



# AICGS ISSUE BRIEF

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## Confronting Religious Diversity in Germany and the United States

BY CATHLEEN S. FISHER

How religiously diverse are the United States and Germany?

How have the two countries adapted to growing religious diversity?

How are church-state relations in Germany affected by the growing Muslim communities?

How does the experience of German Muslims compare with that of American Muslims?

What are the political battlegrounds over politics and religion in Germany and the United States? Are there any similarities?

Does religion matter to the transatlantic agenda and to transatlantic relations?

In September 2001, less than ten days after the terrorist attacks on Washington, DC and New York, a Public Service Announcement (PSA) began running nationwide on U.S. television stations. The spot featured people of different ages and of diverse ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds, proclaiming proudly, "I am an American." The announcement ended with the words *E Pluribus Unum*, "Out of many, one." In the immediate post-September 11 turmoil, the spot's creators reportedly wanted to capture what makes America unique and to celebrate the country's diversity. The Ad Council, the nonprofit organization that distributed the PSA, reported an "unprecedented" response to the spot from Americans conveying their thanks "for bringing such an important message to the country at this time."<sup>1</sup>

Flash forward some four years and across the ocean to Germany. In fall 2005, a group of non-governmental organizations launched a campaign designed to encourage optimism, civic activism, and national pride. Under the slogan, "Du bist Deutschland!", the campaign contracted for a series of TV spots featuring Germans of various ages and ethnicities proclaiming proudly, "You are Germany!" The campaign met with mixed reactions; some charged that the slogan had troubling historical undertones while others, particularly younger Germans, welcomed the spots' optimistic and forward-looking image of a modern Germany.

The images contained in the two TV campaigns reflect the growing diversity that characterizes not only the United States, a traditional country of immigration, but also Germany, which until recently lacked an immigration policy and granted citizenship solely on the basis of blood ties rather than place of birth. But while the populations of Germany and the United States have grown more diverse in recent decades, the two countries respond very differently to the challenges presented by an ethnically, racially, and religiously diverse population.

### The Fact of Religious Diversity

Religious diversity has different characteristics and dimensions in the United States and Germany, but remains an undeniable fact in both countries. Accurate statistics for the number of adherents to different religious traditions are difficult to come by, since both the U.S. and German governments cannot ask about religious affiliation on government census surveys, but unofficial estimates offer a snapshot of dominant trends.

While about two-thirds of Germans report allegiance to either the Catholic or the Evangelical (Protestant) Church of Germany, Germany is also home to other religious traditions, including an estimated 3.3-4 million Muslims from the Sunni, Alawite, and Shiite sects.<sup>2</sup> The majority of Germany's Muslims, roughly 2.3 million, are of Turkish origin as a consequence of Germany's "guest worker" program during the 1960s and 1970s. The German Jewish Community officially numbered 189,000 in 2004—a figure that in fact under-represents the Jewish population in Germany, which is now the third-largest in Europe.<sup>3</sup>

As in the rest of Europe, demographic trends in Germany will increase the numbers of Muslims as a proportion of the total population. In Germany, roughly one-third of the Muslim population is under the age of 18 years, as compared to 18 percent for Germany as a whole. An estimated 15–20 million Muslims live in Europe, a number that could more than double by 2025, given higher fertility rates among this population.<sup>4</sup>

## Outside the Comfort Zone?

Not surprisingly, Germans and Americans think about and have responded differently to this new religious diversity. History, constitutional parameters, and traditional church–state structures influence each society's approach to the fact of religious diversity. Additionally, norms have shaped responses to diversity through notions about modernization and religion, and what it means to be an American or German/European. Although the two countries are adapting to diversity, the presence of numerous religious and secular perspectives forces many Americans and Germans outside their comfort zone.

