom mentioned or emphasized. While this may be easily explained because industry involvement was indirect, it is a grave distortion not to recognize explicitly the major stake on the part of industry in the burgeoning government-university partnership. Even if one were to look only at national defense in a narrow sense, it is obvious that the ever more sophisticated and complex national defense systems—developed with the advice of university specialists—called for an ever greater range of sophisticated and complex products: procured by government, produced by industry. And the wider the range of government needs—beyond weapons systems into, for example, space, and communications technology—the greater the involvement of diverse industrial enterprises in providing the means that are called for by research and development. It is of course true that, in response to this situation, more and more of the affected industries began to set up elaborate research and development programs of their own—often also with government assistance. But here too the staffing of these industrial research programs depended on the availability of university-trained talent—and, at the core, talent trained at the doctoral level. The great investment on the part of the federal government in university science and technology therefore produced not only ideas and techniques that resulted in industrial contracts; it also—and with far greater total impact—provided the funds and facilities within universities to train great new numbers of highly advanced specialists, who found employment in industry and government as well as within the university system itself.

To the extent, however, that the federal government was not only the principal sponsor of science and technology in the major research universities but also the principal consumer of so much of the applicable results, it can be remarked that the need to *market* ideas and techniques was generally—and notably—absent. To a large extent, government was willing to sponsor basic research, i.e., the conduct of scientific inquiry for its own sake, almost partially defined by the fact that an applicable outcome is neither promised nor expected. However, when government sponsored targeted research, government was also likely to be the consumer, or purchaser, of the result; so there could also be a certain indifference as to whether the result was ever purchased or consumed—that decision was, after all, up to government. There was competition—among investigators for research support, and among industrial enterprises for procurement contracts, but very little marketing.

University Attitudes Toward Research

In this connection it should also be pointed out that research as a *product* is not—or at least, not yet—an accepted notion even within the contemporary American research university. To understand this, it is useful once again to go back to Wilhelm von Humboldt and the germinal reform of the Prussian university which he achieved. Von Humboldt spoke not only of freedom of teaching and learning, but also of the identity of research and teaching. His credo was that inquiry was an indispensable part of teaching: so that only someone engaged in inquiry was best qualified to teach, and learning involved engagement in inquiry as much as absorption of subject matter. The twin identity of research and teaching has since become—and remains—gospel within the American research university. And this twinning needs to be understood in light of the fact that the university has been—and remains—primarily a teaching institution. When a major American university styles itself as a research university, what is meant is that its teaching mission is distinguished by a research component of the highest quality. What is not meant is that the university is primarily a research institution. Research without

teaching is still as heretical an idea within the contemporary American university as teaching without research.

To understand this supports the notion that universities as institutions are generally ill-suited to perform research: it is the professor *at* a university who performs research, not the institution. The key relationship which evolved as government became so prominent a sponsor of research was—as noted earlier—between government and individual professors, identified as principal investigators. The inner logic of this arrangement lies in the linkage of research and teaching, as well as in the freedom of inquiry: only the research/teacher could appropriately determine the proper mixture of inquiry and instruction that is inevitably a cardinal feature of an academic research project. Thus, on the face of it, a particular university can be identified as "doing" on the order of $100 million annually of federally sponsored research, and accountable to government and the public for the whole of it. But in reality so great a total is merely the accumulation of hundreds of individual projects, solicited and executed under the guidance of principal investigators, and normally unrelated to each other and scattered throughout the university. A major research university is one whose faculty is composed of many persons of such distinction so as to be able to bid successfully for research awards—grants and contracts awarded by government in the name of the institution, but awarded in fact to the principal investigators. Universities did not and do not *assign* research to members of the faculty—any more than they assign the courses to be taught. Instead, professors select the research they wish to do—just as they select the content of their teaching—and, if funded, thereby put the university into that particular research activity. When professors—principal investigators—move from one university to another, their research awards follow them, and do not remain at the university of origin. As a result, a university widely known for research of a particular kind could—and does—suffer loss of competence with the departure of a principal investigator, whose arrival at a different university would then lend to that institution the distinction lost by the university from which the move originated.

There were—and continue to be—some exceptions to this prevailing situation in that some universities did set up special laboratories, dedicated to particular lines of inquiry, which sought and received support as such, i.e. not on the basis of individual grants and contracts. In most instances, however, there was a special reason for such action by the university: the need for secrecy. When government insisted on secrecy in the national interest, the university faced—and still faces—a dilemma. On the one hand, it is obvious that certain types of research involving national security require the protection of secrecy lest they aid foe as well as friend. On the other hand, secret research is anathema to academic practice. Precisely because of the fundamental credo that research and teaching are inextricably linked, research that—for reasons of secrecy—cannot be related to instruction is illegitimate academically. Academic research *must* serve—or at least be capable of serving —as a teaching base and therefore *must* be open. By definition, then, secret research cannot be academic research. To resolve this dilemma, universities willing to engage in secret (classified) research set up non-academic laboratories, physically isolated from the rest of the campus, in which secrecy could be maintained —but at the sacrifice of the academic mission. At the same time a decision was reached that individual faculty members could engage in secret research as a matter of individual choice, but *not* on the campus. Professors can, in other words, serve as consultants on secret or classified projects, but only if the work they did on such a basis was located outside the academic campus, and as long as their laboratories and offices on campus remain entirely open. This mode of operation made it possible to achieve some academic linkage between an off-campus secret research project sponsored by a university and the same university's academic departments. By means of joint appointments, an investigator primarily engaged in secret research can come onto the academic campus as a part-time faculty member, at least to teach but possibly to perform non-classified research as well, and a regular faculty member can leave the academic campus and engage in secret research at the classified project site, serving as a part-time consultant.

Corrosion in the Government-University Research Partnership

In the course of the 1970s, a gradual sea-change occurred in the relationship between the federal government and the major research universities—a sea-change hard to define both because it took place gradually and because so much on the surface remains the same, but also sufficiently severe so that in effect it seems to mark the end of an era. A series of circumstances coincided to produce this effect. First, the constant dollar level of federal government appropriation to support university research in science and technology has ceased to rise, and on occasion has even fallen, and not only from one year to the next but over several years in succession. A form of the Cold War continues; the nation's investment in national security remains extremely high; even the country-wide mobilization in the national defense remains a constant of sorts. But as far as the universities are concerned, the context of federal research support has changed, from growth and renewal to contraction. And this has come about in combination with the end of that earlier sustained period of growth in student and faculty numbers. Overall, most of the level of effort reached in the past still continues, but the steady acceleration of the previous quarter-century has been halted.

Of greater importance may be the fact that substantial corrosion has appeared in the process of government-university research interaction. This is not surprising in that it is only natural when a relationship goes on for so protracted a period, but an understanding of this reality merely explains problems without relieving them. To a significant degree, the initial trust and shared common purpose between government and the university community have been substantially dissipated—for all sorts of reasons. The unpopularity of the Vietnam War produced sharp differences between government and the majority of the academic community. The sheer volume of federally sponsored research became so great that inevitable problems appeared in the auditing and accountability for so huge and diverse an annual effort. With the enormous growth of the professoriate over a quarter of a century came some dilution in quality. Where, early on, a relatively small elite of faculty members at relatively few institutions had dominated the interaction on the university side, there were now much larger numbers of persons from many more institutions involved, and the quality of peer group evaluation became somewhat arguable in the process. Over time, just enough instances of poor fiscal management and/or questionable performance have occurred to corrode some degree of faith and confidence. And a process dependent after all on annual appropriations from so highly political a body as the Congress could not expect indefinitely to remain miraculously untainted by political consideration. Additional corrosion therefore occurred when Congress on occasion began to tie strings and ribbons to federal grants and contracts. Recently, there has also been a tendency—still unchecked—to make some awards on political grounds, by simply and blatantly operating outside the regular process of application and peer-group review.

Other considerations entered the picture as well. Quite apart from inflation, the absolute cost of pursuing research has become steadily greater as the technology of research itself became ever more complex. The scientist doing equations on a blackboard—as fixed symbolically in the public eye by the ineradicable image of Einstein in his study—has been superceded by the research team operating with a vast laboratory array of instruments whose cost and complexity are awesome. And furthermore, the range of science and technology far outstrips even the most all-inclusive definition of national security, with the result that real argument is now possible to the priority for research support when weighed against the whole array of other public priorities.

The Industry-University Partnership

In the wake of such a sea-change—as the relationship between government as principal sponsor of research in science and technology at the major research universities has become more constrained and more contentious—a still increasing effort is under way to establish a new level of partnership in research—directly between the universities and private industry. No one has even suggested that private industry should eventually replace the federal government as principal research sponsor; nor has it been assumed that federal research sponsorship would cease. But due to the assumption that federal research support in constant dollars would at best level off and perhaps also be less comprehensive, the universities have an interest in industrial research sponsorship as a supplement to—not substitute for—federal support. As for industry, the trigger comes in the field of biotechnology, whose results in any instances have greater promise for commercial rather than national security development. By the beginning of the 1980s, therefore, discussion among representatives of universities and private industry began to be intensive and continuous and a number of large industrial commitments for sponsorship of university research received national publicity and were also surrounded by a host of smaller-scale, less well-publicized commitments of great diversity. It appears to be extremely likely that direct university-industry partnerships in research will continue to proliferate. However, this new linkage has significant limitations and problems. Some of both have been widely discussed already, others less so. An interesting and useful way to appraise them may take the route of comparison with the process of research sponsorship by the federal government.

Partnership grows out of mutual interest. And as has been noted, the foundation of the partnership between government and the universities lay in shared devotion to the national interest—specifically to national security in time of war. The analogous shared concern between industry and universities appears to revolve substantially around financial gain: most fundamentally, profit for industry, research support for the university. How sound is that analogy? It can well be argued that financial gain represents at least as much of a mutual incentive as patriotism, or even that gain can exceed patriotism in intensity. However, it may be more difficult to argue that financial gain as motive can parallel patriotism in serving as the basis for mutual trust. That in turn may be particularly relevant to the potential of industry-university partnership; the operative university partners are the researchers themselves—the principal investigators. In the partnership with government, the basic assumption was not only that everyone within the university shared a common commitment to the national interest, but—especially at the outset—financial gain beyond the mere generation of support for research scarcely was perceived as a factor, and the concept of profit did not usually enter into consideration.

In the partnership with industry, however, profit does enter into consideration, either actually or potentially. On the one hand, it would be unfair if a corporation made large profits from an application of university-based research and there were no sharing whatsoever with the university partner. On the other hand, insofar as the university partner is both the individual researcher and the institution, how is profit shared between these two? At first blush one might think that this question is easily answered by drawing on a long history of institutional patent policies that represent both a tradition and experimental base for profit-sharing on the part of industry as well as profit-sharing between principal investigator and university institution. But in practice there is the complexity involved, for example, in stock ownership by professors and/or universities as institutions; or in profit-sharing by corporations with scientists who serve only as consultants on an individual basis and not as participants in a university-sponsored relationship. It is not relevant here and now to explore further this and other complex entanglements; only to note that common concerns largely based on the expectation of financial gain are not as apt as patriotism to be generated in a great degree of mutual trust or to sustain such trust at a high level over protracted periods.

In fact—without excessive cynicism—one must note the effort to evolve a common industry-university concern much more analogous to wartime devotion to national security, as at least a complement to the profit motive. The common concern invoked in this view is technology transfer—a phrase that stands for the common humanitarian impulse to strive to make the benefits of applied research available to the public as rapidly and effectively as possible. More recently this concept has also been directly related to the national interest—to some degree even national security—by referring precisely to the discussion of economic innovation with which this essay began. Patriotism as well as profit can be invoked by the argument that the welfare—and security—of the United States depends on sufficient technology transfer directly from university to industry to assure not only that discovery results in new benefits to the quality of human life whenever possible in the best and quickest manner, but also to assure that American industry thereby remains so consistently innovative as to reclaim and retain world leadership. The profit potential in this context then becomes a desirable but secondary enhancement of a more noble primary goal. And even those who might be reminded—skeptically—of the now famous old assertion that "what's good for General Motors is good for the country" may find it difficult to deny that there is truth in the argument that university research relates positively to innovation in industry. Obviously, however, any argument linking industrially sponsored university research to American national purpose is awkward to justify when the sponsoring corporation is a major multinational enterprise based abroad. And the fact is, of course, that at least a few of the most prominent new linkages between particular industrial corporations and American research universities have involved foreign rather than American enterprises.

There are other problems that emerge when industry-university research relationships are compared with the government-university research partnership; and some of them also relate to the absence of over-riding national interest as basic justification. On occasion, for example, industry too would like to impose secrecy on research, but of course for proprietary purposes rather than by reason of national security. Universities, committed—as already indicated—to the inseparability of teaching and research, cannot appropriately accommodate industrial interest in confidentiality any more than government interest in secrecy; and ideally, therefore, confidential industrial research should be carried on by professors only off-campus, in industrial laboratories—just as was and is done with secret government research. But when the profit motive is present the easy parallel can be more difficult to apply. What happens, for instance, when the principal investigator is also the entrepreneur? What happens when the university as an institution stands to profit, through a contractual arrangement or as an investor? Are patents the answer? It is generally assumed that most conveniently, the time required to obtain a patent is just about as long as is required for publication of a piece of research. But will this result in an erosion of time-consuming testing because of a rush to publish? And what happens if the research in question involves unpatentable techniques?

Questions such as these raise the more fundamental question as to whether the anticipation of financial gain will not tend inevitably to draw professors away from the concept of research as pure inquiry toward the goal of research for profit. Earlier, goal-oriented research had become something of an issue in the course of the government-university research relationship. Often, however, the goal was classified, and so the research took place away from the university in every event. In the case of other goals such as "the war on cancer," the goal was so broad and humane as to cause no problem. Financial gain is more suspect, particularly because the university as an institution is as directly involved as the principal investigator. In the case of government sponsored research, it is assumed that the university as an institution has only a minor interest in the substance of any particular piece of research being done, as long as it is no secret and as long as the principal investigator who solicited support is appropriately funded and committed. But will university administrators, representing the interests of the university as an institution, remain in such a position of benign indifference when there is a prospect of financial gain for the institution? Will there, in other words, be a tendency by the university to push professors, not merely to perform research and obtain support for doing so—as has long been the case—but to perform particular kinds of research, with financial gain in mind?

This line of inquiry compels recognition of another relevant difference between the government-university and industry research relationships. As noted earlier, the essence of the government-university relationship was government sponsorship through a process of open application by principal investigators whose applications were subject to a peer-review process. Relationships between industrial corporations and universities increasingly have taken on an entirely different form. First, the diversity of industry and of the professoriate is so great that some sort of brokerage was required to match potential sponsors and investigators, and university administrations began to play the role of broker. Second, a marketing approach emerged: a corporation marketing its interest in sponsorship, and a university marketing its interest in receiving sponsorship. Third, instead of a nationwide application process and competition by application, corporate research sponsorship with a university tends to be negotiated on a one-on-one basis, and in most cases with no form of peer review. Fourth—and finally—the result for the universities was a new and highly competitive race for industrial sponsorship, in which university administrators were actively marketing the skills of their professors. It is against this background that questions are asked as to whether the university as an institution will attempt to impart guidance to principal investigators when the factor of financial gain is present.

Fundamental Issues for Industry-Government-University Research Interactions

Problems of this kind are significant and awkward, and they continue to be both explored in practice and debated in the abstract. They are, however, dwarfed by two other considerations that may be even more fundamental and that as yet have received very little discussion. The first of these derives from further consideration of the enormous cost of research instrumentation in the universities. As was noted earlier, the aggregate sum required for adequate instrumentation already appears to be growing beyond even the capacity of the federal government to sustain at public expense. And large as the collective resources of private industry may be, they not only fall short of the resources available to government, but no way exists—nor is likely to be found—for a *collective* application of industrial resources to research support in the universities. Even industry by industry collectively is hamstrung by anti-trust legislation; company by company approaches are the rule. At the moment, such approaches appear to be feasible only as long as the application of corporate resources remains a marginal supplement to a much larger volume of support from government. It follows, however, that significant future decreases in government research support are not likely to be offset by a sufficient increase in support from industrial corporations. Instead of industrial resources rising to balance out shrinking federal allocations, a more likely prospect would be that major reductions in federal support for instrumentation—and its installation and maintenance—would make university laboratories *less* attractive to corporations, because corporate resources available would become sub-marginal under these circumstances.

The future requirements of support for instrumentation have practical consequences for the universities, for industry, and for government. For the universities—assuming that the twin pressures of need and practical possibility will over the long run impose their own logic—the most likely answer would appear to lie in the type of sharing that has already evolved in the field of high-energy physics. Just as, for example, only a finite number of nuclear accelerators exists, and just as these are governed by consortia of institutions so as to provide access to investigators across the entire discipline, so it seems probable that truly large-scale instrumentation resources in other scientific and technical fields will evolve along similar lines. The diversity of universities in conjunction with which such resources are located will on the one hand develop special strength in the relevant particular area of inquiry; on the other hand, colleagues from the rest of the university world will also have access to the facility and its resources. And at a different level, universities will need to consider more effective sharing of resources with colleges that operate on the undergraduate level only. The issue in this respect is not research—professors located in colleges will already have access for research purposes to highly advanced instrumentation resources at major research universities—but teaching. The universities draw on the collegiate sector for their graduate and professional students. Universities thus have an interest in preventing the decline of instrumentation in undergraduate colleges to the point where college graduates

would be so under-prepared in science and technology as to be dysfunctional in graduate and professional schools. As a result, universities will see the need to share the most expensive and sophisticated instrumentation with colleges for teaching purposes, along new lines of sharing within higher education that as yet have barely begun to appear.

As for private industry, corporations dependent on science and technology have an unavoidable stake in the adequacy of instrumentation and the quality of research in the major research universities. The *essential* linkage between the universities and industrial innovation and vitality consists of people—not product—related research. The article of faith within the university community which insists on the inseparability of research and teaching is not merely sacrosanct: it is practical wisdom as well. To the extent that its consequence puts limits on the direct applicability of university research precisely because that research must also serve a teaching mission, these limits are an asset rather than a liability. Both government and industry are inescapably dependent on a flow of talent which the universities produce. To a large degree, the quality of government and industry in the age of technology is determined by the quality of available talent, and the pool of the most highly trained, specialized and scientifically and technologically most advanced talent flows out of the universities.

Industry recognized long ago that innovation in science and technology depended on the creation of industrial laboratories. These laboratories—not university laboratories—are the proper and best source of product development. But industrial laboratories are staffed by university graduates. Under these circumstances, universities are the source of graduates trained in the methods of inquiry and with state-of-the art instrumentation, who are eligible for hiring by industry for its laboratories, and technology transfer occurs as well informed and highly skilled human talent moves constantly out of teaching laboratories into applied research laboratories. Nor is this a one-way street. New techniques and results from industrial laboratories move over into the teaching laboratories of universities, not only by the maintenance of personal contacts, but as university scientists already consult sufficiently with industry to stay current with industrial advances in science and technology. Under less than ideal circumstances, however, universities would lack the resources for the adequate and most up-to-date preparation in science and technology, and the pool of the most highly trained talent would then be not fresh but stale. At the worst, industry would itself have to offer the ultimate in advanced training, if industrial laboratories alone offered advanced instrumentation no longer available to universities for the purposes of research training.

If this is the correct perspective, then a good deal at least of the prevailing industrial—and public—fixation on the *substance* of university research appears to put the accent on the wrong syllable. The most fruitful outcome of the now protracted experience of government sponsorship of university research was in fact the splendid enhancement of the nation's pool of most highly developed talent—not the research results obtained, in any single instance or in aggregate. Clear recognition that universities must do research in order to teach —not do research for its own sake—provides the best guidance for the future courses of action. Such recognition implies that government, industry, and the universities fully share a common purpose: to assure the ability of the universities to attract, nurture and prepare human talent at the most advanced level of science and technology so that the goals of government and industry will not be impeded for lack of human resources. Industry, therefore, should move beyond the current emphasis on the possibility of product development directly out of university laboratories to a more fundamental emphasis on the preservation and enhancement of the teaching mission of the university. In practical terms this would mean supportive concern by industry with the continuation of public investment by government in the strength and quality of university research—and teaching—in science and technology; and less effort on the part of corporations to leverage the prospect of financial gain for universities into pressure to unhinge university research from the teaching mission so as to move it closer to a more goal-oriented character with directly applicable results in view.

The future of innovation in the American economy does indeed depend on the American university. The dependence, however, rests far less on the results of university research *per se* than on the indispensability of research to the training mission of the university. The university's role in the development of human talent transcends by far the university's role in discovery—or, explicitly, the quest for discovery with a goal. It follows, then, that the future of both national security and national prosperity depends significantly on a continued investment in university science and technology support by both government and industry with the greatest emphasis on the development of human talent.

American Shortcomings: Innovation or Marketing?

Tempting as it is to end here, some brief concluding observations may be useful on the innovative character of American society in comparison to other national societies. On the one hand, there *is* evidence that the United States has no monopoly on innovation in science and technology within the world. On the other hand, there is *no* evidence that the United States to date lacks the ideas or the talent to retain world leadership in the advancement of science and technology, provided only that adequate resources are supplied. The record of recent international economic experience shows little evidence that other national economies are more innovative than that of the United States insofar as the substance of science and technology is concerned. What that record does reveal, however, is that other nations have been and remain more innovative and successful in marketing new products internationally than the United States. Japan, for example, appears to be applying a genius for the identification and exploitation of world markets through a combination of highly innovative and effective product development and marketing far more than striving for original discovery in science. In contrast, American industry continues to draw on original discovery but may be falling behind in international market share. For this there may be two primary reasons. First, American corporations may be too comfortable with a domestic market of continental size which for decades has been familiar and sufficient to sustain profits and growth. Second, American corporations have relied heavily on foreign employees when selling abroad, in part on the assumption that indigenous citizens of other lands will get the best reception within their domestic markets, but also because American talent familiar in depth with foreign markets is in extremely short supply.

The simple fact appears to be that American corporations need to cultivate foreign markets more effectively on a global scale, and rely in the process more on American talent that knows the area, its culture and history, and above all its languages. To the extent this is true, American universities may have a major contribution to make to national economic prosperity, not only through teaching and research in science and technology but through foreign language and area studies for far greater numbers of students than have participated in the past. It is not true that worldwide marketing is a new concept for American industry, but it may be true that worldwide marketing falls short when it is executed and supervised by Americans who speak only English, and on behalf of products designed primarily for the American market. The American major research universities are among the most cosmopolitan, least parochial institutions in the United States. Their ability to provide human talent familiar in depth with any and all areas of the world may need greater recognition and support in the context of national prosperity within a global economy. The earlier research partnership between government and the universities included the language and area study centers and fellowships long and successfully supported by the National Defense Education Act. It is worth considering whether American industry has a major stake in reviving and supplementing that experience as well.

In summary, then, the power and strength of American industry in a global economy depends both on future innovation *and* the capacity to market the results worldwide. Innovation in this era of science and technology depends on numerous factors—one of which without doubt is human talent of appropriate high quality. The

American university has become the proper training ground for such talent by virtue of the effective linkage of scientific research to its traditional teaching mission. Thus industry and government have a joint stake in university research, less for the sake of applicable results than for its indispensable educational function. And if there is truth in the thought that American industry may be more deficient in marketing than in innovation, the universities have the capacity to contribute to the solution of that problem as well.

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MODERN UNIVERSITY

STEVEN MULLER

The driving force within the modern—or contemporary—university is change. Not gradual, considered, partial change, but rather an urgent, drastic, total transformation. The whirlwind revolution of human knowledge produced by electronic technology continues and inescapably storms through the university, whose sole business is knowledge. As the scope and content of human knowledge is suddenly multiplied by orders of magnitude, and access to and communication of human knowledge becomes instant and universal, the most sophisticated human institution devoted to transmitting and advancing human knowledge must recreate itself or perish. Inevitably, then, the university today is in the midst of the storm of self-reinvention, and therefore desperately difficult to manage.

Of course the university has recreated itself before. The traditional Western university of faith, committed to the study and transmission of accumulated knowledge, operated for centuries within a prevailing norm of religious orthodoxy. In the 19th Century, however, this traditional university of faith transformed itself into the university of reason, committed to rational inquiry and the scientific method, which demanded that the truth of matters should be demonstrable by proof. The pace of change accelerated. By the middle of the 20th Century, the university of discovery superceded the university of reason. For the university of discovery, the search for new knowledge and the development of new technology became the central and most attractive mission, and teaching became more and more integrated into—some would say subordinated to—the research enterprise. And then, within a half century—or, more graphically—in less than two human generations, the virtual explosion of electronic intelligence processing initiated the contemporary transformation of the university into what I have earlier and elsewhere labeled the university of calculation.[1]

The plain fact is that as yet we have no clear idea of what the university is in the process of becoming. The only clear prospect is change, not merely rapid but also radical. Most of what we have taken for granted is becoming questionable and may not survive. While we cannot yet describe tomorrow's university, we can already ask some of the questions whose answers will determine its structure. Because the management of today's university is fated to manage a degree of change amounting to transformation, and will be confronted with all the questions we can ask and more, it makes sense at the outset to examine issues which are already apparent.

Let us begin with one simple assumption: that the personal lecture system of presenting information will not survive in its present form. This may seem too bold an assumption in view of the fact that "the talking head"

has survived centuries both of words in print and of literacy. However, the world's best lectures can now not only be taped but appropriately illustrated, so as to offer that marriage of words and pictures which contemporary advertising has revealed to be a truly splendid teaching technique. Who would want to sit on a hard seat in a crowded hall and strain to see and hear a far distant learned professor expound verbally when it is possible to hear the same substance in comfort by oneself (or with friends) at a convenient time, in a convenient place, delivered by the greatest living (or even recently deceased) expert on the subject, and accompanied by support graphics and appropriate music or other sounds–all available in the virtual reality produced by the next generation CD-Roms? Lectures, electronically reinforced and presented, very likely will survive, but the live voice in the crowded hall seems less likely to do so. A magnificent lecture performance by a great and famous scholar, fully edited, illustrated, and orchestrated, is one thing. The same material spoken live from a lectern by a local expert is quite another.

If we assume this to be true, other interesting questions pop up. How, for example, will professors teach? If they do not lecture, how will they instruct? And what about the students? Without lectures to attend, what will bring them to the university? The library? Not likely, because just about every word or number available in the library will also be accessible electronically to anyone, anywhere. Laboratories? Yes, of course. Despite the new electronic technology there is as yet no apparent substitute for hands-on laboratory teaching, involving both student and instructor. Virtual reality techniques can assist experimentation, but they are not a likely substitute for hands-on work, and in their most effective and sophisticated form they usually require special quarters and thus are not accessible via personal computers. So, yes, laboratory instruction will continue to require the presence of both professors and students. Could it become true, then, that only the laboratory sciences will require the shared presence of teachers and students in the same space?

If that indeed were true, and if all lectures were electronically presented, then the question arises as to whether the current aggregations of professors at different universities would remain necessary at all. It might make more sense to create centers for each academic discipline. The task of each such center would be to train and maintain a staff of superb experts and to produce a nationwide series of lectures in the discipline–lectures which in aggregate would prepare students for any kind of examinations in the field. If more than one center were needed, this would not be for the sake of redundancy but rather to permit further specialization. Let us take the field of history as an example. In Europe, for instance, there could be one center for European history, but each nation would also have a center of national history, and the history of the rest of the world would be covered by lectures created in Asia, Africa, North and Latin America, etc. What purpose then would be served by separate, comprehensive history departments at any number of separate universities? In fact, would any purpose be served by any such large number of separate universities such as now exist? Would their facilities be transferred and transformed into new centers, each dealing with a single discipline?

