AICGS ISSUE BRIEF

MAY 2008
21

Security and Stability: German and American Cooperation in Times of Transition

BY KIRSTEN VERCLAS

What are German and American perceptions and policies on current security issues?

What are the U.S. candidates' views on prevalent security issues and how would their policies impact transatlantic relations?

How can German-American relations help solve security issues and how might they hinder a solution?

Introduction

Security issues have weighed heavily on the transatlantic partnership since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Yet different threat perceptions have sometimes led to different German and American policies, which was especially apparent after the rift between Germany and the United States over the war in Iraq in 2003. While domestic issues usually influence elections more than foreign policy issues, the war in Iraq is playing a decisive role in the U.S. presidential election in November 2008. Likewise, in Germany foreign policy is on the forefront of the political agenda going into an election year in 2009. The Bundeswehr's role in Afghanistan, which must be approved by the parliament every year, is viewed critically in public opinion polls, such that it could become a major issue in 2009. Foreign policy choices in both the U.S. and German cases could very well decide the elections in the two countries.

In light of the two upcoming elections, this Issue Brief analyzes German and American perceptions of and policies on current security issues including terrorism, the conflicts in the Middle East, and questions of nuclear nonproliferation, i.e., Iran. It will also explore possibilities for cooperation and for conflict between Germany and the United States in solving these issues with an outlook on the changes to be expected after the U.S. presidential election, on the basis of the three remaining presidential candidates' foreign policy agendas. All three U.S. presidential candidates stress the transatlantic alliance as a vital tool in the fight against terrorism and other security threats—a sentiment shared by Germany and Europe—yet a discussion about shared values, methods, and goals must take place in order for the transatlantic community to effectively deepen its cooperation in solving these common challenges.

International Terrorism

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, terrorism has moved to the forefront of the foreign and domestic policy agendas in the United States and Germany. While certain policies have caused rifts (over the war in Iraq), others have improved cooperation (in intelligence sharing). Even as they strive to address terrorism at home and abroad, Germany and the U.S. still have not succeeded in coming to an understanding of what the fight against terrorism entails—is it a war or is it a crime?—and struggle to define their goals and methods, domestically and with their partners.

United States

Germany and the United States view the fight against terrorism in domestic and foreign policy terms. Yet, whereas Germany views the fight against terrorism primarily in criminal terms, the United States emphasizes military means. The current U.S. administration categorizes the fight in Iraq as combat against terrorism, something the German public—and past and present German administrations—have rejected. Despite differences in framing the fight against terrorism, German coordination with the U.S. intelligence community has been an example of fruitful cooperation in spite of complicated federal and state structures that hamper even domestic intelligence sharing. A growing problem for German-American intelligence sharing is the increasing reluctance in the German intelligence community to share information with the United States because of concerns about how the U.S. will use this information. This was exacerbated in recent years with media reports revealing the extent of German-American cooperation, for example, on extraordinary renditions, which has not met with public approval and raised serious human rights concerns. German-American disagreement also manifested itself around Guantanamo and the issue of the protection of human rights in the War on Terror. The concept of a 'Global War on Terror,' which makes Europeans so uncomfortable, is more common in the U.S., where it is employed to create a 'rally around the flag' effect and to mobilize not only public opinion but also resources.

In both Europe and the United States, the War on Terror underwent a shift around 2006: Both partners began to focus less on al-Qaeda as a broad terror network and more on local and regional terror cells, to which Osama Bin Laden is more of an inspirational leader and not necessarily involved in an operational capacity. Europe and the U.S. also face a dilemma concerning the criminal prosecution of terrorist acts: As the intent to commit a terrorist act is usually very difficult to prove, authorities have begun to collect evidence to convict terrorists for non-terrorism offenses, such as tax evasion. Yet intelligence services are often unwilling to reveal their sources, thereby limiting transnational cooperation.

