THE JEWISH VOICE IN
TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

AICGS GERMAN-AMERICAN ISSUES

01

Edited by:
Jeffrey M. Peck

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

AICGS

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR CONTEMPORARY GERMAN STUDIES

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

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

FOREWORD

For more than two decades, AICGS has been engaged in helping to shape the agenda of German-American relations. By anticipating change, producing insights and analyses, and creating channels of communication across a broad range of audiences, AICGS helped strengthen the awareness of the continued importance of the complex relationships between Germans and Americans. The twentieth century tells the dramatic history of the continuities and discontinuities in those relationships. The antagonism and bloody conflict of the first half of that century gave way to the post-1945 period that was testimony to the ability of Germans and Americans to work together.

Now in a new century still marked by old and new threats and dangers, the need to continue learning our lessons about preserving democracy, pluralism, religious tolerance, peacekeeping, and free speech remains of paramount importance. The record of reconciliation, remembrance, and renewal in relations between Germany, the United States, and Israel is one that can be of enormous importance to these contemporary challenges.

AICGS is proud of its two-decade effort to incorporate this record into its programs and projects and this publication represents additional evidence of our continuing work on German and Jewish relations within Germany, Europe, across the Atlantic, and on the world stage.

German and American societies are anything but monolithic and there is a multitude of voices active in them. The Jewish voice is one of them, yet, given the legacy of the twentieth century, it is centrally involved in the complex relations binding Germany and the United States with each other and the world. This publication is an important contribution to the understanding of those relations since they testify to the openness and progress between countries and peoples that have much in common.

This publication is also an illustration of the commitment of AICGS to focus its resources on our continuing effort to understand the changing content of national identities, religion, culture, and values in a world in enormous transition, particularly since the end of the Cold War and now in the wake of September 11. German and American perspectives and policy responses to today's challenges are shaped by societal values and perceived lessons of history. As we struggle to set our priorities and agendas, we need to have a better understanding of the basis of both cooperation and conflict over both. Toward that end, AICGS is reaching out to a broad spectrum of audiences and interests as we facilitate and enhance the German-American dialogue.

I am particularly grateful to the tireless work of Jeff Peck, who was primarily responsible at AICGS for creating the symposia and this publication. I am also thankful for our continuing and close collaboration with the American Jewish Committee and the Leo Baeck Institute.

JACKSON JANES
Executive Director
AICGS

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

INTRODUCTION: WHAT OR WHO IS THE JEWISH VOICE IN GERMAN AMERICAN RELATIONS?

JEFFREY M. PECK

The symposia (April 11 in Washington and September 8, 2003 in New York) that produced these essays were very timely. These two events took the pulse of speakers and audiences at two significant moments and in two different cities, from the prelude to the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Other world events such as the disintegration of the Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East and the outbreak of a "new" anti-Semitism in Europe also contributed decisively to the discussion.

In the German-American context, there were other factors such as the transatlantic fallout over German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's rejection of President Bush's preemptive war in Iraq. Many observers in both countries saw this decision driven by the domestic necessity of reelection, rather than by more lofty ethical rationales. Other domestic events less known to American audiences were also salient, such as the anti-Semitic attacks on the Vice President of the German Jewish community and talk show host, Michael Friedman, by the late Jürgen Möllemann, an FDP politician with strong pro-Arab ties. In the United States, with the Middle East and Iraq still in chaos, the American public remains divided as the 2004 election approaches, an election that will hinge largely on these global events. And within this context, German-American relations remain a source of serious concern on both sides of the Atlantic.

While German and Jewish relations have always been affected by the horrible acts and painful memories of the Holocaust, the German-American relationship has been positive and long-standing since the end of the Second World War. There have, of course, been some difficult moments, specifically the impact of President Reagan's visit to Bitburg Cemetary in 1985. At that point, a critical and prominent Jewish voice, that of Elie Wiesel, cautioned President Reagan upon his visit to the cemetery where members of the Waffen SS were interred, "That place, Mr. President, is not your place." In the last two years, however, the transatlantic alliance has become more tense and fragile as a result of the events mentioned above, as well as the beginning of the so-called Second Intifada. Indeed, as far as Israel and the Middle East are concerned, German-American relations are becoming increasingly complicated by the Jewish voice from both inside and outside the United States. In fact, the triangular relationship among the United States, Germany, and Israel is a complex stage upon which major battles are being played out.

Emanating from Jewish citizens in all of these countries, the Jewish voice has also become a discourse that increasingly goes beyond the Jews themselves. It also includes others who speak for interests favorable to the Jewish state, among these the Christian evangelical right in the United States and German sympathizers on both ends of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, no matter who or what constitutes the "Jewish voice"—state institutions, NGOs, lobbies, or individuals—the question of power and influence remains a central issue.

Who has it? Is it real or imagined? Is it real or exaggerated? Once the Jewish voice might have been almost exclusively concerned with Germany's treatment of its Jews since the Holocaust–a domestic matter with international ramifications, such as the issue of slave labor restitution. Now, however, it almost always refers to the question of Israel, an issue that impinges on global politics and power, as we see so brutally every day. Still, we must admit that the impact of the Holocaust–and the questions of guilt and responsibility that are exploited on both sides of the political spectrum–continue to eclipse even this new focus.

There was no better signal of this shift than the article by writer Ian Buruma in *The New York Times Magazine* (August 31, 2003), appearing just a week before the second symposium. Entitled "How We Talk–and Don't–About Israel," Buruma puts his finger on the issue central to our discussion when he states in the sub-title, "Is anti-Semitism behind much of the world's view that Israel moves American foreign policy? Thoughts on a very loaded question." Indeed, this question is loaded. And as Buruma goes on to show, it is one that is extremely complicated, laden with layers of mythology, prejudice, and even folklore clouding any clear, differentiated, or precise statements about a definition of the Jewish voice. In so many words, the Jewish voice is, as Buruma phrases it, more about how to talk about Israel, rather than what actually happens there. His focus on discourse–language in its specific social function–reminds us that what Jews or Christians, Americans or Germans, Israelis or Palestinians are saying when they talk about Israel consists of terms, metaphors, and comparisons. These statements are made in a language that is fraught with ideologies and prejudices that shape the elusive "truth," a lofty goal that in this deeply contested situation seems to defy achievement. In this maelstrom of verbal accusations and reproaches, Buruma seems to be searching for some semblance of objectivity in a situation that is weighted by history and politics, as well as destruction and death. In other words, the Jewish voice is never neutral and facts are interpreted to suit specific agendas and interests. All the more reason to disentangle, as Buruma nobly attempts, the fact from the fiction and the reality from the myth.