We do not yet know just what the information age will expect of higher education. The most likely demand appears to be for human talent with highly developed specialized skills in a large variety of different fields. Future professionals would presumably have to be credentialed in some way, probably most easily by passing a national, regional, or even international comprehensive examination or examinations. This assumption leads us to envision sets of national, regional, or even international centers, each devoted to a particular discipline or part of a discipline. Each center would be composed of the best available scholars in that discipline or part-discipline, who would provide the lectures, prepare the examinations, and train their successors. All of these centers would be linked together electronically for the sake of interdisciplinary collaboration. It would be quite possible for the national, regional, or international aggregate of these centers to be called a university–an electronically linked network of which each center would then form a component.

But what about the laboratory instruction we mentioned earlier? How would it be provided? The large number of students who would need access to training laboratories would require a number of such facilities, all essentially identical. Would these continue to exist at various universities as they do now? Perhaps, but not necessarily. It seems certain, in the age of information technology, that these laboratories will become ever more expensive to equip and operate. How much redundancy would be required, and affordable? Should the industries which would later hire the credentialed specialists be required to make their industrial laboratories available for training? In states or regions where there are non-university research institutes, such as the Max Planck Institutes in the Federal Republic of Germany, should these institutes be required to make their research laboratories available for teaching? To what extent could teaching in laboratories be automated, or performed robotically? What role would the hypothetical disciplinary centers responsible for the lectures and examinations in each discipline play in the operation and supervision of teaching laboratories? The centers for science would each require laboratories for the preparation of lectures, examinations, and future lectures. Would these laboratories also serve as teaching centers? Would it be more convenient, and cost-effective, to have students move among laboratories as much as necessary, rather than to continue to operate clusters of laboratories around stationary students? We cannot answer any of these questions. They are mentioned only to make the point that the need for laboratory instruction does not per se suffice to justify the continued existence of the large number of existing universities.

My personal expectation, whatever it is worth, is that universities will indeed survive in considerable number, but only if they continue to serve a substantial teaching purpose. Lectures no longer will suffice. But universities can continue to teach by providing professors who will serve as tutors for small groups of students preparing for eventual examinations. The reasoning behind this belief is quite simple: prolonged study beyond school is an essentially solitary pursuit which is too alienating for human tolerance. Though it is of course possible for students to form electronically assembled study groups—as already in existence on Internet— some significant degree of real, as opposed to virtual, human contact among students is likely to prove not only desirable but necessary, despite the knowledge explosion. Most current and past university graduates will acknowledge the extent to which fellow students positively affected their own learning experience. In the same way, former students who credit professors with significant influence on their learning are more likely to do so on the basis of personal encounters rather than mere presence at lectures. It would be as easily possible, of course, to conduct a colloquy with a professor electronically as to form a student study group, but there is still likely to be a point where real human rather than virtual interaction remains an essential ingredient in the learning process. The professor as tutor, or seminar leader, is nothing new. What would be new would be that professors would offer their teaching primarily in these roles, including of course laboratory instruction as well. The drastic change involved would restore teaching rather than research as the university's central mission. It would also provide the university with the humanist role of providing a supportive human community environment to supplement the alienation imposed by electronic technology.

Even if these speculations become reality, would they suffice to keep universities alive in anything like their present form? It is impossible to predict. In the United States, long committed to an undergraduate stage of higher education which usually takes eight semesters, and generally involves student residence in dormitories "on the campus" of a college or university, the elimination of this experience would have significant social —quite apart from academic—consequences. Four full years of undergraduate study keep close to 50 percent of the age group between 18 and 22 out of the labor market, and also usually remove them from living at home. A whole culture of collegiate life, particularly notorious for an athletic component of circus dimensions, has grown up in this context. Even in totally non-residential European universities some sort of student quarter of a town or city tends to exist, and to exhibit various forms of student life. It is unlikely that students will not seek ways to aggregate, and perhaps universities may continue to exist in part in response to this inclination.

Another as yet unknown factor, however, is what sort of education students in higher education will carry forward with them from school. Present conditions already indicate that all school leavers will have acquired the ability to use the electronic knowledge technology. This presumably also carries with it a matching level of literacy and numeracy. What is not clear is how much of a basic education students will have acquired in school. There is, of course, some possibility for universities to influence the outcome of schooling, by setting conditions for eligibility to study further. In most of the world the working assumption is that schools bear the responsibility for general basic education, and that university work therefore can be devoted entirely to specialized pre-professional study. Only in the United States and other societies which use an undergraduate phase in higher education is it true that a relatively advanced level of basic general education is also an essential ingredient of collegiate education. One may now speculate that if students continue to aggregate at universities for tutorials, seminars, laboratories, and social life, then an easy opportunity would exist to add elements of general education to the mixture. But one could as easily speculate that access to general knowledge via electronic technology is so easy that any aspect not dealt with during schooling remains available to any person, at any time, on a life-long basis without need for any formal instruction.

Such speculations in turn lead to the thought that the familiar concept of a student generation of persons who begin higher education at the end of schooling, and then leave higher education to begin professional work, may rapidly become outdated. Already, technological change and innovation proceed at a pace so rapid that highly advanced specialized knowledge can no longer be acquired once in youth for lifelong use. Instead, advanced specialized knowledge needs to be upgraded or shifted to new specializations several times during the longer human lifetimes which have already evolved. If universities in future exist to support individual specialized learning via electronic technology, then one might also assume that students might already be employed either prior to or during their university experience. One might further assume that most individuals would have a series of student experiences over the years rather than only a single dose of advanced study after school. It does seem extremely likely that the link between higher education and professional employment will become closer than ever, which raises the question of how explicitly university study will be linked to employment. Is it, for instance, conceivable that employment would precede university study, even to the point of becoming a condition of admission to university work? One may then indeed wonder whether the university degree itself will survive as such, or whether it will be superseded by a credential for proficiency in a discipline, based on the appropriate examination result. Such a credential also could perhaps be periodically renewed, based on new study and a new examination, or supplemented by a second, or third, credential in another discipline. If the purpose of higher education becomes wholly focussed on proficiency, then higher education will no longer necessarily produce educated, but qualified persons instead.

In this connection it would also seem possible that a widening and severe social gap would open up between those persons in society who are skilled in the knowledge technology, and those who are not. While access to the knowledge technology may be simple, easy, and cheap, that per se no more guarantees universal participation than yesterday's simple, easy, and cheap access to printed knowledge and entertainment guaranteed literacy. And as far as higher education in the information age is concerned, can one reasonably assume that the entire population would participate? Surely not. At this moment, roughly 50 of the school-leaving generation in the United States enrolls in some institution of higher education. I believe that this is the highest level of any contemporary societies. Even if one were to assume that this level were to become a global norm—which seems wholly unlikely—what should one assume about the lifestyle of the other fifty percent of the population? All that can be said here and now is that if indeed there is a great gulf in society separating a knowledge-competent class from a class of those who lack such competence, and if the future university is intimately linked to the knowledge class, then such a situation would be bound to have a significant impact on the university itself. Let me amplify this statement by one example. One way to rationalize the continued

existence of universities in many different communities would be to assume that they would provide instructional support or assistance to a large segment of the neighboring population as needed or wanted on a part-time basis. But this would be much more difficult to envision if that neighboring population consisted largely of an underclass of persons excluded from a socially-dominant knowledge class.

But enough. All of these thoughts are obviously mere speculation. The purpose of presenting them is not to attempt prediction, but only to make the single point that the university as it exists today cannot avoid change –change both drastic and rapid. We cannot even be certain whether the university as we know it will survive at all, nor, if so, in what form. What we do know is that the university as it exists needs to be managed toward and through whatever transformation lies ahead, and that this represents a colossal challenge to university management. Change is invariably difficult for human beings, even when it is welcome. Quick and drastic change is particularly difficult, especially in a workplace, where it will have differentiated–and therefore divisive–impacts on those affected. Management of rapid, major change within any institution therefore is bound to be, not merely unpopular, but most likely to become an adversary process between management and almost everyone else involved. Unusual fortitude is required to lead an organization through any major change. Such fortitude is essential even at the beginning, but it becomes even more crucial–and much, much harder to muster–when the process of change has achieved completion of the first stage, or phase. The pressure to make a pause–to take a break–will then become palpable to everyone, including management. Iron will is needed to press on to complete the change process, and to do so in the face of exhaustion and opposition from everyone else. Changing an institution inevitably means conflict to some extent. The management of conflict requires a very special kind of courage: the ability to function effectively in a hostile environment.

The level of management self-confidence demanded in this situation must also be high enough to include, and rise above, the recognition that the benefits of the changes being imposed are totally uncertain. Clear though it is to everyone that the university cannot simply continue status quo operations into the maturing information age, it remains quite unclear which immediate steps will in the long run prove to have been the right or best ones. Everyone's expectations will require university management to proceed with planning, to set out goals, and then to lead the effort to accomplish these goals. What will be missing, however, is any certainty that the plan and the goals are in fact the right ones. The revolution of the technology of knowledge confronts the university with the inescapable need to plunge into unknown territory, in pursuit of no clear future, but rather toward ultimate solutions which remain to be discovered.

Consequently, yet a third dimension of courage is needed by the management of the contemporary university. The admission of error and the shift to a major course correction must be added to the ability to manage change in a hostile environment, and toward uncertain final objectives. The effort to restructure the whole of the university institution in the absence of a clear ultimate goal is bound to involve trial and error. Error, once discovered, must be admitted and corrected as rapidly as possible. The admission of error is one of the most demanding challenges to leadership–i.e., management, because persistence in error leads to failure. All I have been saying here involves well known aspects of human behavior. What is so striking and different in our own time is the speed with which change now takes place. What once changed only over centuries now is transformed, no longer in decades, but in years or even months. No longer will planning, execution, and result stretch over a career or longer. Indeed the process will not only occur but repeat itself rapidly within years or even months. The same persons who participated at the beginning will all still be participants at the end. Immediate recognition and admission of error and the most rapid possible corrective course is therefore necessary but no longer softened by the passage of time.

This discussion of the kind of management required to transform the university began with a focus on courage –to be unpopular, to move into the unknown, and to admit and correct error. What we are also talking about

is smart management—smart in the most contemporary modern sense—as in smart terminal. Smart university management requires a team, because no one person will possess all the skills required. That team will need leadership, but whoever leads it needs to be smart enough to recognize his or her total dependence on the whole team. And team members—ultimately even the team leader—must be expendable, in the sense that recognition of error, course corrections, and new directions may require deletions from and additions to the team, and perhaps new leadership as well. Precisely this model of management already exists in industry, which of course requires competent performance above all. The modern university, forced by the knowledge revolution to recreate itself, now requires competence in its management as its highest priority. More traditional characteristics of university management lose priority when the only sound criterion by which university management can be compared and judged is effective performance, i.e., competence.

From my own experience, as a corporate director as well as a university administrator, I would argue that there is less difference between effective performance in the management of industrial corporations and of universities than most people might think, with one exception. In universities management continues to rely much more heavily on persuasion than authority, while the reverse tends to be true in most corporations, except—interestingly enough—some of those in the knowledge industry. The need to inform, to persuade, to discuss, and to entertain dissent remains, and should remain, a hallmark of academic management. A community committed to the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge should not be expected to accept management incapable of persuasion and averse to discussion. Nevertheless, university management must have sufficient authority to reach conclusions and act without destructive delay. It has been said in American higher education that achieving change in university faculties is like moving a graveyard. Such pace of change in the modem university simply is no longer survivable.

Having just now referred to the university as a community, let us remember that it is likely to remain a community during the process of reinventing itself. The quick and comprehensive changes required will traumatize the university community but not immediately eliminate it. The community knows that it requires management. However, faced with the enormous threats entailed by change per se, aware that most of the changes are themselves experimental rather than definitive, managed by a team forced to acknowledge and correct management errors, the university community will find it difficult to trust its management. Nevertheless, only some degree of trust will enable management to function effectively in the situation we are contemplating. The effort of management to persuade and discuss will not succeed in convincing the whole community, but it can engender at least some trust. The biggest—indeed indispensable—asset available to management is its accessibility. The individuals on the management team are known, and those in charge can be reached and required to respond. Such accessibility and openness on the part of management point the only way to that minimum of community trust required to allow management to function at all. At the same time accessibility and openness also prevent authoritarian management, which would destroy the integrity of the university community. Blind discipline lacks legitimacy in a community committed to knowledge. However limited, only trust earned on the basis of shared knowledge and interests confers legitimacy on university management. On that limited trust rests the fragile but indispensable authority available to university management.

This fact alone would argue for the need of each university to function with a high degree of autonomy. Accessibility and accountability are at least possible when the management in charge is part of the community. Both accessibility and accountability are lost when those in charge are outside the community altogether, and resident management is perceived as only executing instructions from somewhere else. When dealing with the need for rapid and comprehensive change, the willingness of management to address the problems, and of the community to endure the inevitable trauma, is dependent on a shared sense that all the effort and sacrifice involved will result in an improved, surviving community—and that the contribution of each person is required, recognized, and rewarded. There may be some degree of comfort in the knowledge of any one univer-

sity community that the change it is compelled to undergo is part of a comprehensive total process affecting the whole system of higher education. However, even such a comprehensive overall plan for change would allow for some degree of differentiated adoption by each particular university within a comprehensive system.

In fact, the evolution of the new university model required by the knowledge revolution is unlikely to result successfully from only a single comprehensive effort by a whole national or regional university system.

My opinion here is based on the fact noted earlier, that the speed of change is fast beyond precedent, as well as on the assumption that the final result of the transformation required remains obscure and is as likely to be the product of much trial and error as of a pre-designed scheme. With respect to the speed of change, the prospect is that a finished solution for an entire university system would take longer to develop than the educational needs of currently enrolled students could tolerate. Worse, no matter at what length and with what care the grand scheme is designed, it will likely fail to be definitive. It also will have taken so long as to be outdated by the time it is finally ready for adoption. American experience in higher education, which features an extremely high degree of institutional autonomy particularly among the so-called independent colleges and universities, indicates that successful trials by one institution are almost immediately adopted by most other institutions. Errors, on the other hand, are unlikely to be repeated elsewhere, and their negative results can often be limited to only a single institution. A serious flaw in a grand comprehensive scheme can potentially injure all concerned and is at the same time difficult to correct. The equivalent flaw in only a single institution has much less widely damaging potential. American experience also shows that the survival instincts of autonomous institutions are strong enough to lead to rapid correction of such errors.

Quick adjustments in response to trial and error do, however, require that management is in control of the university budget. The income side of the budget may always be beyond management control to some degree, but that makes control of expenditures even more essential. The allocation of resources within the university is the single most powerful and useful tool in management's hands. In the end, the designation and shifting of funds within the institution is the only effective way in which management authority can be exercised. What this also requires, of course, is reliable management competence to administer university finances and resources. Incompetence in fiscal management makes mockery of financial authority and destroys confidence in and respect for management. Easy and obvious as this is to say, it must also be acknowledged that budgetary competence has not been one of the traditional strengths of the university institution and can therefore not be taken for granted. Lack of budgetary authority, or incompetence in budget management, however —either one—will inevitably result in management incompetence and impotence.

With this thought we arrive at the crucial question: is it possible to create management capable of coping with the challenge of the university's unavoidable and nearly total transformation? We have spoken of management which must deal with a professoriate in professional agony, must move toward goals that are not clearly fixed or visible, must therefore proceed by trial and error and acknowledge and reverse error without delay, and must be persuasive and open to discussion, must remain dependent for its authority on the trust of the community it manages, and must demonstrate reliable competence, particularly in fiscal administration. Is management with all these indispensable virtues possible? Are there ways to achieve or assist what is so desperately needed?

The one suggestion I can offer is that university management should have the assistance of a strong and able board of directors. Such a board would function very much like the board of directors of a publicly-held commercial corporation, principally selecting, supervising, and advising management. This suggestion is obviously derived from my personal experience as the president of a private, or independent, American university. Thus it could at the very outset be deemed to be ill-suited outside the United States. I respectfully suggest

that the suggestion could be adopted to universal use. The primary virtue of such a board is that it provides an alternative to direct supervision of the university by government. Direct, detailed supervision of and accountability to government inevitably inhibits the university's necessary managerial authority and flexibility, and also risks undue political intervention in university operations. It is worth pointing out that the public universities in the United States, i.e., those substantially funded by state appropriations, also have boards of directors. These can and do function as effectively as those in the independent universities, unless they are politically appointed or elected, in which case they function more as simply a part of state government. A board of directors consisting of distinguished persons from business, industry, and the professions serves to provide public accountability of the university. Such a board represents the public interest in much the way the corporate boards of public enterprises represent the interests of the stockholders. As distinct from corporate boards of directors in business and industry, who receive compensation for their services, however, university directors serve in their spare time while continuing their individual careers. They must care enough about the university to volunteer their service, but they are not university employees, nor employees of government. They cannot and do not manage the university, but their approval is required both for the selection of the university's top managers and for all major university policies and decisions. The university board of directors in the United States is regarded as the guarantor of the integrity of the university's fiscal and administrative operations, and as the appropriate representative of the public interest with regard to all of the university's programs, including research and teaching.

All this is nothing new. My point here, however, is that an effective university board of directors can assist and strengthen university management in several ways—ways which are potentially of crucial significance during the crisis of drastic and urgent change. The very existence of a board of directors already achieves the reality that university management is neither selected by nor directly accountable to the faculty, or professoriate. It goes without saying that any university management which is wholly unacceptable to, or would take actions wholly unacceptable to, the faculty could never function. But there is also a clear and crucial distinction from a management selected by and directly accountable to the faculty rather than to the board of directors. If I may be permitted a personal comment, I found that one of the great privileges of my own university presidency was to see the institution as a whole, with at least partial knowledge of each and all of its component parts. But this privilege was also a great burden, because only the president and a few top managers enjoyed this perspective, while everyone else was informed about his or her own component of the university but usually largely ignorant of all the rest. Aside from the management team, the only other group which consistently saw the university as a whole was the board of directors. So my argument now is that in times when change unavoidably threatens faculty interests, and therefore focuses professors on threats to their own most immediate concerns, there is scant chance to rally the faculty to raise its sights to the whole of the university. The sense and significance of the whole can and must however be shared with the board of directors, who may thus represent the only—and indispensable—partner and supporter of management during the crisis induced by change. University directors cannot help but hear all of the voices within the university. An essential reality check is accomplished if they share fully in management's view of the whole. If they do, progress is possible. If they do not, progress will be arrested—as it probably should be. An effective board of directors thus can strengthen management when the university needs it most, and when support from the professoriate is at its most fragile. And it is all too human for short-term sacrifices faced by the faculty to obscure and frustrate long-term gains.

There are two lesser ways in which a university board of directors can also assist management at critical moments. One is to provide public spokesmanship when it is most needed. The board of directors, consisting of non-employee volunteers from other walks of life, has more public credibility than university management itself. At moments when government and the public at large question the university's course—and this is almost bound to happen during an intense period of change which may have caused professors and students to be

up in arms—the firm support of the university board of directors, speaking in the public interest, can make a significant impact. The endorsement of university management's course by a board of persons each of whom is successful in concerns outside the university can carry a lot of weight.

By the same token, the university directors would usually include many persons with management experience. That experience—which renders their public support of university management so credible—also enables them at times to give knowledgeable and crucial advice to university management. In particular, the change process confronting the university is after all not solely experienced there but encompasses the whole society. Business, industry, the professions, indeed all of us, are caught up in this ceaseless and drastic change. University directors who are themselves engaged in managing change as part of their own careers can be of extraordinary assistance to university managers—not by micro-managing within the university themselves, but by sharing experience and ideas. I cannot even begin to count the number of management mistakes avoided or corrected by wisdom or caution expressed by university directors during my presidency.

And now we end as we began. The management of the modern university is faced with change of unprecedented scope and urgency. The existence of the university as it is now and as we know it is in doubt. University managers will have to deal with difficulties beyond all past experience. They are condemned, as the ancient Chinese curse goes, to live in interesting times. Challenges of this magnitude are frightening, but they can also be exhilarating. When so little is clear failures may not be avoidable, but they may also be survivable. Those of us who are spending our lives in the knowledge industry can only welcome the knowledge revolution. Higher education will survive. The task of determining its new shape has begun.

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THE UNIVERSITY PRESIDENCY TODAY: A WORD FOR THE INCUMBENTS

WHERE ARE THE GREAT COLLEGE PRESIDENTS OF TODAY?

STEVEN MULLER

Few of us who lead major universities have escaped this question, asked in a plaintive—and implicitly accusatory—tone. The question, in fact, is not merely rhetorical—it constitutes an indictment. The questioner has in mind the Gilmans, Eliots, Hutchins, or Conants of the past; he sees only those of us who currently hold office and finds us wanting. We seem pleasant enough, the questioner may suggest reassuringly, even able, diligent, and competent; but none of us is a great leader, none the present voice or conscience or inspiration of the higher learning. We are perceived, our questioner will inform us with great courtesy, as lacking the aura, the eccentricity, the genius of greatness.

We suffice rather than impress. We may stand tall, but we do not tower. We plod along in our loafers and fail to fill the giant footsteps of our predecessors. And—at least in my own experience—there is inevitably a ritual conclusion to this dialogue: "Well," says my interlocutor with just the right blend of pity and comfort, "you must spend all your time raising money so that you cannot do much else—and you *do* raise a lot of money."

Having now heard this with some frequency over the years, I have become more accepting both of my own inadequacies as well as those of my peers. Yet the question rankles. Where *are* the great college presidents of today? How inferior, compared to our legendary forebears, are those of us who occupy the presidencies of major universities? If it is true that none among us has attained the dominant stature, the mantle of national advocacy that is expected of at least one or some of us, why is this so? My answer—biased and self-serving as any response from someone in my position obviously has to be—is that we university presidents of today may very well be inferior to our predecessors, but that what we do, how we do it, and how we are perceived are so very different from their circumstances that their comparative superiority is not wholly self-evident. I do not challenge their greatness. I do not assert ours. Instead, I submit merely that the finest of our predecessors rose to an opportunity that may no longer exist for those of us who hold university presidencies today. At the risk of arguing only that we are mutants rather than pygmies, let me try to make my case.

The case consists mainly of a single point: The major research university of today is a radically different institution than its predecessor of three or four decades ago. The most obvious difference is size. As recently as the 1940s and even early 1950s, a university was not very much larger than a college. The question as to where the great *college* presidents of the present day are to be found assumes, in fact, that this is still the case. I speak, however, only of the presidencies of major research universities; and those institutions now are hugely different from colleges. Where once a university was a collegiate institution that granted the doctorate and harbored professional as well as undergraduate schools, there have now evolved in the United States

between 50 and 100 major research universities that are megasize—numbering their students in tens of thousands, their faculties and administrative cadres in thousands, their buildings and their acreage in hundreds. True, colleges also are larger today then they used to be, but today's major research university differs as much from a college as an aircraft carrier is a different vessel from the early flattops.

Much could now be said about the difference produced by size alone, but let me offer just a few observations about the impact of sheer size on the university presidency. To begin with, the president as a person is far less evident than before. He—and let me use "he" generically for the sake of readability, knowing that the word should be "he or she" throughout—cannot possibly know personally, nor be personally known by, the thousands upon thousands who compose the university community each year. He may be visible to all, at one time or another; he may work hard to know many. But to most, he remains an office rather than a person, a symbol more than reality. Furthermore, though the president may still himself make the ultimate judgment on major decisions, sheer institutional size tends also to diminish personal presidential authority. To most of the people in the university, the decisions of greatest relevance need to be made and are made at a level much closer to them than the apex of the central administration. The need to see the president, even directly to involve the office of the president, is relatively rare. And few decisions come to the president, or should come to him *de novo*. Staff effort—staff involvement—normally precedes presidential consideration or is called on at once to augment presidential initiative. The personality of the office still counts—so do the style and the articulation—but the size of the enterprise imposes the restraints of process. Perhaps the simplest effect of size on the presidency—and the greatest—is so obvious as to escape attention: It is the sheer volume of the work required just to keep up with all the facets of so large an institution. The quantity of problems to be solved does in fact increase in direct proportion to the number of people involved. No president can be aware of everything that happens in the university, but no president can afford long to be in ignorance of most that happens; the result is endless presidential hours devoted to the effort of keeping track of the enormity of scope encompassed by the major research university.

Not size alone, however, sharply differentiates the university from today from what it was but twoscore years ago. Complexity plays a competing role with size. The very research intensity that justifies "research university" as a descriptive name subjects the institution to the ultimate in the fragmentation of human knowledge. Because it attracts and fosters the most advanced and specialized talents among its professors and students, the research university offers a kaleidoscope of intricate inquiries that represents not coherence but the glitter and sparkle of a myriad of precious fragments that often seem to bear little relationship one to another. Much could be said on this subject as well; but for the university president, it presents the challenge of continually trying to learn what is happening to the very substance of the research and teaching enterprise. I have myself described my presidency as in part a never-ending seminar. One is blessed with the best of teachers; in my experience, no professor, even a Nobel Laureate, has ever failed when asked to make the effort to enlighten the university president as to the nature and significance of his or her research. But as one moves from lasers to restriction enzymes, from very large system integration to magnetic resonance imaging, from gender studies in East Asia to structuralism, from the nondestructive evaluation of materials to the impact of space telescope on astrophysics, one may aspire at best to fatigued acquaintance with a great many wonders but never to confident or easy comprehension. Yet one must keep on trying—and across the board—even while discovery and innovation multiply faster than rabbits. How can one recruit some, while encouraging others to stay or leave, or authorize new laboratories or bless the creation of new departments, without at least a rudimentary sense of the work actually being done? When faculty achievements bring public acclaim, how could the president of the institution maintain a pose of blissful ignorance? And even more directly to the point, one wonders whether those who speak so fluently of fund-raising have ever thought that he who asks for support must know not only whom to ask, but also what to ask for and why a particular project is of importance and priority. Hours of hard learning in a bewildering array of unfamiliar subjects go into even elementary awareness of what merits support, and why.

It is intimidating to preside over an institution so large as to be unknowable in terms of detail and personal familiarity and so complex as to be mysterious in most of the knowledge pursued and taught within it. A good-sized ego is required to cope with such intimidation; that I do possess and seem to find among my peers as well. But is there an ego large enough today to allow me or any of my peers to claim that we understand it all and speak for the whole of the major research university as if from Olympus? Even forty years ago, our predecessors could still believe or cherish the illusion that they understood at least the major facets of what was being done in their universities. Today this may not be altogether impossible for the president of an undergraduate college. It is no longer possible for the president of a major research university. My peers and I may not be naturally humble, but we may be presumed not to be actually stupid. Absent stupidity, we may be more sharply aware of the extent of our ignorance than were our predecessors, mostly because the limits of our knowledge are daily stretched, in anguish. And that may play a role in holding us back from grasping the mantle of national leadership even in our own domain of higher learning.