Germany

The German government emphasizes the fight against terrorism on a domestic level, yet there is also a foreign policy perspective. On the domestic policy side, the debate about terrorism is linked to debates about immigration and integration. The German government and public understand the threat of terrorism coming from within and from minorities not integrated well enough into European society. The threat within European societies is real as the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 have shown, yet the immigration and integration debate in Germany misses the fact that the London attackers were seemingly well integrated in British society. Also connected to the issue of terrorism is the debate underway in Germany about civil liberties, which plays out differently among the elites and the public at large. While elites are concerned about limitations being placed on their civil rights and their privacy, the general public is more willing to curtail its rights if it increases safety. In combating terrorism domestically, Germany is emphasizing intelligence measures to prevent planned attacks and discover terrorist cells by freezing financial assets and outlawing extremist groups. In Germany, foreign policy regarding terrorism is focused on the war in Afghanistan, which the German population sees rather critically. Because the German parliament must renew the Bundeswehr's mission in Afghanistan on an annual basis, public opinion about the deployment has an immediate impact on the role of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan.

Transatlantic Cooperation on Terrorism in 2009

All three U.S. presidential candidates emphasize the Global War on Terror in their foreign policy agendas. They also all stress the importance of global alliances to win the fight against terrorism, beginning with a stronger transatlantic alliance. While Senator Barack Obama has said little explicitly about transatlantic ties, analysts argue that U.S.-European relations would improve under a President Obama, since they would be based "on shared values, and that will lead to a new era of closer cooperation."[1] Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton advocates that the United States "must reestablish our traditional relationship of confidence and trust with Europe"[2] and one of Senator John McCain's "top foreign policy priorities will be to revitalize the transatlantic partnership."[3] The desire to strengthen the transatlantic alliance will be well received in Europe, and especially in Germany.

The question, however, is what kind of burden-sharing stronger

transatlantic ties will bring and what the three candidates will expect from Europe and Germany, especially in the war in Afghanistan, which the U.S. links directly to the global fight against terrorism. Senator Obama articulates the possible demands on Europe the most forcefully calling for an "integrated strategy that reinforces our troops in Afghanistan and works to remove the limitations placed by some NATO allies on their forces. […] [T]oday, NATO's challenge in Afghanistan has exposed, as Senator Lugar has put it, 'the growing discrepancy between NATO's expanding missions and its lagging capabilities.' To close this gap, I will rally our NATO allies to contribute more troops to collective security operations and to invest more in reconstruction and stabilization capabilities."[4] Senator McCain echoed these remarks in stating that "[o]ur recommitment to Afghanistan must include increasing NATO forces [and] suspending the debilitating restrictions on when and how those forces can fight."[5]

Requests for stronger engagement in the fight against terrorism and especially in its foreign policy component—the war in Afghanistan—might come at a precarious time for Germany. German engagement in the war in Afghanistan remains deeply unpopular with the German population and any increase in or move of German troops to the more dangerous South in 2009 would create a great predicament for Chancellor Angela Merkel in an election year. Thus, demands from the new U.S. president to cement a deeper transatlantic relationship with actual commitments would probably remain unmet, causing potential friction in U.S.-German relations.

Yet, Afghanistan is only one side of the coin. For German-American intelligence cooperation to be successful, it must go beyond cooperation to active coordination with organized complementary activities and mutual reliance, creating a deep bond between intelligence services. This would represent a significant culture shift not only in the U.S. intelligence community, but also in Germany and it would require cooperation between partners on the basis of the same values and goals. The three presidential candidates all argue for improved U.S. intelligence capabilities, with Senator Clinton stressing that effective intelligence requires the U.S. to "rebuild alliances. The problem we face is global; we must therefore be attentive to the values, concerns, and interests of our allies and partners. That means doing a better job of building counterterrorist capacity around the world."[6] All three presidential candidates have pledged to close the base at Guantanamo, which would be welcomed in Europe as a signal of renewed U.S. respect for human rights, setting an important tone for improved intelligence cooperation.

German engagement in the war in Afghanistan remains deeply unpopular with the German population and any increase in or move of German troops to the more dangerous South in 2009 would create a great predicament for Chancellor Angela Merkel in an election year.

The United States can learn many lessons from Europe in its counterterrorism strategy. Currently, the American framework of the 'Global War on Terror' lacks a comprehensive strategy that defines the war's scope and content. In the past years, the U.S. focused on too many adversaries and the specific goals and benchmarks of its mission remained unclear. Since the goals were unspecified, the ways to achieve these goals also remained undefined. The new U.S. administration will need to remedy this situation by defining American goals clearly in cooperation with the U.S.' main allies on the basis of shared values.