Let us look at some of these critical and interpretive moments shaping the realities of the Jewish voice.

- As Buruma points out, there have always been conspiracy theories about Jewish power–that governments such as the British or American, are "dominated or manipulated by Jews"(30). While these myths have rarely led to more than nasty speculation and prejudice in the West, in the Soviet Union and its satellites, attacks on "Zionist conspiracies among Jewish cosmopolitans," to use the inflated language of the time, was indeed very dangerous and led to purges and executions.

- Others have criticized the Jewish voice when it is expressed as exaggerated focus on the Holocaust, as a manipulative attitude inspiring guilt that refuses to allow criticism of Jews or Israel. Reproaches such as this have come from many corners: from Germany, during the infamous debate in 1998 between author Martin Walser and the late President of the Council of Jews in Germany Ignatz Bubis. Walser accused the Jews of using Auschwitz as a *Moralkeule* (moral bludgeon), and Bubis retorted by calling Walser a *geistige Brandstifter* (spiritual arsonist). However, the Israelis are also not immune from being accused of misusing the Holocaust, even from within their own fold. Some examples are the so-called post-Zionists, who condemn the exploitation of the Holocaust for Zionistic goals, and of course, both Norman Finkelstein's incendiary study, *The Holocaust Industry. Reflections of the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering* and Peter Novick's more scholarly and reasoned book, *The Holocaust in American Life*, which have added fuel to the fire in the United States.

- Most recently, in Germany and the United States, there have been new iterations of old conspiracy theories that allege the existence of a neo-conservative cabal (consisting of Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz) in the White House that is heavily influenced by University of Chicago philosopher and German Jew Leo Strauss.

In the first symposium, Jacob Heilbrunn was one of the first journalists to draw these important connections, connections that now are more widely discussed in publications such as *The New York Times*, *Der Spiegel*, and *Commentary*. These men are accused of shaping American foreign policy in the Middle East, especially towards Iraq, with the goal of protecting Israel. Perhaps it is an over-interpretation, but George W. Bush's often criticized no-nonsense bullying resonates with Buruma's reading of Strauss' politics, namely, that "if one thing ties neo-conservatives, Likudniks, and post-cold-war hawks together, it is the conviction that liberalism is strictly for sissies."(32)

There are, of course, other versions of these stereotypes and prejudices that are based on dangerous comparisons, such as equating Zionists or Israelis with Nazis, on the one hand, and calling all criticism of Israel anti-Semitic, on the other. While the lines are often blurred, it is too easy to resort to cliches and knee jerk reactions based on narrowly defined personal interests. Pitfalls exist on both sides, particularly when events are taken out of historical context and discourses associated with one particular event are transferred to the other.

If the critics, scholars, and journalists who contributed to this publication can teach us anything, they can lead us to a more dispassionate yet critical approach. This does not mean disinterest or cold objectivity but, rather, a rational reflection on each of our own points of view—where they originate, for what reasons, and what they mean for our understanding of the situation. Only through this method can we disentangle the strands of history and find our way out of a disastrous conundrum that is harming Jews and Arabs alike.

But what is to come after these symposia and publication? What will the Jewish voice be in the years to follow? Certainly, our discussions have proven that there is no unified or monolithic voice. It is, rather, a voice comprised of many modulations and registers, not always in harmony, neither domestically nor globally. But as these voices proliferate, more differentiation and specificity can capture details and nuances in increasingly complicated relations. This is especially important as history pushes Germany further away from its past and only clouded memory survives to link these events to a continued optimistic and democratic future. Hard questions will need to be asked. Can there be remembrance without victimology on the one side and resentment on the other? Can there be the acknowledgment of legitimate influence without accusations of conspiracy? Could we, in fact, not have a Jewish voice that takes advantage of changing relations between the Diaspora and Israel that produce new identities spawned from these transformations? One such example is the dynamic growth of a Jewish community in Germany today—over 100,000 strong, the fastest growing and the third largest in Europe, consisting primarily of immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Germany is the home of a thriving Jewish community that could not have been imagined even twenty years ago, much less at the end of the Second World War. Soon we will have new "German Jews" radically different than before 1933 and with new perspectives on what it means to speak as a Jew and a German. Perhaps new conceptions of "German Jews" and even "non-Jewish Germans" will represent the dynamic and shifting process of identity building that may some day exemplify the new Europe as well.

In a world of intertwined global politics marked by wars, disasters, and human tragedy, can we imagine a new role for the Jewish voice worldwide? Might Jews not mediate between centers and peripheries

and transcend boundaries of national politics in order to fulfill a transnational role imbedded in their traditional Diasporic identity? This question does not mean that Jewish commitment to Israel should diminish, only that the benefits of new Jewish communities in Europe and the Diaspora, for example, might play a stronger role as Diaspora-Israeli relations adjust to today's globalized society. Perhaps the Jewish voice can exemplify the positive aspects of a future society that is characterized by diversity, rather than by sameness. This would mean focusing on the interaction and production of voices and the identities that produce them, rather than on absolute or exclusive positions–either being only "for" or "against," or "one" or the "other."

Thus, the questions raised about the Jewish voice in German American relations represent both the future of "minority" voices in and between both political systems–for example, the "Muslim voice" and the recognition of how nations come to terms with their diverse religious, racial, or ethnic diasporic populations. This situation is already the norm, and it will continue to advance as the transfer of ideas and images increases even more quickly through information technology than through the migration of people from country to country. Mobility will create a push and pull that will reshape cultural identities into new forms, forms that will challenge traditional notions of the nation-state, ethnicity, race, or religion. Unfortunately, there are risks involved with such movement, as we saw so dramatically on September 11 when borders, once thought immutable, were crossed in real and virtual space. This brought on both the tragic events and made it possible to experience their horror simultaneously anywhere in the world. Now "transnationals" or "non-state actors" terrorize friends and foes alike, making it even more difficult to know the boundaries of security and trust that guide us in differentiating between those who would do us harm and those who would not.

