



AICGS ISSUE BRIEF

MAY 2006

07

The UN After Sixty: Challenges for the Future

BY CHANTAL DE JONGE OUDRAAT

What are the major challenges facing the United Nations in the twenty-first century?

How have the United Nations' peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction tasks changed?

Are the Millennium Development Goals realistic? What are the issues that divide the poorer member states from the wealthier member states on how to solve the poverty trap?

How can the viability of the UN as a collective security organization be reinforced? Is the UN the final and legitimate arbiter on questions concerning the use of force?

What kinds of institutional reforms should be implemented in order to improve the operational effectiveness of the United Nations?

In 2005, at the occasion of the UN's sixtieth anniversary, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called on world leaders to "recapture the spirit of San Francisco and forge a new world compact to advance the cause of larger freedom."¹ The Secretary General believed that the bitter debates in 2003 about the use of force in Iraq and the subsequent U.S.-led invasion of Iraq reflected deep divisions among UN member states regarding the role of the United Nations as an instrument of collective security.

Many observers shared Annan's perception—both of the problem and the need for UN reform.² Unfortunately, most of the public debate for reform focused on institutional reform—particularly on Security Council reform. Little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of the political divisions among UN member states and the types of challenges facing the UN in the early twenty-first century. These challenges are four-fold.

First, the nature of warfare has changed, and this poses formidable challenges to the UN. The UN Charter pledges to save future generations from the "scourge of war." Although armed conflict between states has been on the decline, political violence has not. Internal conflicts and civil wars have become the main source of armed conflict in the international system. These conflicts tear at the fabric of societies and create regional instabilities. Internal conflicts are difficult to solve, and UN member states are frequently divided over how to solve these conflicts.

Second, development has been a key item on the UN agenda since the 1960s. While considerable progress has been made in some countries, others have fallen far behind. In 2000, the UN member states adopted an ambitious program to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and the empowerment of women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development. Unfortunately, progress has not met expectations—over one billion people continue to live in extreme poverty and live on less than \$1.08 a day. The level of priority accorded to economic development continues to divide the North and South.

Third, the United Nations is based on a system of collective security. During the Cold War this system was prisoner of the ideological struggle between East and West. With the end of the Cold War many believed (and even more hoped) that the United Nations would at last be able

to uphold the principles enunciated in 1945 and become an effective guarantor of international peace and security. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the military predominance of the United States in the international system, making the UN system of collective security a prisoner of the United States. Coupled with increasingly unilateralist U.S. policies, this situation has created frustrations among other UN member states and poses a key challenge for the United Nations.

Fourth, the unique and formidable problems posed by security and economic development and the growing demands for the United Nations to intervene, particularly since the end of the Cold War, have led to institutional overload, dysfunctional situations, and policy failures. However, by focusing on administrative mismanagement, ethical conduct, and accountability, the institutional reform efforts will fail to bring about the operational reforms that are needed to deal with the substantive and political challenges the UN faces in the early twenty-first century.

The Internal Conflict Challenge

Internal conflicts are the predominant form of violent conflict in the twenty-first century. In 2006, the UN identified thirty active armed conflicts—most of which are internal conflicts and located in Africa. These conflicts are often driven by underlying non-military problems—unequal distributions of power and resources as well as weak political and administrative state capacities. They almost always involve neighboring states and pose serious threats to regional security. Internal conflicts cause great suffering to civilian populations; they ravage the economic and social structures of the countries and regions in question. At times, they lead to ethnic cleansing campaigns and genocide. Resolution of these conflicts often requires multi-dimensional, long-term intervention of outside powers, including the United Nations.

Internal conflicts or civil wars are not new phenomena. During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union were deeply involved in armed conflicts in developing countries. Their actions often fueled and prolonged civil strife. However, the United States and the Soviet Union were also keen to avoid direct superpower confrontation and would, in some cases, help control the escalation of such conflicts. The UN peacekeeping operations of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s helped the major powers to disengage from potentially volatile and violent situations without losing face. The United Nations was a neutral player in many of these conflicts and intervened only with the consent of the external powers and local parties. UN intervention usually consisted of positioning military forces between two or more warring parties. UN troops did not take sides and their use of force was restricted to self-defense.