The Middle East Conundrum

The Middle East conflict touches not only on issues of terrorism but also on issues related to the region as a whole. Without solving the conflict between Israel and Palestine, questions of terrorism and the security and stability in the region will remain unsolved. Germany's special relationship with Israel, borne out of a historical obligation to the country, is a major paradigm of German foreign policy, and the United States' own close relationship with Israel, as well its involvement in Iraq, shape both countries' approaches to the region. The 2007 Annapolis conference and the renewed peace process have reopened an opportunity for the U.S. and Europe to help bring peace to the region and to provide a lasting solution, yet many stumbling blocks remain.

United States

The United States is the key Western player in the region and is instrumental in addressing the Middle East conundrum. Not only is the United States heavily involved in the region through its military presence in Iraq, even more importantly, the U.S. is also in a position to apply pressure to Israel to accept an agreement regarding Palestine, should it be reached. The primacy of the U.S.-Israel relationship is a constant in U.S. foreign policy and will remain unchanged after the elections in 2008. President George W. Bush, more than any other American president, has emphasized (theoretically at least) the need for a Palestinian state. Israel's interest in the U.S. stems from the American military capability to not only offer Israel access to

weapons, but also to provide security guarantees. Yet, prior to the Annapolis conference, the current U.S. administration had been preoccupied with the Iraq War and neglected the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for most of its terms in office. Although the United States has made recent efforts to reengage in the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, the outgoing U.S. administration has little political maneuverability left to bring about a solution to this complex problem.

Germany

Being the most important trading partner for the Middle East, Germany's strategic position in the region is more of an economic nature rather than of political origin. Germany aligns its policy interests in the region with the strategy of the European Union, which is based on three major emphases: First, the main objective is "a two-State solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on implementation of the Road Map."[7] Second, in achieving this goal, the EU prefers the Quartet (comprised of the EU, the U.S., Russia, and the UN) as the major instrument in negotiations because it prevents political domination by the U.S., who is seen as biased in favor of Israel by some parties. Third, the EU is actively cooperating with the Arab countries through the Barcelona Process in order to secure the support of the Arab nations for any peace agreement. At the same time, Germany's special relationship with Israel is an important factor to consider for Germany's position in the region. This close relationship manifests itself in practical terms as well, such as access to weapons and help with negotiations about the release of Israeli soldiers. Germany's military involvement in the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon is further influenced by this relationship. Heralded as historic by Chancellor Merkel,[8] the mission was also a sign that "Germany is no longer a spectator in the region."[9] Despite its closeness with Israel, Germany is being viewed very positively also by the other major players in the region. Thus, Germany and the EU play a major role in the peace process and will be vital partners for the U.S. in solving this ongoing conundrum.

Transatlantic Relations and the Middle East in 2009

The Quartet will remain the most promising avenue for bringing about peace in the Middle East, as it combines both the United States and Europe as moderators to prevent accusation of bias. Yet, Russian-Western relations remain tense, with tensions likely to increase further if a President McCain implements his views on Russia not belonging in the G8.[10] European and American positions vis-à-vis the Middle East are not always convergent, allowing for the negotiating parties to potentially split a unified Western approach. Indeed, even the run-up to the Annapolis conference was problematic, as "the Europeans were left out during the preparations of the […] conference. This has led to frustration in the European capitals."[11] More substantive questions, such as the Western approach to Hamas and Syria, also endanger U.S.-EU unity in the Quartet. Europeans are growing increasingly wary of the War on Terror, which the United States connects to the Middle East peace process.

As with almost all foreign policy questions, the EU wrestles with the fact that it has to consolidate different national foreign policies. This is especially apparent in foreign policy vis-à-vis the Middle East as, for example, Great Britain "has moved in a pro-Israeli direction and has lost much of its credibility in the Arab world. France cherishes its historically strong ties with former colonies like Algeria and Syria (and Lebanon) and other Muslim nations. This automatically leaves detached Germany in the position of honest broker."[12] While the French position under President Nicolas Sarkozy has shifted toward becoming more pro-Israel, Germany has the potential to play a prominent role in consolidating not only EU interests, but to also have a decisive role in the Middle East peace process as the only player that is perceived as honest and which has had good ties to both Israel and the Palestinians over the past decades.