In this frightening new system of relations, the United States and Germany, the former a traditional country of immigration and the latter a new member of this club, should draw more deeply on their long-term friendship and common values to support the positive aspects of movement inherent in new global networks. While Jews and a Jewish voice have a special history in the transatlantic relationship, it is now just one of many aspects of the relationship. It is, however, an important one that might be helpful in showing us how to navigate a more complex future.

EDITOR'S NOTE

This publication was based on the symposia sponsored by the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS), the American Jewish Committee (AJC), and the Leo Baeck Institute (LBI). The events and publication were part of my commitment to the work of these organizations, in particular my responsibility as Senior Fellow in Residence at AICGS to present my work on contemporary German Jewish identity since the Fall of the Wall and the reunification of Germany. This work will culminate in the publication of my book *New Jews in a New Germany. Post-Holocaust Identities in a Unified Nation* to be published by Rutgers University Press. Collaboration for these two public events emerged as well from my interest in the specific history of AJC's work, especially in Germany, and in the mission of the LBI which has traditionally focused on German Jewry up until 1933 and now extending its purview to the postwar and contemporary periods. The contributions of these organizations and the participants, purposefully chosen from academia, journalism, and NGOs, as well as the United States and Germany, made the events and this publication an example of the kind of dialogue that I ask for in the discussion of the Jewish voice. The openness and exchange of ideas, understandably sometimes at odds, illustrated the positive potential of such collaboration and critique. Panels such as "Defining the Jewish Voice," Shaping Transatlantic Foreign Policy and the American Domestic Agenda," "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism, and Anti-Americanism, and "Responses to the War in Iraq," as well as short position papers, helped focus this broad topic on specific issues. I have asked Lily Gardner Feldman who also participated in both symposia to compose a final longer essay that surveys the attention of AICGS to Jewish issues, largely through her involvement at AICGS over many years.

My thanks to all of the participants for their ideas and especially to the three organizations' leaders for their support: Jackson Janes, Andrew Baker in Washington, and Carol Kahn Strauss and Frank Mecklenburg. Special thanks to Frank Trommler for his suggestion of the title and for all of his work at AICGS on culture and politics, to Cathleen Fisher, Associate Director, and Ilonka Oszvald who are in charge of this publication, and to Susan Breslow for the photograph of the synagogue on the front cover. We hope to continue this dialogue in the future.

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SECTION ONE
HISTORY

THE JEWISH VOICE IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

ANDREW BAKER

For most of the postwar period, the Jewish voice in German-American relations was primarily a dissonant one. This was no surprise and in view of the Holocaust it would be hard to imagine something different. As German-American relations grew steadily closer throughout the decades of the Cold War, new generations of Americans came to think of Germany first as a democratic ally rather than the enemy of two world wars. Jews were among those who had longer memories and were expected to remind their fellow Americans of the more troubled chapters in German history.

Even before the Second World War had ended, Roosevelt's Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau was the leading advocate for the creation of a dismembered and de-industrialized Germany as the best means of preventing Germany from threatening its neighbors in the future. The one Jewish member of FDR's cabinet was far from the only proponent of this policy, but it became known as the "Morgenthau Plan." The exigencies of the Cold War led to a very different policy, and many American Jews—among them a considerable number of émigrés from Germany—were deeply involved in the postwar reconstruction of Germany. Nevertheless, the Morgenthau Plan, though quickly forgotten in the United States, was often cited in later German discussions as having been the real goal of American Jews.

At the same time Heinz Galinski, the most prominent leader of Germany's post-Holocaust Jewish community, understood his role as one of admonishing Germany not to forget its past. "I did not survive Auschwitz in order to remain silent," he frequently said until his death in 1992. Germans accepted his lectures, but that did not mean they liked them.

In 1985 German Chancellor Helmut Kohl persuaded President Ronald Reagan to accompany him to a military cemetery in Bitburg for what was to be a symbolic gesture of German-American reconciliation. Although non-Jews as well were uncomfortable to learn that Bitburg also contained the graves of SS veterans, it fell largely to American Jews—and first among them Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel—to criticize the president's plans.

When the prospects of German unification became real after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there was no lack of critical voices. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was among the most acerbic, and other European neighbors voiced their own apprehension. Even Germany's Social Democrats cautioned against moving too quickly. Nevertheless, the "perceived" Jewish opposition to unification was given undue attention in Germany, despite the fact that most Jewish organizations refrained from speaking on the subject. The American Jewish Committee, in fact, adopted a statement endorsing unification.

Ten years ago the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, which has become one of the most visited sites in Washington, D.C., opened its doors. However, at the time of its creation, the Kohl government feared it would be an inherently "anti-German" institution and even tried to influence its content. The German Chancellor was notably absent from the dedication ceremonies, which were presided over by President Clinton and included many heads of state.

Throughout the decades Germany has taken steps to address the claims of former Holocaust victims. Government leaders have often pointed with pride to the fact that billions of dollars have been paid in compensation. What is less frequently acknowledged is the fact that these payments have been made incrementally and almost always as the result of difficult negotiations requiring political pressure. In recent years these claims have become more public and sometimes have been taken up by class action attorneys as well as traditional Jewish survivor groups.

After the fall of communism there were new efforts made particularly on behalf of Nazi victims in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, victims who were not included in early restitution agreements limited to those living in the West. The German government was particularly reluctant to extend the same programs that had been established in the West after the war to victims who had been caught behind the Iron Curtain, the "double victims" of Nazism and Communism, as they were sometimes called. The American Jewish Committee took up their cause and initially tried to persuade Bonn through private channels to offer them compensation payments.