Sometimes it is said of us as university presidents that we have become merely managers. There is, I think, some truth in that, although the "merely" gives me pause. As chief executive officers of our institutions, we are, of course, expected to manage. There are all those people, in their thousands; all those buildings; all that research; and all that money. Our annual budgets are counted in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As presidents, we are apt to be nominal landlords to students who may number in the thousands and, in some cases, also to faculty and staff. We have responsibility as well for extracurricular activities—a multimillion dollar industry for most of my colleagues if, happily, not for me. And there are other managerial obligations: While I do not dispose of a small airline, as some of my peers do, I am responsible for a hotel, as many of them are; and I am ultimately responsible for the disposal of radioactive waste (from radiation treatment for cancer), the operation of a nonhuman primate breeding facility, the maintenance of a small fleet of research vessels, and campuses overseas. There is the university press and the academic support services, especially the university library system. There is some responsibility for the teaching hospital—hospitals in the plural in my case—as well as prepaid health plans and HMOs. There is policy for and supervision of thousands of nonacademic personnel—nearly five thousand, in my case—without whom the institution would cease to function, just as surely as if all the faculty left or no students enrolled. So, yes, we are managers and—also, yes—we are expected to raise money as well. Our revered predecessors were of course managers as well. But there can be no doubt that the size, complexity, and diversity of the major research university place vastly greater managerial responsibilities in the hands of those of us who serve as president today than was true three or four decades ago.

Let me assume at this point that I have stated my case that there is a radical difference between the job of a major research university president now and in the earlier days of our great predecessors. By way of further reflection as to why none of us now in office has attained greater national stature, I have some thoughts to offer that involve circumstances in the world outside our institutions. One might by now assume that the demands of our assignment are so great that my peers and I have no time left for any other activity at all. However, this is not the case. We do quite a lot away from our campuses—in fact, probably more than we should; but much of it represents what I would like to refer to as distraction. We serve on boards and panels in the field of education; we testify before legislatures and other public bodies; we give speeches before a variety of public and academic audiences; we travel abroad to meet with our peers overseas and to become familiar with some of their universities; we meet with our alumni in major cities across the country, and even abroad; we call on foundations and other donors. Our predecessors did all these things also but not to the same extent. The problem today is that travel is so quick and—at least apparently—simple that we tend to agree to do too much, on an overly compressed schedule. One-day journeys from one coast to the other are stock-in-trade. Three- or four-day journeys to Europe are not infrequent. I am surely not unique among my peers with an alumni trip that took me to eight cities in five days. This kind of mobility is useful: It widens our perspective, it provides some public exposure and the occasional opportunity for public advocacy, and it affords relief from

the heavy day-to-day office schedule. It is, however, a major distraction as well—last-minute overloads before a trip and awful accumulations afterward; reports and papers read in haste on airplanes; fatigue produced by overcrowded schedules; and the tension of delays that frustrate tight and orderly planning.

All that I mean to say here is that our pace is faster than that of our predecessors, and our geographic range is greater. And this, of course, is true not only of university presidents but of virtually all American professionals. It may well follow, then, that we are less serene than our predecessors, and I believe this indeed to be the case. It does not obviously follow, however, that we are less reflective, and I do believe that this is necessarily so. Is what we say always so dull, so trivial, so insignificant that we attract little attention even though we are in public with some frequency? Maybe so—certainly so, all too often, in my own case. But to me it seems that there is another set of circumstances involved as well. Earlier I spoke of great former university presidents in terms of dominant stature, of national advocacy; I did so because that is the frame of reference in which the original question is asked. If greatness is equated with national stature, then part of the problem with today's university presidents may be that we are not media personalities.

In a society whose attention span has shrunk from earlier times and that reads less and less, national recognition derives primarily from national television and secondarily from newspapers and weeklies. On the one hand, the thoughtful—and lengthy—address, the colorful anecdote, and the detailed exposition of the complicated have been largely replaced by brief remarks, one-liners, and headlines or captions. On the other hand, prolonged and repeated national television exposure has elevated to national stature (greatness?) not only politicians but also television commentators, articulate athletes, and other entertainers. University presidents do not make news very often, and when they do, the news is often bad. We are not—most of us—showbiz. We do not star in our own commercials because our universities do not use commercials, at least not yet. But I do not doubt that if one of us were to narrate a popular weekly television program—perhaps on science or health—then a new star might be born and one of us might have, at last, the national stature of a Carl Sagan or of a Dr. Ruth. We may well be at fault in not attempting to use "the media"—television in particular—to greater advantage. The only point I wish to make here is that the path to national stature in our time is radically different from the one that was open to our predecessors.

But, having said all of the above, I have a still different and, to me, more satisfying answer to the question of why there are no great university presidents today. There may not be, is my answer, but there are still great universities. In fact, where there were perhaps a score of great universities four decades ago, there are now three or four times as many. The quality and scope of university research today make the research effort of 40 years ago look tiny in comparison. And someone does preside over each of these great major universities. There was a time—in the '60s and early '70s—when the pressures of Vietnam and student unrest reduced presidential incumbencies to the point where many of our immediate predecessors held office for only a few years. Today, however, a goodly number of my peers and I have been in office for more than a decade and hope to serve somewhat longer still. We are charged to make decisions, and over the years we have made many, not all of them good or right. We have had a hand in great changes: new programs begun and older ones reduced, eliminated, or merged. We may be blessed with an end to the drastic growth in numbers of students and matching numbers of faculty and staff, but we may be cursed with stark reductions in support. We are presiding, still, over the transition of our institutions into an era of new communication—of knowledge stored, recalled, displayed, and manipulated in staggering quantity and with dazzling speed. Our scholars and graduates soar the heavens in rockets, plumb the depths of the seas, examine the microcosmics of animate and inanimate matter, and probe the workings of the human brain and mind. Our pride is in the institutions that we serve and that, in turn, serve society—and serve well.

And, yes, we have our dreams of greatness—not for ourselves, but for our universities. We are—each of us—builders. Our task is to help to remodel our institutions for tomorrow—for the students who come anew each year, for scholars who will acquire knowledge that as yet eludes us, for discoveries and techniques that will enhance the human condition anew. Let us admit it: We are not great ourselves. But we serve great institutions with a great purpose, and that is no mean task. We lack the dash and daring of the single skipper at the helm; instead, we pace the automated captain's bridge of an ocean liner. But as we leave and enter port each academic year, there is still pleasure and satisfaction in the job done, and to be done again. No, there may be no great university presidents today. But there are great universities, greater than yesterday's. And the men and women who captain them are no unworthy breed.

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VALUES AND THE UNIVERSITY

STEVEN MULLER

The role of the university in teaching human values is of major importance and enormously complicated. We have a shared concern about the widely apparent erosion of the commitment to fundamental human values within our American society. Probably we also would all agree that there should and must be ways in which our colleges and universities can constructively respond to that concern and help to restore a commitment to values. Beyond such general common ground, however, I foresee more disagreement than consensus, more complex ambiguity than clarity. The task I have set for myself is to address the problem, without hope that I can provide a simple solution, and to focus my efforts on the most basic issues as I perceive them. I will strive for the utmost in candor and objectivity, while knowing that doing so may bring at least as much discomfort as satisfaction—and perhaps more irritation than pleasure.

The value system on which the American society is founded derives absolutely from the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, and that tradition has been losing force throughout the twentieth century. A chasm the size of the Grand Canyon separates the religious orthodoxy of our founding fathers—that white male minority of landowners and professionals which provided the leadership that created the United States—from the widespread agnosticism or religious indifference among our current population. The Judeo-Christian religious tradition is not dead, nor necessarily dying; it may still encompass most of our citizens, but it is ceasing to be the prevailing norm to which all Americans can appeal or repair with certainty. That is fact—like it or not—and it will remain fact unless and until a religious revival sweeps over all of us. I can make no prophesy as to whether, when, or how such a religious revival might occur, but I do not anticipate it in short order.

Volumes are required to analyze the decline of religion in the United States, so only a few brief thoughts are in order here. The power of religious commitment within a society depends in part on the effectiveness of organized religion. In twentieth-century America, church and temple have been progressively undermined by material affluence: a population suffused with possessions and creature comforts idolizes both—idolizes literally in the Biblical sense—and is concerned less with the spirit than with the flesh. Religious commitment also depends in part on the family for vital reinforcement. In twentieth-century America, the family structure is disintegrating. Obvious symptoms include sexual permissiveness; divorce; the impact of geographic mobility on the dispersion of the extended family, a mobility that reduces communal existence only to the so-called nuclear family; and the tendency for parents to assign secondary priority to child-rearing in favor of the pursuit of material gain and social pleasure outside the home. It is less well understood how profoundly the family

structure is assaulted by the drastic impact of the explosion of technological developments. For example, communications technology is aimed at individual rather than communal consumption (telephone, television, computers, radio, and printed materials all target individual use within the home); communal housekeeping chores have been replaced by automation; and the resulting abundance of leisure time tends to be available more for individual than for communal activity. The revolution in food preparation and consumption is eroding not only the formality, length, and symbolic importance of the family meal, but is in part replacing dining altogether with snacking and grazing.

Religious commitment is further eroded by widespread cynicism and skepticism among the American people. Cynicism derives on the one hand largely from the perceived gap between the absolute value standards that religion ordains, and on the other hand from the visible departure from these standards in the behavior, not only of most people, but even of persons in authority—not only public but also religious authority. In a society whose discipline has given way to self-indulgence, there is bound to be cynicism concerning absolute ideals of behavior that are visibly and almost universally inapplicable to everyday behavior. As for skepticism, this would appear to be the inevitable by-product of a society whose overwhelming material success derives from the application of human reason to the solution of practical problems. The scientific method, proceeding as it does from observation, to hypothesis, to proof or disproof, encourages curiosity rather than faith. This is not to say that science and faith are incompatible—they are not. But we are not at a point, at least not yet, where science engenders faith. Instead, a spirit of inquiry questions established truth, including religious truth.

If these observations are descriptively accurate—and they are not intended either as blame or praise—they lead to the conclusion that the erosion of a religious commitment creates a crisis of values in society whose fundamental values stem from religious commitment. There appears to be little argument but that our American society confronts such a crisis of values. A society bereft of common values is in trouble. The lack of a universally accepted value system is a disease that tends to beget social disintegration. A society that perceives itself as sick with a crisis of values therefore discovers itself as threatened and seeks to cure itself with the restoration of a value system. Most naturally, however, the need to restore a common system of social values literally involves a restoration, i.e., not so much an attempt to forge a consensus around a new system, but rather an attempt to reimpose the traditional value system of the past. If that value system derived originally from religious faith and belief—as ours did, if it has decayed because of a decline in faith and belief—as ours has, if a recovery of faith and belief proves elusive—as is also true so far in our case, then the attempt to restore it without faith and belief requires acts of authority—it is imposed rather than revived—and the system of values becomes political ideology to be obeyed, rather than a creed to which faith and belief voluntarily subscribe. Marxism-Leninism offers a striking example of a value system based on an imposed political ideology, as did Hitler's National Socialism. A special problem for American society, however, is that the traditional democratic value system rooted in faith and belief and available for restoration is incompatible with imposition as political ideology authority. In so many words, any effort to make traditional American values mandatory would destroy traditional American values.

What then can we do? If nothing is done, our society is likely to decay further into the chaos of undisciplined self-indulgence. We can await—and many of us can work for—a religious revival. But even those of us who believe that such a revival is the best and only answer will probably have to realize that matters are likely to get much worse for much longer before it occurs. We can try to restore order by imposing a value system politically, but such action would destroy the very value system that created our society and that most of us would rather preserve. Can we create a new system of values that is compatible with our tradition and sufficiently attractive so that we can subscribe, rather than be required to submit, to it? If we wish to consider this alternative, then a powerful potential reposes in our educational system. And so we turn—at last!—to education, and to higher education in particular.

It is of course time that education in the United States be generally separated altogether from religion, except for schools and colleges operated directly by religious organizations. This American situation, due to the separation of church and state provided by the Constitution, represents a sharp break with earlier practice and with the continuing norm in many other nations. Until the American situation was established, most other societies tended toward patterns of governance in which church and state formed a united establishment, and in which schools and universities served that establishment in terms of both its secular and religious dimensions. American colleges originally were private institutions formed under religious auspices, although publicly chartered. The evolution of public colleges and universities—largely in the nineteenth century—led to the same separation from religion that obtained in the public schools and, over time, played a role in the gradual separation of much of independent American higher education from its church-related origins. The modern American university, characterized above all by post-baccalaureate programs leading to doctoral and professional degrees and by an explicit commitment to scientific research, came into being only toward the end of the nineteenth century and is largely a product of the twentieth century. As an institution, the contemporary American university exhibits the productive application of scientific method in both research and teaching, and that scientific method itself is rooted in academic freedom, defined primarily as the unfettered ability to pursue inquiry even when such inquiry and its results challenge established dogma. Initially, in fact, academic freedom principally meant freedom from religious orthodoxy. We have already noted that the scientific method and religious faith are not incompatible per se, but it is true that science can succeed only on the basis of free inquiry and that free inquiry is wholly incompatible with any notion that its findings must conform to preconceived absolutes including religious dogma. The insistent need of science for freedom of inquiry therefore inevitably produces conflict with dogmatism, religious and otherwise.

It does not follow, however, that separation from religion and rejection of religious dogma as a constraint on academic freedom result in an American university institution that is value free. Quite to the contrary, the contemporary American university is profoundly committed to the value system rooted in reverence to human reason. Admittedly, this value system has seldom been articulated and, as a result, is more real than apparent. There appear to be at least three interrelated reasons for this lack of articulation, of which the third may be the most interesting and relevant for our present concerns. First, the rationalist value system of the contemporary university has been taken for granted as self-evident; second, its results have been so astonishingly productive that energy has been channeled into its application rather than explication; and third, it appears to overlap so substantially with traditional American values that it has largely escaped both serious challenge as well as explicit separate recognition. Insofar as the university value system rooted in reason is committed to the ability of each person to pursue the exercise of reason to his or her limits; to freedom of action within rational bounds; to the application of reason to the solution of problems and settlement of differences and against the arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power and authority; and to distinctions among persons based exclusively on rational merit—to that extent, ingredients of that value system seem to correspond effectively to the religiously derived human values encapsulated both in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. There are two particularly interesting aspects of this overlap between the traditional American values system and the rational values that constitute the foundation upon which the contemporary American research university has been built and operates. The first is obvious: The spirit of freedom, individualism, tolerance, and diversity that infuses the religiously derived traditional American value system has provided a splendidly supportive environment for the evolution and spectacular flowering of the rational research-driven American university as we see it today. The second is not so obvious: The supportive existence of traditional American values made it largely unnecessary for the American university to articulate its own rational value system, which in effect has thrived primarily as a set of unchallenged assumptions within the larger context of the American tradition.

It follows, however, that decay in the traditional American value system presents special problems for the American university. This is not merely theory. The challenge to inherited values that erupted in the 1960s—

prompted by the trauma of Vietnam—inevitably manifested itself particularly in the American university, where so many of the young who spearheaded that challenge were gathered. And—confronted by rebellious discontent and anger based in part on rejection of established values—the American university proved to be visibly vulnerable: It found appeals to the American tradition ineffectual, and it was unprepared to articulate and assert its own rational value system in response. As a citadel of rational inquiry, the university found itself for a protracted period unable to cope with unreason among students and, worse, with matching unreason among some members of the faculty as well. As it turned out, the university's omission of articulation of its own value system produced a lack of internalization of rational values even within the faculty.

Where then does this rather bleak analysis lead us? As part of the recovery from recent trauma, the American university—and the colleges that model themselves on the university institution and, perhaps ultimately, the schools whose teachers prepare in colleges and universities—has begun to articulate and promote the rational value system it requires for its own self-preservation. This rational system of values may be a wholly inadequate substitute for the religiously based system of traditional American values; but at least it corresponds to that system to a significant degree, is not in opposition to it, and is preferable to no value system at all. It is not reasonable—and therefore not practicable—to expect the American university to promote a religiously derived value system spontaneously because an institution so committed to rationalism will not be attracted to religious orthodoxy. As for the teaching of American values as a mandatory obligation, that demand would transmute the American tradition into political ideology and therefore would be self-defeating, as previously noted.

There is however, a more hopeful possibility. It may arise from that very triumph of reason that characterizes the enormous success of the American research university in mastering new science and technology and in pushing toward the limits of human reason. More is happening in the contemporary American university than the beginnings of the articulation of a rational system of values. For one thing, the fragmentation of knowledge into ever more complex specialized disciplines that has marked the university for the past several decades is beginning to be transformed by a new effort to restore coherence, to achieve some reintegration. At this time, almost all the new initiatives in the university are multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary, and they strive to recombine earlier fragmentation. Even more significant is the awakening realization that the limits of human reason are real. To cite just one example, we have learned more about the functioning of the brain in the last score of years than all of humankind knew in the past, and we know more as well about the human mind, whose logic can be programmed into computers and labeled artificial intelligence. But we still know very little about the ways in which brain and mind interact, and we have already learned that logic cannot program human judgment, emotion, intuition, and perception. Thus it may be that the triumph of reason in the university brings us back to confront anew the mystery and grace of the human spirit. And it may even be that this emerging confrontation will lead the best and brightest of the most reasoned minds to seek old values in new forms, to rediscover with new force that reason and spirit are as indissolubly linked in the human mind as teaching and research in the university, and to strive anew for spiritual values that transcend the limits of reason. If this be so, then our society may be closer to the full recovery of a value system than is now apparent, and then our universities may foster and enhance the human spirit as much as they already endow human reason.

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A LIFE OF SERVICE

JOHN BRADEMAS

Steven Muller and I met over fifty years ago at Oxford University where we were both Rhodes Scholars. We were both students of politics. Steven became a university administrator and professor in the United States; I became a Member of Congress. Years later we were both university presidents, Steven of The Johns Hopkins University; I of New York University, and now we are presidents emeriti.

As I reflect on Steven's career and mine, I realize that despite the obvious differences between the life of a university leader and that of a legislator, there are also similarities. Indeed, after having served at NYU for six months, I was back in Washington with several of my former colleagues one of whom asked me, "John, what is it like, being a university president?" I replied that I found the world of a Congressman and that of a university president remarkably similar. In both jobs, one deals with a variety of constituencies, makes speeches, raises money and wrestles with massive egos. In short, I said, I felt very much at home at NYU!

One of my early recollections of Steven Muller was as a fellow participant, with, among others, James H. Billington, the eminent authority on Russian culture and now Librarian of Congress, in a seminar on Hegel and Marx at All Souls College, Oxford, in the rooms of the British Historian, G. D. H. Cole. The seminar was taught by Cole and Isaiah Berlin. I have several times thought how splendid it would have been to have had those sessions recorded! That Oxford seminar was a metaphor for Steven Muller's continuing interests and mine: comparative politics, international relations, the management of universities.

Given his birth in Germany, it is not surprising that Steven became chairman of the Board of Trustees at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, a director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and of the Atlantic Council. In his address at the *Reichstag* in West Berlin in 1985, on the 150th anniversary of the death of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Steven described von Humboldt not only as "the father of the modern German university" but also as "the grandfather of the university in America." Indeed, Steven explained, "In 1876 The Johns Hopkins University opened in Baltimore under the leadership of Daniel Coit Gilman…as a new American university, in the modern sense, of the United States and in the United States." Added Muller, "…von Humboldt's Prussian university was an institution committed to two dominant concepts: freedom of scientific inquiry, and the unity of teaching and research … concepts [that] inspired not the reform but the creation of the American university."

More than most university presidents, Steven Muller has drawn on his experience as scholar, professor, Cornell Vice President and Provost, and President of Johns Hopkins, to write thoughtfully and elegantly on a wide range of the major issues with which American research universities today deal. He has offered counsel on the university presidency, the place of the university in teaching values, the changes in the way universi-

ties apply the new technologies to reach students, on the role of government-owned laboratories on a university campus, on the relationship between research universities and industrial innovation. In an address at the Bologna Center of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a center of which he was a vigorous champion, Steven insisted, that to serve society effectively, a university must enjoy autonomy—both in the freedom of its faculty to engage in teaching and research and in the ways in which the institution is governed.

I draw particular attention to three other dimensions of Steven Muller's work as president of Johns Hopkins and mine as president of New York University. We were—and are—both deeply committed to the view that not only should our universities be dedicated to public service but that university presidents as individuals should be, too. Without my here reciting my own involvement in pro bono activities, I note Steven's chairmanship of the Association of American Universities, his leadership as a director of the Council on Financial Aid to Education and chairmanship of a NASA Council Task Force on NASA-University Relations and member of two Presidential Commissions: The White House Fellowships and World Hunger.

Steven and I share an interest, too, in museums, I as legislator and author in the House of Representatives of the Museum Services Act and the Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act and co-sponsor of the measures that authorized the National Endowment for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities; and Steven, as a director of both the Whitney Museum of American Art and Baltimore Museum of Art.

Steven Muller has also been a major figure among American university leaders as a champion of the study of other countries and cultures. At Cornell he was Director of the Center for International Studies and he is today a fellow of the Foreign Policy Institute and Distinguished Professional Lecturer at Hopkins' Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Here again we had common commitment. During my presidency at NYU there were established a Center for Japan-U.S. Business and Economic Studies, a Casa Italiana Zerilli-Marimo, an Onassis Hellenic Studies Program, Skirball Department of Hebrew and Judaic Studies, and particularly gratifying to me, the King Juan Carlos I of Spain Center, for the study of modern Spain.

Not long after coming to Washington Square I had the privilege, at Steven's invitation, of joining him, Frank Rhodes of Cornell, and several other university presidents on a trip to the People's Republic of China, and although we did not visit Nanjing, I know of Steven's foresight in establishing the Johns Hopkins-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies, the first American Campus in China after the Communist takeover. Both Steven and I have led great private research universities but both of us are also proud of the public/private pluralism that characterizes the American system of higher education. Steven and I agree that all public colleges and universities are private in that in addition to depending on federal and state tax revenues for support, they seek contributions from individuals, corporations, and foundations. All private institutions, in like fashion, are public in pressing, in addition to philanthropic contributions, for federal and state funds for research and student assistance.

Nearly twenty years ago (October 1985), in an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Council on Education, Steven Muller said "The major research university in the United States has a key role to play in the expansion of human knowledge and in making the benefits of such expansion of knowledge available to society." In his several capacities but especially as president of The Johns Hopkins University, Steven Muller has been a leading figure in advancing these two fundamental purposes of institutions of higher learning in the United States. As his Oxford contemporary, fellow university president and friend, I voice my great admiration for Steven Muller's outstanding contributions to our country.

02

BRIDGES AND BOUNDARIES:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

REFLECTIONS ON GERMANY, EUROPE, AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BY STEVEN MULLER IN THE CONCLUDING DECADES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

ROZANNE L. RIDGWAY

Nearly a decade and a half since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, "Europe" remains a work in progress and the continent, its eastern boundaries still undefined, is a busy marketplace of political, economic, and social aspirations. Relations between the United States and a new Europe are the subject of a seemingly endless transatlantic dialogue and the institutions that once served shared transatlantic interests are subject to stress and strains.

One recalls the short life of the notion that those states most influential in the shaping of Europe effectively could choose between a "wider or deeper" community as states emerging from Soviet domination or from the dissolving Soviet Union itself pressed for inclusion in the institutions of Europe and the Atlantic Alliances. Instead, from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Nice, the states of Europe have moved inexorably toward a larger capacity to play a larger, singular role in global affairs, should they so choose. From summit to summit leaders of NATO have created the likes of partnerships, councils and planning groups to accommodate increasing numbers of states. NATO today extends beyond the Caspian Sea in its arrangements. It ponders the inclusion of Russia in its deliberations.

Not only are institutions and their membership rolls and arrangements undergoing change. The question "Wither NATO" is again alive, arising not only out of the circumstances of the end of the Cold War, but also the appearance of new threats, the loss of a shared assessment of the danger, and the growing imbalances of power and technology between the United States and its European allies. Above all, as we have moved away from the decades of the Cold War, from the century of catastrophic European conflict, and into a new century that appears not to have as clear a strategic focus and certainly not an exclusively European cast, there is a loss of memory–where have we been, why did we build the institutions that now dot the Atlantic and European landscape, of what is partnership?

One could well ask, what have these several papers of Steven Muller's from the last century, written largely in the context of the role of Germany in the affairs of Europe and the Alliance, to do with the issues before Germany, Europe and the Alliance today? Other than being an archival example of an esteemed scholar's work, what can they offer us for today and tomorrow? Certainly, they make easy reading, as one would expect. More important they provide context and continuity, and, in some instances, examples of a willingness to speak out to say things that needed saying at important moments in contemporary political history. They may, for the most part, be about Germany, but then so is institutional Europe largely about, influenced by, or centered on Germany. And the character of the transatlantic relationship, with respect to its continental European partners, is largely a reflection of Germany's place in Europe. Finally, these papers are prescient in their sense that the political reunification of Germany would be more easily accomplished than its social and economic coming together.

Not all the predications, warnings, and recommendations came to be. Not all of the analysis holds up. Nonetheless, by offering his views, Steven Muller did the times in which he spoke an enormous service and provides his successors a worthy model of the fearless observer and scholar. As Dr. Muller said in his Herter Lecture, “The risk that only a fool would speak when not only angels but diplomats are silent is one I choose to take.”

I first met Steven Muller in 1984. He came to East Berlin to represent the Unites States on the tenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Those years had not seen much in the way of constructive discourse between Washington and the East Germans. Recognition of the GDR in 1974 was part of a package deal including recognition of both Germanys, their entry into the United Nations, the further refinement of certain arms control negotiations, and the approval of the forum that became the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The fact that NATO allies all recognized the GDR provided support for the Federal Republic in its very active d ialogue –primarily on humanitarian matters–with the GDR. For the United States, it was at best a diplomatic observation post. Nevertheless, an anniversary provided an opportunity to meet with groups–students, academicians, cultural officials of the East German Communist Party–otherwise not easily accessed.

Steven Muller’s reputation as a scholar and leader of a great American university assured his welcome in East Berlin. He was invited to speak at the Karl Marx Library of Humboldt University. On this occasion, nearly two decades ago, he had a tough message for the East German audience: the Wall would not, could not keep out a world in which knowledge no longer was confined to books and kept within libraries but rather moved through the air, over and around physical obstacles. Implicit in his message: the system they represented would not prevail. It was not a welcome message and Dr. Muller had the courage to deliver it. As is clear from his papers, the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union was not apparent, indeed was no more conceivable to Dr. Muller than officials of the NATO world. What is clear is that Dr. Muller could see that change was in the offing and that technology would defeat a false ideology.

At the same time, Dr. Muller was willing to deliver a contrarian message to his American audiences. “The very sterile relationships between the United States and East Germany,” in Dr. Muller’s words, “had the capacity to “cloud all perceptions of German reality.” Dr. Muller’s role in establishing and leading the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) anticipated the challenges of understanding a reunified Germany. One forgets that the very idea of AICGS, encouraging the study of both Germanys, was not looked on favorably at the time in circles either in the United States or the Federal Republic. (There are some similar challenges this very day. The examination of unpopular issues, causes, and points of view still requires a fearless champion.)

Finally, there is throughout this collection a concern about the diminution of American Studies programs located at universities here and in Germany and a companion lack of interest in German language studies in this country. It takes no imagination at all to extend this concern for studies of language and culture to our contemporarily, non-European world. Would that there were a greater capacity to speak across cultures and a deeper understanding of that part of the world where American interests and values are now being tested as they were in the course of the Cold War.

Steven Muller’s papers, as represented by the samples here, may leave off in the beginning of the 1990s. They are vivid reminders, however, that “Thinking is in fact dangerous, but not as dangerous as not thinking.” These papers may be from another time, but they are not out-of-date.