### History, Constitutional Provisions, and Church-State Structures

The United States has lived with religious diversity from the very beginning of the republic. Throughout much of its history, however, diversity was equated with different traditions within Protestantism, and then Christianity (Catholicism), and only later encompassed an understanding of the United States as a country of Judeo-Christian traditions. Accommodation of diversity has played out within the parameters established by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees both free exercise of religion and precludes the establishment of a state church. In the absence of a state-established church, different faith communities and groups had to compete for supporters in a pluralistic market, in the process creating a uniquely American, voluntaristic system of "denominations." The "wall of separation" between church and state, however, never meant that religion was

The United States, too, is home to an increasingly diverse population of religious communities and faith traditions. In contrast to Germany, immigrants to the United States over the last several decades are characterized by great diversity in terms of religion, race, ethnicity, and language, but also in education, skills, and material resources. In 2005, the foreign-born population in the United States totaled over 35 million, or 12.1 percent of the population. At present, most immigrants come from non-European countries. Unofficial estimates indicate that perhaps more than 75 percent are adherents to Christianity, but inflows of immigrants from East and South Asia have also led to growth in the number of persons adhering to non-Christian traditions. An estimated 1.3 million Hindus, 2.5 million Buddhists, and 6–7.5 million Muslims now reside in the United States. Of Muslims living in America, roughly two-thirds are immigrants and their descendants from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Africa and other countries; African-Americans account for an additional third.<sup>5</sup> While many immigrants retain their religious and cultural traditions and some, in fact, become more religious, others welcome the freedom to be more secular.

banned from public life. Indeed, today religious language and influences permeate public and political life in America, a trend that some Americans view with growing concern.

Many Germans and Europeans equate religious diversity with a history of division, conflict, and human suffering. In the postwar Federal German Republic, confessional divisions between Catholic and Protestant were overcome politically under the banner of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, and today, religious affiliations are less and less predictive of voting behavior. Like the U.S. Constitution, the Federal Republic's Basic Law (Article 4) guarantees freedom of religion and obliges the state to remain neutral with regard to religious matters. Church–state relations are structured in a very different manner than in the United States, however. The state cooperates with religious bodies that have been granted the status of a "corporation under public law"—at present, the Catholic and Evangelical (Protestant) Churches, as well as the Jewish Community and a number of smaller Christian denominations. These public corporations are special partners of the state, assisting in the provision of social services, health care, and religious education in the public schools. The state administers a 9 percent tax on the income of members of these recognized religious bodies.<sup>6</sup>

### Norms about Religion, Public Life, and Modernity

Germans and Americans also react differently to the new religious diversity because of societal norms that shape views of

the appropriate relationship between religion, national identity, and politics and public life.

A commitment to separation of church and state and tolerance for diversity have become part-and-parcel of the American mythos but have coexisted with the belief that the United States is “fundamentally Christian and that the meaning of diversity should be understood primarily in reference to the Christian majority.”<sup>7</sup> At the same time, Americans have never equated modernity and integration of religious minorities with secularization. Secularization theory, simplistically put, posits that modernization will inevitably lead to the irreversible decline of religious beliefs and traditions, as well as the control of religious institutions and norms over society; the theory has never appeared to apply to the U.S. case. Religion remains a vital part of both private belief, values, and behavior, and of American public life, despite progressive secularization in urban regions in the Northeast and on the Pacific coast and among individuals with a college education.<sup>8</sup> In other words, the United States is modern, secular, *and* religious. Theories aside, in the minds of most Americans, there is no contradiction between being a modern and good American and retaining religious values and beliefs.

In Germany, the normative context of the new religious diversity is fundamentally different. Over the past decades, a growing number of Germans have ceased to participate in traditional religious practices, although many continue to identify themselves in some diffuse cultural way as “Christian.”<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, religion in contemporary Germany is largely a private matter. Until recently, it was virtually inconceivable that any German politician would think of saying the words “God bless our country” in a public speech, as did German President Horst Koehler. Such utterances remain rare occurrences in German politics, in contrast to the almost obligatory closing of “God bless America” in addresses to the American nation. Moreover, most Germans assume that modernity in fact will and should lead to a declining role for religion in public life as science and enlightenment mitigate religious beliefs, and economic prosperity and political stability eliminate the need for the assurances that religion once provided. Although many Germans and other Europeans may turn to the national churches to perform important life rituals, as sociologist José Casanova has observed, they nonetheless believe that a modern and enlightened European is a secular one.<sup>10</sup>