Only after these efforts failed did the Committee initiate a public campaign in the United States. In May 1997, an AJC ad appeared in *The New York Times* with two photographs–one of a Holocaust survivor in Ukraine and a second of a Latvian Waffen SS veteran–and posed the question: Guess which one receives a war victim's pension from the German government? It went on to explain that anyone who had served in the German army was eligible for disability payments regardless of nationality or date of application or even–it would come out–if they were implicated in war crimes. No such benefits were extended to Holocaust survivors, however. The AJC took the issue to Capitol Hill, and three months later eighty-nine U.S. Senators signed an open letter to Chancellor Kohl urging him to help the "double" victims. Within days the German government reopened negotiations with the Claims Conference and reached an agreement in December 1997 to pay monthly pensions to Nazi victims in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

There were also voices inside Germany seeking similar goals, but they were simply incapable of succeeding on their own. Advocates among the opposition Greens in the Bundestag could not move the CDU to act. The German television show Panorama, ran a hard-hitting piece that contrasted the sad plight of Holocaust survivors in Latvia with the former Latvian Legionnaires (and Waffen SS veterans) who paraded in Riga on the anniversary of the German occupation–or "liberation" as they called it–and submitted their pension applications. The show's producers had imagined that it would generate such a public outcry that the government would be moved to change its policy. However, one of the producers reported privately that immediately following its telecast, he received the most phone calls from viewers in the Netherlands. It seemed that many Dutch Waffen SS veterans were unaware of the benefit and wanted to know where to apply for their German disability pensions.

Later in the decade, German industry was targeted for its failure to address the claims of former slave and forced laborers. This "absence" was hardly unknown inside Germany, but it took the threat of class action lawsuits and a public campaign in the United States to force the issue. Although Chancellor Kohl had repeatedly rejected any government role in the matter, Gerhard Schröder addressed the problem shortly after taking office. Eventually a German-American agreement was negotiated by Otto Graf Lambsdorff and Stuart Eizenstat, with the participation of Holocaust survivor organizations, private attorneys, and representatives of several eastern European countries. The goal was to create a foundation jointly funded by the German government and private industry that would offer humanitarian payments to millions of former forced and slave laborers in return for legal peace in America.

It was not difficult to persuade the U.S. government or members of Congress to take up these restitution claims, which were often recognized as long-delayed injustices. At the same time, however, it is hard to imagine that left to themselves either German leaders or those Americans working in the general arena of German-American relations would have acted at all without prodding from the American Jewish community.

Even as restitution demands blanketed the headlines, a small but growing number of American Jewish leaders began to recognize that there were other issues to consider, and they came to see Germany in a different light. Firsthand visits of American Jews to Germany, many of which were initially subsidized by the government or political foundations, introduced them to Germans with shared democratic values–people who were honestly grappling with the burdens of the Holocaust. They also saw Germany's importance to Israel as a trading partner and political ally within the European Union.

In 1997, prior to opening an office in Germany, the American Jewish Committee organized a seminar in Berlin entitled, "Jewish Perspectives in the German-American Relationship." One of the German participants, journalist Josef Joffe, still imagined that most of the American Jews present would have difficulty in reconciling their stereotypes of Germany with its present-day reality. "This implausibly friendly German liberal democracy, in all its boring normality, represented by this heavy-set, slightly oafish figure of Helmut Kohl, this can't be the real Germany. There has got to be some other Germany behind it, a Germany secretly polishing the old jack boots and dreaming of lost power." Joffe may have overstated the case, but it had been a natural assumption in Germany even as little as six years ago that, but for American Jews who still had their reservations, the German-American relationship would be without parallel.

Although much has changed in the intervening years, few would have predicted the sharp deterioration in German-American relations. Unlike his predecessor, Gerhard Schröder was unable to forge the warm, personal relationship with his American counterpart that Kohl had used with such success. Schröder's turn toward anti-American rhetoric and criticism of President Bush in the last weeks of a difficult reelection campaign may have been his key to victory, but it left an angry White House in its wake. Schröder's own opposition to American plans for war with Iraq, coupled with support for French initiatives designed to undermine U.S. efforts at the United Nations, only served to increase the animosity. When Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld grouped Germany together with Libya and Cuba as countries unhelpful to American interests, it was clear that the U.S. administration was nursing a very deep grievance.

In marked contrast, American Jewish leaders are among those most disheartened by the worsening transatlantic relationship and were among the most interested in finding a way to repair it. The resumption of hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis brought about alarming anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic manifestations in western Europe. Although the European Union seeks to involve itself in the Middle East conflict in ways that many Jews fear will be detrimental to Israel, Germany is still widely recognized as the country most sympathetic to the Jewish state among the EU member nations. When other European leaders initially sought to ignore or downplay the wave of attacks on Jews and Jewish institutions, the German Foreign Minister forthrightly addressed the issue. As a result, we find ourselves today in the ironic situation where the Jewish voice in German-American relations has become one of the very few striving for harmony.

THE HOLOCAUST AND HIGH POLICY

ROBERT GERALD LIVINGSTON

How did the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the uproar–or the lack of it–on the part of the Federal Republic after 1949 to deal with the crime affect the U.S. government's policies toward West Germany? The answer–hardly at all. Only twice in the fifty-one-year relationship between Bonn and Washington did the issue of the Holocaust rise to high policy levels. The first time, in the 1950s, it went virtually unnoticed in the United States, although it caused a temporary uproar in Israel. The second time, when President Ronald Reagan visited the German military cemetery at Bitburg in May 1985, a public furor in America ensued. But in neither case did the issue disturb the solidity of the official relationship in the slightest.

In 1951, the Israeli government sought American (as well as British, French, and Russian, the former occupying powers) support for its $1.5 billion dollar claim for reparations from Germany. The United States and its western allies refused, thus distancing themselves from the Holocaust. They argued that such reparations would burden West German economic recovery, alienate the German public, and impede their own negotiations with Bonn over its government's indebtedness for postwar economic aid. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who from the first days of the Federal Republic had indicated his willingness to pay some kind of reparations to Israel and for individual Jews' claims, began in the autumn of 1951 three-sided negotiations with Israel and the Jewish Claims Conference. These led by early 1953 to a settlement of 3.5 billion Deutschmarks in deliveries of manufactured goods and some millions in cash. This was followed four years later by a secret German-Israeli military agreement involving shipment of German arms to the beleaguered Jewish state. Three years after that, in 1960, Adenauer met at the Waldorf Astoria in New York City with Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion to intensify the relationship between the German and Israeli military establishments, which a German historian considers paralleled in German history only by that between the *Reichswehr* and the Soviet Red Army in the 1920s.[1] In this case, the American government, which for Near East policy reasons of its own did not wish to extend open military aid to Israel, encouraged Adenauer to initiate this military relationship. As the Chancellor put it to a fellow German politician, "They [the Americans] wanted to give us the chance to prove our solidarity through a gesture toward the Israelis. It should be we, who have quite a lot behind us in the past, who should contribute to a strengthening of the security of the Israeli people through a delivery from our arsenal and at our expense."[2]