EUROPEAN AUGURIES

STEVEN MULLER

Since 1945, we have become accustomed to Europe divided, by that Iron Curtain of Sir Winston Churchill's famous phrase. This West-East separation already has prevailed for almost twice as long as the respite of two decades between World War I and World War II. Force of habit leads us to expect the division of Europe to continue indefinitely into the future. How sound is that expectation? Let me advance the thought that a divided Europe may not be as permanent as it seems. Such a thought raises questions that may one day demand answers. I do not pretend to be a prophet. The point I seek to make is merely that it seems prudent to consider responses to questions that may actually arise. There is too little evidence of such prudence at the moment, at least in public discourse.

Europeans have interacted amongst themselves, in concert or in discord, for centuries. To the extent, then, that accumulated history may impart momentum toward the future, one must assume that the weight of history would tend more to push Europe together again rather than to keep the peoples of the continent apart. It may be more significant to note how fundamentally the present separation of Europe rests on the division of Germany into two states. The impact of the weight of history may be very difficult to assess. In recent decades, however, nationalism appears as a more predictable phenomenon. Nationalism has been a major factor in international politics. It would seem somewhat peculiar to assume that Germans—of all people—should be immune to it. If national self-determination is conceded to constitute a force upon a people, then some pressure must be assumed upon the German people in this direction. And any movement toward the reintegration of Germany cannot fail to have parallel repercussions for the whole of Europe.

Please permit me a word of caution before I proceed. My purpose is to raise questions that are framed in a perspective of very long range. I attribute no motives to present populations, and least of all to present governments or political leaders, except those already on record. Also, I know full well that the questions I raise will abrade sensitivities, if only because they affect emotions and offend what can only be called the orthodoxy of prevailing habits of thought. It is at least a comfort to me to provide the explicit reminder that my thoughts are purely personal and private. My hope is that the freedom of private reflections may make a contribution to public issues. The risk that only a fool would speak when not only angels but diplomats are silent is one I choose to take.

If one assumes that the weight of history and the force of national self-determination combine into some future pressure toward European reintegration, then one should assess the strength of the factors that tend to main-

tain the division of Europe. These factors derive to a marked extent from the Soviet Union on one side and the United States on the other. The Soviet grasp on Eastern Europe consistently has been firmer than that of the United States on Western Europe, but the more significant fact is that neither superpower has welded its European allies conclusively unto itself. Despite the strength of NATO, no one would describe Western Europe as a mere European extension of the United States, nor even as the European province of an Atlantic alliance. As for the Warsaw Pact nations—granting exception in southeastern Europe to Yugoslavia as a unique case—they also are not accurately described merely as Soviet provinces. Despite armed Russian intervention on occasion, it is not possible to deny that these states—Poland, Hungary and Romania, for example—lead national lives of their own. Such evolution as has occurred in Europe in recent years has tended to loosen rather than tighten the bonds between the European states and their superpower allies.

To acknowledge this evolution does not imply that either the Soviet Union or the United States is no longer concerned with Europe. It does, however, raise the question as to what the respective interests of each of the two superpowers in Europe are. The Soviet interests may be easier than the American to define. In ascending order of priority the interests of the Soviet Union with respect to Europe appear to be as follows. The maximum aim of the USSR is to attain significant control over the whole of Europe. It is not necessary in stating this to specify the extent to which this aim may be due to a grand design to impose Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy on the world, or derived chiefly from a defensive desire to protect Russia from any attack based in Europe. Either motive, or any mixture of the two, justifies the goal of dominance over the continent. Short of that, the second stage of Soviet purpose is more explicitly defensive, i.e., at least to neutralize as much as possible the threat of an attack on Russia from a European base. If this cannot be achieved either, the third stage of Soviet priority would stem from an understandable and perceptible phobia about Germany. It is to prevent the possibility of a future attack on Russia that could occur on German initiative. On the most urgent, minimum, and therefore presumably most indispensable level of Soviet purpose is the determination to interpose a belt of allied Eastern European states between Russian motherland and any attack from the West.

The interests of the United States in Europe cannot be described with equal precision. The first American priority—first both in time and importance—is to deny the Soviet Union control of the whole of Europe, which is translated into the American guarantee to defend Western Europe against Russian attack. Here again it is not necessary to specify the extent to which this American purpose derives from moral grounds, or naked national interest, or whatever mixture of both. It is clear enough that on geopolitical as well as economic grounds, Soviet control of all of Europe would constitute an unacceptable threat to the national security of the United States. It must be noted that this goal of keeping Western Europe free of Soviet control is the only American interest on the continent that has been stated with precision and conviction. It therefore has the appearance of being both the maximum as well as minimum interest of the United States with respect to Europe. That appearance, however, is substantially misleading.

A second American interest in Europe, perhaps implicit in the first but seldom made explicit, is to maintain a military foothold in Western Europe to serve the national security of the United States, for purposes that go beyond guaranteeing the defense of Western Europe against Russian attack. It became clear during the 1970s, for example, that the American military presence in Western Europe is vital to the active preservation of United States interests in the Middle East. It is now becoming clearer that a major augmentation of the deployment of land-based American nuclear missiles of intermediate range in Western Europe may become a necessary fourth component of the American deterrent against a Russian nuclear assault on the United States. The nuclear deterrent capacity of the United States has always been described as a triad, with land-based, seaborne, and airborne components. The land-based American missiles that can be targeted on the whole of the Soviet Union are primarily in the United States. Now there are those who argue that the credibility of the American deterrent requires the augmentation of such a land-based American capacity in Western Europe

as well. The intent of the United States to augment what are more commonly called tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe is being discussed solely in terms of the credibility of American guarantees for the defense of Western Europe. It is perhaps not altogether clear whether the credibility of American nuclear guarantees to NATO can be kept so neatly separate from the credibility of the American deterrent against Soviet attack on the United States itself.

Earlier in the period since 1945 it was assumed that part of the total scale of American interests in Europe was also to roll back the Iron Curtain, i.e., to lift Russian dominance from the Warsaw Pact nations. Such an American purpose ever since has been explicitly disavowed. But the evolution of events point to the conclusion that the liberation of Eastern Europe is no longer a significant American purpose and in fact has been superseded by a different one contradictory to it, namely to keep Europe as stable as possible. The logic of this succession in purposes is relatively simple. The politics involved are not, and presumably account for much of the evident lack of clarity. The willingness of the Soviet Union to use armed force when necessary to maintain essential dominance in several Warsaw Pact countries demonstrated how profoundly the USSR is committed to this purpose. Interference from NATO countries clearly carried with it the risk of war. Therefore, to a large extent the loss of life involved in armed insurgence was foredoomed to be in vain. A goal of liberation that could not be effectively supported because of the risk of war, and that accordingly rendered suicidal such insurrections as it might help to encourage, simply could not be maintained. This goal thus faded away.

More than that, the risks to the United States of instability in Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the virtues of stability on the other, have become more apparent. On the risk side, instability in Eastern Europe is perceived by Moscow as so great a threat as to harden the whole range of Russian policies and attitudes. There is also the potential risk that the United States might be drawn into a confrontation at the initiative of one or more of its European allies. As for the positive aspects, stability in Eastern Europe tends to reduce Russian intractability in terms of policy; assists economic interchange between NATO and Warsaw Pact states; and tends to give more flexibility to worldwide American policy. It may continue to be impossible for an American administration to state clearly, especially before voters of Eastern European descent, that the removal of Russian dominance from Eastern Europe is not a policy objective of the United States; and that in fact American interests are best served by stability throughout Europe, thus implying cooperative acquiescence in continued Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe. But the inability to say this publicly has small impact on reality. I know that there was never any such thing as the Sonnenfeldt doctrine. However, the policy perceived in this mirage strikes me as the opposite of imaginary.

If one now matches up the Soviet and American purposes with respect to Europe, four interesting aspects become visible. One is the relative fuzziness of the American purpose—an aspect that will require some later elaboration. A second is that the most ambitious Russian goal—dominance over the whole continent—is so totally opposed to the primary American purpose of denying precisely this, that this objective of the Soviet Union is likely to be frustrated indefinitely by American opposition. Third, a surprising degree of symmetry has developed between Russian and American purposes at the minimum most essential level of Soviet goals—continued dominance in Eastern Europe—and the third level of American purpose—stability throughout Europe. Finally, the Soviet Union appears to have an objective at the second level—the neutralization of Europe—which runs counter to the second level of American purposes—to maintain a military foothold in Western Europe; but the actual extent of asymmetry at this level does not yet appear to have been fully tested. I believe myself that the testing of Soviet-American asymmetry at this level is in fact already under way and marks a major stage in Europe's continuing evolution since 1945.

We began by speaking of the weight of history that might tend toward more reintegration of Europe, and of latent German nationalism tending toward some amalgamation of the two German states. What room is there

to accommodate these tendencies between the conflicting purposes of two superpowers? Potentially more room, I submit, than is as yet generally perceived. Let us assume that for the indefinite future in Europe East will not take over West, nor West take over East, and that all of Europe will live under the range both of Russian and American rockets. Let us assume further that the existence of two German states is an essential aspect of this situation, and that these two states will also continue as separate entities. But let us also recognize, rather than merely assume, that under these conditions as they now prevail, Europe already is less than totally divided. And more than only economic interchange occurs within the infrastructure of the continent. At the macrolevel of geopolitics, little of significance may be occurring. Most people, however, do not live at that macrolevel—at least not by choice. At the microlevel—where people do live—an American can now attend a conference of European rectors whose composition is indeed Pan-European; and this personal reference is offered solely as one illustration of the fact that Pan-Europeanism is becoming more the rule than the exception among professions, special interest groups, as well as among those who deal in economic matters. I do not wish to overstate the point. Let me note only that there are a number of matters at the microlevel that are specifically under discussion between the two Germanies, indeed involving civil servants from both sides. And I cannot resist the temptation to point out that—no matter its origins in the Middle East—the strength of organized Christianity in Warsaw Pact nations must be perceived as a European phenomenon, whether one thinks of the Pope's reception in Poland or the vigor of the Evangelical Church in the German Democratic Republic. But I do not claim that such little things make much of a case, except insofar as they may be straws in the wind.

Suppose, however, that the USSR were to propose the neutralization of all Europe under a framework that would allow also for some federative reintegration of the German people? The notion is not new, and is well-known under the label of Finlandization. Its core concept is the demilitarization of the continent, presumably accompanied by superpower guarantees of non-aggression and of the security of existing borders. Russian interest in advancing—and even realizing such a proposal is easy to rationalize. Our own earlier analysis cannot be predicted; at the least, however, it would appear to be questionable. If that is so, then there are some implications for the fact that the question concerning an American initiative in Europe can be answered with an unqualified no, at least at this time. In a neutralized Europe, both Britain and France presumably would have to surrender their independent nuclear armaments, so substantial resistance to the notion can be expected from both nations. The biggest question mark envelops the German Federal Republic, which does not have access independently to nuclear weapons. Except for nuclear capability, however, the FRG has emerged as the strongest of the Western European states within NATO. Ever since the initial leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the Federal Republic has firmly tied itself to partnership with the United States and has assigned no priority to German national reunification. But it requires neither prejudice nor powers of prediction to ask whether this strategy will for the foreseeable future continue to appear best for the FRG. The geopolitical calculus which this question enters is complex indeed. It involves the future credibility of the American deterrent; the dependence on American global strategy and national policy induced by reliance on United States nuclear deterrence; the variable introduced by the independent nuclear capacity of Britain and France; the perception of the severity of threat of Soviet aggression; the credibility of overtures to neutralization of Europe; the enigma of latent German nationalism; and calculations concerning developments within and among other European states. To mention this calculus will evoke references to Rapallo. As a historic reminder, such reference may have its uses. As a possible precedent, Rapallo is an irrelevant distraction.

The fate of Europe since 1945 has assigned a literally crucial role for the Germans. Their existence, their location, and their division ordain their pivotal position in the European future. This pertains not only to what they themselves do, but also to how other states perceive them, or expect them to behave. We have already noted the special phobia of the USSR toward Germany. But how would Britain and France, and other Western European states, react to a NATO alliance in which the FRG plays an ever larger role, including shared use

of American nuclear weapons? How would the FRG, NATO and individual Western European nations react to renewed Russian pressure applied to Berlin—especially if that pressure is intended to persuade others of the advantages of neutralization? How widely might American and Western European interests diverge with respect to the Middle East, and if there is any growing divergence, what role will the FRG play? Such questions are not now answerable, but they are not merely rhetorical. To raise them is to raise the possibility not only that a greater integration of Europe and specifically of the German people as a consequence of neutralization may come to have more attractions for the Federal Republic than are now perceived, but also that the attractions of such a development may become more persuasive to other members of the NATO alliance as well.

Such a possibility would be further complicated if the only response by the United States were a sterile negative toward all moves in the direction of neutralization. To say this may be interpreted as either an implicit or explicit endorsement of the neutralization of Europe. It is not intended to be that. Instead this analysis indicates only that there may be circumstances which may lend some attraction to a new Russian initiative for neutralization, and that outright American opposition to such an initiative without any alternative to the status quo might place the United States at a relative disadvantage. The superpower that appears to propose movement that accommodates the historic interdependence of Europe and the national self-determination of the German people will have more to offer than its adversary. Beyond that assertion, the United States at some future time might also find itself in a position of responding—in the absence of any initiative of its own—to an initiative from the Federal Republic, either generated exclusively in Bonn, or induced by a Soviet proposition. It is, of course, quite common that the dependence of allies on a superpower involves reciprocal dependence of the superpower on its allies. But it might in the very long run not serve American interests best if a dialogue on the future of Europe primarily involves Bonn and Moscow and America participation were minimized. One may here recall some irritation in Washington with the autonomous style of General de Gaulle. In the long run, however, such an autonomous style might be more likely to emanate effectively from Bonn than from Paris—or, for that matter from London. Therefore, it would seem to be desirable for the United States to consider a conception of its own concerning Europe which involves neither surrender of the commitment to keep Western Europe free of Soviet domination, nor acceptance of a Russian initiative for the neutralization of Europe, and which does not constitute an overt challenge to continued Russian primacy in Eastern Europe. Is such an American conception even possible? Certainly it is not likely to emerge unless there is more active consideration than is accorded at present to alternative futures for Europe. But it is fair to ask about at least one possible direction along which an American initiative might orient itself. This direction is not in fact new, but then neither is the notion of European neutralization.

The single most successful American initiative in Europe since 1945 may well have been the Marshall Plan. It was offered originally to every war-ravaged European nation, but was then confined in practice to Western Europe alone. At an early stage, the Marshall Plan became intertwined with the ideas of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, and the European Coal and Steel Community which evolved into the European Community. That Community is now beginning the embrace of Europe's South as well as West and North. It is tempting to wonder what consequences would ensue from a new initiative, with which the United States would associate itself, to extend the membership of the European Community eastward. The Community evidently has the potential to become a European federation, and might one day accommodate itself to the regionalism within European nations as well as to diversity among the nation-states. It is not necessarily inconceivable that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would endure, while nations belonging to either or neither would become part of a European Community. A political and economic federation neither neutralized nor focused on national defense problems is not beyond the bounds of imagination.

Certainly the first response from the East to the proposal of a truly European federation would be entirely negative—at least as negative as the Western response to neutralization. However, at the very least it would represent a more positive reaction to a possible Russian initiative than mere rejection. The positive aspects would include both a basis for greater cultural and economic interdependence within Europe, as well as a framework to facilitate closer links between the two Germanies. Beyond that, it is now worth recalling the fuzzy state of American purposes in Europe that was noted earlier, and the complex history of American attitudes toward the stability of the Warsaw Pact countries. In the late 1950s any degree of American acquiescence in the continued Russian domination of Eastern Europe would have sounded far more radical than it does today. We have observed that the asymmetry of Russian and American purposes in Europe at a level above the status quo but below continental domination by either superpower remains to be fully tested. At a minimum, it seems correct to assume that the United States will fare better during such a period of testing with some initiative of its own to counterpose against Russian overtures toward neutralization. To govern the future is beyond reach. To shape it must at least be attempted, and ought only at the very worst go by default.

One might well stop here, and indeed we soon shall. But a brief set of concluding comments seems necessary to account for the interests of China—the third superpower—in Europe. One must assume that a significant level of tension will persist between the Chinese People's Republic and the USSR. From this it follows that China's one paramount interest in Europe is instability, simply because the higher the degree of European instability the more the Soviet Union will be preoccupied with its Western rather than its Eastern flank. By the same token, heightened tension in relations with China constitute an incentive for the USSR to seek maximum reassurance with respect to Europe. In the long run, then, China is likely to play a role that may effect Europe even at far remove. Closer relationships between the United States and the People's Republic of China would affect the Russian perception of Europe. Greater accommodation between the United States and the USSR with respect to Europe will be perceived as an adverse development by the Chinese. It may even be that if China concludes that American pressure on Russia in Europe is insufficient for its own security, that the People's Republic might then seek other European alliances for the purpose of encumbering the Soviet Union in the West. But the most likely impact of China on Europe appears to lie in the incentive which the People's Republic provides to the Soviet Union to maximize security for itself in Europe.

Auguries are apt to remain ambiguous, as these surely are. But anyone concerned with the possibility of German nationalism becoming a more vital force—in spite of the evident sincerity and skill of the leadership of the FRG to date and all the reassuring polls that indicate so low a level of interest in reunification within the West German population—must also recognize that a divided Europe cannot accommodate German reintegration of any significance. A neutralized Europe might accommodate a more cohesive German future and suit the Soviet Union. Were such a prospect offered with persistence under the right conditions, it might in future be more appealing than it now appears. Outright rejection without positive alternatives might then be more awkward to sustain. Therefore, a search for alternatives might not be premature. A Pan-European Community, confederating very different types of states which are committed to asymmetrical defensive alignments, is an admittedly difficult conception. A better alternative is preferable, but none has yet been suggested. Almost thirty-five years have passed since 1945 and Europe is still divided. What are the odds that this will still be so in the year 2014?

Herter Lecture, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, November 8, 1979.

INSTITUTE FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS

STEVEN MULLER

It is an exceptional honor and pleasure to address this annual meeting of the Institute for External Relationships on the subject of cultural relations between Germany and the United States. Please let me apologize at the outset for the inadequacies of my German. It is, of course, a language in which I have not thought or worked since I was twelve years old. Perhaps a few mistakes will be a useful and constant reminder that I speak to you not as a German now living in the United States, but as an American who happens to have been born in Germany.

If you will forgive me a second personal reference, my appearance before you also represents an interesting combination of two very significant aspects of past cultural relations between Germany and America. As President of The Johns Hopkins University, I am associated with an institution which was founded in 1876 as the first American institution of higher education deliberately modeled on the German university as reformed above all by the ideas of Wilhelm von Humboldt. In the middle of the 19th century the United States had many colleges in the British tradition of higher education, but most of them were still affiliated with religious denominations and the doctoral degree was not offered. The freedom of teaching and learning which was von Humboldt's fundamental principle, and the resulting ability to develop modern science free from the restraints from religious dogma, had already made the German university of that time an inspiration to many of the best minds throughout the world. The finest young American scholars traveled to Germany to complete their education.

This was true of Daniel Coit Gilman, the founding President of Johns Hopkins, and of many members of the original faculty which he assembled. Gilman's main purpose was to establish in the United States a university on the German model. He realized this ambition when Johns Hopkins was created, and it was only then that training for the doctoral degree and advanced research were taken up by the leading American colleges that had been created much earlier and which now transformed themselves into universities. At the ceremonies marking the 25th anniversary of the opening of The Johns Hopkins University, the principal speaker was President Eliot of Harvard, who then gave credit to Gilman and to The Johns Hopkins University for making possible the establishment of the doctoral programs of his own institution which had now become Harvard University, rather than Harvard College. In this particular sense then I am privileged to represent through my University the extraordinary contribution which the German university in the last century made to the cultural and educational life of America and much of the rest of the world.

As an individual who was born in Hamburg in 1927 and who emigrated with his family in 1939 as a refugee, I am also a junior member of that great wave of human potential which left Germany in dark days and came to the United States. It is not necessary to recite again that long and well-known list of persons, from Thomas

Mann and Einstein in the fullness of their careers, to Henry Kissinger and Michael Blumenthal who came as children as I did, who have since enriched the totality of American national life. But it is only right to remember the contrast between the older Germany and the so-called Third Reich, which drove out and expelled the finest flowering of the national culture. We will talk here of the present and future, but it is neither safe nor proper to forget the claims of the past. Please let me say that I speak with no personal bitterness. I have been far too fortunate in my life to feel bitterness. On the contrary, I speak of both Germany and America with deeply inbred affection. My happiness in being here on this occasion and to speak to you on this subject comes truly from my heart. But there is one word of warning that I owe you: I still feel myself to be enough at home so that I shall dare to be more outspoken and doubtless less polite than other Americas would surely be.

I congratulate the leaders of the Institute of External Relationships for having selected German/American cultural relations as the theme for this year's annual meeting. Mutual understanding between our two peoples is of enormous mutual interest and significance. In reviewing this subject at the end of the 1970s it is striking to note how much has changed so fast. Let me be very frank and say that while I do not see a crisis, I do believe that during the decade that is now ending much has deteriorated in the mutual knowledge and understanding that exists between the cultures of our countries. It is important that we acknowledge this development. If we see it in time we can do better. If we do not there is real danger that mutual understanding will deteriorate further; and that would be a disadvantage both for Germany and the United States.

I am aware of a great sentence which former President Theodor Heuss once uttered as Chairman of this great Institute, when he said that external relations do not spell international politics. Surely that was and remains correct. But it is equally true that it is simply not possible to make a total separation between the cultural and the political relationships of two peoples. So I intend to honor the Heuss dictum. But because I speak as a private citizen I shall also feel free to make references to the world of international relations when it impacts directly on cultural affairs and connections.

I.

It seems to me that the decade of the 1960s marked the high point of mutual understanding and cultural affinity between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Our cultural relations in those days were so close as to constitute a major achievement at any time, and an absolutely astonishing triumph during only the second decade after a great war in which we were enemies. In the 1960s, which began in the United States under the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, most citizens of the German Federal Republic saw in the United States a powerful political ally against external danger, a land of enormous and vibrant energy, an incomplete but inspiring model of social democracy, and a sponsor and partner in many things. Citizens of the United States were aware of the Federal Republic as a steady and reliable ally, as a working democracy whose practices were very close to those of their own country, as a national culture reborn and full of promise, and as a society with values very similar to those of America.

Much of this is still valid today, but it is necessary to recognize that the decade of the 1970s was full of difficulties which have individually and collectively amended mutual perceptions on the part of our peoples. Perhaps no single person can correctly review circumstances that are both so complicated and so recent, but let me nonetheless try to list at least some of the factors which I believe play a role in German/American cultural relations today. And I must state with regret that I think each and all of them have begun to diminish the quality of mutual understanding which had been reached in the 1960s.

There is no basis on which it has been possible for me to put this series of very different developments in any particular order. But to begin with—and with an eye to the future—let me note some striking differences with

respect to the younger generation in both countries, with particular reference to the leaders of tomorrow who were and are in the German and American universities of the 1970s. The past twelve years were marked in both your country and mine by active radicalism on the part of university students. In both countries this phenomenon has declined somewhat during the decade but it was certainly at its height as the 1960s ended and the 1970s began. It is, of course, not possible nor appropriate to examine this subject in great detail here and now, but at least a few observations about it do appear to be necessary.

Perhaps the most important thing to note is that the epidemic of student radicalism looked deceptively alike here and in America during the days of protests and demonstrations, but that fundamentally the situation was almost completely different in the United States and in Germany. As one looks back, it seems clearer and clearer that in the United States the principal inspiration for student protest was the war in Vietnam. For reasons that historians will continue to examine years and years from now, the United States was involved in a war which more and more young Americans questioned. Their many concerns became focused on two principal issues: the war increasingly appeared to them to be unjust, and it also increasingly appeared to them to be a lost cause. In protesting both the war itself and the prospect of their own involvement in it, American students called into question the conduct and goals of American foreign policy. But despite a lot of rhetoric and the statements of a few individuals they did not really challenge all of the institutions and social traditions of the United States. That may still be a controversial evaluation, but it is supported by the fact that student radicalism in the United States has almost completely disappeared in the wake of the end of the Vietnam war. The current generation of American students is not necessarily conservative, but it certainly cannot be described as being radical. The principal preoccupation of American university students today appears to be to prepare themselves as well as possible for satisfactory employment in a highly competitive economy and society. And to do that constitutes an implicit acceptance, to a significant extent, of the institutions and values within that economy and that society.

It is difficult for anyone from overseas even to venture an assessment of student radicalism in Germany. However, it seems to me that one must conclude that the war in Vietnam played a much lesser role here on the one hand, and that on the other hand the challenge to domestic institutions and social traditions went much deeper in Germany than in the United States, and that it was more serious. In contrast to the continued American preference for pragmatism over ideology, ideology did and still does play a role among German students for which there simply is no American equivalent. At the risk of being wrong and certainly of being controversial, I would venture to say that at least to some extent university students in the German Federal Republic perceptibly moved to the ideological left during the period of student activism. There appears to remain still a cluster of ideological extremism which has no American counterpart, or at least no American counterpart of any significant size or impact.

In Germany too university students are intensely concerned with future employment within the society, and so here too one can assume a significant degree of acceptance of the institutions and practices of the economy and the society. But at least I personally believe that there is a substantially more critical attitude toward society as it now exists among many German students than there is in the United States, and more of a tendency to the political left as well. But what is significant here is, of course, not student radicalism as such in either country, but rather such impact as it may have on German/American cultural relations. And my conclusion is that the student generation of the 1970s and of the present in the German Federal Republic feels less attraction to the United States than did their predecessors. If it is true that a significant number of German students retain fundamental questions about their own society, those questions at least to some degree relate to American society as well. Despite appearances, there never was much real kinship between student radicals in our two countries. At present, German and American university students, while clearly in a similar situation on the one hand, do not on the other hand appear to have much of a common cause. I shall

return to the subject of the young generations once more before I close, but the observation I wish to make here is primarily that if, indeed, ideology plays a role in the thinking of German university students, then that is a tendency more likely to inhibit mutual understanding among young Germans and Americans than to enhance it. American student radicalism had very little genuine intellectual content, and what little there may have been now appears to have evaporated. For the present and future, therefore, I see the danger of misunderstanding between young Germans and young Americans as more likely than the promise of closer understanding.

Another fact to note is that the number of young Germans who come to study at American universities has been much less in recent years than it was in the first two decades after the Second World War. One reason for this is that the German university system itself has greatly expanded and offers both more and better opportunities. It must be admitted also that the unrivaled American superiority in scientific research which existed twenty years ago no longer obtains. Not only in Germany but in several other countries as well research of the highest international quality is now performed. Once again it is not our purpose here to examine this particular situation for its own sake. Nor will we ignore the fact that thousands of foreign students—including many Germans—still study at American universities. What is recognizable is that the United States no longer has a near-monopoly on the most advanced research and equipment; that in Germany advanced research has progressed so well as to offer splendid opportunities right here; and that as a result the best young German scientists as a group have less reason to study abroad and a much greater variety of choice beyond the United States when they do elect to do so.

This then implies a quite significant change in future cultural understanding. Today, as one travels through the world of German scientific research, one encounters over and over again leading professionals who have lived in the United States for a year or longer and who know America with real familiarity. In future, this is bound to be the case much less. German scientists may still know the English language, will still be aware of the work of their American colleagues, and many of them will still have visited in the United States. But it cannot be assumed that most of them will have lived or studied in America for extended periods. At the same time, some Americans of course will continue to study in Germany, but there is no prospect that their number will greatly increase in the next few years. So there is a gradual weakening of the crucial human links that have been binding our two societies closely together in an area of special leadership and prominence.