The challenges the UN faces are complex and interconnected. They play out against the backdrop of globalization, which exacerbates economic and political inequalities.³ Within the United Nations, this translates into increasing polarization between North and the South, between rich and poor member states. As the poorer get poorer and the richer get richer, there is a growing sense of unfairness, injustice, and destitution. Globalization accentuates existing fault lines and creates political resentments that make it more difficult to generate consensus on a common vision of general norms of conduct and appropriate international responses.

As recognized by Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, "differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being." Many people in the developing world "believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful."⁴

With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations became a more active player in international peace and security issues, with most of its attention focused on internal conflicts and civil wars. Initial successes in helping move some conflicts toward resolution—in Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1989), Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1991), and Mozambique (1992)—propelled the UN to take on more responsibilities in this domain.

Many of the UN's new responsibilities involved tasks that extended far beyond the monitoring of cease-fires. The UN Security Council began to task the UN with forcing local parties to cease hostilities and to oversee the implementation of peace agreements. The latter entailed many nation-building responsibilities, such as the disarmament and demobilization of armed forces, the design and supervision of judicial and political reforms, the organization and monitoring of elections, the training of judiciary and law enforcement officers, and the promotion of economic recovery and development.

The expanded complexity and scope of these new tasks led to many organizational and administrative mishaps. They also brought to the fore more fundamental political problems. Two problems have stood out.

■ First, when and where the UN should intervene

The decision to launch a major peace operation requires the agreement of the permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom (the P-5). Many internal conflicts do not engage the major interests of the P-5 and hence will not lead to international action.

When the Security Council does act, intervention decisions are often based on muddled political and humanitarian considerations and lowest common political denominators. These have led to late or no action and to ill-defined mandates. The ethnic cleansing campaigns in the Balkans and the genocides in Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2005/2006) stand out as staggering humanitarian and moral failures of the UN and its member states.

■ **Second, how to ensure that operations are launched with sufficient resources**

Complex peace operations require a sustained supply of military manpower and financial resources. The demand for both has far exceeded the supply. The violent or potentially violent nature of many peace operations requires well-trained and well-equipped troops to ensure secure and stable environments. Yet, the potentially violent nature of these operations has made many countries—particularly developed countries—hesitant to commit troops. The disengagement of the rich industrialized powers from UN peace operations has posed real challenges for the UN. Since the late 1990s, the top troop contributing countries have all come from the developing world. The lack of adequate military resources has led to delayed and ineffective operations as well as the loss of many lives. To sustain secure and stable environments, outside powers also need to support programs that demobilize and disarm combatants, train police and law enforcement officers, and create effective public institutions, including economic institutions, that operate within the rule of law. Unfortunately, resources for these larger peacebuilding tasks often arrive in a haphazard, uncoordinated manner and tend to dry up once large-scale physical violence has stopped. Under these conditions, it should come as no surprise that roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years.

The 2005 UN Summit recognized that conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction are core functions of the UN and

pledged to strengthen UN capabilities in this field. It did so by creating a new body—the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The PBC was given three main tasks: to assist in planning for the transition from war to lasting peace; to marshal and sustain efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding; and to ensure better integration and coordination of efforts of the international community.⁵ Its work is to be gradually expanded, but would start with two or three cases (countries) in its first year of operation. By including not only the permanent members of the UN Security Council, but also the top financial and troop contributors to the UN, as well as the international financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) and important donor institutions such as the European Union, the PBC brings together all of the major players.⁶

The tasks for the PBC are daunting and expectations are high. Getting the major donors and the members of the UN Security Council to speak with one voice and move in the same direction requires unity of purpose that is difficult to achieve when international actors have different interests and agendas. In addition, some observers have questioned the top-down method to arrive at better integration and coordination of international efforts. They have cautioned that without the active participation of local parties, including international agencies in the field, reconstruction efforts are more likely to fail. Finally, if member states are serious about this effort, they should endow the Commission with sufficient resources. So far they have not given the Commission the support it requires.⁷

The Peacebuilding Commission can become a catalyst for change only if it receives the full political and material support it requires. Failure will entail heavy costs—not only for the people in conflict-ridden countries, but also for outside powers such as the United States and members of the European Union. Indeed, when conflicts become catastrophic in terms of human suffering and refugee movements, the United States and its European allies are often forced to intervene at high costs and for long periods of time.