Such agreements by West Germany with Israel passed generally unremarked by the American Jewish community. Certainly it is true that Adenauer's readiness to develop relations with the Jewish state and make recompense for the Nazis' crimes against the Jews improved his already good standing with a United States government that placed great trust in the aged leader. However, it was but a minor element. Nor did Washington press Adenauer on this issue. His pro-Israel policy, which encountered much resist-

ance in the German parliament, arose largely out of his own moral convictions. It may also have contributed marginally to smoothing his path around the United States on his first visit in April 1953. But Jewish and Israeli issues appear to have played no role at all in planning for the trip, and the American Jewish community, although it remained ambivalent about West Germany, organized no protests against Adenauer.[3] Perhaps too Adenauer's policy helped in some small way to qualify West Germany for admission to the western "club" par excellence of the 1950s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which it joined in 1955. The large contribution that a new German army was expected to make to defense against what NATO members perceived to be a formidable Soviet threat was by far the overriding factor, fully justifying the inclusion of the new Federal Republic in the western alliance.

Not again until 1985 did West Germany's dealings—or failure to deal—with the victims of the Holocaust become an issue at the top levels of governments in Washington and Bonn. Adenauer's political grandson, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, brought it to the fore with his invitation to President Reagan to pay a visit, which Kohl conceived as a gesture of reconciliation, to a cemetery near the German-Luxembourg frontier where German soldiers who had fallen in the First and Second World Wars were interred. While planning for the visit was well along, the graves of 44 Waffen-SS soldiers were discovered in the front of the small, wooded Bitburg cemetery. An outcry arose among American Jews and among veterans of the Second World War as well.

Kohl's plan to stage this reconciliation visit had been born on the French coast, where on June 6, 1984, the fortieth anniversary of D-Day, Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, and François Mitterand, the French president, gathered to celebrate their nation's victory over Germany, whose chancellor had not been invited along. Reagan's image-maker, Michael Deaver, arranged moving television images of his president standing before thousands of white crosses and Stars of David marking the graves of GIs who had died on Omaha beach and in the hedgerows of Normandy. Making it up to his German ally, Mitterand then in September stirred a different historical memory, of the World War I slaughter of German *Landser* and French *poilus*, when he and Kohl clasped hands over the soldiers' graves at Verdun. This intensely moving and apparently spontaneous gesture gained wide publicity for Kohl in Germany, symbolizing as it did the greatest achievement of postwar West German foreign policy, reconciliation with the ancient enemy, France. It stuck in Kohl's mind when he came to Washington in December to congratulate Reagan on his recent election triumph over Walter Mondale, and with tears in his eyes he described the Verdun ceremony to the American president. Could not something similar be arranged to symbolize publicly that other great postwar German alliance, with America? And so Bitburg, located in Kohl's home state of the Rhineland-Palatinate, came to be chosen as the site for a Kohl-Reagan counterpart to Kohl-Mitterand in Verdun.

When, about a month before the scheduled visit, the Wafffen-SS graves were discovered, a storm erupted among Jews in America and the left in Germany. Their accusation was that Kohl wanted to honor the SS along with regular soldiers who had fallen, thus making victims of perpetrators. His true objective was, so the accusation went on, to put an end to public debate about a criminal past in Germany that must never be covered up but always remembered. And he was inveigling the American president into putting a seal of approval on this scheme by joining him at the Bitburg.

The American Jewish community put direct and indirect pressure on Reagan to cancel the visit. In a dramatic session at the White House, Elie Wiesel stood up in the front row and told the president, "That place, Mr. President, is not your place." All of Reagan's advisers opposed the Bitburg visit, including Secretary of State George Shultz, who devotes an entire chapter in his memoirs to why it was a mistake. Nancy Reagan was against it, as was Nancy's astrologer. The U.S. Senate passed a 96 to

0 resolution protesting the visit. Reagan not only held firm, but he also warned Deaver (who had been sent to Germany several times to plan Reagan's trip visit) not to try to get the German leadership to rescind the invitation. Made aware of the furor in the United States, Kohl wrote and phoned Reagan to say that if the visit did not go ahead his government might fall, an argument that Shultz found incredible.

Arrangements in the end were made for Reagan to go first, a few hours before Bitburg, to the site of the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp; Nancy Reagan did not accompany him to the cemetery, remaining instead at the nearby U.S. Air Force base. The president spent a bare twenty minutes at the cemetery, delivered no speech there, and left the wreath-laying to a retired U.S. Army general of World War II accompanied by a German *Luftwaffe* general who, as young pilot, had flown combat missions.

Unaffected by Jewish objections, the president held firm to his commitment, because the U.S. alliance with West Germany was crucial at a time when he and his advisers were convinced that the Soviet threat and military capacity continued undiminished. Then too, Kohl had given Reagan his first foreign policy victory when two years before he had agreed to the deployment of American Pershing and cruise intermediate range nuclear missiles on German soil, a move that Kohl's predecessor, the Social Democratic chancellor Helmut Schmidt, had failed to put through. The Bitburg visit can thus be seen, quite simply, as one professional politician's quid for another's quo. Conceivably Reagan's decision might have gone the other way had he not just before been resoundingly voted into a second and final term by an electorate in which the overwhelming majority of Jewish voters did not cast their votes for him. But that is purest speculation.

Finally, it remains to ask why the Holocaust issue never came to influence official German-American relations in the slightest. In the 1950s, the memory of the crime among Germans was largely repressed, so that the Holocaust and how postwar Germany dealt with it did not emerge as a political issue during the first two postwar decades either in the United States or the Federal Republic, and the importance to Washington of bringing West Germany into alliance against the Soviet Union would have dampened it even if it had. In the late 1960s, when younger Germans began calling on parents and grandparents to account for their conduct during the Third Reich, the Holocaust became, both among American Jews and younger Germans, a much-debated, emotional, and, at least in Germany, a political issue, lasting from the 1970s on until today. By then, however, the passage of time had long since removed from German public life all who had been involved in it during the Nazi period, the German-American alliance had developed a strong formal and informal infrastructure, and the Federal Republic had become by far the most powerful European state, with which many and varied American interests were in play. For these reasons, any administration in Washington, irrespective of whether Republican or Democratic, would certainly continue in relations with Germany to give strategic considerations and *Realpolitik* absolute priority before that moral reckoning which memory of the Holocaust demands.

