



AICGS ISSUE BRIEF

JULY 2006 **08** The U.S. and Germany in the United Nations: Cooperation Prospects and Conflict Potential BY KARIN L. JOHNSTON

- What is the status of UN reform efforts?
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- What are the future prospects for UN Security Council reform?
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- How can the diverging interests between developing and developed countries be reconciled?
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- In which areas of reform can collective engagement add new impetus to advance UN reform objectives?
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- How can the United States and Germany work cooperatively to encourage reform efforts in the United Nations?
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The United States and Germany have long supported the United Nations. In recent years, however, the two countries have at times been at loggerheads over whether or how to involve the organization in addressing international conflicts. German-American differences on issues such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the appropriate response to terrorism following September 11 have played out in both bilateral and multilateral settings, including in the United Nations. These differences are the result of each country's diverse roles in international politics but they also reflect the impact of domestic politics, institutional pressures, and historical experience. Disagreements between the United States and Germany have been particularly apparent in the United Nations, where they have impacted efforts to reform the organization. German leaders tend to see the UN as the cornerstone of a nascent global order, while many Americans have taken a more pragmatic view of the UN as a sometimes useful but inherently political and flawed international organization.

As major financial contributors to the United Nations, as well as influential members of the international community, the United States and Germany could play a key role in the development of strategies to overcome the organization's weaknesses. A major question, however, is whether Germany and the United States can find common ground to advance a reform agenda. The UN reform process offers opportunities for the United States and Germany to pursue mutual interests if both sides are committed to pragmatic cooperation and putting aside more fundamental differences over the role and purpose of the United Nations in international relations.

The Impetus for UN Reform

After sixty years as the world's premier international organization, the United Nations has recently come under extreme scrutiny from member states. Deep divisions in the international community over the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as a series of scandals in the UN system, such as the Iraqi oil-for-food program, sexual abuse of civilians by UN peacekeeping troops, and irregularities in the UN procurement program, have all served to undermine the UN's reputation as an arbiter of international conflicts. Established to mediate in an international system with clearly defined superpowers and obvious spheres of influence, the United Nations has thus far proven unable to effectively adapt to shifts in the configuration of the inter-

national state system caused by events such as the abrupt end of the Cold War and the increase of international terrorist attacks like those of September 11.

In response to increasing criticism of the world body and growing demands for reform, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a High Level Panel to examine the possibilities for revamping the United Nations. On 2 December 2004, the High Level Panel issued a report titled, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility." In response to the Panel's reform recommendations, Annan released his own report on 15 March 2005, titled, "In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All." Annan's report was released just months before the United Nations General Assembly 2005 World Summit in September, at which the recommended reforms were to be addressed.

The Panel's suggestions for UN reform were clustered in four areas: peace and collective security, human rights, development, and UN management. Negotiations on reform measures at the 2005 Summit were long and difficult. Vast differences of opinion prevented more than a few reform measures from being passed. Those approved included the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission and a new Human Rights Council. Not surprisingly, no consensus on Security Council reform was reached. The Summit had marginal success in the areas of management and development reform, although most measures were sent back to the General Assembly for further debate.

A seemingly critical point for the UN reform process came during the December 2005 budget committee meeting. The United States and other large UN budget contributors, already tired of ineffective reform discussions, forced through an

exceptional measure that tied spending to progress in reform. A spending cap with a deadline of 30 June 2006 was imposed on the biennial budget in an attempt to put greater pressure on UN member states to agree to a set of management reforms. As the June deadline neared, it was questionable whether enough progress on reform projects had occurred for the cap to be lifted.

Ultimately, the UN budget committee agreed to lift the mid-year spending cap on UN funding. However, the United States, Japan, and Australia disassociated themselves from what was termed a "consensus decision," underlining that in their view, the state of the UN reform process did not justify lifting the spending cap. Removing the cap avoided a system-wide financial crisis in the United Nations, but may also have underscored a fundamental criticism of the organization: that it is unable to make effective decisions on critical issues, even when they could arguably benefit all UN member states.