However, it is unclear how much a new U.S. president will be able to focus on the Middle East peace process while Iraq remains as the most important foreign policy item on the U.S. agenda for the region. Both Democratic presidential candidates link their strategy in Iraq with the peace process between Israel and Palestine. Senator Clinton argues that "[g]etting out of Iraq will enable us to play a constructive role in a renewed Middle East peace process that would mean security and normal relations for Israel and the Palestinians."[13] Senator Obama echoes her in saying that "[t]he morass in Iraq has made it immeasurably harder to confront and work through the many other problems in the region—and it has made many of those problems considerably more dangerous. Changing the dynamic in Iraq will allow us to focus our attention and influence on resolving the festering conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians—a task that the Bush administration neglected for years."[14] These statements suggest that both Democratic candidates would see the solution to the crisis in Iraq as a vital step toward the Middle East peace process, yet both also indicate that Iraq will be the primary focus of at least the initial period of a Clinton or Obama presidency. The Republican presidential candidate, Senator McCain, differs in his stance on American troops in Iraq and concluded a trip to the Middle East in March 2008 during which he met with Israeli politicians—but not the Palestinian president. Similar to the potential Democratic nominees, he emphasizes that "the next U.S. president must continue America's long-standing support for Israel, including by providing needed military equipment and tech-

nology and ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge."[15] He also states "[t]he long-elusive quest for peace between Israel and the Palestinians must remain a priority. But the goal must be genuine peace, and so Hamas must be isolated even as the United States intensifies its commitment to finding an enduring settlement."[16]

The support for Israel will remain a constant theme in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. All of the 2008 presidential candidates will also support the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the coming years, yet resolving the issues in Iraq might take precedence, especially if it is viewed as a necessary prerequisite to solving the Middle East peace process. U.S. policies toward the entire region will have an impact, as will U.S. efforts to increase its energy independence. However, the Middle East peace process could be a very important area in which the United States and Germany can truly cooperate—if Germany recognizes this potential, the United States engages more fully in the peace process, and U.S.-EU positions do not shift too far apart. While one of the most complicated negations, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has the potential to become a success in the transatlantic partnership, a0 political milestone that this partnership needs if it is to transcend historical ties and become an instrument for solving complex policy issues.

Iran and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The Middle East peace process is closely connected to the relationship between the West and Iran. Together with Syria, Iran is one of the most important financial supporters of Hamas and presents the most existential threat to Israel. The United States, Israel, and the EU have repeatedly stated that a nuclear Iran would threaten not only Israel but also the geopolitical balance of the entire region and is therefore unacceptable. Yet, Iran is only a symptom of the bigger picture of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The treaty has been attacked both by nuclear and non-nuclear states as not functional, burdensome, and unfair. The new U.S. president and the new German government will have to wrestle with both Iran and nuclear non-proliferation in 2009 and beyond.

United States

Under the current administration, the U.S. has advocated restrictive economic and political sanctions against Iran and Iranian-U.S. relations have reached a low point. Pithy rhetoric from the leaders of both countries did not improve relations and Europeans especially have been concerned that President Bush will either go to war with Iran or have Israel attempt to destroy Iran's suspected nuclear facilities with tacit U.S. endorsement. While some of the friction can be attributed to the style of both President Bush and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, U.S. policy toward Iran has been based on a bipartisan consensus, with nuances only in the amount of pressure to apply on Iran. In trying to prevent a nuclear Iran, the United States is actively defending its interests in the Persian Gulf. The allies in the region see Iran clearly as a threat and would like to have American security guarantees. However, the U.S. military is already stretched with two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and, by most analysts' assessments, would not be able to sustain a prolonged war with Iran, to a certain extent compromising U.S. ability to contain Iran with threats of a military engagement. Apart from continued American-European cooperation, key in dealing with Iran—from the U.S. perspective—will be the balance of forces in the region and the U.S. arguing from a position of military strength. In this it will also be important to solve the problems in Iraq and not let that conflict further deteriorate the U.S.' image in the region.