The Development Challenge

Policymakers ranging from former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to Nigerian President Olusagun Obasanjo have recognized that reducing worldwide poverty and promoting economic development is essential to safeguarding peace and security.⁸ The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document acknowledged, “that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being.” UN member states have recognized that security, development, and human rights are “interlinked and mutually reinforcing” and in 2005 they reaffirmed their commitment to the time-bound Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of 2000.⁹

However, progress on the MDGs has been uneven and has been particularly lagging in Sub-Saharan Africa. The world’s population has grown enormously, doubling in the period from 1960 to 2000 from 3 to 6 billion. Half of the world population is poor and lives on less than \$2.15 a day. Over one billion people live in extreme poverty and live on less than \$1.08 day.¹⁰ The situation is most dire in Sub-Saharan Africa, where over 300 million people—46 percent of the population—cannot meet their basic needs for survival. It is also the only region in the world where the number of extreme poor has increased.¹¹ In addition, Sub-Saharan Africa is the home of 87 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion people who live on more

than \$1.08 but less than \$2.15 a day. Finally, many of these people live in countries that are subject to violent armed conflicts, which means that many people in this region are caught in a double trap—the poverty trap and the conflict trap.¹²

Theories of economic development have undergone considerable change since 1945, when development assistance became an issue of international concern. Initially, development assistance was viewed as a short-term activity to help get war-torn countries back on their feet. However, the onset of the Cold War and rapid decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s changed this view. Donor countries realized that development assistance required a broader and more sustained effort.¹³ Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the accumulation of capital and trade was seen as the motor of growth and the key to economic development and poverty reduction. By the end of the 1960s, confidence in this approach started to erode because of slow progress, particularly in the developing world.

The governments of developing countries became resentful and felt cheated out of the trade-induced growth that many developed countries enjoyed.¹⁴ In 1974, the Group of 77, a coalition of countries from the South, called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Group of 77 made six demands related to: trade and the stabilization of prices for primary commodities such as coffee, cocoa, and bauxite; the establishment of a common fund that would help countries adversely affected by steep price declines; the regulation of multinational corporations and the transfer of technology; an increase of foreign assistance; and changes in the structure of the World Bank and the IMF so as to give the developing countries a greater voice. Most of these demands went unheeded. If countries wanted aid, they were often forced to choose sides in the Cold War and seek assistance from one of the superpowers.

The global economic recession of the late 1970s, prolonged by the debt crisis of the 1980s, led major donor countries to rethink the conditions for economic growth and development assistance. Macroeconomic market principles and measures that would liberalize the trade and financial markets were seen as new keys to economic development.

Although this approach was highly criticized at first, by the late 1980s and early 1990s it was widely accepted by both donor and recipient countries. The principles of what was called the Washington Consensus consisted of three precepts: stabilizing macroeconomic balances; giving markets free rein; and privatization. However, the progress by countries that adhered to the Washington Consensus was slow or, in the case of Latin America and Africa, negative. Countries that did experience economic growth—notably India and China—were not adhering to these guidelines.

By the mid-1990s, many donor countries began to emphasize the role of good governance in promoting and sustaining economic growth. Many development assistance programs were made conditional on governance reform—the transparency of institutions, the adoption of anti-corruption measures, and the rule of law were high on the list. However, results continued to lag, particularly in Africa.

In 2000, the UN member states adopted the UN Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs put more emphasis on human development—people and poverty—and represented a shift away from growth and industrialization as the central objectives of development. They also represented a shift away from the Washington Consensus.