German ambivalence about the compatibility of modernity and religion were evident in a 2006 poll conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project. According to the poll, 70 percent of Germans believe that there is a conflict between being Muslim and living in a modern society, a view that 57 percent of Muslims living in Germany shared. Moreover, 37 percent of Germans, a sizeable minority, also believes that there is a conflict between being a devout Christian and living in a

modern society. The corresponding numbers of Americans expressing the view that being a devout Muslim or a devout Christian is incompatible with modernity were 40 and 29 percent, respectively.<sup>11</sup>

As in America, norms in Germany are not without their contradictions. The collective embrace of secularism as a sign of Germany’s modernity coexists with a belief held by many that Europe—and the borders of the European Union—is defined in important ways by the cultural tradition of Christianity. The influx of a largely Muslim immigrant population is problematic in this normative context. In addition to being non-Christian, many Muslims wish to retain their religious beliefs, values, and behaviors, making them “the other of Western secular modernity.”<sup>12</sup> The growing presence of Islam in Germany may also challenge the norm that religion is largely a private matter and has little role in the public sphere.

### Accommodating Diversity

Germany has largely adopted a “top-down” approach to dealing with religious diversity. In the case of Germany’s sizeable Muslim population, the German government has encouraged Muslims in Germany to unite under a single umbrella organization that could be a state partner in much the same way as the Catholic and Evangelical churches or the Central Council of Jews.

Germany’s Muslim communities remain divided, however, and so far no single organization has won recognition by the federal government as a “corporation under public law.” Efforts to unify the Muslim communities have been hampered by several factors. First, Muslims in Germany come from different national and ethnic backgrounds. Additionally, the Turkish community in Germany, which constitutes the largest group of Muslims in Germany, is itself divided, leading to the establishment of rival organizations, including the Islamic group *Milli Görüs* and the *Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion* (DITIB), an organization funded by the Turkish government to provide religious services to Turks in Germany. In addition to these Turkish organizations, there is an unaffiliated Central Council of Muslims, established in 1994 and modeled after the Central Council of Jews, but it is estimated to represent perhaps only 10 percent of Muslims in Germany. Divisions among these groups, concerns about outside influences (e.g. Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood), and the fact that *Milli Görüs* remains under observation by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution continue to hinder progress toward agreement on a central partner for the German state.<sup>13</sup>

Disunity also has complicated efforts to provide religious education to Muslims in Germany in public schools. Under the traditional system, religious education is provided to pupils in schools through the state churches. Lacking a nation-wide

entity that is recognized as a “public law corporation,” Muslims in Germany have had far less access to religious education in public schools, which the *Länder* (states) are responsible for regulating. Progress is being made, albeit slowly, as different *Länder* and municipalities cooperate in various ways with local Muslim communities to offer Islamic courses in German (rather than in Turkish, as has been the case under several earlier arrangements) at select public schools. The issue of Islamic education still remains controversial. Other practices, such as the refusal of Muslim girls to take gym or swimming classes, have also provoked public debate.

Critics of the “top-down” approach argue that the existing structure of church–state relations is too rigid to accommodate the diversity of Muslim life in Germany. The insistence that Muslims create an umbrella organization, in this view, amounts to an effort to “virtually shoehorn Muslim organizations into structures that correspond to national criteria and objectives,” an approach that means “effectively nationalizing, if not secularizing, Islam.”<sup>14</sup> The approach, of course, has its defenders as well as its critics. In any event, most German Muslims are not fully integrated and many feel widespread alienation from mainstream society.

Americans’ accommodation of new faith communities reflects a different historical tradition. For the most part, Muslim and other non-Christian faith communities have adapted to the prevailing structure of church–state relations, transforming themselves effectively into quasi-voluntary associations, as others have done before them. Adherents to non-Christian religions are nevertheless keenly aware of their minority status. Many report mixed experiences in their interactions with Christians and find that Christians are often mis- or uninformed about non-Christian beliefs, values, and practices, in part because of the role of the media in shaping views and perceptions.