Germany

Germany and the United States have had similar views on Iran; while not all tactics and decisions are the same, the overall goals and strategies are compatible. Even though Europe in general, and Germany in particular, always stress negotiations as the modus operandi vis-à-vis Iran, neither wants to see a nuclear Iran in its backyard. Germany's constructive engagement with Iran (*Doppelter Ansatz*) emphasizes the desire to negotiate with Iran on the one hand and allow the UN to explore how it can pressure Iran to fulfill international obligations on the other.[17] Germany, France, and Great Britain comprise the 'EU Three,' which have held negotiations with Iran in the past. Despite initial U.S. hesitation toward this initiative and Iranian efforts to split the United States and Europe, the Bush administration came to support the European efforts. Western collaboration has spilled over to the UN Security Council where the five permanent members and Germany orchestrated a new sanctions resolution in March 2008, followed by a May 2008 new package of incentives from the P5 plus Germany (which Iran rejected). Russia and China are important players to the U.S., as they are in a good position to apply pressure and offer incentives to Iran (i.e., Russian equipment for Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant). Germany also has leverage with its economic relations with Iran, which have been excellent over the past decade, with Germany being Iran's top trade partner: "[i]n 2005 Germany had the largest share of Iran's export market with $5.67 billion (14.4%)."[18] Both the trade and financial sector are areas in which German-American collaboration

has been especially good in maintaining restrictions on Iran. Additionally, Germany is chairing the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008, which could be an important instrument in supplying Iran with nuclear energy without allowing Iran to become nuclear itself, making Germany an important voice in the West's stance toward Iran.

Transatlantic Cooperation on Iran and Nuclear Proliferation Issues in 2009

The Democratic presidential candidates have similar views on Iran. Senator Clinton states that "Iran poses a long-term strategic challenge to the United States, our NATO allies, and Israel. It is the country that most practices state-sponsored terrorism, and it uses its surrogates to supply explosives that kill U.S. troops in Iraq."[19] This opinion, which is shared by Senators Obama and McCain, does not differ from the current U.S. administration's assessment, arguing for a consistent evaluation of Iran. Senators Obama and Clinton differ, however, from the current administration on what this assessment means in practical policy implications. Senator Obama argues that "[a]lthough we must not rule out using military force, we should not hesitate to talk directly to Iran."[20] Senator Clinton agrees: "[I]f Iran is in fact willing to end its nuclear weapons program, renounce sponsorship of terrorism, support Middle East peace, and play a constructive role in stabilizing Iraq, the United States should be prepared to offer Iran a carefully calibrated package of incentives."[21] Both senators keep the military option on the table, and both stress that the international community will be crucial in solving this crisis without it. Thus the cooperation between the European Union and the United States vis-à-vis Iran will also be important in the years to come.

Senator McCain also emphasizes the international community's responsibility to confront Iran, but he goes even further by stating that "[i]f the United Nations is unwilling to act, the United States must lead a group of like-minded countries to impose effective multilateral sanctions, such as restrictions on exports of refined gasoline, [even] outside the UN framework."[22] This position may cause friction with the European nations—and especially Germany, which has always viewed international cooperation through the UN Security Council as one of the paradigms of its national security policy. For any new U.S. president, dealing with Iran will be one of the most important priorities—even more so because Iran is closely connected to U.S. success in Iraq. It is imperative in addressing the Iranian challenge to avoid sending mixed signals of U.S. desire for a regime change in Iran and opposition of nuclear capabilities, a dilemma that has marred the current U.S. administration's approach to the country.