By 2005, some progress had been made, though it fell short of the intended goals. The UN Millennium Project, established to monitor implementation of the MDGs, argued that many countries in Africa were stuck in a poverty trap. That is, many countries were too poor to allow for sustainable economic growth or even any growth at all. The report highlighted five structural reasons as to why countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are likely, without outside assistance, to remain caught in a poverty trap: high transport costs and small markets; low-productivity agriculture; a very high disease burden; a history of adverse geopolitics; and slow diffusion of technology from abroad.¹⁵ The report called for a drastic increase in development assistance—from \$135 billion in 2006 to \$195 billion in 2015. Heeding this call for action, the G-8 adopted a comprehensive aid package in June 2005, which included the doubling of aid by 2010—an extra \$50 billion, and \$25 billion for Africa—and the cancellation of \$40 billion worth of debt.¹⁶

Many experts remain skeptical.¹⁷ William Easterly argues that these types of top-down efforts are ineffective. The only reason these initiatives are popular, he says, is that they keep “rich people happy that ‘something is being done’ about such a tragic problem as world poverty.”¹⁸ Easterly argues for piecemeal solutions at the local level. Even those more sympathetic to the MDGs and the G-8 initiative, such as Stephen Smith, argue that “successful cases of development usually involve a unique, local response to local constraints that outsiders are not in a good position to understand.”¹⁹

Meanwhile, the developing world calls for greater assistance from developed countries, while at the same time resisting the top-down development plans of development institutions. Many in the developing world perceive these institutions as pushing a liberal, market-oriented agenda not appropriate to local conditions.

Development poses a daunting challenge. It is another area where expectations have been high but policy results have lagged. The development challenge is particularly pressing in

Africa. Africa is also the main challenge in terms of internal conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. Both challenges are intricately linked, and an integrated approach is needed.²⁰ Unfortunately, while the UN has important operational respon-

sibilities in the security field, its operational responsibilities in the development field are marginal, compared to the responsibilities and capacities of the World Bank and the IMF, or bilateral development assistance programs.

The Collective Security Challenge

Collective security is a system in which states agree on a set of rules and values governing their behavior and a promise to respond—militarily, if necessary—to violations of the rules.²¹ Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring international peace and security, and its decisions are binding. For the UN collective security system to work, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, states must agree on the rules and values that will govern their behavior. Second, no one state can be so powerful that it can withstand collective action.

The first condition was not met during the Cold War. Rarely did China, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom reach a consensus on international peace and security issues. Conflicts abounded, but police actions by the UN Security Council were few and far between. With the end of the Cold War, the main political obstacle to enforcement action by the Security Council seemed to have disappeared. Many thought that the United Nations would at last be able to uphold the principles enunciated in 1945 and become an effective guarantor of international peace and security. In the euphoria of those early post-Cold War years and in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, which had seen a concerted international response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, many hoped that the Security Council would henceforth be able to bring into play the full range of enforcement measures provided for in the Charter. Many peacekeeping operations were launched in the 1990s and a vigorous debate unfolded over the use of force and the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states.

At the heart of these debates lies the question whether military force can be used lawfully in situations other than those foreseen by the UN Charter. Most legal scholars and most governments argue that the UN Charter contains a general prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4)). Scholars and governments generally maintain that the Charter allows for only two exceptions to this rule. One is in self-defense in response to an armed attack (Article 51). The other is when the use of force is authorized by the Security Council in order to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 42).²²

Thinking about the use of force evolved considerably in the 1990s and early 2000s. Within the context of peacekeeping operations and civil wars, the debate evolved from a very disputed right to humanitarian intervention—that is, the right of

outside powers to intervene militarily in case of genocide and gross violations of human rights—to a widely accepted norm of the duty to protect—that is “a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.”²³

The use of force in response to terrorist attacks also became more widely accepted, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. At that time the Security Council explicitly recognized that states have an inherent right to individual or collective self-defense. In other words, it condoned the unilateral use of force in those circumstances.²⁴ It underscored the growing consensus, particularly among the great powers, that sees terrorism as a national and international security threat.

Consensus with regard to the use of force to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was more elusive. The U.S.-led attack on Iraq in 2003 without UN Security Council imprimatur led to legitimate questions regarding the viability of the UN as a collective security organization. It prompted UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to suggest that the UN had reached “a fork in the road” and to ask a group of sixteen former government officials to take stock of the UN's position and develop proposals to improve the UN's capacity to take effective action.