II.

Let me then turn next not particularly to tourism, but to two factors much more significant than tourism, both of which may present obstacles to mutual understanding. Perhaps just a few words are needed as to why tourism itself can play only a minor role in cultural relations. Please let me state very clearly that I favor tourism and that I do believe that even brief visits by private citizens from each of our two countries to the other are indeed desirable. The difficulty is that brief visits inevitably can form only superficial impressions and tend to leave behind so few enduring relationships. To this must be added that the first impressions that remain behind are quite likely to be distorted, in part because the tourist industry in each of our two countries quite naturally emphasizes what is most different as being most interesting, and pays much less attention to common and shared situations.

For instance, it sometimes seems to me that American tourists are encouraged to perceive the Federal Republic primarily as a living museum, whose oldest ruins are more significant than any recent development. On the other side, German visitors to the United States tend to be shown only the latest and biggest, or the loudest and quickest. Disneyworld, Studio 54, and the whole of the Manhattan East Side, Chicago's O'Hare airport, the cluster of new museums in Washington, D.C., and the Superdome in New Orleans are equivalent

as a sample of American reality to the understanding of Germany one receives from several days spent in taking a boat up or down the Rhine to look at castles and drink beer in villages, plus one day each in Heidelberg and Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

In view of such limitations of tourism, two rather more significant observations should be recorded. The first is that it makes such a great and obvious difference whether visitors at least can speak the local language. Here the German performance remains in general exceptionally good. The number of Germans who can now speak English is impressive. The American performance remains catastrophic. Despite every hope that in a world of interdependence and easy travel Americans would have learned to speak other tongues, only a small minority of Americans command any second language, let alone German.

It is not my mission to solve the problems of German/American cultural relations, but if there were only one thing I could do to promote better understanding of Germany in the United States then I would without question concentrate on the learning of the German language by more Americans. And I do mean the learning of it, not merely four or more years of study that produce no ability to read or speak the language, but only a lasting dislike of its grammatical structure. It must be quite openly acknowledged that the deep-rooted American resistance to foreign languages is a source of major problems to American international diplomacy, trade, and cultural relations. My country must do better, and in the future the horizon of German/American cultural relations can only widen if more Americans can learn to read and speak German.

My second point has to do with the fact that even in the presence of a great deal of mutual tourism, the citizens of both our countries depend primarily on what they learn in school for what they know about the United States on the one hand, or the Federal Republic on the other. And the essence of what is learned in school comes above all from the textbooks that are in use. Here I must confess to very deep worry. I have not studied this field, and so I make no charges. But what little I have seen troubles me a great deal. Textbooks are not written by objective machines. They are written by people. It is my impression that a thorough examination of the textbooks that introduce young Germans to America and young Americans to Germany would reveal substantial bias and prejudice, and that this may possibly be an even greater problem here than in the United States.

All textbooks—even the very best—are always just a little behind the times, because they do take several years to write and produce. There is something of a problem in American schoolbooks on Germany because they now fully cover the period of Hitler's rise and fall. It is possible that they unfairly overemphasize this terrible period. The Holocaust in particular was a phenomenon of such scope and horror that it cannot escape emphasis. The danger is that it alone may create the governing impression. German history since 1945 has been—thank God—less dramatic, and less terrible, but is also therefore pale by contrast. I do believe that Americans must carefully examine their textbooks to make sure that the German history of the twentieth century is presented completely but also fairly, and that the sins of one generation are not irresponsibly attributed to its successors.

It is something quite different about German textbooks that deal with the United States which disturbs me. It is my suspicion, admittedly based only on quick impressions rather than extensive research, that many of them show a negative left-wing bias. It is my honest guess that at least some of these schoolbooks are written by very intelligent young German scholars who were in the universities during the peak period of student radicalism, and that ideological convictions of the left still govern their thinking and writing. If that may be fair for themselves, it may nonetheless produce for students a description of the United States which is less than fair and accurate. Any American will admit that the American society is competitive, based on the pursuit of self-interest, and sometimes flamboyant, and that there are racial and other problems the United States. No

American is now particularly proud of Vietnam or of Watergate. However, an introduction to the United States that emphasizes only such negatives and either ignores or understates the enormous positive aspects of America's national evolution and contribution to the world is obviously unbalanced.

As I have said, I am in no position to make charges. But it is necessary to remind ourselves that we may tend to take schoolbooks of all kinds too much for granted. We know that they are not exciting to read, but we should never forget their impact on young minds. It would please—but surprise—me to learn that an analysis of the treatment of the United States in German textbooks would prove that treatment to be wholly fair and accurate. I would, however, suggest that such an analysis is worth undertaking. I will later say just a few more words about the current state of American society. For now, let me make only the obvious point that the changes in American society over the last ten to twenty years have been profound, extremely rapid, and still continue. It would be my hope that these most recent developments—in their positive and negative aspects—will be included in textbooks. German/American cultural relationships will greatly depend upon what we learn about each other in our schools. I believe with considerable intensity that it would be rewarding in both countries to pay greater attention to the accuracy and equity of our schoolroom texts.

III.

To turn then to yet another aspect that has seen much recent change and that affects our mutual understanding, we must refer to that unique concentration of Americans who do live in the Federal Republic because they have been assigned to do so as members of the armed forces of the United States. They are, of course, to a large extent geographically concentrated and housed with a degree of separation from the general population. Nevertheless, they are visible and accessible. One must assume that they represent a significant American reality to many Germans, who do see these soldiers but have never visited the United States. I will not dwell on the fact—long obvious—that the presence of the American military in the Federal Republic cannot help on the one hand to influence German perceptions of the United States, nor that on the other hand no nation can be properly assessed solely on the basis of its armed services.

What is different about the American military today, in sharp contrast to the only recent past, is that the United States Armed Services after the end of the Vietnam War consist now only of individuals who have volunteered to serve, and that their pay in dollars buys a great deal less in Germany than was formerly the case. It is yet once again not our business here to analyze the problems of conscription or a military composed of volunteer professionals, nor of the complexities of the declining international value of the dollar. What can and should be said in brief and in fairness is that a volunteer army is by definition less representative of the total population of its country than an army based on conscription. And also that the morale, behavior and external impression of soldiers and their families is very directly influenced by a severe and rapid decline in their standard of living, especially when compared with relative affluence of the general population in the host country. Quite simply, Germans cannot help that some of their judgments about the United States will be affected by what they see of American troops in this country; but these judgments should take full account of the fact that ours is no longer a citizen army produced by conscription, and that its standard of living reflects the purchasing power of the dollar in marks more accurately than the standard of living of the average American.

These references to the dollar lead on to another significant change of more recent years that is bound to have an impact on German/American cultural relations. I refer, of course, to an almost complete reversal of roles with respect to economic prosperity. If one goes back to the days of the Marshall Plan, the United States was at a peak of economic power while the Federal Republic was largely devastated by war and defeat. Recovery, in part engendered by American assistance, and the so-called economic miracle that in part was modeled on American economic practice, overcame the German economic poverty of the 1940s. But only recently has

the American economy shown the full effects of the costs of Vietnam, dependence on OPEC oil, and declining productivity per man-hour. The single label for the result is high inflation, which the Federal Republic in turn has successfully avoided to a much greater extent. I must continue to apologize for raising these large issues which we cannot pause to examine in appropriate detail. What is relevant here is that economic relationships do affect cultural relationships and that—in sharp contrast even to the previous decade—Germany enjoys for today and almost certainly tomorrow a greater level of prosperity than the United States.

There are some interesting sidelights to this new fact. Our cultural relations will have to account for the development of some increase in competition between German and American business interests. It will be cheaper for Germans to visit the United States than for Americans to visit here. That is already visibly in evidence. There is already, and there will continue to be, more of a new German presence in the United States: the German investor in the American economy, as well as the German employee who works in America for the German investor. No one who recalls some of the earlier negative reactions to American investment in the German economy should be surprised if there are some counterpart negative reactions to the new German investment in the United States. Respect and affection do not always or of necessity go hand in hand. Neither the relative prosperity of the Federal Republic nor German business initiatives in the United States are likely to enhance the popularity of Germany in America, although they will serve to demonstrate the importance of both countries to each other.

Moving away from economics, we should also add to this quick catalogue of some of the factors that make the 1970s and the future so different from the 1960s—the growing American recognition that there are two German states, not one. American awareness of the German Democratic Republic is still in its infancy. But such awareness has begun to exist, even though only so barely and recently that its effect on cultural relations between the Federal Republic and the United States is as yet incalculable. Until only the past two or three years, the Federal Republic *was* Germany as far as most Americans were concerned. It was known that there was an East German territory in which other Germans lived, but in the eye of American public opinion —looking from far away—this appeared to be little more than the most westward extension of the Soviet Union itself. Americans find it difficult to perceive the national characteristics of a state that—as Americans saw it — had to build a literal wall around itself to keep its own people from leaving. For almost the whole period since 1945, when any American said Europe he meant Western Europe, and when he said Germany he meant the Federal Republic.

This is no longer quite so true even today, and it will almost surely begin to be even less true in the decade ahead. Formal diplomatic relations exist between the United States and the German Democratic Republic. Not much more has happened as yet, but efforts are under way to initiate some beginning scientific, cultural, and scholarly exchanges, and there is parallel activity in terms of mutual trade. A long time ago the leadership of Marshall Tito slowly led to greater American understanding that there was a Europe greater than Western Europe, which included the Warsaw Pact countries under Russian influence, and Yugoslavia, which began to be seen in the United States as having a life of its own. Later events in Hungary and Czechoslavakia in particular discouraged Americans from giving much credence to the individuality of Warsaw Pact nations. But the recognition of the German Democratic Republic occurs not only in concert with an equivalent gesture by the Federal Republic, but also alongside events such as the changing perception in America of Poland after the election of Pope John Paul II and his visit to his homeland, and such as the aggressively self-determined foreign policy of Rumania. I do not in any way wish to overstate my point. My simple judgment is only that the future of cultural relationships between the Federal Republic and the United States will now have to take the existence of the other German state into more explicit account. By the end of the 1980s it is not inconceivable that when one says “Germany” to an American, the question “which one” will seem natural—despite the fact that no one used ever to ask that question for over a quarter of a century.

Probably only one more phenomenon should be mentioned in this impressionistic and quite personal list of factors that have in my judgment led to some decline of the excellent level of mutual German/American understanding that we had achieved in the 1960s. This is the parallel tendency within each of our two societies to become with the passage of time somewhat more parochial, i.e., to be preoccupied more with the internal problems of our nations than with external relations. This parochial tendency is natural and unavoidable and probably nothing much can be done about it. It is perhaps ironic that it is one of the fruits of peace. We can all observe that the newspapers in the United States and here—or more totally the so-called news media as a whole—are more filled with local developments, including crime, than with international news. It is still true that Europeans read and see more about the United States than Americans do about Europe. But that is offset to some degree that Europeans read and hear about Washington far more than they do about the complex reality of the life of the whole continental United States. The main fact is simply that in the absence of war and immediate threat to peace we have both become more preoccupied again with our domestic problems.

IV.

That does bring me back, however—if only briefly—to the attitudes of the young people with which I began. In the United States it is fair to say that Germany certainly is of no greater interest than it was a few years ago. Specifically it is also not of less interest, but there has been some lessening of interest in the whole rest of the world—with the possible exception of China—among young Americans. And so interest in Germany is proportionately reduced also. In the Federal Republic too I sense some lessening of interest in the whole of the world among students, but I personally believe that a decrease of interest in America or a more actively hostile interest has developed to some degree, and quite specifically. If this is true then I regret it, and it will have an impact on our future cultural relations. As I become older I can more easily understand the radical impatience of the young with the mistakes of the past and present. But just as I have spoken of the injustice of attributing the sins of the fathers to the children, so too am I concerned lest the lessons that an older generation learned so painfully be lost to the next generation. University students today were born only in the mid-1950s. We owe them some memories which they lack.

I am conscious now of having enumerated some eight or nine developments which individually and collectively constitute a challenge to the best mutual German/American cultural understanding. Please let me remind you that my purpose is not to be negative and that I do not want to depress you. Quite the contrary: I speak as I do because I so deeply believe in the importance of good German/American cultural relationships. Only by honestly recognizing difficulties can we adequately prepare for the best possible responses. I am conscious also of having said perhaps too little about the many positive aspects of what we have already mutually accomplished. If I have said little on this score it is because we are all so happily familiar with these past and present achievements. And because it is my fear that an overindulgence in the appreciation of how well we have done—gratifying and courteous as it might be—would not help us to see clearly enough the new and different tasks that lie ahead. There are always risks in candor. But true friends can and must be candid with each other. I pay you the tribute of heartfelt friendship and can only ask you to accept the burden of candor in the bargain.

As I conclude, I wish to leave you with a final brief personal assessment of the cultural state of the United States which, after all, I represent here, however inadequately. To Europeans, America often appears as a paradox. Enormous energy seems to be combined with a lack of discipline. Tremendous power seems to be combined with inconstancy of purpose. Technological sophistication seems to be combined with political naivete. Abundant freedom appears in combination with a degree of public disorder. Productive individualism sometimes appears to combine with excessive self-indulgence. There are Europeans who find it difficult to understand why the overwhelming power of the United States in the aftermath of the Second World War

seems to have declined rather than expanded. In Germany and elsewhere in Europe I have heard doubts expressed as to whether the American society can sustain itself, and concern that it might fall victim to its own perceived excesses.

It is noteworthy that the paradoxical combinations which I have just mentioned are typically descriptive of a human being in the late stage of adolescence. It is no doubt risky to make an analogy between a whole nation and an individual. Nevertheless I suggest that it may prove useful to think of the United States as being only an immediate post-adolescent in the family of nations. Americans celebrated 200 years of nationhood in 1976. What is so very evident within the United States is that internally its life as a single people is still only at its beginning. America across that vast continent of ours has been a compendium of regions, of immigrants, of sectional differences and contrasts, and of social decentralization. Only within the past two or three decades have technology and the pressures of the rest of the world begun to create the true beginning of an American civilization.

The image of an America at the age of twenty among much older national civilizations is so simple—perhaps too simple—that I will not labor it. I will express only my own confidence that for the United States the good old days still lie ahead. The energy that pulses in our music and the power of our technology will mature in time. One should not mistake the awkward age of a giant now full-grown for something else. The cultural development of the United States into a mature American civilization is worth observing. Out of the tragedy of recent war an exceptionally close cultural relationship developed between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. I hope with all my heart that this very meeting may serve to bring about a new commitment to build on that achievement and to bring our two peoples even more closely together, lest we allow ourselves to drift apart by taking each other for granted. It is this hope that brought me here, and so it is with this hope that I leave you.

Address at the Institute for External Relationships, Stuttgart, Germany, December 1, 1979.

AFTER THREE HUNDRED YEARS: A KEYNOTE ADDRESS IN 1983

STEVEN MULLER

Mr. Chairman, distinguished colleagues, ladies and gentlemen:
With deep appreciation and humility, I recognize that I was selected to make these opening remarks primarily because I happen so conveniently to symbolize part of what this occasion is about. It is my good fortune to serve as president of Johns Hopkins, whose founding was so intimately rooted in German origin; and I am also one of those many Americans born in Germany whose United States citizenship is based on naturalization. Let me try, therefore, to respect this symbolism with some comments about the German influence on American higher education. A keynote address should not trespass on the learned papers we are about to hear. But the German influence on the modern American university does not appear specifically on the program and may be worthy of mention before this conference of scholars.

Only two countries contributed fundamentally to the development of higher education in America: Great Britain and Germany. The British legacy of course came first. In the American colonies of England, colleges were very soon founded that were patterned on what then existed in Great Britain. Harvard College was founded in the Massachusetts Bay Colony as early as 1636, and the College of William and Mary in Virginia in 1693. By the time of the American Revolution, numerous such colleges had been founded, and many others were established as American settlement spread westward across the continent. These colleges were sometimes called universities, but they were far from that in the modern sense.

They were designed for the higher education of young men of privilege, to prepare them primarily for two professions, the ministry and the law. Physicians at first learned their profession in proprietary schools run by established doctors, and teachers were ministers, sometimes lawyers, or not trained at the college level. These were liberal arts colleges that taught a rigid, narrow curriculum over four years. Almost all of them operated under the auspices of a particular religious denomination. They differed from British experience in that in the United States there were so many different denominations, that their funding therefore came from religious communities and wealthy individuals to a far greater extent than from public funds, and that no community of such colleges ever came together to form the type of British university represented by Oxford or Cambridge.

By the early nineteenth century there was increasing dissatisfaction with the American colleges. It was charged that their learning was dull, restrictive, and of low quality. Their tradition ran counter to spreading democracy and to the loosening of religious orthodoxies. Above all, they produced no practical education in a new nation

that had begun a mighty process of industrial development. The following comments from Henry P. Tappan, later president of the University of Michigan, summarize the dissatisfaction with the collegiate system of American higher education by 1851:

The Colleges of America are plainly copied from the Colleges of the English Universities. The course of studies, the President and Tutors, the number of years occupied by the course, are all copied from the English model. We have seen that in the English Institutions, the name of University alone remained, while the collegial or tutorial system absorbed all the educational functions. In America, while Colleges were professedly established, they soon assumed a mixed character. Professors were appointed, but they discharged only the duty of tutors in the higher grades of study; so that the tutors were really assistant professors or the professors only tutors of the first rank. Our Colleges also have from the beginning conferred degrees in all the faculties, which in England belongs only to the University. . . .

We inspire no general desire for high education, and fail to collect students, because we promise and do not perform. Hence we fall into disrepute, and young men of ability contrive to prepare themselves for active life without our aid. In connection with this the commercial spirit of our country and the many avenues to wealth which are opened before enterprise create a distaste for study deeply inimical to education. The manufacturer, the merchant, the gold-digger, will not pause in their career to gain intellectual accomplishments. While gaining knowledge, they are losing the opportunities to gain money. The political condition of our country, too, is such, that a high education and a high order of talent do not generally form the sure guarantees of success. The tact of the demagogue triumphs over the accomplishments of the scholar and the man of genius.

Put these causes together, and the phenomena we witness and lament are explained. Our colleges are complacently neglected when they neither afford the satisfaction and distinction of a thorough and lofty education, and yield no advantages in gaining wealth and political eminence.[1]

A new start was needed, and for this purpose American eyes turned to the German university. This did not happen primarily because there was reluctance to turn back once more to Britain, nor merely because there was general respect for the state of German learning. It occurred primarily because of the extraordinary reforms in the German universities that Wilhelm von Humboldt had achieved, beginning with the foundation of the University of Berlin in 1809, and rapidly thereafter throughout the German universities. The key to Humboldt's reforms was the famous statement that the principles which ought to permeate and dominate establishments of true scholarship were "solitude and freedom." By solitude, Humboldt meant the protection of the scholar from the pressure of practical needs and demands, permitting a total individual commitment to scholarly investigation without regard to utilitarian factors. By freedom, Humboldt did not mean the autonomy of universities, but freedom of teaching and freedom of learning: a professor should be free to teach what he wanted to teach, and a student should be free to attend whatever lectures interested him. These ideals put into practice meant a university committed to research, and research for its own sake, carried on by professors free to investigate as they chose, and by students free to study what and with whom they chose. This was the ideal of the new university which Wilhelm von Humboldt founded in Berlin.

It is not proper here to attempt a history of the development of the German university in the nineteenth century, but two practical effects of the spread of Humboldt's ideas must be mentioned. The first was the elevation of the faculty of philosophy—which earlier had prepared students for work in the three higher professional faculties of theology, medicine, and law—to the same level as the other three. This raising of the status of the philosophical faculty had the crucial effect that the various disciplines gathered together in this faculty were at last free to develop along their own hues. The second was the added impetus which the commitment to research gave to the seminar system of instruction. The seminar meant not only a limited research project undertaken

by a small, carefully selected group of students under the direction of a professor, but also a separate room or a number of separate rooms where the meetings are held and in which special libraries and other teaching resources are placed.

What American eyes found most appealing of all in the German university in mid-nineteenth century was the leading position which Germany had achieved in the natural sciences. Here there is irony. Wilhelm von Humboldt himself had been antagonistic to the pursuit of knowledge for practical purposes or utilitarian reasons, but in the German universities reformed by his ideas the natural sciences, so closely linked to industrialization, gained prominence. This was largely because of the encouragement and financial support given to the development of the natural sciences by the Prussian and other German governments and also because the basic idea of the Humboldtian university–the stress on pure research and the seminar system–ideally fitted the interests of the natural scientists. And it was Wilhelm's brother, Alexander von Humboldt, who used his own great influence in the Prussian court to promote the development of the natural sciences within the reformed philosophical faculties of the universities.

Shortly after the 1850s Americans saw in the contemporary German research university with its vigorous work in the natural sciences the inspiration for the reform of American higher education. It was not Humboldt's humanism per se that inspired Americans. It was that the university model that had evolved from his ideas was able to offer disciplined training for practical, utilitarian tasks and was free of the domination of religious orthodoxy. Few Americans were troubled by, if indeed they were even aware of, the fact that Humboldt would have despised their concern for education in the mechanical, industrial, and commercial arts and sciences and that he would probably have failed to understand the restraints that religious orthodoxy had placed on the early American colleges. For a quick appreciation of how the German university looked to American eyes in 1851 we may again turn to Tappan, for a summary of what many other leading American educators saw and thought:

> We have spoken of the German Universities as model institutions. Their excellence consists in two things: first, they are purely Universities, without any admixture of collegial tuition. Secondly, they are complete as Universities, providing libraries and all other material of learning, and having professors of eminence to lecture on theology, law, and medicine, the philosophical, mathematical, natural, philological, and political Sciences, on history and geography, on the history and principles of Art, in fine, upon every branch of human knowledge. The professors are so numerous that a proper division of labor takes place, and every subject is thoroughly discussed. At the University every student selects the courses he is to attend. He is thrown upon his own responsibility and diligence. He is left free to pursue his studies; but, if he wishes to become a clergyman, a physician, a lawyer, a statesman, a professor, or a teacher in any superior school, he must go through the most rigid examinations, both oral and written. Collegial tuition in the German Universities does not exist, because wholly unnecessary, the student being fully prepared at the Gymnasium before he is permitted to enter the University. Without the Gymnasium, the University would be worth little.[2]

Thus in the period after the American Civil War the idea of the research university and the prominence of the natural sciences was introduced from Germany into American higher education. The impact was widespread. From the first decade of the nineteenth century Americans had begun to study at German universities. An astonishing total of more than ten thousand Americans attended German universities during the century. Leading American educational reformers traveled to Germany for inspiration. In 1868, Cornell University was founded to provide a nonsectarian and practical education, with emphasis on the mechanical and agricultural arts. The first president was Andrew D. White, who had matriculated at the University of Berlin in 1855, had served at Michigan with Tappan, and drew heavily on his German experience in building Comell. Charles William Eliot, who in his forty years as president beginning in 1869 remade Harvard into a university, spent most of 1863 at Marburg and drew from there most of his ideas for the reform of Harvard.

The importation of German university ideas often met resistance, particularly when religious orthodoxy was offended. At Amherst in 1877 a German-trained professor of biology was removed for teaching biology as a science and not "as an absolutely dependent product of an absolutely independent spiritual creator."[3] There were public protests in several places against "Germanism," which led to the establishment of German-style beer parlors on the edge of campus. Tappan, whom I quoted earlier, made a vigorous effort as President of Michigan to reform that university along German lines but was ousted by the faculty after a decade largely because of his "Germanic pretensions," which included the "intemperate" habit of drinking wine with meals. The single most direct, dramatic, and far-reaching translation of the German university idea to the United States occurred in 1876 with the opening of The Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. The founding president was Daniel Coit Gilman, who had studied at Berlin in 1854 and 1855. Gilman returned to Germany in 1875 in preparation for the founding of the new university and visited a number of German universities, most notably Strassbourg, Freiburg, Göttingen, and Berlin. The Johns Hopkins University under Gilman was the first new American university explicitly founded as an institution committed to advanced study and research along German lines. Many of the early faculty at Johns Hopkins had been students at German universities, including Ira Remsen, the first professor of chemistry and second president of the university, who studied at Munich, took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1870, and taught at Tübingen; William E. Story, professor of mathematics, who took his doctorate at Leipzig in 1875; Basil L. Gildersleeve, the first professor of classics, who studied at Berlin and Bonn and took his doctorate at Göttingen in 1853; and Henry A. Rowland, the first professor of physics, who studied in Berlin. The Johns Hopkins University was nicknamed "Göttingen in Baltimore" and was the first American university to offer systematic study for the doctorate degree in various disciplines.

Despite its nickname, however, The Johns Hopkins University was not a German university. Gilman had stated, "We did not undertake to establish a German university, nor an English university, but an American university, based upon and applied to the existing institutions of this country."[4] In the simplest terms, what happened in American higher education was that the collegiate sector remained but that there was superimposed upon it research-oriented instruction at the graduate and professional levels, which is postbaccalaureate in that it follows the college years, rather than replacing them. The collegiate pattern still shows evidence of its British roots, but university graduate and professional patterns owe most to the nineteenth-century German university as Americans saw it. The German experience was also used to liberate the American university from religious influence, ever since Comell, Johns Hopkins, Chicago, and the great state-owned universities were explicitly established as nonsectarian institutions.

With this look backward at the German influence on the evolution of the American university, let us now return to the present and look ahead. As a personal symbol of recent German emigration to the United States, let me say that my complete Americanization and my absolute commitment to the United States do not prevent me from maintaining a special and continuing interest in German affairs. Natural as that may be, such an interest in the German present and future is largely shared by most Americans who recognize the pivotal position occupied by German-speaking peoples in the heart of Europe. This conference thus seems to me to be of double importance because its focus is wide enough to include German-American relationships not only as they were in the past but as they are today and will continue into the future. Three hundred years are an unfinished and ongoing story. And in my opinion the division of Europe that has existed since the 1940s is not permanently stable, and new questions are likely to arise in the future context of German-American relations.

The present division of Europe denies a lot of history and economic geography. Some of the legacy of a shared past and a common culture still spills across the boundaries between east and west, as does a considerably larger flow of commerce. But although history and the configurations of nature are not negligible forces, they are probably less powerful today than they might have been in the past. Modern technology—in economics, transportation, communications, and the employment of synthetic substances—makes the shape of nature less

relevant. And the unprecedented fear of nuclear annihilation may be more than sufficient to choke off any emotion based merely on the historical past. The fact that the division of Europe is ahistorical and unnatural may therefore be a bit awkward, but alone it probably poses no serious threat to the status quo.

It is of greater concern that the stability of the status quo depends so much on everyone's ability to look only backward, never forward. Whenever we in the West are troubled in our resolve to preserve the status quo we appeal to the past. Our leaders invoke on our behalf the names of Marshall, Churchill, Truman, or Adenauer and recall the resolve in the founding of NATO or the Berlin airlift. It is, of course, natural that immobility is hard to bear. To go forward is too risky. To go backward is not possible either, but there is psychological relief in going back in spirit to where it all started and then marching forward mentally to where we already are. This may work less well with repetition. And it may become more awkward to accomplish when it involves a future generation, which is asked to rally around a past it did not experience and therefore cannot remember. It is not surprising that those most committed to the status quo are deeply worried about the successor generation, to whom the constant need to look backward may be less appealing and satisfying. Young people have a natural tendency to look forward and even to seek change. It is therefore a bit frustrating for them and for their elders to have to insist that things must stay the same and to compel them to fix their vision as firmly as possible on the past.