Much work remains to be done in the area of UN reform. Lifting the spending cap may have averted a financial crisis for the organization, but doing so may have removed a powerful impetus for pushing the reform agenda forward. A preliminary practical assessment of the potential for more significant progress in the near- to medium-term in the areas of peace and collective security, human rights, development and management reform reveals numerous problems and challenges that could set back reform efforts indefinitely. Overcoming those obstacles will require effective leadership within the United Nations. The United States and Germany may prove capable of providing such leadership if their differing views of the world body can be adjusted in the interest of achieving a more effective United Nations organization.

Peace and Collective Security Reform

Perhaps the most difficult area addressed by the UN reform project relates to security issues, since questions of how the United Nations can respond to changing power relationships in a new global order are at stake. There is no consensus on how to shape a new collective security system and many questions remain about how such a system would look, among them: who has the power to use force and when; what constitutes a defensible threat against a sovereign state and, by extension, how may a state defend itself; and where do the limits of national sovereignty lie?

German and U.S. political leaders tend to espouse very different perspectives on the role of multilateral institutions and international law in guaranteeing international peace and security. German leaders argue that the threats and challenges

of the new global disorder can only be met if the United Nations plays a central role, and that, as the third largest UN donor and a key contributor to multilateral peace operations, Germany should assume a greater role in UN decision-making through a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. For U.S. political leaders, American power, not the United Nations, is the central guarantor of international security, and the United Nations reflects an outdated perspective on the nature of security threats. The Bush administration and many Congressional leaders have taken a particularly critical view of the United Nations and place little faith in the organization's ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to international crises.

Despite their differences on the details of peace and security and Security Council reform, the United States and Germany

have worked in tandem over the last few years to secure important reforms relating to humanitarian interventions (the “responsibility to protect” clause) and to the establishment of a post-conflict Peacebuilding Commission. These successful endeavors point to the potential for future cooperative work on other aspects of security reform.

“Responsibility to Protect”

At the September 2005 Summit, UN member states adopted the concept of “responsibility to protect,” acknowledging that the UN’s mandate of collective security incorporates not just protection for the state but for the individual as well. The UN Security Council unanimously affirmed this agreement on 28 April 2006.

The “responsibility to protect” clause establishes that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens. However, should a state deliberately conduct actions against its own population that constitute a violation of human rights—defined here as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity—and if peaceful means of resolving the conflict fail, then the international community has an obligation to take collective action through the Security Council.¹

How the “responsibility to protect” clause will work in practice remains to be seen. Many UN member states objected to language in the clause that might imply that states have a legal as well as a moral obligation to intervene. Other countries (many of them human rights violators) viewed the “responsibility to protect” concept as interference in the affairs of a country and a violation of state sovereignty. The efficacy of this reform measure will be determined by member states’ future reactions to their “obligation” to respond to deliberate state violations of human rights. Already, there are calls for the Security Council to apply the “responsibility to protect” clause to the case of Darfur in Sudan. Despite three years of civil war and the documentation of countless human rights violations, the international community has yet to respond decisively to a situation that meets many of the “responsibility to protect” criteria.

Peacebuilding Commission

The United Nations has a spotty track record in helping states weakened by conflict make the transition to a stable post-conflict environment. UN peacekeeping missions have faltered for various reasons, among them insufficient and unsecured funding, lack of political commitment, short attention spans as new issues come to the fore, deficits in planning capacities, and problems with coherence and coordination on the ground. More importantly, the United Nations had no body responsible for developing post-conflict strategies that could integrate an

increasingly complicated network of international actors and institutions working in different functional areas.²

The new Peacebuilding Commission is intended to overcome such deficits. Established in December 2005 via joint resolutions in the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission’s mandate is to assist in the recovery, reintegration, and reconstruction of states emerging from a phase of violent conflict. The Commission will advise the Security Council, ensure better coordination within the UN, assist in planning post-conflict strategies, and marshal and sustain efforts by the international community to retain funding for and interest in post-conflict reconstruction projects over the longer term.