Indeed, by sidestepping the Security Council on Iraq, the United States implicitly rejected the idea of collective security. This rejection was costly and potentially risky. As a result, other states will be more reluctant to help the United States in the future, as we have seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Washington's actions may lead other states to seek alternative means for ensuring their security, potentially leading to the breakdown of the non-proliferation regimes. The deterioration of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is especially worrisome.

The Institutional Reform Challenge

The institutional reform challenge for the UN is three-fold—political, managerial, and operational. The political challenge focuses on reform of the deliberative, executive, and negotiating bodies of the UN. In 2005 and 2006 much attention has focused on the expansion of the UN Security Council and the establishment of a Human Rights Council. Security Council reform is the hardy perennial of UN reform debates.²⁵ The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change presented two formulas for expanding the UN Security Council, but it was unable to obtain agreement on any one formula. Kofi Annan also called for action in his 2005 summit report *In Larger Freedom*. Despite vigorous campaigning by Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India—contenders for new permanent seats—no agreement on the expansion of the Security Council could be reached by the UN's membership. Deep-seated national competitions foreclosed agreement on this issue in 2005, and it is unlikely that this issue will be resolved soon.

Replacement of the UN Human Rights Commission was less contentious. The Commission had come under increasing criticism in the 1990s, when states openly disrespecting human rights would receive membership on the Commission and use their membership to shield themselves from criticism. The new Human Rights Council was established in 2006 by decision of the UN General Assembly and is to accord human rights a more authoritative and credible position within the United Nations by making membership more restrictive and keeping notorious human rights abusers out.²⁶

The managerial challenge of the UN has to do with the way the institution functions. Operational activities have increased enormously since the end of the Cold War. There has been expansion across the board, but especially in the peace and security area. For example, from 1990 to 2005, forty-two peacekeeping operations were authorized, compared to eighteen between 1945 and 1990. In addition, most post-Cold War operations are infinitely more complex and also involve more personnel—from an average of 1800 in 1996 to an average of over 5500 in 2005.²⁷

The dramatic increase in mandates and responsibilities has led to mishaps, inefficiencies, and inexcusable practices. In 2005 many of these problems came to the fore. The independent inquiry into the Oil-for-Food Program, under the leadership of former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, revealed important managerial weaknesses.²⁸ Another UN inquiry revealed serious flaws in the UN procurement system for peacekeeping operations.²⁹ Revelations regarding sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) further tarnished the UN.³⁰

Following the 2005 Summit, Kofi Annan published a comprehensive report to streamline the Secretariat and its functioning.³¹ Many of these reform efforts should not require the active cooperation and approval of UN member states. That said, the UN member states have a tendency to micromanage activities of the Secretariat. Suspicion and mistrust among UN member states and the member states and the UN Secretariat are common and have led to intervention by the member states in almost all decisions about the allocation of financial and human resources.³² Developing countries are very protective of the prerogatives of the General Assembly and fear that if too much power is given to the Secretary General, he too easily will become subject to the pressures of the powerful donor countries, who then will end up dictating the agenda. Managerial reforms within the UN are perceived as having important political implications—only strong leadership from the UN Secretary General and active cooperation by UN member states will allow for reforms to go forward. Whether Annan can muster such support in the last months of his tenure is doubtful.³³

The most difficult challenge for the UN is the operational challenge. This is the “missing third leg” in the UN's institutional reform efforts. As outlined above, the substantive challenges with which the UN is faced are complex and interconnected—security and development challenges in particular are closely linked and interdependent. Policy and operational responses need to reflect this reality. Yet, different bodies have responsibilities for these areas. The Security Council has primary responsibilities for peace and security issues—the World Bank and the IMF have primary responsibility for economic development issues. While some progress has been made since the early 1990s to coordinate activities, much remains to be done.

In addition, over the last decade many parallel structures have been set up to deal with security and development problems. The global UN institutions are no longer the only players in these arenas. Other inter-governmental organizations, such as the G-8, the European Union, NATO, and regional and sub-regional intergovernmental organizations have increasingly taken up political and operational responsibilities. Non-governmental organizations and civil society groups have also been active in these fields. The real challenge for the UN in the coming years will be to bring all these international actors together. It will require major conceptual and operational changes in the way the Secretariat and UN member states operate.