The experience of American Muslims is instructive: Muslim communities in the United States are of varied ethnic and

national origin and are, in the main, better educated and more economically prosperous than the majority of Muslims living in Germany and other European countries. Although they have reportedly faced challenges to their civil liberties and increased incidents of discrimination and harassment since September 11, 2001, Muslims in the United States are better integrated into the structure of American political and social life than Muslims in Germany. Indeed, a multiplicity of religious, civic, cultural, economic, social, ethnic, artistic, and professional organizations now exist to represent American Muslims’ interests, ideas, and objectives, and to provide support to Muslim communities. Many Muslims in the United States identify themselves self-confidently as Americans. Indeed, some scholars argue that an American Islam and an American Muslim identity are emerging, which might in turn serve as a catalyst for change within Islam.<sup>15</sup>

While Americans and Germans are adapting to the new reality of religious diversity, many are doing so with some ambivalence. Studies of individuals’ responses to religious diversity in the United States suggest that many Americans are reluctant to truly engage their differences on a deeper level, while a majority of Germans report having little desire for more intensive contact with their Muslim neighbors. Majorities of Americans and Germans have negative views of Muslims resident in their countries and of Islam more generally. A 2006 Pew survey showed that, while 54 percent of Americans have somewhat or very favorable views of Muslims, only 36 percent of Germans have a favorable view of Muslims (down from 47 percent in 2005). In both the United States and Germany, majorities associate Islam with fanaticism and violence (67 and 79 percent, respectively), and are concerned about Islamic extremism arising in their own countries.<sup>16</sup> Given these trends, more public debate about the appropriate role of religion in public life appears certain, to the degree that growing Muslim populations challenge traditional norms and structures of church–state relations.

## Political–Religious Battlegrounds in Germany and the United States

Political–religious controversies on both sides of the Atlantic suggest that traditional structures and processes for coping with diversity are under increasing strain. The battle is not just or even primarily theological, but political and cultural as well. As Robert Wuthnow, Director of Princeton University’s Center for the Study of Religion, observes: “Besides the concerns about fairness and decency, the new diversity raises questions about who we are as a nation and as a people. What values should we embrace? Whose values are these? Will they be strong enough to generate conviction and commit-

ment? Inclusive enough to unite us and promote cohesion in our communities?” Public debates have crystallized around several hot-button issues:<sup>17</sup>

### RELIGION IN POLITICAL LIFE

In recent decades, religion has made striking advances into the realm of American politics. Evangelical Protestants are mobilized and well organized, and can be expected to sustain pressure on political leaders for greater influence over public policy

and key party nominations. The efforts of the Christian Right are directed not only at reaffirming Christianity's place as the fundamental foundation of the American nation, but also at fighting what, in its view, is a defensive battle against the forces of secularism that would ban religion from public space and from political decision-making altogether. The actual influence of evangelicals remains a subject of much speculation. Some scholars argue that the Christian Right, as a social movement, has had limited success in advancing its public policy agenda. Nevertheless, both mainstream Christians and secular Americans have begun voicing concerns about the influence of evangelicals and the more frequent blending of religion with politics. At the same time, progressive political organizations are considering whether or how it might be possible to mobilize religious voters in service of other agendas, for example, to advance environmental protection, social justice and equality, or peace.

Controversies over religion and politics take on a far different form in Germany, where the challenge is how to integrate ethnic and religious minorities into German political life and institutions. Muslims are under-represented politically, a reflection of the fact that, until recent changes in Germany's citizenship laws, most were precluded from becoming German citizens—and therefore, voters. Only an estimated 15 to 20 percent of Muslims living in Germany are now citizens, though many more may apply for citizenship in the future.

The acquisition of citizenship can be an uphill slog, requiring applicants to demonstrate fluency in German, proof of financial independence, renunciation of extremist groups, a commitment to the principles of the Basic Law, and evidence of acculturation. The public mood, moreover, seems to be in favor of raising the bar for those who would become German citizens. In 2006, Baden-Württemberg and Hessen announced plans to introduce a "citizenship test" that would measure applicants' historical and cultural knowledge of Germany. The tests stoked significant controversy, however, as some claimed they were much too difficult or contained an anti-Muslim bias.

How would Germany's Muslims vote, if they were fully enfranchised? One study of Muslim elites suggests that German Muslims are divided between secularists and those who would welcome a more public role for religious faith. Though German-Turks have tended to vote for parties of the left, other "value conservatives" would rather support conservative parties—assuming the Christian Democrats make room for them. What most factions appear to have in common is a desire for Islam to gain equality in the national framework of church-state relations; some, moreover, would like to see greater parity between secularity and religion in Germany.<sup>18</sup> Until more German-Turks and other Muslims can vote, these aspirations are unlikely to find full expression.