When one is wholly committed to the status quo, the past is not only prologue but epilogue as well. That tends to make the present somewhat stale. Thus if one can look forward only to a lifetime of fearful deadlock across the middle of Europe, one may have to be content to find mobility and change within the confines of one's nation-state. In the postwar days, when the status quo of the division of Europe came into being, nationalism had a bad name. Today this is much less true. I believe that the renaissance of nationalism in Europe is linked to the preservation of Europe's division. It is of deep concern to me that the preservation of the status quo so harshly inhibits any hopeful, changing vision of the future. That in itself is difficult to sustain—unstable, if you like—and ever more so for a new generation. But the revival of nationalism worries me even more.

Why should this be so, and am I even right about nationalism? One of the more popular slogans in the United States in the very recent past has been "Let Poland be Poland." Polish nationalism, at least, is still explicitly celebrated. Please do not misunderstand me; I do not fail to sympathize with the fate of the Polish people. But it is a fact that the status quo of the division of Europe rests on the division of Germany or, more properly said, the existence of two German states. Are the Poles alone in their nationalism? What about the British? The French? And how do you like the sound of "Let Germany be Germany"?

It may be bad taste to say that. But—alas—silence is not always golden. Truth can indeed be hard to face at times, but there may nevertheless be more virtue in confronting it than not. It is difficult to believe that, if nationalism really is once again popular and evident in so many other European states, Germans should remain indefinitely immune to it. To reach such a conclusion it is not necessary to make any reference to German nationalism in the past two centuries. Quite the reverse: the simpler assumption that Germans in many ways are apt to behave rather like their neighbors would argue that nationalism among their neighbors is likely to foster nationalism among Germans. But if that belief is true, then one must appraise the special problems attached to contemporary German nationalism.

Of course, there are two German states today, with social systems that are not only very different but indeed are vigorously opposed to each other. The most obvious assumption therefore would be that both may be nationalist in their own way and that this will pose no special problems for anyone else. But should one believe that this most obvious assumption is also the most likely? Several factors make such a belief at least questionable. It is already acknowledged that the relationship between the two German states is unique and in

certain ways differs from relations between other states that share a common border. It is also beyond argument that the situation of Berlin is unique and unusual. Also, it seems to me that Germans in the Federal Republic—especially younger citizens—may not look back at the origins of the Western alliance in the same way as others do, when the appeal is made to reaffirm the founding of the status quo. After all, one should perhaps not wholly ignore the fact that for Germans the aftermath of World War II involved national defeat rather than victory. It appears that special efforts have been made in the German Federal Republic to deemphasize nationalism as much as possible. If that is true, it may be justifiable and even admirable, but it may have an unintended reverse effect. If an effort to repress nationalism induces frustration, frustrated nationalism may in the long run become even stronger than vigorous nationalism freely and openly expressed. That does seem to be precisely true in the case of Poland, which has claimed so much of our attention and sympathy recently.

I hope it is evident that I am making an effort to tread gently on tender ground. Even so, I reach an unavoidable conclusion: that the preservation of the status quo, of the division of Europe without much foreseeable prospect of change, poses special difficulties for Germans: that the revival of nationalism throughout Europe implies that these special difficulties are more likely to increase in the future rather than to lessen, and that the key position of Germans in Europe makes it likely that any added difficulties they experience will also pose additional difficulties for their neighbors. As gently as possible but firmly I would therefore argue that the existence of two German states remains as much a problem as it represents a solution and that this will be at least as much the situation in future years as it is today—perhaps even more so.

There is, then, reason to believe that American-German relations in days to come will retain intensity and deep mutual interest, while at the same time these relations may not necessarily be easy. That is in part why—while this conference is in progress—some associates and I will formally establish a new American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. No such national resource has until now existed in the United States. In founding such an institute, in Washington, D.C., and in affiliation with The Johns Hopkins University, we expect to create an institutional base for those particularly concerned with contemporary German affairs and with contemporary American-German relations—to conduct studies; present informational programs; promote improved mutual understanding and interrelationships; and assemble a current and complete library and other relevant materials. As the title of the institute proclaims, our concern will not be with the German language or the past but with the contemporary, and we hope to include within the contemporary not only scholarship in many fields but also journalism, statesmanship, and cultural achievement.

The same concern that leads to the creation of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies lends special importance to this Tricentennial Conference of German-American History, Politics and Culture. As we shed light on three centuries of fateful German-American interaction, we shall see not only the past but also the present more clearly and be better prepared for the future.

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THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE THEY ARE NOT THE SAME

STEVEN MULLER

Plus ça change, plus la même chose is often true, but not always. My remarks today aim to indicate that relations between "Germans and Americans are embarked on a new course, are heading into different—and as yet uncharted—waters. Since the 1940s, the three principal factors which have governed German-American relations have been the memories of the Third Reich, the aftermath of the Second World War, and the alliance against Soviet Russian expansionism. The Third Reich and the Second World War will by no means be forgotten; but those of us who experienced them ourselves are getting older. We are already a minority within both our people, and before long we shall be gone. The alliance will remain, but its terms too will change as the years pass. The time has surely come to take a new look at some of the factors which are now beginning to play a larger role in the German-American relationship. Let me therefore try to mention a few of these factors.

One that will unavoidably play a role is the changing demography of the United States. Until the recent past, the great majority of Americans had roots in Europe. With the passage of time, however, these roots are less immediate, insofar as they mean less to each new generation of Americans born and raised only in the United States. More than that, a growing fraction of the American people does not have European roots, especially if one includes Hispanic Americans in that fraction. Until a few years ago, four out of five Americans were of European descent. According to the 1982 census, this ratio is dropping rapidly and will reach three out of four by the end of this decade. And—unless present trends change—only two out of three Americans will be of European descent by the beginning of the twenty-first century. Such demographic change will have its impact on American relations to all of Europe, of course, but it will obviously play a part in German-American relations as well.

A second circumstance to be reckoned with is that fewer Americans are likely to speak German. This is likely to be true even if great strides are made in training more Americans to master other languages than their own. Such strides in foreign language instruction are urgently needed if the American economy is to compete effectively in international commerce, but in all candor it is not likely that the German language will have high priority in that context. While recognized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century as a primary language of science, German appears to have lost this primacy in the past few decades; and as a language of world commerce German is likely to strike most Americans as less urgently useful than Japanese, Chinese, Spanish,

and perhaps even Russian. The immigration of German speakers into the United States caused by the Third Reich is long past, and the children of even these more recent immigrants largely tend not to speak German. Hundreds of thousands of Americans continue to be stationed on German soil each year in military service, but their segregation is such that few of them acquire any significant amount of German in the process.

The existence of two German States is likely to perplex Americans more in years to come than now. Not noted now for their mastery of European history, Americans who know of the Second World War only from history books are likely on the one hand to regard the German Democratic Republic as a normal state, in the sense that most Americans today do not know that Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, for example, did not exist before World War One. On the other hand, they are likely to be increasingly puzzled by the fact that Germans in the Federal Republic do not regard the German Democratic Republic as just another state. This will seem especially puzzling when no such attitudes extend to Austria, where German is spoken and which is regarded as a friendly country, while the GDR is a Soviet satellite. American knowledge of the German Democratic Republic is currently absolutely minimal. There can be no argument but that it is for Americans—and by far—the least known of the states within the Warsaw Pact. And to such American eyes as see all Europe as strange, and Eastern Europe as not only strange but politically hostile, whatever strangeness may be special to the German Democratic Republic seems to blur into general confusion. The fact that two states both call themselves German, and that to American ears Federal Republic and Democratic Republic sound much the same, makes for even more confusion. On an occasion only last year when the ambassadors of both German states attended a function at which I also spoke, almost every other American present who spoke to me asked "which is which?"

American perplexity about two German states would matter less if it were not also likely that their coexistence will preoccupy so much internal attention in both these states. Young Germans in the Federal Republic, for example, striving to attain their own sense of national identity, are more likely than not to be somewhat irritated by the innocence of young American friends who ask why West Berlin is both part of the Federal Republic and located within the other German state. The more one thinks it likely that a new generation in the Federal Republic will continue to have a special interest in the other German state, the more one must assume that this special interest will play a role in German-American relations. To a new generation of Americans, a German Federal Republic firmly anchored in Western Europe will seem easier to understand than a German Federal Republic also pursuing closer ties with another German state which is in the Warsaw Pact. And for Germans in the Federal Republic, American confusion on this subject is likely to appear naïve at best and significantly disturbing more of the time.

These thoughts now bring us inevitably to the Alliance itself. What will not change here is that the alliance between the German Federal Republic and the rest of NATO is the keystone of peace in Europe. This of course is the very fact which makes German-American relations not merely significant but crucial. But here too things are not likely to remain the same. Prophecy is not possible, but questions are. We should remind ourselves that mutual nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and the USSR has been essential in preserving peace in Europe for four decades. The nature of the alliance therefore depends greatly on the continuation of mutual nuclear deterrence. Were there to be a major change in the latter, then equally major change in the alliance would inevitably ensue. One may sometimes wonder whether those who work so passionately for the total elimination of nuclear weapons have thoroughly thought through the possibility that such a step might—however ironically—serve only to make conventional war more probable.

Assuming the continuity of Russian-American mutual nuclear deterrence, one would expect at least that familiar questions are likely to continue to be asked, and always in new ways. How credible, at any future moment, will Germans find the American commitment to expose the United States to nuclear attack in defense

of Europe? How long, how strongly, under what circumstances, will Americans be willing to station their own troops in the Federal Republic? How well will Germans and Americans work together to meet conventional forces with sufficient conventional forces so as to buy the time that may be needed to avert the use of nuclear weapons? Will new developments in chemical and biological weapons add a hideous new dimension to arsenals on both sides? Of all these questions, the one perhaps most likely to be a continuing future problem revolves around the continued American military presence in the Federal Republic, if only because so many people are involved and because the cost to both countries is so considerable.

While these and other questions will be asked and answered in changing ways, and as new years pass, and while Americans puzzle over the quest of Germans in the Federal Republic to define their national identity, their role in the European Community, their relationship to the German Democratic Republic, and their relationship to the United States–simultaneously the Germans in the Federal Republic are not likely to have an easy time understanding America and Americans. German tourists and businessmen will know America firsthand, but the stream of Germans who studied in the United States in the 1950s and '60s has dwindled to a trickle. American popular entertainment has become and is likely to remain a constant in German popular entertainment, but one may question how much that helps or hinders German understanding of American reality. American Studies is not a growing academic field in the Federal Republic at this time. Some Americans have expressed concern about the quality of textbooks in German-schools that deal with the United States; but learning of another country from books–even the best and most accurate books–imposes a significant lag between observation, writing, publication, reading–and the rapid changes that will have occurred in the meantime.

One could go on to talk about other factors that will affect German-American relations, such as economic competition, or somewhat divergent views in Bonn and Washington about the Middle East, but the point has perhaps now been made that the basis of these relations will indeed change, and that change will not of itself serve to improve them. What this means is *not*–not at all–that relations between Americans and Germans are doomed to worsen. It means only that a job of work needs to be done to maintain and improve these relations. That task will call on the governments in Bonn and Washington to be fully supportive, but it is not a task that falls on the two governments exclusively, or even primarily. If we have learned anything about relations between peoples, it is surely that they depend on many layers of interaction and tend to defy central direction, let alone control. Official relations are the business of government; good official relations are indeed required if two peoples are to understand each other well; but true compatibility between two peoples can only be achieved if willing hands work spontaneously at many different levels and a multiplicity of efforts.

Much will therefore depend on whether those of us here, and many others in both countries, do what must be done to enhance the mutual understanding of our peoples. The diversity and scope of effort required defies detailed description, but a few key suggestions can be offered. There should certainly be a vigorous effort to expand American Studies in the Federal Republic, and students in such programs should be encouraged and supported so that they can complete part of their studies in the United States. German studies in the United States also require new development. In this connection the hope must be that this will be an American effort, supported but not carried out by the government of the Federal Republic–just as American Studies in Germany should be a German effort with appropriate support from Washington. It is of course my specific hope that the new American Institute for Contemporary German Studies will grow to serve as a catalyst for this effort in the United States, having been founded last year precisely for this purpose. And it will also be necessary for Americans to learn more about the German Democratic Republic, lest American ignorance cloud all perceptions of German reality.

A greater effort should surely be made to restore the special ties in science and technology that have traditionally linked Germans and Americans together. Today the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation still makes it possible for many German scientists to train and carry on research in America; where is the counterpart American foundation program to bring American scientists to the Federal Republic? The German Marshall Fund of the United States is, as of recent years, embarked on a welcome new program to bring German professionals to the United States in several fields, and one may also hope that one or more German foundations will offer a reciprocal program for Americans. The Bosch Foundation has launched a new program for American Bosch Fellows to live and work in the Federal Republic, and a reciprocal American program may be called for in return. Much is already under way—much more remains to be done.

My conclusion is therefore quite simple. Good relations between Germans and Americans matter—they remain key to the peaceful evolution of Europe's future. Such good relations will not happen without effort, nor will their existence in days past guarantee their continuity. Effort and money will have to be expended over the years to come to promote sound understanding between Americans and Germans, and no one-time push will be as effective as the development of a multiplicity of long-term mutual commitments. The challenge will be considerable, but the rewards are greater—and the penalty should Germans and Americans fail in future to understand each other will be enormous. In this view, let me conclude with two observations for which I can only apologize to the late Wilhelm Busch. For Germans it will continue to be true that "Deutscher werden ist nicht schwer, Deutscher sein dagegen sehr." And for Americans "Deutsch zu lernen ist schon schwer, Deutschland verstehen noch viel mehr."

Address at the Conference on German-American Cultural Relations, Stanford University, September 18, 1985.

A NEW GERMANY IN A NEW EUROPE

STEVEN MULLER

It is an enormous honor to be here with you tonight to deliver the third annual lecture in memory of Karl Heinz Beckurts under the sponsorship of the Atlantik-Brücke. I had never dreamed that I would have the wonderful privilege of this invitation. I must confess, however, that in the months and weeks between then and now the burden of speaking to you at this extraordinary moment in German, European—and world—history has all too often seemed to me much, much greater than the honor. Let me say very simply that it is the memory of the personal courage and vision of Karl Heinz Beckurts which inspired me to attempt this address in his honor, and which sustains me even now.

Karl Heinz Beckurts was a scientist of extraordinary distinction and range. He had the gift of leadership. He became a visionary and effective industrialist of the highest stature. He was also profoundly committed to the public good, the decencies of personal and public life, and the German-American partnership. He was always eager to learn anew and to look with far-seeing clarity and without fear at the implications and consequences of discovery. He also became a personal bridge between science and the university on one hand, and industry on the other. As president of a university who has himself been engaged in the effort to build such bridges, I have a special understanding and the highest respect for this particular achievement. His murder by terrorists four years ago deprived us all of an extraordinary personality and a magnificent human spirit. The memory of his achievements and his influence lives on among us, serves to inspire us and brings us together here and now.

Before I turn to my subject, I feel duty-bound briefly to make two points. First, I am an American, through and through. You are listening to me in German. You know that it is my mother tongue. You may even hear remnants of the accent of my native Hamburg under the American intonations. But the thoughts I express were conceived and written in English and laboriously translated into German, and they are American thoughts. Yes, I have German blood in my veins and, despite the bitter memories of the son of a Jewish father during the 1930s, I feel a sense of kinship with German life. But I am not a German with American citizenship. I am an American with a special interest in German and European affairs.

Second, I speak here only for myself, and as a private citizen and professor. My views do not represent the government of the United States, nor those of The Johns Hopkins University or the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies. I will, however, try in my remarks to portray to you how some of my fellow Americans think about the current course of events.

A new Germany in a new Europe—that is not only the title of this address, it is what is being created all around us every day, with unbelievable speed and still uncertain outcome. A year ago, who would have foreseen the revolutions of 1989, or the prospect of free national elections throughout Eastern Europe, or that we would be meeting tonight in the wake of the first-ever free elections in the German Democratic Republic?

Before I took the flight over here, I looked at a copy of *The New York Times* of Wednesday, March 22, 1989. The international news on the front page concerned talks between Israelis and Arabs, and the isolation of Ethiopia's rulers. There was one smaller story about the new political debates on Soviet television. That story was not important by itself, but it was a then-unrecognized and very small clue to the future, which has in the meantime become the present.

Historic changes never have only a single course, but the door to the revolutions of last year was opened by the abdication by the Soviet Union of the power to impose its will on Eastern Europe. Books will be written about why and how this happened. We cannot yet be certain that this abdication is permanent. All that is evident is that the Soviet leadership clearly signaled that it would no longer use force to support its Eastern European client regimes and that, when brave men and women put themselves at risk to overthrow those regimes one after the other, the armed forces of the Soviet Union remained passive in their barracks. The substance of Soviet power may or may not be evaporating, but its application to Eastern Europe has evaporated, and a wave of national liberation swept over the power vacuum that was created the Cold War in Europe ended almost overnight and caught us all by surprise. We are still so surprised that we are also not yet prepared to deal with so much change so quickly. In fact we hardly dare to believe that so formidable and tenacious an adversary as we have confronted in Europe for over four decades has simply decided to withdraw.

For most Americans and most Germans and perhaps for most of the rest of the world as well, the single most dramatic symbol of the end of an era was represented by the unexpected, almost unimaginable opening of the Berlin Wall. I saw this drama on television, as perhaps many of you did, both joyfully and stunned with disbelief. All that weekend I felt compelled to turn on television again and again, to see the same images of dancing on the Wall and East Germans pouring into West Berlin and, at some point, I remembered that that weekend was the anniversary of the Armistice of 1918. A thought came to me then which still stays in my mind.

I thought then and now that Europe in reality experienced only one war between 1914 and 1944, a thirty-year war interrupted only by a lull, and a war that ended without a peace. It was as if Europe slowly froze over between 1944 and 1949, locked into the confrontation of two superpowers, rigidified by force and not by choice. The thaw did not come until 1989, in spite of hints throughout the 1980s that it might be in the wind, might be slowly beginning, might arrive one day. I thought that weekend in November that the day had finally dawned for Europe to find peace again within itself and to put an end at long last to thirty years of war and forty frozen years of East-West division and confrontation.

I still think that Europe now faces a golden opportunity to put an end to three-quarters of a century of troubles, but since that weekend of euphoria last November there has also been time to reflect on the great differences between Western and Eastern Europe during the four decades in which they were frozen rigid. In Western Europe a true European spirit was reared, and grew, and a newly advanced phase of European social and economic integration is scheduled to begin in 1992. National sentiments have been freely expressed, but on the whole they have been diluted by the emerging sense of European community—and shared prosperity. In Eastern Europe, however, cooperation among the member states was compelled by Soviet power, both military and economic, and expressed in the context of a Marxist-Leninist ideology whose bankruptcy is now naked for all to see. National freedom and aspirations were repressed with an iron hand.

The revolutions of 1989 have now created a situation in which free national expression has burst out of the constraints of repression and in which nationalism has become the most obvious and immediate substitute for a dead ideology. This is wholly understandable and probably unavoidable, but it may not be altogether desirable. It is certainly infectious. Mr. Gorbachev may have reckoned with Czech, Polish and Hungarian nationalism, and perhaps even Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian nationalism; but Georgian, Ukrainian, Moldavian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani nationalism seems to be causing him greater difficulty. In any event, the newly free nations of Eastern Europe are proudly nationalist, and each is struggling to achieve a new national structure for itself–except for the special case of the German Democratic Republic, to which we shall turn in a moment.

The strength of nationalism after a long period of repression, and its attraction as a substitute for an imposed ideology should not be a surprise. Since the death of Marshall Tito we have all had the opportunity to watch the resurgent nationalism of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and others begin more and more to fret at the fabric of the Yugoslav federation. But a newly exuberant nationalism in Eastern Europe can be perceived as a problem in terms of my image of a Europe that has not really been at peace since 1914 and which has been frozen since the 1940s. Both the good and the bad were under the ice together, and the thaw is bringing both back to the surface and into the light. For example, undigested consequences of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the consequent improvisations of the peace treaties which followed the Armistice of 1918 are once again becoming visible in Eastern Europe. No one has forgotten that conflicting national aspirations pushed Europe into war in 1914 and persisted until war formally broke out again in 1939. German national aspirations have been at the center of European conflict for the past one hundred and twenty-five years.

Quite naturally, therefore, the world's attention is focussed on the way in which the two Germanys will unify in the wake of the revolutions of 1989. Just as the division of Germany into two states was the most dramatic symbol of the Cold War, so the unification of Germany is perceived as the key to the future of a free Europe. Let us be clear that unification itself is not the issue. Had the German Democratic Republic lived for a hundred years–God forbid!–then perhaps it would have had a reason to live on in freedom as a separate state. As of today, however, a state which owed its existence to force, whose ideological justification has been rejected by its people, and whose economy and social fabric are disintegrating clearly has neither the chance nor reason to continue as a separate nation. The issue is not the unification of the two German states, but *how* that unification will be achieved. And the fundamental question about how one German state emerges is whether the process of creating it is purely German, or European. It is, of course, my deep conviction that a European process of achieving the creation of a single German state is far preferable to a purely German process, and that both the Soviet Union and America must be perceived to be and must participate as a part of Europe.

What does one mean by a European process? The answer is simple: A single German state should emerge only as part of a larger process that brings Eastern and Western Europe together again in a new pattern of association. This is the new European architecture to which statesmen have already referred, or–if you wish –the new house of Europe. A European process also means that the future of East Germany should be treated as little as a special case as possible, and that a single German state should not emerge until a larger European framework is also put in place. To be as specific as possible, the economic recovery of East Germany should be part of a larger economic recovery program addressed to all of Eastern Europe, and in which all of the EC and the United States participate. And the unification of Germany should not occur in a head-long rush in this very year.

Is such a European process for the unification of Germany really necessary? And is it possible? Let me try to answer these two essential questions.

A purely German process to create a single German state would mean unification almost at once, by the simple absorption of East Germany into the Federal Republic. This in fact is not quite so simple, as there has already been time to discover. It is possible. It is, however, a course that carries with it very great risks, some of which are already apparent and should serve as a warning. The most obvious risk is that a large and economically powerful single Germany will appear so soon as to unbalance Europe before a new European architecture can be achieved. This might very likely engender fears of a Germanized Europe, which in turn might lead to alliances designed to counter German influence, which might then result in an adversary basis for any new European structure. We must be frank with each other or there is no point in talking at all: You may not enjoy hearing it from me, but you know as well as I do that there is historic distrust of German national power latent throughout Europe. The response to the position which the German Chancellor has taken on the Polish border –a position whose legal propriety I do not question–has already served as a warning of the potential which still resides in conflicting national sentiments and aspirations.

There are other risks as well. East Germans have now just had the opportunity at last to express their own views in a free election. The results of that election are still being analyzed in detail, but clearly there is a majority in favor of unification as soon as possible. This means that unification appears as the best solution to the majority of East Germans, but it does not mean that they are without concern as to how they will fare in the process. They are people without their own heroes or established leaders, because a Stalinist regime ruthlessly purged every voice that tried to speak freely. They and the single state in which they will live will fare better if their progress into that state is not a stampede, and if they can always look back on their path to unification as the path they freely chose themselves.

In this connection I have a special concern for the young people in the German Democratic Republic. These young people suffer from a total lack of appropriate role models. Not only do they lack their own Walesa or Havel, but even their parents must seem bewildered to them at the very least. Most of what they learned in their schools and their organizations appears to have been nonsense, and their government obviously has betrayed them. As a result East German youth appears to me to be extraordinarily cynical and truly a lost generation, and I have heartfelt sympathy for them. Certainly it will not be easy to integrate these young people fully and with renewed confidence into the citizenry of a newly united Germany. Even now thought should be given that time and effort must be reserved for this essential task.

Right now, even after their first free election in nearly seventy years, the East Germans still feel helpless because their economy and their society are disintegrating. The need for a single German currency appears to be so urgent that it simply cannot wait. Nowhere is it written however that currency integration and political integration must be simultaneous. Surely an economic investment program is also urgently needed in East Germany, but that is equally true of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and elsewhere. Of course the continuing hemorrhage of East Germans into the Federal Republic cannot continue. Instant unification might solve that problem, but even that is not certain. It is not self-evident that there are no other ways to reduce or eliminate this flow of Germans from East to West, nor that the need to plug this drain makes a purely German process of German unification mandatory.

A European process of German unification is also necessary because the Federal Republic of Germany has already achieved so much as a reliable and strong member of enormously effective alliances. At this moment Germany needs its allies–and its allies need Germany–more than ever. I do not need to explain to this audience that the Treaty of Rome does not provide that a member state can substantially increase itself without the agreement of its partners, nor that questions of national security and allied troop deployment fall within the purview of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, nor that there are German obligations to the Helsinki process. There is also of course the matter of the rights still reserved to the former occupying powers, which

has already initiated the negotiations described as two plus four. Furthermore, the prospect of a single German state raises the question of the absence of a peace treaty to conclude the Second World War and the possible utility of a future treaty to accomplish this purpose.

So then, if a European process for the unification of Germany is necessary and desirable, is it possible? It will perhaps be argued at once that there simply is not time. Respectfully I disagree. Peoples and leaders respond far more rapidly and effectively to a crisis than to the possibility or prospect of a crisis, and the need for a European process is, in my view at least, critical. How much time in fact did the Adenauers, Achesons, Marshalls and Trumans have in their day? We should not waste our time and energies bemoaning the fact that no contingency plans were prepared for the situation now facing us. No one expected the events of 1989 to occur so fast and so completely, and no contingency planning could possibly have provided for the full range of events as they actually happened. The need and the opportunity for a European process are present, and indeed at the working level the beginnings of such a process are already under way. The time needed is still available if the will to use time to the utmost is there. What may be most needed is the clearest possible, unambiguous call for the construction of a new European structure, and that call can most effectively, if not indeed only, come from the Federal Republic of Germany.

It seems to me that an enormous responsibility and opportunity face the Federal Republic to serve as the catalyst for the emergence of the new, better and whole Europe which will enter the next millennium. On every side the need for European cooperation toward the establishment of a new European pattern is already being voiced. Many of the voices heard are from the Federal Republic. The Federal Republic is already making every effort to consult its allies and its European neighbors to the East. The only step still missing is an explicit and irrevocable linkage between the unification of Germany and the restructuring of Europe. Yes, I know full well what I am saying. These simple words mean an unprecedented conception of the German national interest at a higher level than every before: at the level of Europe. In effect, the German people would have the vision and courage to say to their neighbors: “We now have the blessed opportunity to come together again as a single national community, but we can best do so only with your help. The two states in which we were compelled to live apart each lived within a larger community, but that community was forced on the Eastern state, and only in the West were we free to choose and help to shape the larger community in which we lived and prospered. Now as a single state we wish to continue to participate in, benefit from, and contribute to such a community. Such a community must extend farther East, and it has new problems to deal with, not least the economic imbalance within it which, within Western Europe itself, our partners and we had already learned to address. We Germans cannot do this alone. We need our neighbors to be our partners, old and new, because never again do we want to stand alone. We ask you to come together so that we can come together, freely and by our own choice, so that we can achieve that larger common good which will be best for each and all of us.”