Concluding Thoughts

The Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change had hoped that striking a new grand bargain between the North and the South could bolster the UN's effectiveness. It argued, "without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. What is needed today is nothing less than a new consensus between alliances that are frayed, between wealthy nations and poor, and among peoples mired in mistrust across an apparently widening cultural abyss." The panel insisted that the UN must not just assert that a threat to one is truly a threat to all, but also act accordingly.³⁴ For this to happen, UN member states must acknowledge that the challenges are interconnected. They must also recognize that these challenges play out against the backdrop of globalization—that is, the growing integration of the world in terms of politics, economics, communications, and culture. Policy responses will need to take this reality into account. The challenges require integrated and networked

type of solutions. States and inter-governmental institutions have a hard time adjusting to these new requirements, preferring to work through upward or downward 'stovepipes.' Changing the operational institutional culture of the organization may ultimately be the UN's greatest challenge.

Global peace and order questions can be addressed only if international actors work together. Building patterns of cooperation will require sustained engagement based on mutual respect. The United Nations—the only international organization with near-universal membership and a broad mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security—is the best available platform for the formation and maintenance of international coalitions to tackle security and development challenges in the twenty-first century. UN member states—particularly powerful UN member states—should show leadership and assume special responsibilities in this domain.

NOTES

1 Kofi Annan, "In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN," *Foreign Affairs*, 25 April 2005, 63-74. See also Annan's report to the UN members states *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (New York: United Nations, September 2005).

2 See for example, *American Interest and UN Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 2005).

3 See, for example, Bruce R. Scott, "The Great Divide in the Global Village," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001; James K. Galbraith, Joe W. Pitts, Andrew Wells-Dang "Is Inequality Decreasing?," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002.

4 *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Security and Change* (New York: UN, 2004), 10.

5 Early warning and monitoring functions—that is identify countries under stress and who risk sliding towards state collapse or war—were dropped in the proposal by the UN Secretary General in his report *In Larger Freedom*. This was an issue popular neither with the developing countries, nor with Washington.

6 In addition, the PBC seeks to actively involve other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations active in the country in question.

7 A support office with a staff of fifteen—down from a proposed twenty-one—would seem meager to say the least. See the report of the UN Secretary General: *2005 World Summit Outcome: Peacebuilding Support Office*, 23 February 2006, UN document A/60/694.

8 See, for example, "Box 2 - Poverty reduction and Global Security," *Investing in Development A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals: Overview Report* (New York: United Nations, 2005), 7.

9 See *2005 World Summit Outcome* document, A/Res/ 60/1, 16 September 2005, para 9.

10 Extreme poverty is defined as living on less than \$1.08 a day. Poor is defined as living on less than \$2.15 a day. See *Investing in Development*.

11 South Asia also has many people living in extreme poverty. However, here the percentage of the population living with less than \$1.00 a day has decreased from 52 percent in 1981 to 31 percent in 2001.

12 See also Macartan Humphreys and Ashutosh Varshney, *Violent Conflict and the Millennium Development Goals: Diagnosis and Recommendations* (New York: Center on Globalization and Sustainable Development, The Earth Institute at Columbia University, CGSD Working Paper No. 19, August 2004).

13 For an overview of development assistance since the end of the Cold War see Catherine Gwin, "Development Assistance," in P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., *Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), 151-195.

14 See Craig N. Murphy, "What the Third World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the New International Economic Order Ideology," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.27, No. 1, 1983.

15 See *Investing in Development*. See also Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005). Jeffrey Sachs is the Director of the UN Millennium Project.

16 The UK had been the driving force behind this proposal. See the Tony Blair commissioned report: *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa* (London: March 2005).

17 See, for example William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006); William Easterly, "The Utopian Nightmare," *Foreign Policy*, September/October 2005, 58-59; Amir Attaran, "An Immeasurable Crisis? A Criticism of the Millennium Development Goals and Why They Cannot be Measured," *PlosMedicine*, Vol. 2, No. 10, October 2005, 0955-1192 (with reply of Jeffrey Sachs); and Dani Rodrik, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?," *Journal of Economic Literature*, January 2006.