NOTES

1 Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die Ära Adenauer 1949-57* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), 187.

2 Quoted in Klaus Hildebrand, *Von Erhard zur Grossen Koalition 1963-1969* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1984), 112.

3 Thomas W. Maulucci, Jr. "Konrad Adenauer's April 1953 Visit to the United States and the Limits of the German-American Relationship in the Early 1950s," *German Studies Review*, XXVI, No. 3, 588.

THE JEWISH PRESENCE IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: THE EARLY POSTWAR PERIOD

ATINA GROSSMANN

Only since the ruptures of 1989/90, as the post-World War II era became history and thus the object of contested memorializations, have historians and a larger German and Jewish public rediscovered what was obvious to Germans, Jews, and Americans in occupied Germany from 1945 to 1949. They discovered that a significant number of the millions of people uprooted by war and persecution who remained on western Allied territory as "unrepatriable" DPs (displaced persons) were Jews. These people were the survivors of the Nazi genocide and involuntary migration–precisely the people both the Allies and the Germans had least expected to have to deal with in the aftermath of National Socialism's war of extermination.

At the beginning of the National Socialist regime in 1933, there were some 500,000 Jews living in Germany. In 1946/47, three years after Germany had been declared *judenrein*, approximately 250-300,000 Jews, albeit in very large measure not the same Jews, were living in Germany. Many of these Jews had not resided in Germany before the war and were living mainly on occupied and defeated territory in the British and American zones. They included a small remnant of German Jews who had emerged from hiding, forced labor, death camps, or a precarious above ground existence in "privileged" mixed marriages or as *Mischlinge* (people of mixed heritage). Others were returned emigrés, many of them now in the uniforms of the occupiers, freshly minted American citizens serving as translators, interrogators, civil affairs and cultural officers. Most, however, were from Eastern Europe–survivors liberated by the Allies on German soil who were later joined by tens of thousands of "infiltrees" who poured into the American zone from eastern Europe as it became clear that there was no safe future for them in their former homes. This latter group was diverse, consisting of camp survivors, those who had been hidden or with the partisans, and, very importantly, a large cohort (almost 2/3 of the survivors), of about 200,000 Jews who had spent the war in the Soviet Union and were repatriated to Poland, from which they once again fled.

These various Jewish survivors became a key element in what Frank Stern called the "Historic Triangle," of Germans, Jews, and Americans that defined much of postwar West German politics.[1] These categories themselves were complex and fluid. Occupying Americans included American Jews serving as chaplains, officers, and GIs or as employees of Jewish relief agencies, notably the American Joint Distribution Committee.[2] To further complicate the definitions, some of those Americans were, in turn, themselves of Eastern European descent, often still Yiddish speaking, or refugees from Nazism who had only recently emigrated and acquired U.S. citizenship through their army or military government service.

The story of Jewish survivors and the "DP problem" as part of the postwar German and American experience are certainly not new topics for historians. There

has been very little reflection, however, on the interactions, encounters, and confrontations among surviving Jews, defeated Germans, and victorious Americans, or for that matter on the relations between German Jewish and DP survivors, or the fact that the majority of the Jewish survivors in Germany had actually spent most of the war in the Soviet Union and not under Nazi occupation.[3] Postwar German history has mostly ignored the presence of the living Jews. Their story has been told as one of absence, tragic loss, and memorialization. Histories of Jewish survivors in Germany—and there are more and more local studies—have generally treated them as an entirely self-enclosed cohort coexisting temporarily and separately from Germans, existing in different worlds on the same terrain, divided by memory and experience. The extensive Israeli historiography has presented DPs and Jewish survivors as part of the contested history of Zionism and the state.

Studies of American policies towards DPs have tended to focus on the negative aspects of American policy, initially laid out in former Immigration Commissioner Earl G. Harrison's August 1945 fiercely critical report on the policies of the military government toward survivors, which denounced their continued detention behind barbed wire and famously concluded that "we appear to be treating the Jews as the Nazis treated them except that we do not exterminate them." This view was powerfully reinforced by the passionately outraged letters sent home by Jewish servicemen—a campaign at least partially instigated by their chaplains at High Holiday services in 1945. The letters, sent to families, local congregations, and Jewish welfare organizations detailed the neglect and even mistreatment of the surviving remnant (*She'erit Hapletah*) of European Jewry by the military and relief agencies. Historians, in turn, have drawn attention to American anti-Semitism and the U.S. military government's tolerance of German hostility toward DPs, especially as it increased in the later years of the occupation.[4]

These are all important approaches. However, contemporary accounts, records, memoirs, and oral histories read "against the grain" can also present a rather different picture of the regular interactions and close, if ambiguous, connections not only between Jews and Germans, but also between surviving Jews and their American keepers and protectors. They can also tell us more about survivors as active agents, working their ties to the American occupiers and Jewish agencies to their political and economic advantage, and how that limited but important access was perceived by the resentful, defeated Germans.

Ironically, it often seemed, both to Germans and to the U.S. military government, that Jews in post-Nazi Germany were more present than ever before, increasing in numbers and demands daily, populating the black market bazaars, and demonstrating loudly and sometimes violently for emigration permits. In some cases they even outnumbered defeated Germans in small towns in Bavaria or Hesse. Indeed, as the memory of liberation, with its horrific images of Nazi atrocities, faded, and the Cold War proceeded, it was the victims of Nazism, still displaced and unruly, who were viewed by both the victors and the Germans as inconvenient and disreputable disturbers of the peace. This stood in direct contrast to the Germans, who with their "clean German homes and pretty, accommodating German girls," styled themselves the victims of war, bombings, expulsions, and denazification, and later as industrious partners. But it was also true, at least after the wide publicity accorded the Harrison Report, that Jewish DPs did have a privileged relationship with the Amis. They "were on exhibit to visitors (journalists, congressional delegations, Jewish American groups) from the moment of their liberation" and their lead ership knew very well how to manipulate and stage these calls for better treatment and entry to Palestine.[5] It was not an accident that the only department of the Central Committee of Liberated Jews with an English, not Yiddish, name was "public relations."