It is asking a lot to suggest that a people can attain such a transcendent level of national interest. It is particularly difficult in a year of national elections. We Americans know full well from our own experience how hard it is to sustain statesmanship in a democratic society consumed by an electoral struggle among competing domestic political factions. But we have not always failed, and the effort must be made in any event. I have great faith in the lessons which the people of the Federal Republic have learned from once so bitter and more recently so promising experiences. I also believe that East Germans may find some comfort–and in the long run even satisfaction–from the prospect that their forty years of hardship opened the way for that new and better Europe which they were always promised but which is only now attainable. What does seem to me to be certain is that a European process for the unification, of Germany has far better long-term chances of historic success than an essentially German process. And I believe that such a European process can only be launched effectively by a German initiative.

By now you may be wondering why I am not speaking of a greater American role in all these matters. I do believe absolutely that there is and must be American participation in Europe's future, but I do not believe that the principal leadership toward a new European structure should come from the United States. Quite frankly I believe that the greatest American contribution to Europe has been, not so much the Marshall Plan, enormously important as it was; nor strategic defense, essential as that was and still may be; but rather the self-restraint we have learned in the exercise of American power and influence. The triumphant contrast between successful freedom in Western Europe and failed Stalinism in Eastern Europe seems to me to be due at least in part to the fact that the United States learned to treat its allies as partners rather than vassals and to let Western Europeans themselves arrange their own affairs. Such Americanization as took place was much more the product of attraction rather than compulsion. Strong American partnership with Europe remains a vital necessity, but it does not necessarily call for strong American leadership in European affairs.

In accord with such thoughts, I am also not as much dismayed by the lack of a more active role as yet by the government of the United States in the wake of the revolutions of 1989 as are some of my friends, both American and European. President Bush has shown himself, among other things, to be generally a cautious politician who is, however, capable of strong action when he judges that to be appropriate. He has had substantial reasons to be cautious. There are still divided views within his administration specifically as to the permanence of Soviet abdication of the use of power in Eastern Europe and more generally as to the stability of future Soviet foreign and domestic policies. There are mixed views as to the future of Germany in particular and of Europe in general among millions of Americans of European descent. Millions of Americans are themselves still barely able to entertain a view of the world in which the Soviet Union is not the principal adversary. They view the revolutions of 1989 with at least as much puzzled amazement as pleasure and have little idea as to how the future of Europe should evolve. Other Americans are primarily concerned with the economic impact of current European developments, and are contemplating the potential of new markets and investments in Eastern Europe. With such relatively few and diverse pressures on him from the American public, President Bush has not been motivated to take the risks of a strong initiative with respect to Europe. Overseas, the Soviet position has appeared to date to be more flexible and adaptable than anyone would have expected even six months ago, and it is not in the present American interest to add unnecessarily to the problems of the Soviet leadership by pushing too hard. No major concerted pressure has come from the other European allies. As for the Germans themselves, consultation between Bonn and Washington has been extensive and constant and–except potentially for a brief period with respect to the Polish border–the President has had no significant reason not to be supportive of a major and steadfast ally.

This may not be the most accurate nor perceptive summary on my part of the reasons why Washington has not so far been more assertive with respect to Europe, but the main point I wish to make is that it would be a mistake to explain Washington's watchful waiting either as evidence of declining American power or interest. There is no simple symmetry between the current state of the Soviet Union and the United States. Yes, we have serious problems with deficits, drugs and debt resulting from a huge negative balance of trade with the rest of the world. Yes, we have become self-indulgent during a prolonged period of prosperity. But the raw energy of the American people and their ability to work and produce are still present and still enormous. We remain and will remain a power to be reckoned with. As for declining interest, Americans have learned in this century that withdrawal from the rest of the world is not possible. We know also that Europe is linked to us politically, economically and strategically, and that we ignore European developments only at our peril. I do not believe that the United States is about to abandon its interests in or commitments to Europe.

Before I come to the end of these reflections on a new Germany in a new Europe, let me return once more to the subject of nationalism to which I referred earlier. If you were thinking along with me then, some of you might have questioned my statement that in Western Europe "national sentiments have been freely expressed,

but on the whole they have been diluted by the emerging sense of European community—and shared prosperity." I stand by these words, but you and I know that there is nevertheless frustrated national sentiment to some degree all over Western Europe, not only among the Basques and the Flemish, but also among the Welsh and the Scots, and many others. I said also that the new nationalism in the now suddenly free states of Eastern Europe is wholly understandable and probably unavoidable, but that it may not be altogether desirable, and I added that it was certainly infectious. No one has questioned that the people of the two German states have the right to self-determination with respect to unification into a single state. My own concerns have only addressed how best to achieve this objective. We must, however, ask how universally we are really prepared to agree that every national or ethnic group is entitled to a state of its own.

I do not raise this issue anew for the sake of playing games. My thoughts remain with the emerging Europe of the future. My real question is not so much focussed on national or ethnic aspirations as on the future role and utility of the nation-state. In light of contemporary and still evolving technology—everything from telecommunications, higher and higher speed mass transportation, and computerized mass production to global financial market and space-based weapons systems—the functionality of the nation-state requires analysis and discussion. The design of Europe '92 already addresses deficiencies in the limits of the autonomous nation-state of the past. A new Europe spanning East and West faces the same issue. Must we in fact take it for granted that the traditional nation-state will be the permanent building block for the long-term European future? The thought of a Europe of regions is not new, but the time may have come to give it more prominent consideration. It may become possible to separate ethnicity from nationalism. Ethnicity decoupled from nationalism may represent a desirable, even precious human bonding in an ever more technologically impersonal world. Nationalism, at least in terms of aspirations to statehood has often been dangerously divisive in the past. It may not only prove to remain so in the future but also turn out to be increasingly anachronistic and counter-productive. A Europe of regions might in due course allow more easily for the full expression of cultural and linguistic ethnicity at a local level, while moving away from the increasingly sterile constraints of the nation-state toward a community large enough to match the demands of contemporary technology. Admittedly these are thoughts more relevant to the long-term future than the present. They serve here primarily to indicate that the key to the emergence of the Europe of the next millennium should be an ongoing process rather than a structure. And that process should begin now, coupled to the advent of a single German state.

In conclusion, then, I would like to leave you with two thoughts. First, what Europe needs most at this moment is less another Adenauer, another Bismarck, another Churchill, or another de Gaulle, but rather another Jean Monnet. And second, were I able to give a single message to my German friends I would with all humility paraphrase a famous sentence from the inaugural address of the late President Kennedy and say, "Ask not what Europe can do for you; ask what you can do for Europe."

Address at the third annual Karl Heinz Beckurts Memorial Lecture sponsored by the Atlantik-Brücke, Hanover, Germany, March 22, 1990.

AN AMERICAN ANTICIPATES EUROPE IN THE 1990s

STEVEN MULLER

Please let me make it as clear as possible at the outset that the thoughts that follow are only my own. They do not represent the views of any organization, institution or government. If you do not like them, only I am responsible, because for my thoughts I am not accountable to any human authority. Thank you for understanding this.

The division of Europe into east and west that came into being after 1945 has now lasted for more than three decades. Many believe that each passing year makes this division more stable and lasting. Others see instead a lessening of stability and durability. For these, each passing year brings Europe closer to the moment when its division will erode away. I am among those who believe that the division of Europe is increasingly unstable and that it will not long endure. Not long, however, is not the same as soon. I do not expect much change soon. That is why I ask you to join me in looking ahead for at least a decade, and beyond the eras of Brezhnev and Reagan, Schmidt and Mitterand, Thatcher and Jaruzelski.

Why has Europe been divided since 1945? Let us review the familiar catechism: First, because Hitler's Third Reich was destroyed. Second, because neither Russia nor the United States obtained military control of the whole of Europe. Third, because Russia retained ultimate control over the whole part of Europe in which Russian troops were stationed, with the exception of West Berlin, the former Soviet zone of occupation in Austria and Yugoslavia; and because that part of Europe not occupied by Soviet troops allied itself with the United States to resist the possibility of ultimate Russian control. Fourth, because it seems clear that any effort to change the division of Europe would result in war, which no one wants to risk. At the end of the catechism only four alternatives appear for the course of Europe for the indefinite future: the status quo of division; American sponsored hegemony; Russian hegemony; and the end of the division of Europe brought about with the agreement of both Russia and the United States. Alternatives 2 and 3 are ruled out because they would require the use of force and would almost certainly result in war, and the fourth alternative seems unlikely. That leaves only the first alternative, the status quo. And here we are.

This is all so obvious and well understood as to be tiresome. We in the West have quick public labels for any departures from the status quo. Those who would press the Russians to retreat are warmongers. Those who would not be enthusiastic about resisting a Russian advance are communists and/or traitors. Those who believe in a peaceful end to the division are either dreamers or appeasers, because Russia would only agree to end the division by "Finlandization," which is a slogan for ultimate Russian control and the surrender without war of Western responsibility and values. This slogan is not fair to Finland, which to those who have been there does not seem wholly devoid of either responsibility or Western values, but it is a very familiar slogan and–at least to most Americans–it has negative connotations of helplessness.

I have already confessed that I question the durability of the status quo. Do I favor American or Russian hegemony? No, I do not. Well then, I am not a warmonger, communist or traitor, but I must be a Finlandist appeaser. Perhaps. It is at least likely that I shall be so labeled. But before we decide, let me request of you the courtesy of reviewing some aspects of the status quo that trouble me.

The division of Europe of course denies a lot of history and of economic geography. In fact some of the legacy of a shared past and a common culture still spills across the boundaries between east and west, as does a considerably larger flow of commerce. History and the configurations of nature are not negligible forces, but they are probably less powerful today than they were in the past. Modern technology in economics, transportation, communications and the employment of synthetic substances makes the shape of nature less relevant. And the unprecedented fear of nuclear annihilation may be more than sufficient to choke off any impulse based merely on the historical past. The fact that the division of Europe is ahistorical and unnatural may therefore be a bit awkward, but it alone poses no serious threat to the status quo.

It is of greater concern that the stability of the status quo depends so much on everyone's ability to look only backward, never forward. Whenever we in the West are troubled in our resolve to preserve the status quo we appeal to the past. Our leaders on our behalf invoke the names of Marshall, Churchill, Truman or Adenauer and recall the resolve in the founding of NATO, or the Berlin air-lift. It is of course natural that immobility is hard to bear. To go forward is too risky. To go backward is not possible either, but there is psychological relief in going back in spirit to where it all started and then marching forward mentally to where we already are. However, this may work less well with repetition. And it may become more awkward to accomplish when it involves a future generation which is asked to rally around a past which it did not experience and therefore cannot remember. It is not surprising that those most committed to the status quo are deeply worried about the successor generation, to whom the constant need to look backward may be less appealing and satisfying. Young people have a natural tendency to look forward, and even to seek change. It is therefore a bit frustrating for them and for their elders to have to insist that things must stay the same and to compel them to fix their vision as firmly as possible on the past.

When one is wholly committed to the status quo, the past is not only prologue but epilogue as well. That tends to make the present somewhat stale. Thus, if one can look forward only to a lifetime of fearful deadlock across the middle of Europe, one may have to be content to find mobility and change within the confines of one's nation state. In the days when the status quo of the division of Europe came into being, nationalism had rather a bad name. Today this is much less true. I believe that the renaissance of nationalism in Europe is linked to preservation of Europe's division. It is of deep concern to me that the preservation of the status quo so harshly inhibits any hopeful, changing vision of the future. That in itself is difficult to sustain—unstable, if you like—and ever more so for a new generation. But the revival of nationalism worries me even more.

Why should this be so, and am I even right about nationalism? Well, perhaps the most popular slogan in the United States for at least the early part of last winter was "Let Poland be Poland." Polish nationalism, at least, is still today explicitly celebrated in my country. Please do not misunderstand me, I do not fail to sympathize with the fate of the Polish people. But it is a fact that the status quo of the division of Europe rests on the division of Germany, or more properly said the existence of two German states. Are the Poles alone in their nationalism? What about the British? The French? And how do you like the sound of "Let Germany be Germany?"

What bad taste it is to say that! But—alas—silence is not *always* golden. Truth can indeed be hard to face at times, but there may nevertheless be more virtue in confronting it than not. From where I live—across the Atlantic—it is difficult to believe that, if nationalism really is once again popular and evident in so many other European states, Germans should remain indefinitely immune to it. To reach such a conclusion it is not neces-

sary to make any reference at all to German nationalism in the past two centuries. Quite the reverse: the simpler assumption that Germans in many ways are apt to behave rather like their neighbors would argue that nationalism among their neighbors is likely to foster nationalism among Germans. But if that belief is true, then one must appraise the special problems attached to contemporary German nationalism.

Of course there are two German states today, with social systems that are not only very different but indeed are vigorously opposed to each other. The most obvious assumption therefore would be that both may be nationalist in their own way and that this will pose no special problems for anyone else. But should one believe that this most obvious assumption is also the most likely? Several factors make such a belief at least questionable. It is already acknowledged that the relationship between the two German states is unique and in certain ways differs from relations between other states that share a common border. It is also beyond argument that the situation of Berlin is unique and unusual. Also, it seems to me that Germans in the Federal Republic—especially younger citizens—may not look back at the origins of the Western alliance quite in the same way as others do, when the appeal is made to reaffirm the founding of the status quo. After all, one should perhaps not wholly ignore the fact that for Germans the aftermath of World War II involved national defeat rather than victory. And—once again from that great transatlantic distance from which I look—it appears that special efforts have been made in the German Federal Republic to de-emphasize nationalism as much as possible. If that is true, it may be very much justifiable and even admirable, but it may have a quite unintended reverse effect. If an effort to repress nationalism induces frustration, frustrated nationalism may in the long run become even stronger than vigorous nationalism freely and openly expressed. That does in fact seem precisely to be true in the case of Poland, which has claimed so much of our attention and sympathy recently.

I hope it is evident that I am making an effort to tread gently on tender ground. Even so, I reach an unavoidable conclusion: that the preservation of the status quo, of the division of Europe without much foreseeable prospect of change, poses some special difficulties for Germans; that the revival of nationalism throughout Europe implies that these special difficulties are more likely to increase in the future rather than to lessen; and that the key position of Germans in Europe makes it likely that any added difficulties they experience will also pose some additional difficulties for their neighbors. As gently as possible but quite firmly I would therefore argue that the existence of two German states remains as much a problem as it represents a solution, and that this will be at least as much the situation in future years as it is today—perhaps even more so. To the extent this is true it will not make it easier to sustain the division of Europe indefinitely.

The last concern I wish to express about the European status quo relates to the observation that it is based so extensively on fear. I do not question either that fear is justified nor that it represents one of the most powerful human impulses. What may be worth examining, however, is whether fear has remained or will remain the same as the decades succeed each other. It is still true that West fears aggression from East, and East from West. Enormous efforts have been made to prevent aggression from either side by making sure that it would result in mutual destruction. Over time, however, these enormous efforts have not only become ever more expensive, they have also per se become more fearful. If sheer numbers of weapons and their quality are frightening in themselves, then the level of fear has obviously increased. Also, in the West, there used to be fear among Europeans that the United States might not risk its own destruction for the sake of Europe. More recently, an additional fear has been expressed, namely that the United States might have the weapons to escape from such a choice by countering Eastern aggression in Europe only within Europe, thus—in the terrible phraseology of Vietnam—destroying Europe in order to save it.

Throughout the decades of the division of Europe, the focus of fear has been on the two nuclear superpowers. The most common question has been whether either the Russians or the Americans will start “something.” Will the focus remain there indefinitely? What if one or both of the superpowers begin to fear that Europeans

might start “something” that would then involve the superpowers and result in their mutual destruction? To date such a possibility has seemed farfetched indeed. When, for instance, events unpleasing to Americans have taken place in the German Democratic Republic, in Poland and Hungary, in Berlin, in Czechoslavakia and again in Poland, the United States remained explicitly uninvolved even if painfully; and the Russians also have become more and more careful. Of course it is hard to conceive “something” starting in Europe that would not involve Europe’s destruction: a compelling inhibition. But will this remain true indefinitely if greater reliance in future is once again placed in so-called conventional weapons, in an effort to reduce the fear of nuclear annihilation? The two superpowers, over nearly four decades of forcing each other with such intensity, seem at least in part to have developed mutually imitative approaches to some of the problems of national security. What if in future they began to perceive the division of Europe as more of a risk to them than a safeguard? Might the day even arrive when Moscow and Washington would jointly seek their own security in an agreement to impose a mutually agreed-upon new pattern upon Europe?

Concerns such as these—about the momentum of history and geography; about the compulsion always to look backward; about the revival of nationalism; and about the shifting nature of the fears upon which it primarily rests—lead me to regard the status quo of a divided Europe, not as the solid ground on which future developments will be based, but rather as increasingly unstable and questionable. This does not deny the crucial role which the division of Europe has played, and still plays, in our common survival since 1945. It is far from my intent to be critical of the past. Even today I would still agree that—to paraphrase Churchill—the division of Europe is the least attractive alternative with the exception of all the others. But that brings me precisely to the point: in itself, the division of Europe is not an attractive solution for the future of Europe. I am convinced that in the years to come it will appear as ever less attractive. The single point of these remarks is that the time has come to give serious, extensive, public thought to a peaceful alternative which will end the division of Europe.

I am fully aware that such a statement, taken seriously, has major and unavoidable consequences. Were widespread public discussion of means to end the division of Europe to begin, that alone would immediately destabilize the status quo—perhaps daringly so. Any such discussion would without question introduce new fears, plus a vast range of uncertainties which would be resented, resisted and exploited. In such a context, it would be impossible to avoid a central focus on the question almost everyone is afraid to raise, that of the long-term future of the two German states. Accordingly, it is the prevailing wisdom that the matter of transcending the division of Europe is too full of risk and danger for anyone to raise responsibly in public. Knowledge of that accounts for my opening sentences. But—even though I am not accountable—am I being irresponsible?

There is a phrase in the Old Testament (Proverbs XXIX,18)—“Where there is no vision, the people perish.” That is the heart of my case. I see great peril in the prospect that for years to come young Europeans will be allowed to look ahead solely to the sterile, stale division of a Europe forever threatened by the ever-growing armories of the two superpowers whose rivalry makes that division an iron necessity. I believe that those of us who now have any voice whatever in our affairs have an obligation to try—at least to try—to develop a more satisfactory vision of the future. Of course I welcome any and all responsible initiatives, especially by governments, to reduce the level of armaments and the threat of nuclear war. I hope such responsible initiatives will have success. But I have also slowly come to the conclusion that it will not be possible to reach really meaningful achievements in arms reduction or threat limitation without a new vision of Europe. Almost all present, or scheduled, weapons negotiations are—understandably—geared to the status quo of divided Europe. Therefore they not only are as unstable as the status quo may be, but even such limited success as they may have would then inhibit new departures. It would be ironic and tragic if the unintended consequence of limited progress in arms negotiations were to produce greater instability, because an acceptable strategic reduction would serve also to reinforce an ever less bearable level of political and social tension.

So I call for a new vision of Europe, undivided. I urge the courage openly to face a forward move and all its risks. I agree that we may all be saner—and not less safer—if we begin facing forward again instead of fixing our eyes forever backward. Some of my fellow Americans may believe—knowing only their own history—that the founding of NATO is analogous to the founding of the United States and was intended to create permanence. I personally do not hold such a view, nor do I believe it to be commonly shared in Western Europe. But what new vision of Europe do I have to propose? Ay, there's the rub, as Hamlet says.

It will not surprise you that I will not now unveil my personal blueprint of a new design for Europe. But let me at least suggest that Finlandization is not the only alternative available for discussion. If, in fact, it were useful to use an existing state by way of a model, then what about Switzerland? Here is a confederation that already accommodates different nationalities and languages, and whose political pattern might be adaptable to the accommodation of member entities whose social, economic, and political structures differ widely. The confederation has developed a tradition of neutrality without subservience, and it has a not inconsiderable potential for self-defense. Is a European confederation in the long run really out of the question? Would it need to be disarmed? If it existed and had the means of self-defense, whom would it threaten? I cannot answer these questions, but why should they not be discussed?

It will be argued, of course, that any such talk is nonsense, if only because Russia would never permit Eastern Europe states to participate. Is that, however, if one thinks not of today or tomorrow but of a decade or more ahead, really a foregone conclusion? Certainly so if no such vision or potential design comes into being in the meantime. What if it did? Is it forever inconceivable that Russia would perceive greater security for herself in a European confederation still exposed to Russian missiles and space satellites, than in the effort to maintain garrison states at rising economic and political cost? What guarantees would Russia require for her security under such circumstances? Should the question not even be asked? The objection to this might be that the interest of the Soviet Union attaches as much to the future of socialism in states now socialist as to national security per se. However, Yugoslavia is a socialist republic without benefit of Soviet insistence and might well remain so even as a member of a Pan-European entity. Hungarian socialism appears to be distinctive—would it disappear of necessity without the ever-present pressure of potential Soviet intervention? And if it were true that socialism can only be guaranteed by the actual or potential use of Soviet force, how long—under what changing circumstances—can and will the Soviet Union be committed to deploy such force? Decades ago the Soviet Union vetoed the participation of its satellites in the Marshall Plan. If a similar compelling initiative —but European in origin rather than American—were to evolve in the future, must one assume a priori that Russia would find herself compelled, and able, to exercise such a veto once more? What is perhaps even more important, would there not be much gain in at least evolving such an initiative and being able to offer it?

That, after all, is still my single point: that the time has come for Europeans to think and speak among themselves about a shared new pattern. The Marshall Plan itself was of course not the product of a single man nor a single speech. Five years of planning, beginning while the war still raged, preceded the vision offered in the speech, and years of effort then went into the implementation. I wish today there were more evidence of a similar phase of planning for the European future, more voices raised on behalf of a transcendent Europe. And I will add without apology that I hope in particular to hear more German voices speaking along these lines, because it seems to me that the future of Germans, and of the two German states, would be uniquely assisted by a more comprehensive European framework. I hold—by the way—no special brief for the Swiss model to which I have referred. Perhaps other ideas will be much better—such as a Europe of regions that will erode the aging structure of the nation-state and will be built according to lines of even greater diversity than that of Europe's nations, more local autonomy, married to economic and industrial development on a large-scale but involving multi-regional compacts rather than inter-state agreements. All this, at any rate, is no longer a subject on which an American should say too much. If what I believe is indeed correct, if the time has come

to develop new initiatives for change in Europe, then the proof will come in what Europeans think, say and do. It is difficult for this American, at least, to look at Europe ten years from now and not believe—and hope—that such a process will by then be well under way. And it is ever harder for me to believe that over that time the status quo of a divided Europe will remain unshaken—or that we would all be better off it that indeed were so.

And now I must close by asking your forgiveness. I have not solved any of your problems, I have not been at all amusing, and I have not been safely reassuring. Instead I have tried to make you think about an uncertain future, which really is not a very nice thing to do. My only excuse is that people from universities are supposed to try to make people think, which is no doubt at least one reason why universities can be so irritating. However, as long as universities make people think, they may be tolerated as a necessary evil. When universities stop trying to make people think, they become less and less useful. And universities that wholly conform to orthodoxy may be worse than useless, because they may lead people to believe that thinking is either unnecessary or dangerous. Well, thinking is in fact dangerous, but not as dangerous as not thinking. So please try to forgive me, and thank you for listening so patiently.

Address at the DAAD Assembly, Bonn, June 15, 1982.

A MAN OF VISION

JÜRGEN RUHFUS

Transatlantic relations have sunk to an unprecedented low level, NATO is weakened, and the member-states of the European Union are deeply divided over the question of support for the American intervention in Iraq.

It was a moment of joy in Washington when President George H.W. Bush awarded Germany and the United States the rank of "Partners in Leadership." A few years later during the tenure of his son, George W. Bush, the White House and the U.S. Department of Defense were referring to the "poisoned relations" with Berlin. In Germany, the policies of the current U.S. administration are seen as hegemonistic and war-driven and have led to a drop in sympathy for the United States in the latest public opinion polls.

What response must be given? A wave of dialogues, an honest exchange of thoughts and viewpoints between friends—not a dispute by means of speeches given in election campaigns or through sarcastic comments made on television shows, not silence on the highest levels but efforts to use existing channels to reduce disagreements.

Differences of opinion between the governments in Bonn/Berlin and Washington are not new. President Carter and Chancellor Schmidt had dramatic disagreements about a whole host of topics (economic policies, civil use of atomic energy, nuclear weapons, rearmament, and the continued policy of détente towards Moscow). The concept of "star wars" under the Reagan administration also led to problems and frictions between Europe and America.

Throughout difficult periods in the past, talks were not halted—quite the contrary. It led instead to intensified contacts on both sides.

When the connection between governments becomes vulnerable to strains, it is the dedication of individuals and institutions engaged in strengthening German American relations that become so much more important.

A cruel fate had forced Steven Muller to leave his hometown of Hamburg at a very young age. He belonged to the great "wave of human potential" of people who were forced to leave Germany because of their Jewish heritage and who found a new home in the United States.

Steven Muller was never bitter. He never left any doubt that he was an American citizen out of deep and heartfelt conviction, not just necessity. But he also stood by his connection to Germany. He gave himself to the task of facilitating lasting contacts between the two countries.

I met Steven Muller soon after my duties as ambassador in Washington commenced in 1987. A meeting with the distinguished personalities of the Atlantic Council and the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies was high on the priority list of first contacts for a new German ambassador in Washington.

As a former member of the executive board of the student council and the commission for international affairs at the University of Munich and a strong supporter of reforms, I saw with admiration and respect how much leeway and how heavy a responsibility American universities gave to their presidents to influence the education of the students, to shape research and teaching, and in particular to organize the management of their Alma Mater. Naturally academic esteem is a precondition for university presidents; they head the university, they are its public representative, they have to ensure that the university is embedded in the scholarly and economic life of its surroundings, they have to acquire funds and means for research and teaching, and they give impulses for new areas of academic work. The contacts to university presidents such as Steven Muller, Father Leo J. O'Donovan S.J. (Georgetown University) or Kingman Brewster Jr. (Yale University) are part of my most impressive personal experiences and enrichment.

Steven Muller worked actively within his sphere of influence and conquered it. For eighteen years, he influenced the education of almost an entire generation of students in the metropolitan area of Baltimore, Maryland and Washington, D.C. He increased and expanded the reputation of his renowned university there. Today, his lectures date back ten years, but they remain impressive documents. It is a joy to read these excellently written, reflective lectures that were focused on giving German or American audiences an understanding of the thoughts and motives of those on the other side of the Atlantic.

As president of his university, Steven Muller pointed out that the example of German universities influenced the founders of The Johns Hopkins University. The university combined the Anglo-Saxon tradition of religious colleges with the ideals and reforms of Wilhelm von Humboldt. Steven Muller stated that, "I am privileged to represent through my University the extraordinary contribution which the German University in the last century made to the cultural and educational life of America and much of the world."

Steven Muller was impressively committed to German unification. In a speech at the Atlantik-Brücke, he voiced his support for German unification as part of a larger process that would bring Eastern and Western Europe back together, stating that "a European process for the unification of Germany has far better long-term chances of historic success than an essentially German process." And another important point: He saw a role for the United States and believed that there must be American participation in the future of Europe. He was also convinced, however, that the "principal leadership towards a new European structure should not come from the United States." America should retain its self-restraint in the use of its power and influence towards Europe.

Apart from his clear understanding of foreign politics, Steven Muller also possessed a knowing eye for the inner workings of the United States. I will never forget his closing remarks at the seminar of the BMW Foundation in Washington in the early 1990s. Even at that time, he pointed out the far-reaching impact that the rapidly changing demographics would have in the United States. By 2010, as a result of high rates of immigration and high fertility rates, two out of every five U.S. citizens will be of non-European descent. By the mid-twenty-first century, this percentage could increase to more than half the population. Looking ahead, he stated that this shift would deeply impact the domestic stability of the United States as well as the foreign policy orientation of his country.