Iran is only one country defying proliferation. North Korea's attempt to develop nuclear power facilities, albeit so far successfully addressed by the Bush administration in cooperation with the international community, has not been completely solved. Furthermore, recent U.S. allegations of Syrian-North Korean cooperation to develop nuclear capabilities could cause tensions to flare again. The importance of nuclear proliferation and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) cannot be underestimated. As an international issue, Germany and Europe also have an interest in solving these problems. But the problem of the NPT is that there is a stalemate about the ultimate intention of the treaty: Is it a non-proliferation treaty or a disarmament treaty? While nuclear states, among them the U.S., see the NPT principally as an enforcement tool against nuclear proliferation, non-nuclear states, including Germany, contend that nuclear states have not done enough in terms of disarmament. The U.S. presidential candidates have raised interesting ideas for renegotiating the treaty. Senator Clinton emphasized the U.S.' responsibility to reduce its nuclear arsenal. Additionally, she would "seek Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 2009 […]. This would enhance the United States' credibility when demanding that other nations refrain from testing." She would also "support efforts to supplement the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty […arguing that e]stablishing an international fuel bank that guaranteed secure access to nuclear fuel at reasonable prices would help limit the number of countries that pose proliferation risks."[23]

For any new U.S. president, dealing with Iran will be one of the most important priorities—even more so because Iran is closely connected to U.S. success in Iraq.

Senator Obama agrees with Senator Clinton on reducing U.S. nuclear stockpiles in accordance with Russia and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Additionally, his "administration [would] immediately provide $50 million to jump-start the creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency-controlled nuclear fuel bank and work to update the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."[24] Senator McCain is even more specific in his vision to update the NPT: "The next U.S. president must convene a summit of the world's leading powers—none of which have an interest in seeing a world full of nuclear-armed states—with three agenda items. First, the notion that non-nuclear-weapons states have a right to nuclear technology must be revisited. Second, the burden of proof for suspected violators of the NPT must be reversed […], there should be an automatic suspension of nuclear assistance to states that the agency cannot guarantee are in full compliance with safeguard agreements. Finally, the IAEA's annual budget of $130 million must be substantially increased so that the agency can meet its monitoring and safeguarding tasks."[25]

Both Democratic candidates stress renegotiations of the NPT

and a U.S. willingness to disarm portions of its nuclear arsenal, a position that Germany, as one of the states sympathetic to complaints that the U.S. has not done enough to further disarm, would certainly welcome. Should Senator McCain be elected, Germany and the U.S. would most likely differ on the U.S.' responsibility to disarm as well as his argument that non-nuclear weapons states have no right to nuclear technology. While the NPT is not as successful as it could be, re-negotiations of the treaty might lead to more harm than success, as other states will want to address their grievances as well. As the prospect of nuclear energy, as a cleaner fuel, becomes more popular, Senator McCain is unlikely to be accommodated in his position against a right to nuclear technology for non-nuclear weapons states. If a renegotiation of the NPT is indeed on the agenda, it would be advisable for Europe (including Germany) and the U.S. to agree on a common position to avoid a failure of the negotiations or possible dead-lock. Compromises will be necessary on both sides.

Conclusion

Election years are uncertain times. The current U.S. administration has little political room left to make an impact and the new U.S. administration will not be determined until November. Once the new U.S. president takes office in January 2009, Germany will be preoccupied with its parliamentary election campaign, culminating with the elections in fall 2009. Still, pressing security issues, such as terrorism, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, will not wait for the new German and American governments to be assembled. Regardless of which candidate wins the election, the U.S. public will demand solutions to American involvement in Iraq. The German population is increasingly questioning the German involvement in Afghanistan. Foreign and domestic demands are increasing. A strong transatlantic relationship is imperative for solving the security issues currently facing our countries. But the new U.S. administration will not work on improving the transatlantic relationship only for the sake of historical ties. If the transatlantic relationship is to survive, and the German-American partnership is to remain a vital part of this relationship, it needs to become a solution to these security issues and not another problem. A transatlantic discussion about shared values and goals as well as the acceptable methods to achieve these goals is essential if the German-American partnership is to be taken seriously by both the White House and the Bundeskanzleramt beyond the elections in 2008 and 2009.

NOTES

1 Dan Vickrey, "President Obama and Europe," Atlantic Review, <http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1044-President-Obama-and-Europe.html> (7 May 2008).

2 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 14.

3 John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom – Securing America's Future," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 26.

4 Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007) <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401-p30/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html> (19 May 2008).