18 See Easterly, *The White Man's Burden*, 17.

19 Stephen C. Smith, *Ending Global Poverty: A Guide to What Works* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005) 215.

20 In 2006 another blue ribbon panel was established by the UN Secretary General to streamline UN activities in the development, humanitarian assistance, and environment fields. It is expected to produce a report in the summer of 2006.

21 Unlike a balance of power or alliance system, collective security is not directed against third parties.

NOTES Continued:

22 Some scholars maintain that Article 2(4) does not contain a general and comprehensive prohibition on the use of force. They argue that it merely regulates the conditions under which force is prohibited, but leaves room for exceptions—only two of which are mentioned in the Charter (Articles 51 and 42). They maintain that the Charter permits the use of force in other circumstances. State practice—despite declaratory policies to the contrary—seems to concur with this view. Over the years, governments and scholars have argued that force can be lawfully used to protect and rescue one's nationals abroad, free people from colonial domination, protect people from gross violations of human rights, and to fight terrorism.

23 See *High Level Panel Report*, para 203. See also the *2005 Summit Outcome* document, which endorsed this norm, and UN Security Council Resolution 1674 of 28 April 2006.

24 The Security Council regarded the attacks of 9/11—as any terrorist attack—as threats to international peace and security, but it did not call for collective action. By invoking a state's right to self-defense, it handed over this responsibility to individual states. Resolution 1368 (2001) therefore became a very important instrument—if not a blank check—legitimizing the unilateral use of force in response to terrorist acts. Russian President Vladimir Putin invoked UNSC Res. 1368 (2001) and its right to individual and collective self-defense one year later when justifying Russia's right to military intervention against Chechen rebels operating in Georgia. See Putin's letter to the UN Security Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and Unwire, 12 September 2002. [www.unfoundation.org/unwire/]. See also Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, "The Role of the Security Council," in Jane Boulden and Thomas G. Weiss, *Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) 158-161.

25 The 2005 World Summit also requested a review of all UN mandates older than five years. A mandate is defined as a request or direction for action by the United Nations Secretariat originating in a resolution from the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). See the Report of the Secretary General, *Mandating and Delivering: Analysis and Recommendations to facilitate the Review of Mandates*, UN document A/60/733, 30 March 2006.

26 See UN General Assembly Resolution A/Res/60/L.48, 15 March 2006.

27 The UN's budget for peacekeeping has grown from US \$1.2 billion to over US \$ 5 billion over the last ten years. In 2005 alone the UN procurement budget—85 percent of which is for UN peacekeeping operations—jumped from \$400 million to \$1.6 billion and it is estimated to be \$2 billion in 2006. Similarly, military personnel saw an increase of 70 percent and civilian staff increased by 30 percent.

28 See the reports of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme @ www.icc-offp.org

29 See the Security Council debate on 22 February 2006 in UN document S/PV.5376.

30 See Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, Permanent Representative of Jordan, *A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN document, A/59/710, 24 March, 2005.

31 See the Report of the Secretary General, *Investing in the United Nations for a Stronger Organization Worldwide*, UN document, A/60/691, 7 March 2006. For more on UN Secretariat Reform efforts see Manuel Froehlich, *The Ironies of UN Secretariat Reform, 2006*.

32 See *Investing in the United Nations*, para 14-19.

33 Divisions within the UN are between the North and the South, donor and recipient countries, but also play out in the allocation of responsibilities between members of the Security Council and the General Assembly. For example, in March 2006 the Group of 77 hotly contested the UN Security Council's right to discuss peacekeeping management and procurement issues.

34 *A More Secure World*.

The UN After Sixty: Challenges for the Future

Located in Washington, D.C., the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies is an independent, non-profit public policy organization that works in Germany and the United States to address current and emerging policy challenges. Founded in 1983, the Institute is affiliated with The Johns Hopkins University. The Institute is governed by its own Board of Trustees, which includes prominent German and American leaders from the business, policy, and academic communities.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
GERMAN STUDIES
FOR CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN INSTITUTE

1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036 – USA
T: (+1-202) 332-9312
F: (+1-202) 265-9531
E: info@aicgs.org
www.aicgs.org

AICGS