However, the Peacebuilding Commission’s functions remain highly problematic for the following reasons:

- The extreme diversity of member states’ interests will make unity of purpose within the Commission difficult to achieve;
- Continuing difficulty obtaining hard commitments for resources, funding, and cooperation will slow progress;
- With 31 members, the Commission is arguably too large to function effectively;
- No additional funds were allocated for the new body, so the Commission must depend on existing resources and voluntary contributions from UN member states, a rather precarious position. How much funding member states will in fact provide is not clear at present;
- The Commission’s effectiveness may be compromised by ongoing institutional struggles between the General Assembly and the Security Council, since the Commission must report to both bodies.

Germany and the United States strongly supported the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission and have been appointed members. There is no doubt that the two states share similar views on the need to work together to reduce the level of violent conflict in the international system. Together, they can work to strengthen linkages between the Commission and regional organizations. They can work with the Commission to ensure smooth coordination between financial contributors and UN bodies, develop better coordination strategies within the United Nations, and help to integrate resources flowing into post-conflict recovery efforts.

UN Security Council

So far, efforts at building consensus on UN Security Council reform have fallen short. Security Council reform measures were intended to resolve problems of representation, legitimacy, and effectiveness, but there are disagreements about these measures at all levels—between small and large, rich and

poor countries, among the five permanent members of the Security Council (the P5), and within the General Assembly. Existing power asymmetries and structural factors feed the flames. American predominance is resented by many UN member states, but the reality is that the United States' involvement is critical for the functioning and future prospects of the United Nations, regardless of how other states feel about its preponderance of power. In addition, the Security Council's growing appropriation of legislative functions, e.g. passing resolutions proscribing actions not strictly related to peace and collective security, has intensified the power struggle between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Security Council reform requires overcoming substantial potential complications, including:

- High institutional barriers, including the need to reform the UN charter, which is considered highly unlikely;
- Permanent members' veto powers, which can obstruct reform measures;
- Disagreement over the composition of a new council, particularly over permanent vs. non-permanent members;
- Potential approval of reforms that expand representation but weaken effectiveness.

One potential solution to the Security Council reform dilemma may result from the current negotiations between the UN and Iran over Iran's nuclear power program. Germany is directly involved with the Security Council's negotiations, functioning as an ad hoc Security Council member in a P5 + 1 constellation. The P5 may conclude that such functional groupings—including states with a stake in a particular conflict or that

bring something concrete to the table—have advantages as a way to partially address critics who emphasize the need for better representation and transparency in the Security Council.

The prospects for an agreement on formal Security Council reform, however, appear dim. The United States, as well as other permanent members with veto rights, have little incentive to reform the Security Council. Many U.S. leaders and experts express concerns about the effectiveness of an enlarged Council and argue that other reform priorities—particularly management reform—are more urgent. Germany, however, has been pushing for Security Council reform for several years. In 2005, Germany, Brazil, India and Japan supported each other in a bid for permanent Security Council memberships. The bid failed, but the new German coalition government, led by CDU Chancellor Angela Merkel, has reaffirmed Germany's desire for a Security Council seat. On 6 January 2006, Germany, Brazil, and India submitted a second Security Council reform proposal. The German government has said this second resolution is intended to keep the debate on UN Security Council reform alive—not to push for a second vote on Security Council reform measures.³

In fact, there are no realistic prospects for such a vote in the foreseeable future, and all indications are that the new German government will not place this issue at the top of its foreign policy agenda. Although the U.S. government supported the German bid for a UN Security Council seat in the 1990s, the Bush administration has not publicly endorsed Germany's membership bid. Whether the ad hoc arrangement fashioned to deal with Iran—or potentially other issues—will diffuse pressure for more formal reform remains to be seen.

Human Rights Reform

The establishment of a new Human Rights Council is seen as a litmus test for the future viability of the UN and the success of the reform process. The Human Rights Council (HRC) replaces the discredited Commission on Human Rights, which had allowed well-documented human rights abusers, such as the Sudan and Zimbabwe, to become members. The important question for this area of UN reform is whether the new Council, which met for the first time on 19 June 2006, will avoid the weaknesses of the old Commission. Real progress in promoting global human rights requires successfully changing not only institutional procedures, but also the culture of cynicism that has surrounded the UN's human rights body.

Both Germany and the United States supported the creation of the new Human Rights Council. German officials felt the new Council was a major step forward and that effective measures had been adopted to keep the worst human rights violators out.