5 John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom – Securing America's Future, "Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 22.

6 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 10.

7 EU Position on the Middle East Peace Process, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/index.htm> (23 April 2008).

8 Judy Dempsey, "Germany to deploy UN troops to Lebanon," International Herald Tribune, 14 September 2006, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/13/news/germany.php< (23 April 2008).

9 Ibid.

10 John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom – Securing America's Future," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 27.

11 Almut Möller, "Europe and the Annapolis Process," The AICGS Advisor, 22 February 2008, <http://aicgs.org/analysis/c/moeller022208.aspx> (23 April 2008).

12 Jeroen Bult, "Germany's Middle East Policy: Equilibrium and Growing Self-Confidence," 24 January 2007, <http://www.worldpress.org/Europe/2644.cfm> (23 April 2008).

13 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 8.

14 Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007) < http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401-p10/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html> (19 May 2008).

15 John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom – Securing America's Future," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 23.

16 Ibid: 23.

17Auswärtiges Amt, „Der Konflikt um das iranische Atomprogram," <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Abruestung/IranNukes/070915IranNuklear.html > (16 May 2008).

18 Nader Habibi, "The Cost of Economic Sanctions on Major Exporters to Iran," 5 May 2006, <http://www.payvand.com/news/06/may/1046.html> (7 May 2008).

19 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 11.

20 Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007) < http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401-p10/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html> (19 May 2008).

21 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 11-12.

22 John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom – Securing America's Future," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 22.

23 Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 23.

24 Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007) < http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401-p20/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html> (19 May 2008).

25 John McCain, "An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom – Securing America's Future," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007: 31.

The next two years are critical for German-American relations. With the presidential election in the United States in 2008 and the German parliamentary election in 2009, the political landscapes, priorities in domestic and foreign policies, and political actors are about to change. Key issues of interest to both countries include the war on terrorism, the war in Iraq, how to deal with Iran and North Korea, the relationships with China and Russia, and environmental issues such as global warming. These issues will be examined and reevaluated by the new leaders, perhaps assigning them a different importance than they currently carry. Regardless of what the future agenda will be and on which key issues both sides will have to focus their attention and resources, it is imperative that the United States and Germany come to an understanding about these issues and their comparable or diverging interests related to them. The German-American relationship remains one of the most crucial partnerships to address the issues confronting the world—especially with Germany as one of the most important players in Europe. This AICGS project analyzes current and future issues on the German-American agenda and will make recommendations to the new American administration. This project aims not only at understanding the key issues before us, but also at examining how the German-American relationship can be used to solve these issues or where German and American interests and views might diverge and how a potential confrontation can be avoided.

Recent Publications from AICGS:

- Steven Erlanger, Lily Gardner Feldman, Helmut Hubel, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Tony Smith, Bassam Tibi, Angelika Timm, and Clemens Wergin, *German and American Perspectives on Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East Conflict*, AICGS German-American Issues 6 (2006).

- Peter Rodman, *American Policy Toward Iran: Bush and Beyond*, AICGS Web Essay (2008).

All AICGS publications are available on our website at www.aicgs.org/analysis/publications.

Kirsten Verclas is the Research Program Associate at AICGS and can be reached at kverclas@aicgs.org.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

AICGS is grateful to the **German Marshall Fund of the United States** for their generous support of this project.

This Issue Brief is supported in part by the AICGS Foreign and Domestic Policy Program.

Building Knowledge, Insights, and Networks for German-American Relations.

Located in Washington, DC, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies is an independent, non-profit public policy organization that works in Germany and the United States to address current and emerging policy challenges. Founded in 1983, the Institute is affiliated with The Johns Hopkins University. The Institute is governed by its own Board of Trustees, which includes prominent German and American leaders from the business, policy, and academic communities. Please visit our website at www.aicgs.org.

Security and Stability: German and American Cooperation in Times of Transition

AICGS
AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES
AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036 – USA
T: (+1-202) 332-9312
F: (+1-202) 265-9531
E: info@aicgs.org
www.aicgs.org

1983–2008
KNOWLEDGE • INSIGHTS • NETWORKS
WISSEN • EINBLICKE • BEGEGNUNGEN