## WHO IS AN AMERICAN/GERMAN?

Immigration and integration of religious minorities is a source of controversy in both Germany and the United States. At issue for both countries is what integration entails—assimilation, acculturation, or participation in civic life amid cultural diversity—and what it means to be American or German.

In Germany, current discussions about immigration focus on whether and how a Muslim minority can be fully integrated, and who bears the burden of adaptation. In 2005, 88 percent of Germans expressed the view that Muslims want to be distinct instead of adapting to German customs and a German way of life, a sentiment that has found expression in the push for citizenship training classes and tests.<sup>19</sup> The mood in Germany, even on the political left, appears to be shifting in favor of assimilationist policies as conservatives, as well as some former '68ers and feminists, warn against a false tolerance and argue that the West must not compromise on basic democratic principles and values.

For the United States, the current immigration debate is less focused on religion and more on the control of illegal immigration, primarily from Mexico; the costs and benefits of legal and illegal immigration; and the obligations of citizenship. But post-September 11, many Americans, like their German counterparts, appear to be increasingly concerned about whether American Muslims wish to become part of the mythical American melting pot.

In both countries, debates about immigration and integration are, at their core, about what it means to be an American or a German in an increasingly diverse society. Germany, until recently, lacked immigration laws. Perhaps more importantly, as Jeffrey Peck observes, "it did not have a notion of identity that was porous enough to accommodate...great differences." He continues: "While it is legitimate to expect that new citizens learn the language, history, and culture of their adopted country, this should not mean giving up other identities they want to keep."<sup>20</sup> The answer for Germany may be a more flexible notion of identity that allows "multiple affiliations." This is precisely what American Muslims appear to be doing, according to Qamar-ul Huda of the U.S. Institute of Peace. While characterization of American Muslims as Arab-American or African-American captures the ethnic origins of this diverse community's members, he notes: "They miss the trend of American Muslims using alternative identities to express themselves." The creation and involvement of Muslims in many different organizations "have all contributed to multiple identities that go beyond a one-dimensional ethnic identity. American Muslims, like many Americans, have an amalgamation of identities."<sup>21</sup>

## WHOSE VALUES?

The degree of social tolerance for divergent perspectives and norms is a hot-button issue in both the United States and Germany, though the battlelines are drawn differently.

In the United States, the “culture wars” over abortion, same-sex unions and marriages, and gender roles rage, as do controversies over issues at the nexus of science, ethics, and religion (e.g. stem cell research, end-of-life issues). The battles are often complex and convoluted, pitting religious conservatives against other religious perspectives and those holding more secular views.

In Germany, by contrast, controversy has centered on the compatibility of Muslim values and behaviors with the principles and norms of German democracy, particularly as they pertain to gender roles and equality. Both Germans and Americans tend to associate Islam with a lack of respect for women. In Germany, books about forced marriages have become best sellers, and the German media have focused special attention on marriage practices and highly-publicized cases of “honor killings.”

Alternative perspectives of values and the status of women are also evident in the so-called “head scarf” debate. On 24 September 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the wearing of a head scarf (*hijab*) by a Muslim teacher or other civil servant could not be banned unless prohibited by *Länder* laws, a decision that prompted several *Länder* to proceed with drafting such legislation. Proponents of the ban have argued that Germany must protect its Christian heritage; others see the *hijab* as a tool for the oppression of women and therefore an unconstitutional challenge to western notions of human rights and the rule of law. Others counter that individuals should be free to practice and express their respective religious beliefs, and express understanding for the desire of Muslim women to protect their modesty and traditions. For others, the *hijab* is evidence of a desire among Muslims to define their identity and create a community apart from mainstream German society. In many ways, the debate over the *hijab* is a proxy debate about “whose values” will prevail as Germany becomes home to a more diverse population in terms of ethnicity, religion, and national origin.