Sullen (the term most frequently used by the American victors to describe their former enemies), resentful, and self-pitying in defeat, the Germans viewed the DP communities that sprang up in and around former *Wehrmacht* barracks, Nazi schools, or confiscated German housing blocks as a kind of *Schlaraffenland* of "sugar and Spam, margarine and jam, plus cigarettes and vitamized chocolate bars," centers of black market activity fed by easy access to the cigarette and food rations of the occupiers and

Jewish relief organizations.[6] In numerous towns and villages, such as Feldafing near Munich, locals, suddenly confronted with an influx of tattered and emaciated *KZ*niks, and then later with DPs arriving from Poland, approached their new neighbors with, to quote one survivor's memoir, "a mixture of fear, contempt, and bewilderment."[7] Jews, who had expected to be treated by the Americans as anti-fascist allies, not as troublesome refugees, complained bitterly about their harsh treatment at the hands of the military and the uncomprehending patronization by relief workers. At the same time however, the Germans, anxious to position themselves as allies against Communism, resented the Americans' quick requisitioning of homes and official buildings to house survivors and the sympathy shown by the attendance of high ranking U.S. officials, including General Eisenhower, at DP religious services and political congresses. As American occupation became steadily gentler in 1946/47 and focused on reconstruction and cooperation rather than punishment, the Germans nevertheless had to contend with the increasing flow of Jews from eastern Europe into the American zone. Relieved of their initial anxieties about violent revenge by their former victims, Jewish observers noted that the Germans worried that their country, made *Judenrein* by the Nazis, would again be "flooded" by Jews from the East.[8]

Indeed, rather than producing awareness of Germany's crimes, the survivors' very obvious presence–their astonishingly rapid (at least superficial) physical recovery, their entrepeneurship in black market commerce, their appearance as witnesses in proceedings against former camp guards (*Kapos*), their economic and political access to the American victors–not only produced resentment and competition for Allied favors such as housing and food rations, but it also reinforced doubts about the Allies' insistence in their denazification programs that the Germans had murdered millions of Jews. (Such sentiments could be summarized in statements such as, "if there had really been so many death camps, then why are there so many Jews around, and why do they look so healthy and well-dressed and have so many children?") The fact that within a year of the war's end, Jewish DP camps and surrounding communities were crowded with "infiltrees" from newly communist Poland (most of whom had spent the war in the Soviet Union rather than under Nazi occupation), and who could be labeled as victims of Communism rather than Nazism, only reinforced these perceptions, producing ominous signs of a new/old anti-Semitism directed against "foreigners." U.S. Military government surveys tracked rising (or at least more openly expressed) anti-Semitic sentiments in late 1946 and 1947. Such prejudices were most pronounced in Munich, the center of DP life, and lowest in West Berlin, a city with a relatively high proportion of German Jews among the survivors.[9]

During the brief liminal early postwar period, these different groups of Jews staked out a public presence that would have been unimaginable before May 1945 and has been, until recently, largely forgotten. The intensity of the many debates about identity, memories of the recent past, and relative guilt and victimization was fueled by an attachment to concrete questions of livelihood, money, property, privileges, and compensation, as well as by the engagement of provocatively present and alive Jews. Germans and Jews under Allied (especially American) occupation continually negotiated and contested issues of everyday life–from the most urgent needs for food, clothing, and housing to the restitution of bank accounts and property. *Wiedergutmachung* and the determination to extract monetary compensation were inextricably linked to the memorialization of the dead and some measure of revenge for the horrors suffered.

German and American attitudes evolved over time-moving from the shock of defeat, liberation, and the mass influx of 1946/47 to disdain for the "hard core" of about 15,000 Jewish DPs who remained in Germany after the establishment of the Federal Republic and the state of Israel, and the easing of U.S. immigration in 1948. The basic themes of the interactions sketched here–a difficult but ever-present connection mediated and regulated by Americans (both Jewish and gentile) with both Jews and Germans insisting that they were unjustly treated-can be traced throughout the occupation period 1945-1949. They also set the stage for the continuing debates and encounters of the later postwar period, echoing into the post-unification present.

NOTES

1 Frank Stern, "The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans and Jews in Postwar Germany," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte XIX* (1990): 47-76.

2 See for example, Lucy Davidowicz's recollections of herself in a U.S. officer's uniform as a JOINT worker in Munich.

3 For a fuller discussion of these issues see Atina Grossmann, *Journal of the History of Sexuality* (April 2002).

4 See the remarkable collection of letters in archives of American Jewish Distribution Committee, New York.

5 Abraham S. Hyman, *The Undefeated* (Jersualem: Gefen: 1993), pp. 250ff.

6 Kathryn Hulme, *The Wild Place*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1953),pp. 211-12.

7 Simon Schochet, *Feldafing* (Vancouver, British Columbia: November House, 1983), pp. 131.

8 Report by Zorach Wahrhaftig, "Life in the Camps Six Months After Liberation November 27, 1945," American Jewish Archives, Vol. 9, *Liberation and the Saving Remnant*, Cincinnati: American Jewish Archives, Papers of the World Jewish Congress, 1945-1950, ed. Abraham J. Peck (New York: Garland, 1990), p. 133.

9 See Constantin Goeschler, "The Attitude towards Jews in Bavaria after the Second World War," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* 36 (1991): 443-458. See also Frank Stern, *Whitewashing the Yellow Star,* chapter on "American Military Government and German Antisemitism," pp. 106-157. For summaries of the surveys see Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt, eds., *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany. The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949* (London, 1970).

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SECTION TWO
DOMESTIC AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

DEALING WITH THE AMERICAN VOICE IN GERMAN-JEWISH RELATIONS

FRANK TROMMLER

At least since the Second World War, the United States has served as a model and projection screen for a number of intractable issues that modern nations have to deal with. The reference to the United States has been instrumentalized to encourage crucial discussions on modernity, high and low culture, the dominance of technology, the progress in democracy, the treatment of minorities, and many other issues.