However, during the protracted negotiations creating the Council, the United States objected to what it saw as an unacceptable compromise that would allow the election of members via a simple majority vote in the General Assembly, rather than the two-thirds majority vote it advocated.

Many UN analysts appeared to agree with the German position that the Human Rights Council had mechanisms in place for keeping spoiler states out, including a universal review procedure to scrutinize all countries' human rights records, the suspension of members who commit human rights violations, and full cooperation with the Council as a requirement for membership. Moreover, the two-thirds majority vote advocated by the United States would not necessarily have prevented states with questionable human rights records from becoming members if they had the support of the General Assembly and their regional bloc. Nevertheless, the United

States ultimately voted against the final Human Rights Council document—one of only four member states to do so (the others were Israel, Palau, and the Marshall Islands).

The resolution creating the Human Rights Council was adopted on 15 March 2006, paving the way for membership elections. Germany was elected to the Council, but the United States announced that it would not seek membership in 2006. Many UN observers believed the reason for this decision was the very real probability that a U.S. bid for membership to the Human Rights Council would have failed due to declining U.S. credibility on human rights issues. In this view, failure to obtain membership would have been more politically damaging for the United States than not standing for membership at all. The United States did, however, state that it would cooperate with Council members to ensure the highest standards of human rights⁴ and pledged its support to any state genuinely fighting for human rights. The U.S. government has said it is considering standing for Human Rights Council membership in 2007.⁵

It is unclear whether the Human Rights Council will prove a significant improvement over the Commission on Human Rights. The Council's first meeting continued the tradition of politicizing actions that so discredited its predecessor with the passage of a resolution sponsored by Islamic countries that required the review of alleged Israeli human rights violations at

every Council session.⁶ Another obvious criticism of the Human Rights Council is that not all states with questionable human rights records were prevented from becoming members. The reorganization of regional blocs has not necessarily reduced the likelihood that states with poor human rights records can assemble a majority to block unpopular resolutions.⁷ Members gave a “soft” pledge not to swap their votes for short-term political gains, but the pledge is not enforceable. Additionally, Council membership was reduced by only six countries, from 53 to 47 members—a missed opportunity, some say, to have increased the body's effectiveness.

Regardless of its membership status, the United States can support Germany and its other allies on the Council in establishing strong rules and procedures, developing universal review mechanisms, and working to minimize the politicization that crippled the old Commission. Other countries have appointed a human rights envoy to the Human Rights Council, and there have been calls for President Bush to do the same.⁸ Additionally, democratic states like Germany and the United States can set a positive example of the principles embodied in the new Human Rights Council by allowing their human rights records to be scrutinized by the international community. The U.S. and German governments can also use their political weight in international bodies that retain more “action authority,” such as NATO or regional organizations, to complement and support the work of the Human Rights Council.⁹

Management Reform

As major contributors to the United Nations, the United States and Germany share a common interest in advancing institutional reform within the organization. Bureaucratic disorganization and mismanagement, scandals such as the Iraqi oil-for-food program, and gross irregularities in the peace-keeping procurement process all offer hard evidence that reform is necessary. Some progress on management reform has actually been made, including the establishment of a new ethics office, a whistleblower program, a Management Performance Board, and an independent audit advisory committee.¹⁰ Despite these successes, however, management reform presents significant challenges. Progress on other initiatives, such as the call for a review of all UN mandates passed by the General Assembly over the course of the past sixty years, has been halting due to a significant and growing North-South divide within the United Nations—a trend that poses a significant obstacle for the future of UN reform.

Developed and developing countries have diverged in particular over the mandate review. Mandates have been the General Assembly's instrument for sending political messages and shaping policy debates. Developing countries therefore see the

mandate review not as a type of management reform but as a move by developed countries to control policy substance. While the United States, Germany, and other top UN contributors see as central issues the need for more institutional efficiency, transparency, and accountability, and a reduction of the crippling micromanagement imposed by the General Assembly, developing countries view reforms in this area as existential power plays aimed at reducing the power of the General Assembly to monitor the Secretary-General and control budgetary matters, which would enhance the Secretariat's—and thus, by extension, the big donors'—power in the United Nations. Changing the working practices in the United Nations, both institutionally and culturally, has therefore been a real challenge.