## Facing Global Diversity: Challenges for Transatlantic Relations

Rather than marching steadily toward secularization, societies across much of the world appear to be increasingly influenced by religion. Indeed, given global demographic trends, the proportion of the world’s total population that embraces religion as an important force guiding beliefs, values, and actions is actually increasing. Beyond demographics, the spread of democracy is doing its part to revive religion. “Religion was supposed to fade away as globalization and freedom spread,” Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft recently observed. “Instead it’s booming around the world.... Democracy is giving people a voice, and more and more, they want to talk about God.”<sup>22</sup> Religious diversity has provoked heated domestic battles, but it also creates new challenges for the transatlantic agenda, impacting it in several ways:

### MUSLIM INTEGRATION AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM

Some observers in the United States and Europe worry that the failure of Germany and other European countries to integrate their Muslim populations may be fueling Islamist extremism in Europe, posing a threat both to these societies and to the United States. In this view, Europeans might learn something from the American approach to integration. As one American critic observed: “One may wonder whether the mixed U.S. approach—separating religion from politics without placing a wall between them, helping immigrants slowly adapt but allowing them relative cultural autonomy—could inspire

Europeans to chart a new course between an increasingly hazardous multiculturalism and a naked secularism that estranges Muslims and other believers.”<sup>23</sup> But many Europeans insist that the American model is not transferable. This issue is likely to remain on the transatlantic agenda.

### TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

The increasing salience of religion also poses significant challenges for the further evolution of the European Union. Membership negotiations between Turkey and the EU have begun, but public opinion polls continue to register majorities in many European countries, including Germany, against Turkey’s eventual accession. In addition to those who object on political or economic grounds, opposition to Turkey’s bid to join the EU is strongest among those who express the greatest concern about Islamic extremism and immigration. But the issue of Turkey’s eventual EU membership also touches on the politics of identity and religion. Most Europeans, it would appear, cling to a complex and unarticulated notion of Europeanness that mixes secularism and a Christian cultural identity. This conflation, some argue, will make it difficult for Europe to come to any consensus on its outermost borders or the internal cultural identity of the European Union. A rejection of Turkey on cultural (religious) grounds could increase nationalist sentiment in Turkey, strengthen those forces that would prefer not to align with the EU, and/or provoke new demands

for minority rights by the Turkish minority in Germany.

## GLOBALIZING ISLAM

As the Danish cartoon controversy of late 2005, early 2006 demonstrated, the barriers between the domestic politics of religious diversity and relations with the Muslim world have grown fluid and porous. Because Europe is home to proportionally larger Muslim populations than is the United States, tensions in the Middle East or elsewhere in Muslim-majority countries can perhaps be more easily imported to Europe, influencing social relations and increasing political tensions in European countries. As one German newspaper commentator wrote at the height of the controversy: "We can't pretend any more that only the Americans have a problem with the Arabs while we stand by ringing our hands; the conflict is returning home."<sup>24</sup> Moreover, as the confluence of the Danish cartoon controversy with the escalating debate over Iran's nuclear activities demonstrates, the domestic and foreign dimensions of the West's relations with Islam can overlap in unexpected ways and with unanticipated consequences. Coping with the phenomenon of a globalizing Islam, and truly engaging differ-

ence at the national and global levels, constitutes a shared challenge for Germany and the United States.

Can we learn from one another as we cope with the multiple challenges of global religious diversity? How much religion can and should democracies tolerate in their public life? Are there dangers not only in allowing a greater space for religion, but also in curtailing religious expression in democratic civil society? What are the implications of Islam's growing presence in Europe—for European societies and governments, but also for the United States and transatlantic relations? Could the experience of the United States in dealing with diversity and with religious diasporas in America be useful to Germany and other European countries, or are our experiences too different? Could an Americanized Islam play a role in catalyzing change and reform within Islam, including in European countries with significant Muslim populations?

In the end, as Germany, Europe, and the United States struggle to deal with these and other challenges, the only certainty is that religion is here to stay, both at home and on the transatlantic and global agendas.

## Notes

1 The Ad Council, "I am an American (2001–Present)," Public Service Announcement, <http://www.adcouncil.org/default.aspx?id=141>.

2 U.S. Department of State, "Germany," *International Religious Freedom Report 2005*, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51554.htm> (accessed 14 June 2006).

3 Immigration from the former Soviet Union accounts for the growth. Jeffrey Peck reports that as much 80 percent of the new migrants are halakhically not Jewish and thus are not recognized as such by the German Jewish Community. See Jeffrey M. Peck, *Being Jewish in the New Germany* (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univ. Press, 2006), 44.