Certain inevitable conclusions arise from these facts: In their outreach to U.S. citizens, Europeans are too narrowly focused on the former emigrants from their continent and their descendants. They must pay more

attention to the members of the fast growing minorities, which in a few decades could well be in the country's majority. Germany and its partners in Europe have to engage more with the problems of a multicultural society that has resulted from the growing number of foreigners in the European Union. Simultaneously, this should also be an important focus of the transatlantic exchange of opinions and experiences. We have to analyze what we can learn from each other on this matter.

Even before I left Washington, I pointed out this new challenge at the embassy and at several meetings with colleagues from the European Union, and suggested increased contacts to African Americans and Latin Americans. I made proposals to that effect on my return to Germany as well.

Steven Muller was, in the best American tradition, a member of a variety of organizations and institutions of education, research, and cultural life. A great emphasis of his work also lay on the foundations that were focused on foreign policy and international problems.

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies was founded in 1983 thanks to his efforts. He was so fully committed to the idea of such an institution that he contributed a personal guarantee for the financing of this new Institute. The fact that the Institute was founded as an institution "at The Johns Hopkins University" shows the high aspirations for the work and the research.

The Institute was able to attract prominent personalities with ties to Germany, from a variety of areas of public life to its Board of Trustees. The first chairman, Donald Rumsfeld, whose ancestors came from Northern Germany, was previously adviser to President Reagan and is now Secretary of Defense in the administration of George W. Bush. As chairman of United Technologies, Harry Gray, chairman of the Board of Trustees during my time in Washington, established many economic and technical ties with Germany.

When he retired from his post as president of Johns Hopkins University, Steven Muller was able to turn his full attention to his activities at AICGS.

The Institute saw its main function in examining the existing development of both German states, to study the relations and problems between the two halves of Germany, and to make the challenges of the divided Germany known in the United States.

In the beginning, there were doubts on the German as well as on the American side as to whether the strong emphasis on including the GDR was not a step too far. Should a renowned Institute affiliated with the prestigious Johns Hopkins University and claiming distinguished American personalities as its members put its means and qualified staff at the service of the GDR, offering a forum for the presentation of communist propaganda in the capital of the United States? The work of the Institute answered these questions quickly and convincingly.

AICGS offered the opportunity for a place outside of the two German states to gain a better understanding of the ideas and visions of both sides and to unearth hidden or forgotten similarities. This proved easier in a friendly place near the shores of Maryland than amid the frictions and disputes on both sides of the Elbe River.

For example, at a joint event in Baltimore, Hermann Axen, the head of propaganda of the GDR government, and the foreign policy exponent of the conservative CDU, Alfred Dregger, discovered to their mutual surprise that, despite all the other differences of opinion, both sides had similar objections to the stationing of short range nuclear missiles in the middle of Europe.

Even before unification, AICGS compared the different positions of both Germanies and examined which developments could be useful in German-American discussions. The chairman of the CDU, Angela Merkel, who comes from the GDR, recently observed rather regretfully that in Germany this work was short-changed due to the rapid realization of reunification.

After unification, AICGS shifted the focus of its comparative studies from the problems between the two German states to the relations between Germany and the United States. In the future, the focus will be on challenges faced by the two countries and the resolution of the problems between the United States and its European partners.

Over the past four decades, Washington has taken a cautious but positive stance towards European integration. Even if some of the decisions of the European Union, especially in the areas of economy and trade, were not in the American interest, they were largely accepted by the U.S. government in order to support the growth of the European pillar of the transatlantic bridge.

The deep rift in Europe over the American approach in Iraq showed clearly how great a shadow the United States is able to cast over the European integration process, with its unusual concentration of political and military power as well as economic weight.

When, after the situation in Iraq is stabilized and the task of repairing and expanding the transatlantic partnership is at hand, it will be necessary not to focus on the disputes between the United States and Germany, but to place the problems between the United States and Europe at the center of the work of institutions of transatlantic cooperation.

This expansion of the work of AICGS would be a meaningful continuation of the goals of contemporary German studies.

Germany, which lies at the center of the European continent, has a fundamental interest in European unification. I hope that the United States, too, will continue to see its vital interest in supporting the Europeans overcoming their differences of opinion and the expanded EU community of twenty-five states soon growing into a partner capable of taking action. The United States is capable of fighting and winning a war on their own, but for a successful peace process, it is vital even for the strong and powerful United States to have partners and friends on the other side of the Atlantic that have the same value system and are willing to defend these together.

HOW AICGS CAME TO BE

ROBERT GERALD LIVINGSTON

From year to year in the late 1970s and early 1980s it was becoming steadily clearer that West Germany was changing, that it was no longer that pliant ally of the United States that it had been for the first twenty to twenty-five years after the Federal Republic's establishment in 1949. Tensions on a wide range of issues divided President Jimmy Carter and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in the second half of the 1970s.

At the same time young and left-leaning Germans began mounting a vehement, noisy, and widespread opposition to the stationing of American missiles on German soil, culminating in a huge peace demonstration, with decidedly anti-American tones, in Bonn in October 1981. Relations between West and East Germany, the communist German Democratic Republic, were warming, with Schmidt paying a first-ever visit in 1981 to the leader of the GDR, the Federal Republic's arch-enemy since 1949. West Germany was changing—obviously. But in what directions and why? The answers were hardly obvious even to those Americans long interested in Germany. For decades West German government subsidies had flowed generously to American institutions working on German affairs and (West) German-American relations. American, particularly private American, funding however, remained sparse. For years West German ambassadors in Washington had sought to stimulate private philanthropic interest in Germany, but perhaps because such philanthropic traditions were weak in their own country and American fundraising techniques strange, these efforts had borne little fruit. German language and literature continued, as Manfred Stassen writes in his contribution to this volume, to be the chief focus of the study of Germany in this country.

These, then, were the main elements of the context within which the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies came to be and which influenced its initial intellectual and programmatic focus. Although it selected a germanically long name (designed to make it clear that the Institute's focus was on post-World War II Germany), AICGS, as the inevitable acronym had it, was intended by its founders to be a distinctly American and distinctly private institution. To establish credible independence and bona fides it deliberately did not in its early years seek financing for operations or projects from the German government or institutions supported by it. Rather, AICGS obtained its initial support from institutional, corporate, and individual contributors in America.

The Institute began by concentrating on the foreign policy, domestic politics, and economics in its program of seminars, lectures, and conferences. Humanities assumed a strong place in its programming only later, launched by Manfred Stassen, at the time a visiting fellow at the Institute, led by Professor Frank Trommler of the University of Pennsylvania, and financially supported by the Institute's second chairman, Harry Gray and his wife Helen.

Another feature was AICGS' attention not only to the old American ally West Germany but also to communist East Germany, the German Democratic Republic. In the early 1980s research institutions at American universities continued to reflect the Cold War's division of the European continent: for the most part they carried on West European or East European (and Soviet) studies. AICGS broke with that pattern well before the political approach of "Europe whole" adopted by President George H.W. Bush at the end of the decade became customary in academic studies too. Discreet encouragement for attention to both Germanies came from high officials in Schmidt's chancellery. And also from key members of the Institute's Board, such as Kenneth Rush, formerly President Nixon's ambassador in Bonn and negotiator of the Four Power agreement on Berlin of 1971, and Steven Muller, President of The Johns Hopkins University, with which AICGS quickly affiliated. Muller had previously for several years chaired a U.S.-GDR academic exchange organization.

It was mainly owing to the personal interest taken in the Institute by Steven Muller, then into his second decade as the president of Johns Hopkins, that AICGS was able to start up rapidly in 1983-84. He attended every single board meeting in the early years and agreed to an Institute affiliation directly with the university in Baltimore (not via the intermediary of its Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington)—a decision that was as fortunate as it was generous, in that it gave the Institute great freedom in developing its programs. Muller also arranged for a handsome, interest-free startup advance from the University (which AICGS later repaid).

In assembling a board, the Institute was ably assisted by Thomas Farmer, first Secretary Treasurer of the Institute, who was well-connected in Washington political circles.

Given the Institute's effort to attract American corporate funding and its interest in foreign policy and politics, the first Board members thought it advisable to seek a prominent and energetic Republican businessman as chair. It found the right one in Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the pharmaceutical firm G.D. Searle & Co. and former congressman from Illinois, ambassador to NATO, and secretary of defense. He was succeeded in 1986 by Harry Gray, chairman of United Technologies. With the help of Donald Rumsfeld and Harry Gray, a strong board of American businessmen and scholars interested in Germany was quickly brought together. The Institute was incorporated in the District of Columbia and it moved into its first home on Massachusetts Avenue, near the Brookings Institution. Robert Gerald Livingston, former president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and at the time research professor at Georgetown University, became acting director in December 1983.

Support in the first five years came mainly from American firms such as Procter & Gamble, with interests in Germany, or German corporations such as Hoechst, with large investments in the United States. The transatlantic flow of capital in the early 1980s was still, on balance, mainly from America to Germany (that started to reverse at the end of the decade), and AICGS funding reflected that. Steven Muller's many friendships and experience, as a veteran university administrator, provided AICGS valuable access to companies and foundations with an interest in German economics and politics.

During the years following the Institute's establishment, Muller's participation and guidance continued vital in other areas besides financing. AICGS began to attract visiting scholars and launched a publications program. Efforts were made too to organize events outside Washington, with occasional and then frequent luncheon seminars in New York and Atlanta. Scholarly expertise from other universities was tapped to strengthen not only the humanities program, with Professor Frank Trommler, but also an economics program headed by Professor Stanley Black of the University of North Carolina. AICGS thus found itself prepared, institutionally, financially, and intellectually to address the many new questions brought to the fore by the biggest change in Germany since World War II—the unification of the country in 1990.

A SMALL STEP FOR A UNIVERSITY–A BIG LEAP FOR GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS
APERÇUS ON TWO DECADES OF GERMAN STUDIES IN AMERICA

MANFRED STASSEN

To write about a university president, and a successful one at that, is easy. To write about a scholar and colleague, particularly if one agrees with most of what he has to say on the state of the University on either side of the Atlantic, is already more delicate. But to write about someone who, like Steven Muller, is "all of the above," and a friend, is a true challenge. But, then, only the challenging tasks are worth the effort.

Baltimore and The Johns Hopkins University have a long-standing and well-documented relationship to Germany. While not much of what was "specifically German" has survived in the city, all of what constituted the "genius of the German University" has survived at Johns Hopkins. This, to a large extent, at least for two decisive decades for higher education development in the post-WW II era, is due to the extraordinary energy and vision of Steven Muller.

The odds that he had to overcome in order to preserve an academic tradition that was essentially German, in an American political environment initially hostile, later indifferent to Germany, were tantamount to the odds that the profession of *Germanisten* encountered in the United States, particularly after the last war. Beyond the mantra-like reassertion of an alleged "transatlantic community of values"–that had gained considerable currency among "atlanticists" on either side–Steven Muller believed in the privileged relationship between Germany and the US supported by the number and quality of individuals who "lived" it. He was aware of the lopsideness of German academic interest in the United States and U.S. interest in Germany: There were, in the 1970s and 1980s, nineteen university chairs of Indology in Germany, and only six American Studies (of which only one dealt with American domestic policy). At the same time, the German Studies Association (GSA) had among its growing membership countless specialists on Germany. He knew about the "double-bind" situation in which the new Germany found itself trapped with regard to American interest in its identity: The only "movement" discernible was, for the longest time after 1945, an oscillation between boredom vis-à-vis a "pet ally" (*Musterschüler*), and the revival of erstwhile fears of a repeat performance of the German *Sonderweg* (*Ostpolitik*) and/or of irritations caused by such not so trivial tendencies of some German political leaders to invite foreign dignitaries occasionally to the wrong cemeteries (Bitburg).

For about thirty years after 1949, the successive West German governments had felt the need of establishing, in the United States, a scholarly institute whose sole object of investigation would be post-1945, contemporary Germany. Such an institute, it was hoped, would help to end the distorting perception, in American academic and informed public circles, of German history ranging only, and with an inherent teleology, from the Teutoburger Wald to Buchenwald. However, German efforts to establish such an institute failed, essentially for two reasons:

(1) In Germany's foreign cultural policy perspective at the time, such an institute could only be run—or at least be co-sponsored—by the German government or one of its cultural agencies, such as the *Mittlerorganisationen* Alexander-von-Humboldt-Foundation (AvH)—or the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD); (2) such an institute would be instrumentalized in the effort to restore and expand the use of the German language as a *Kultur-* und *Wissenschaftssprache* it had been for the longest time before the two world wars, by incorporating into its agenda the training of future American teachers of German.

In the early 1980s, the New York Office of DAAD succeeded in convincing the German government to drop this plan (the later creation of a German Historical Institute in Washington followed another German tradition and a different academic logic). If such an institute was going to be recognized as legitimate and serious, and hence effective in the United States, it had to be entirely free of German influence and, at best, a private, not a governmental American initiative.

Steven Muller had the vision to establish just such a private institute, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS). And his Hanseatic background told him that there was not only a *Zeitgenossenschaft* (simultaneity), however distorted by the vicissitudes of post-WWII world politics, but also an indestructible *Raumgenossenschaft* (shared cultural-political space) between the Western and Eastern part of Germany. Even after *Ostpolitik* had become acceptable in polite political circles, no German-sponsored institute could have included the political and scholarly *Auseinandersetzung* with the SED regime of the former GDR in its agenda, let alone acted, at crucial times, as a broker between the two sides. AICGS Founding Director Robert Gerald Livingston and former German Ambassador to the United States, Jürgen Ruhfus, address this issue at greater detail in this volume.

The establishment of AICGS as an exclusively American private initiative, without German public funds, "freed" the German side to pursue other foreign cultural-political avenues. In the decade between 1980 and 1990, the New York Office of DAAD, together with leading representatives of the North American scholarly establishment, undertook the daunting task of reforming German philology in the academy. From the American perspective, such a reform became necessary in the wake of a dramatic drop in the number of students studying foreign languages in general, and German in particular. From the German perspective, the traditional philological university programs did not necessarily attract the elites with future leadership potential that it was hoping for. In addition, there was a growing recognition among the experts on the German side, of the advent of a "successor generation" to the many émigrés in the American academy and to the "old hands" in American politics who had known Germany (and many of them German) very well, mostly through personal experiences in the war and in the immediate postwar era.

The answer to this predicament seemed to be the creation of interdisciplinary German Studies taught, at least initially, in the medium of the students' native language, English. The strategy (Hegel would have called it "the cunning of reason") was to attract students of all disciplines, seriously interested in Germany as a country, a major U.S. ally, and a "global player," with a considerably economic and political potential. This new clientele would be different from both the traditional "roots"—seeking undergraduates (with the proverbial Black Forest German grandmother in the closet)—who would engage in the study of German for a semester or two and then turn to "more serious" academic pursuits—and the graduate student who would be taught as if he or she would eventually become a member of the guild of professors of German. Long ago, this automatism had ceased to function because of the erosion of German philological studies in all major North American universities. Also, the language and literature-based German philology curricula had not sufficiently taken into account the demographic shift in the student population at most American universities, away from East Coast kids trained and socialized on a European cultural canon.

Interdisciplinary German Studies are by now well established, on all levels of higher education, across North America. In the mid-1980s, the GSA adopted a set of guidelines, differentiating "best practice" recommendations in this field according to scope and orientation of the institutions participating. These guidelines set the standards and serve as a foundation for quality assessment. DAAD New York supported the many meetings that led to their passing. In the end, they helped to overcome the tremendous misgivings of a monodisciplinarily oriented faculty against an interdisciplinary approach, the so-called *Dilettantismusverdacht*, as well as the administrative tendency of building impermeable "fences" around the "fortress Department."

Over the decade of the 1980s, the New York Office of DAAD established about twenty co-financed Long-Term German Studies Professorships (*Langzeitdozenturen*), of between two and five years duration, at an equal number of major North American research universities. The holders of these positions are not philologists, but come from a variety of disciplines in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. Their courses, taught in English where necessary, and in German where possible, focus on all aspects of contemporary Germany.These teaching assignments are mutually beneficial: they help to increase and internationalize the North American curriculum on Germany, and they offer the German staff member a first-hand experience of the American university teaching and research culture which is an invaluable asset to their home institutions after their return to Germany.

In the mid-1980s, when East-West relations were taking on a new quality, and when Germany's integration into a united Europe had reached a point of no return, the German government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, following the lead established by DAAD New York, approached a number of North American university presidents on the possibility of establishing, at prestigious institutions, so-called "Centers of Excellence" for research and teaching of "German and European Studies." They were intended to have a high profile of academic achievement and curricular innovation, and thus act as magnets to the continent's best, i..e. to the next generation's elite in transatlantic, American-European relations. The seed money for the first ten years of the Centers' operation came from the German government, while funds raised by the institutions in question during this initial period would be used for the subsequent operation of the programs initiated. With the University of California at Berkeley, Georgetown and Harvard Universities taking the lead, there are today six "Centers for German and European Studies" in North America. The idea proved exportable to other parts of the world: At the time of this writing, there are six more such Centers, in Europe and Asia, and more are planned. The work of the centers authoritatively defined what Auslandsgermanistik can and should be the world over, and their interdisciplinary approach is beginning to make significant inroads even into the more conservative bastions of German *Inlandsgermanistik*–a "surplus"–value not intended and by some deemed impossible.

These initiatives, at first, did not sit well with the traditionalists in the (West) German foreign cultural policy establishment, nor with the stalwarts of German *Kameralistik*, the defenders of purity in the use of public budget line item allocations. The funds used on the German side for this expansion of traditional Germanistik were originally intended for the promotion of the German language abroad–an apparent contradiction. Today, there is a large consensus that unusual historical circumstances may require unusual flexibility as well as some apparent detours on the way to reach the intended goal. On the American side, there were, at first, many critics who feared that these heavily government-sponsored centers might present to the American academic public a view of Germany colored by the sponsor. The opposite is the case. As German Studies expert, Hinrich Seeba of Berkeley, has recently pointed out, the centers, rather than being beholden to the cultural foreign policy objectives of the successive German governments, they are indebted to the ideals of the Frankfurt School of Social Research and tend to analyze critically all aspects of German culture, not the least those that played a role in the genesis of the Holocaust and Germany's varied history of orchestrating *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*.

At a conference last year in Berlin, DAAD took stock on these various initiatives to promote German and European studies in North America (and elsewhere) over the past twenty years. Almost at the same time, AICGS celebrated its twentieth anniversary. There was a good measure of praise for both these very different initiatives. While the North American Centers for German and European Studies have been emulated elsewhere, AICGS has remained an "*Unikat*" in the world, to this day. This is, of course, largely due to the specific "cultural genius" in the United States that is different from that in other countries—in particular the special emphasis being placed on the private sector and the vigorous existence of philanthropy and corporate giving to academic institutions, still underdeveloped elsewhere—but it is to no small extent also due to the initial vision and unfailing energy of that cosmopolitan, Hanseatic American, The Johns Hopkins University President Emeritus, Dr. Steven Muller.

A TRIBUTE TO STEVEN MULLER

FRANK TROMMLER

Steven Muller has been one of the most inspiring and influential promoters of good American-German relations in the last decades of the twentieth century. I am tempted to qualify this statement by pointing especially to the academic and cultural realm but believe, after looking at his initiatives since the 1970s, that his work extended far into the field of politics when he helped overcome mutual alienation and American disinterest. With his founding of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies as President of Johns Hopkins, Steven laid the groundwork for building a new relationship that did not rely anymore on the good will of the war generation but, rather, was carried by common interests, scholarly exchange, and effective leadership of new generations. It is a testimony to his foresight that AICGS has remained an effective guardian in yet another transformation of the relationship after the two Germanies united and fifteen and now twenty-five countries integrated in the European Union.

My assessment of Steven's leadership in the field of American-German relations is based on personal observations and an unforgettable encounter in 1983 when I learned that he meant business, not just symbolic reassurance of a common history. In my preparations for a large conference at Penn in 1983 that was to take stock of three hundred years of German-American history and a century of rough political relations between the two countries, I had learned from Heide Russell, the impressive German cultural attaché in Washington, about a speech by Steven on present-day Germany that appeared like a lightning rod in the murky routine of diplomatic maneuvering across the Atlantic. When I read it, I realized that there was no one better suited to open such a symposium that spanned history and current politics than Steven Muller.

Steven brought all these things together in his opening address at the conference reprinted here. At Penn, one of the legacies of Ben Franklin in the eighteenth century, he planted the banner of Johns Hopkins as the more scholarly, German-based university. It was a learning experience for our own President, Sheldon Hackney, later of NEH fame. There was history, there was a nice provocation in good decorum, before the participants swarmed out to the various sessions. But Steven made clear: history is fine—but what about the future? All of a sudden we realized that he talked business. With his inspired eyes he looked around the wood-

paneled hall and launched the agenda for founding an institute in Washington that would answer the question. While the volumes of the conference have become history, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies is and remains a reality. Gerry Livingston, Jack Janes and their collaborators have built it into that respected guardian of studies of contemporary Germany.

I credit Steven with always having intellectual, not just political or organizational input in American-German relations. I might mention his conference at Hopkins, "The Contemporary German Mind," in 1988 in which he made prominent German intellectuals like Jürgen Habermas, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Hartmut von Hentig, Peter Sloterdijk, Marion Gräfin Dönhoff, Karl Dietrich Bracher and Wolf Lepenies answer his provocative question whether the very German mind had gone to sleep while figuring out what the world held in store. (One year later the Berlin Wall fell. No sense of that.) He also took special interest in Manfred Stassen's AICGS conference called "Emergence" in 1992 about the intellectual transformations in Germany and Eastern Europe, and prepared, together with Mitchell Ash, the AICGS symposium on the needed reforms of the German university in 1995 which appeared as an important book.

When Jack Janes and Lily Gardner Feldman invited me in 1994 to serve as the chair of the Humanities Program at AICGS, my positive response was to no small degree based on the knowledge that I could turn to Steven when I needed special help or advice. And Steven was most generous with his time when we organized several workshops with American and German institutions about the different approaches to arts sponsoring in the mid-nineties while the Republican Congress was out to kill NEA and NEH.

His most memorable participation in the Humanities workshops occurred in 2000 when he spoke, despite his severe illness, to the topic of "Immigrant Scholars and American Views on Germany" which was close to his heart. Let me conclude in recalling what Steven Muller said at that occasion since it sheds some light on his enduring commitment to good American-German relations.

As a German Jew who had to leave his native Hamburg as a twelve-year old in August 1939, he was not exactly eager after the war and his becoming a U.S. citizen to have any but the most basic contacts with the perpetrators' country. It was during his first visit to his totally destroyed hometown in 1950 that he changed his mind, as he recalled. Realizing that also Germans who had not been Nazis suffered total devastation, made him give up his hatred, as he put it. His later commitment to work towards closer transatlantic ties, towards a better understanding of and between the two German states is built on a courageous and admirable fight within himself. By overcoming the inner barriers Steven Muller was able to find the strength to overcome many barriers that stood in the way of a post-Holocaust transatlantic rapprochement. I honor Steven Muller as an exemplary leader in American-German political and intellectual relations.

Berlin, July 24, 2002

Dr. Steven Muller on his 75th Birthday

In his youth, a harsh fate forced Steven Muller to leave his homeland. Despite all bitterness, however, he not only put down roots in the United States of America, but also worked significantly towards building new sustainable bridges across the Atlantic after the terrible world wars. In this endeavor, it was his astute, warm sense that unfailingly led him to a humanly, culturally and politically farsighted conclusion.

We Germans especially owe it to his generous ways that new connections developed.

As professor and president of the Johns Hopkins University, he showed new generations the way and what it is that a solid and humane liberal democracy needs and how it can bear on the good of humanity. The Johns Hopkins University's reputation, that an elite for international relations is being raised here, is largely his doing.

Always, Steven Muller called for Europe's active participation in international relations on the basis of a solid friendship with the Americans.

Through the institute in Bologna, Steven Muller incorporated Europe directly into the Johns Hopkins family. The chair that carries his name there is an expression of the deep respect and gratitude that we Europeans, and especially we Germans, feel towards Steven Muller, this great and active, this responsible and wise citizen of the world.

Richard von Weizsäcker

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Steven Muller is President Emeritus of The Johns Hopkins University, a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, and Distinguished Professorial Lecturer at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.

He served as the tenth president of The Johns Hopkins University from February 1, 1972, to June 30, 1990. Between 1972 and 1983, Dr. Muller also served as President of The Johns Hopkins Hospital.

Dr. Muller is a founder of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and currently serves as Co-Chairman Emeritus of its Board of Trustees. He is also a Director of the Atlantic Council, a member of the Board of the Oxford/Cambridge/NIH Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Biomedical Research, and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In addition, Dr. Muller is a member of the American Association of Rhodes Scholars, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Dr. Muller has served twice as a Director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He also served as Chairman of the Board of St. Mary's College of Maryland, which honored him in January 2004 with the Order of the Ark and the Dove.

Dr. Muller is a specialist in comparative government and international relations, particularly concerned with developments in Europe. He is the author of a textbook in comparative government and of a number of professional articles in this field. In recognition of his contributions to German-American relations, Dr. Muller was awarded the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1980. In 1988, he was also named *Commendatore* by the President of Italy.

In past years, Dr. Muller served as a member and Chairman of the Association of American Universities; chairman of the Association of American Medical Colleges panel on medical education (GPEP); founding Chairman of the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities; a Director of the Council on Financial Aid to Education; a member of the NASA Advisory Council; and Chairman of the Council's Task Force on NASA-University Relations; and a member of two Presidential Commissions: The White House Fellowships, and World Hunger. He has also been a member of the Board of Editors of *Daedalus*; a Director of the Whitney Museum of American Art; a Director of the Baltimore Museum of Art; a Trustee of the Consortium for the Advancement of Higher Education; and he twice served as a Director of the Greater Baltimore Committee. He is a former Director of Alex. Brown Incorporated, Commercial Credit Corporation, CSX Corporation, Safeway Corporation, Beneficial Corporation, Millipore Corporation, and Van Kampen Closed End Funds.

Before coming to Johns Hopkins as Provost in April 1971, Dr. Muller served from 1966 until 1971 as Vice President for Public Affairs at Cornell University. From 1961 until 1966, he served as Director of the Cornell University Center for International Studies. Between 1961 and 1971, he also held the tenured appointment on the Cornell University faculty as Associate Professor of Government and continued to teach both undergraduate and graduate students in addition to fulfilling his administrative responsibilities.

Dr. Muller graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles in 1948. From 1949 to 1951, he was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in England, where he received a B.Litt. degree in politics in 1951. He first came to Cornell University in 1951 as a graduate students in the Department of Government and received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1958. He served in the United States Army Signal Corps during 1954-1955. From 1956-1958, he was an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College and then returned to Cornell University as Assistant Professor of Government.

Dr. Muller was born in Hamburg, Germany, on November 22, 1927, emigrated with his family to England in 1939, and first came to the United States in 1940. He has been a naturalized citizen of the United States since 1949. His late wife, Margie, was the former Bank Commissioner of the State of Maryland. He is now married to Dr. Jill McGovern, Chief Executive Officer of The Marrow Foundation. Dr. Muller, who lives in Washington, D.C., has two married daughters, three grandsons, and two granddaughters.