In December 2005, the United States intensified the conflict when it led a move that forced through a measure releasing only part of the UN budget for 2006. The release of remaining funds was made contingent upon progress in management reform in three areas: transparency and accountability, oversight ability, and mandate review. A deadline of 30 June 2006 was imposed for achieving these reforms.

At the General Assembly's budget committee meeting on 1 May 2006, the developing countries reacted to the spending cap by abandoning the convention of agreement-by-consensus for the first time in twenty years, forcing a vote on a resolution that reasserted the General Assembly's control over budgetary and financial questions. UN observers warned that the abandonment of the consensus rule in the budget committee—an agreement brokered in 1988 to prevent poor countries with the numerical majority from increasing the UN budget beyond a negotiated level—would lead to more difficulties in the future. The vote on the resolution in the General Assembly on 9 May 2006—121 for, 50 against, 2 abstentions—indicated a clear North-South split and underscored the failure of Kofi Annan's management reform efforts.

Development Reform

A recurring theme in UN reform debates is the assertion that peace and collective security are dependent on reducing global poverty and strengthening weak governments. UN member states see the importance of a coherent strategic approach on development that addresses both the need for structural and procedural reform within the UN and for enhanced cooperation with other international organizations, such as the World Bank, the IMF, NGOs, and regional organizations. Yet, despite the acknowledged importance of development reform, the deep rift between the wealthy North and the poorer South is most evident in this area. In his March 2005 report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed a "grand bargain" on development in which wealthy countries would commit more resources to development projects and Security Council reform, while developing countries would accept security and management reform measures. This grand bargain failed; at the September 2005 Summit, UN member states agreed only to increase annual Official Development Assistance levels by \$50 billion by 2012.¹¹

Although development reform was not significantly advanced at the September 2005 Summit, the United Nations continues its commitment to the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), aimed at reducing extreme poverty by 50 percent by 2015. The MDGs address specific economic and social factors that influence development rates, such as public education, child and infant mortality, HIV/AIDS and other major diseases, and environmental sustainability. They also encompass broader goals, such as establishing a global partnership for development. In effect, the MDGs map out a set of quantifiable objectives for creating the conditions many desperately poor nations need in order to improve the lives of their citizens.

The Millennium Development Project, an advisory body commissioned by Annan in 2002 to oversee the fulfillment of the MDGs, argues that developing countries' compliance with the MDGs, together with developed nations' commitment to give 0.7 percent of GDP for development aid assistance, can

In order to avoid an organization-wide crisis, the UN budget committee lifted the spending cap on 29 June 2006. However, this move avoided addressing the original intent of the spending cap: forcing progress on management reform. At present, the implications of this event are unclear. Developing nations will likely continue to block any reform effort they see as diminishing their power in the General Assembly, while developed countries and large UN contributors will continue to insist on fiscal accountability and institutional transparency. Consequently, it appears that the intense divisions between the developed, wealthy countries and the developing, poor countries will continue to hamper efforts at structural reform.

achieve the 2015 goals. Many other analysts, however, do not see the political will necessary to press states into compliance developing in the international community.

The U.S. and German governments agree that development is a major component of the UN reform agenda, although their approaches to the issue differ. As a matter of stated policy, the U.S. government is committed to alleviating poverty and improving international economic development. It supported the UN's Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the Monterrey Consensus in 2002, which committed its signatories to fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals. Though it has not agreed to the 0.7 percent of GDP aid pledge urged by the United Nations, the U.S. government has supported other goals, such as fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS, for which the U.S. Congress appropriated \$3.4 billion for the 2007 fiscal year.

These positive elements of the U.S. government's development policy were, however, forgotten in the rancorous battle over the September 2005 Summit outcome document precipitated by U.S. Ambassador John Bolton's submission of more than 700 alterations to the final document, including a demand that all references to the MDGs be deleted, in addition to all references to development assistance targets set by wealthy countries, which the United States itself had reaffirmed. Bolton's strong-arm tactics upset months of negotiations and created the impression that the United States was uninterested in the plight of poor countries and unwilling to do its share to fight extreme poverty.