4 Timothy Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2004): 28; "EU: Estimated and Projected Muslim Population, 1985–2025," *Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project* (December 2004): 83.

5 See Robert Wuthnow, *America and the Challenges of Religious Diversity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005).

6 <http://www.germany.info/relaunch/info/archives/background/church.html> (accessed June 25, 2006).

7 Wuthnow, 10.

8 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 84.

9 Grace Davie, "Is Europe an Exceptional Case?" *The Hedgehog Review*, vol. 8, nos. 1–2 (Spring–Summer 2006).

10 On the normative expectations governing American and European views of religion and modernity, see José Casanova, "Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A EU/US Comparison," Discussion draft for conference on "The New Religious Pluralism and Democracy," April 21–22, 2005, Washington, D.C., Georgetown University's Initiative on Religion, Politics, and Peace; idem, "Der Ort der Religion im säkularem Europa," *Transit-Europäische Revue* 27 (2004).

11 Pew Global Attitudes Project, "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other" June 22, 2006, 49–50.

12 Casanova, "Der Ort der Religion."

13 Jytte Klausen, "From Left to Right: Religion and the Political Integration of German Muslims," in *Understanding the 'God Gap': Religion, Politics, and Policy in the United States and Germany*, AICGS German-American Issues, no. 4 (Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 2005): 28; idem, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

14 Savage, 41.

15 Qamar-ul Huda, "The Diversity of Muslims in the United States: Views as Americans," U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 159, February 2006.

16 "The Great Divide."

17 Wuthnow, 88–9.

18 Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge*.

19 Pew Global Attitudes Project, "Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics," July 14, 2005.

20 Peck, 100.

21 Huda, "The Diversity of Muslims in the United States."

22 Timothy Samuel Shah and Monica Duffy Toft, "Why God is Winning," *Foreign Policy* (July/August, 2006): 39.

NOTES Continued:

23 Robert Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2005): 133. See also Savage, 31-33.

24 Bernd Ulrich, "Der Konflikt kehrt heim," *Der Tagesspiegel*, February 4, 2006.

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## AICGS Project on Religion and Politics in Germany, Europe, and the United States

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The relationship between religion, politics, and public life is the focus of increasing discussion and debate in the United States, in Germany and Europe, and in global politics. In the United States, Christian activists and organized interest groups have made their influence felt in American political life, while religious perspectives permeate much public discourse on social issues. While public professions of religious faith by political leaders are rarer in Europe, Germany and other European countries are grappling with the challenges of integrating diverse Muslim communities into political and social life, and are debating the role that religion and culture will play in defining national and European identity and the boundaries of the European Union.

AICGS programming on religion and politics seeks to enhance transatlantic understanding about the role of religion in American and European public life, and its impact on transatlantic relations and foreign policy. In partnership with scholars from the *Forschungsbereich Religion und Politik* from the Humboldt University, Berlin, AICGS is undertaking a German-American dialogue on religious pluralism, fundamentalism, and democracy. The dialogue is made possible through the generous support of the Transatlantic Program of the Federal Republic of Germany, with funds from the European Recovery Program (ERP) of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technologies. With support from the Robert Bosch Foundation, AICGS is organizing a U.S.-European dialogue on religion and politics with participants from France, Germany, Poland, Turkey, and the United States. Both dialogues are interdisciplinary, engaging experts from diverse disciplines, as well as public officials and journalists. This Issue Brief draws in part on insights from a conference on "Religious Pluralism and Democracy," held on May 22, 2006 in Berlin, Germany, with the support of the Transatlantic Program of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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Cathleen S. Fisher is Deputy Director of AICGS. She co-directs the Institute's work on religion and politics in the United States and Germany.

## Confronting Religious Diversity in Germany and the United States

Located in Washington, D.C., the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies is an independent, non-profit public policy organization that works in Germany and the United States to address current and emerging policy challenges. Founded in 1983, the Institute is affiliated with The Johns Hopkins University. The Institute is governed by its own Board of Trustees, which includes prominent German and American leaders from the business, policy, and academic communities.

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1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW  
Suite 700  
Washington, D.C. 20036 – USA  
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F: (+1-202) 265-9531  
E: [info@aicgs.org](mailto:info@aicgs.org)  
[www.aicgs.org](http://www.aicgs.org)

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