Although the proposed amendments were eventually dropped, and President Bush reaffirmed the U.S. government's commitment to the MDGs in his speech before the General Assembly on 14 September 2005,¹² the United States' commitment to fighting poverty is nevertheless often questioned. The United States lags far behind other developed countries in terms of the level of gross national income given to official development assistance. Only two-thirds of the \$3 billion President Bush

requested for the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a program that provides grants to poor countries that have shown a commitment to adopting economic and political reforms, was approved in the foreign spending bill for the 2007 fiscal year, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in May 2006.¹³

The German government is more engaged in advancing a UN development reform agenda. In acknowledgement of the growing effects of globalization, German development policy shifted from a bilateral to a more multilateral aid approach in 1998. The German government has committed to contribute 0.7 percent of its GDP to the MDGs by 2015. In alignment with the European Union's pledge, Germany has also agreed to increase its development aid to at least 0.51 percent of its gross national income by 2010.¹⁴ However, in the context of Germany's current economic difficulties, it is questionable

whether this goal can be reached: Germany's overseas development assistance, currently at 0.3 percent of GDP, would have to double from 6 billion Euros in 2003 to 12.66 billion Euros in 2010, and then almost triple to 17.66 billion Euros by 2015 in order to reach the 0.7 percent of GDP pledge level.¹⁵

The United States and Germany can work together to advance UN development reform mainly by helping the United Nations improve its function as a facilitator of aid projects. Although the United Nations is not the world's largest aid donor, it can be instrumental in creating more effective aid development cooperation, one of the biggest hurdles confronting the development community. The United Nations' convening and norm-setting powers can enhance its development efforts. German and U.S. development experience can assist the United Nations in creating strategies that make use of its existing strengths in this area.

Conclusions

An overview of the UN reform process initiated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the early 2000s shows that prospects for advances in UN reform are admittedly mixed. Concerted support for the UN reform agenda by the United States and Germany has the potential to slowly push the process forward. However, differing opinions on certain reform issues, as well as of the larger role and purpose of the United Nations, must be reconciled in favor of such progress. The different roles played by the U.S. and Germany in the international community, which have been shaped by their respective historical experiences, will influence how these two states are able to cooperate on the issue of UN reform.

Reform in the area of peace and collective security is unlikely to take the shape of a restructured Security Council. The permanent members of the Security Council have little incentive for allowing such reform. The German government's efforts to keep the discussion of Security Council reform alive may eventually encourage the P5 to take a more flexible view of this issue, particularly if the P5 + 1 arrangement being tested in negotiations with Iran proves successful. However, a more realistic approach to peace and collective security reform for Germany and the U.S. would be to focus on developing the capabilities of the new Peacebuilding Commission to fulfill its

purpose. Establishing clearly defined rules and procedures for the Commission's operations, as well as efficient lines of communication both within and outside the UN system, is a priority. Systems for proper reporting to the General Assembly and the Security Council must be put in place and financial support procured. As members of the Peacebuilding Commission, the United States and Germany can encourage peace and collective security reform by setting these processes in motion.

A shared commitment to human rights makes Germany and the United States natural partners on initiatives in this area of UN reform, where working together will ultimately advance the interests of both states. Germany and the United States also have parallel interests in management and development reform, though their priorities differ somewhat. Nevertheless, shared interests create an incentive to coordinate strategies for implementing needed reforms in this area of UN reform. The combination of German respect for the United Nations and American pragmatism regarding the organization's capabilities can potentially result in strategies for reform that acknowledge the higher purposes for which the United Nations was created, while also remaining practical and feasible.

AICGS INITIATIVE ON THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The AICGS Initiative on the United States, Germany, and the United Nations explored different aspects of UN reform, seeking to enhance mutual understanding of German and American views on the purpose, structure, and role of the United Nations and to identify areas where opportunities for coordinated engagement on issues of mutual concern exist. The project was made possible through the generous support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Other AICGS UN Initiative Publications:

- Christian Schaller, "Combating the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Stronger Role for the UN Security Council?" AICGS Issue Brief No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: April 2006)
- Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The UN After Sixty: Challenges for the Future," AICGS Issue Brief No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006)

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NOTES

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