Given their visibility, relations with the United States cannot just be seen and explained on the political level, but also must be approached on the semantic level, which comprises the language that is used for certain problems. Political and semantic factors intermingle when other societies address larger issues by observing the United States, relating to it, or drawing directly on this relationship. These factors intermingle also when America is described in a negative way. Anti-Americanism is seldom purely political, it's also semantic—and vice versa.

Reflecting on the interplay of these factors helps us understand the increasing significance that the Jewish voice has had on German-American relations, especially since the 1980s. Once the United States embraced Holocaust memorialization with much fanfare in the 1980s—referred to by Anson Rabinbach as "the decade of the memory wars"[1]—the German endeavors of commemorating the Holocaust were constantly put to the test. It was the time when references to the United States in Germany carried an increasing portion of what could be termed comparative memory work, when the American TV series *Holocaust* was integrated into public perceptions of American popular culture, and when Chancellor Kohl's initiative towards a "normalization" of German history broke down under the weight of the Bitburg scandal, a scandal that embarrassed President Reagan, who stood by his partner Helmut Kohl while Jewish and non-Jewish groups expressed their dismay about his visit to a German war cemetery where Waffen SS soldiers were buried.[2]

For the first three decades after World War II, Germans did not refer to the United States when they addressed what was first called "Auschwitz," and later "the Holocaust." They focused instead on Israel when they tried to approach a topic that they preferred to suppress. Since the initiation of Adenauer's policy of restitution in the Luxembourg Treaty of 1952, the German orientation toward Israel shaped the public language of coming to terms with the past long before official diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in 1965. Focusing on the relationship to Israel allowed Germans to avoid revisiting their individual complicity in the social exclusion and subsequent extermination of the Jews. In the public debates of the 1960s about the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, as well as the abolition of the statute of limitations for murder, German society turned toward questions of guilt and responsibility. Writers such as Rolf Hochhuth, Peter Weiss, and Martin Walser were able to successfully engage the theater in this endeavor as well. While these debates about collective and individual responsibility fed into the student rebellions of 1968, the United States, absorbed by the Vietnam War, featured prominently as the target of a different discourse—the younger generation's assault on capitalism, colonialism, and fascism.

This constellation was clearly reversed by the public impact of the American TV series, *Holocaust*, which was aired in the United States in 1978 and in Germany in 1979. The impact cannot be overrated, yet the series was hardly the breakthrough of public Holocaust awareness that it has often been credited with. Such a breakthrough had occurred already with the Eichmann Trial in the early 1960s. Rather, *Holocaust* became the catalyst for an individual identification with the victims that had been missing from the public discourse on the persecution of the Jews. The series was not about German guilt, the crucial topic of the reflections in high culture and literature in the 1960s and 1970s, but about the everyday experience of Jews in Germany forty years earlier. And it was presented in the style of a soap opera. To understand the shock and dismay among the German elites about the fact that this product of the despised American popular culture was much more successful in motivating millions to reflect on the experience of the Jews, one must understand the previous attempts of German writers and intellectuals to dignify this topic in order to avoid its trivialization. The shock led to painful self-reflections among intellectuals and the media about the reasons for their failure to achieve a similar effect on the general public through their treatment of this topic. The resentment against the trivialization of the Holocaust at the hand of the Americans drew on the traditional rejection of American popular culture. Yet at the same time, it confirmed that the established moral discourse on German guilt had become stale and idiosyncratic.

Thus, on the one hand, the enormous growth of Holocaust commemoration in the United States in the 1980s documented by Peter Novick,[3] inspired a more personal, intimate, painful, and, eventually, more cathartic commemoration in Germany. It was furthered by the "discovery" of the small Jewish community living in Germany as a viable partner for expressing the awareness that Jews were not just dead victims of the Nazi past but, rather, living beings in the middle of past and present German societies. In a spectacular demonstration at the Frankurt theater in November 1985, thirty Jewish citizens blocked the performance of the play by director Rainer Werner Fassbinder, *Der Müll*, *die Stadt und der Tod* (Garbage, the City, and Death), because it contained anti-Semitic passages. It was an action of self-empowerment that helped articulate a distinctly new Jewish voice within Germany. Helped by the Bitburg scandal earlier in the year, the new visibility of the Jewish community also drew attention to American Jewish organizations. As Lily Gardner Feldman has shown, it was the moment when the role of American Jewish organizations, which had often been "ancillary or parallel" to bilateral politics, "began to intersect directly with German-American relations in the late 1980s" and assumed a central dimension of these relations in the 1990s.[4]

On the other hand, however, American preponderance in Holocaust commemoration (which culminated in the erection of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington in 1993), was viewed by German elites as an intrusion. Particularly in the first years after the NBC *Holocaust* series, German elites lamented that Americans were about to take over the narrative of recent German history. The topic continued to feed on a weak, yet constantly present, anti-Americanism that was the flip side of the "big-brother syndrome" of the Cold War,[5] as widely discussed with regard to the 1984 German TV series *Heimat*, with which director Edgar Reitz attempted to respond to the *Holocaust* series. Large demonstrations in Bonn and elsewhere against the decision to install intermediate-range missiles in the early 1980s expressed the resentment against German dependence on the United States. Given recent German history, dependence was viewed as something equally disconcerting. What was considered to be a German issue, to be debated in terms of the German-Jewish and German-Israeli dialogue, seemed to have come under the tutelage of American mentors. In other words, what was being articulated as resentment was directed less against the emerging Jewish voice in German-American relations than against the American voice in German-Jewish relations.

Turning to the 1990s, a new phased in this constellation began, as the Jewish role reached "an apex of focused public affairs and lobbying"[6] and American interference on behalf of Jewish interests moved to center stage. The issues of remembrance took a

clearly material form as financial compensation to Jewish and non-Jewish laborers in Nazi factories was negotiated by the governments. Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstadt assured that the legal path would lead to a successful outcome.

This phase has not yet fully become history; however, the events of September 11, 2001, and the war on terror that President Bush declared in reaction to it, have shifted the predicament, especially in light of the subsequent alienation of France, Germany, and Russia from the United States over the war against Iraq in 2003. Public attention has turned away from questions of commemoration and compensation. An eerie silence has descended on the plans to finally raise the Holocaust monument near the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. It has become more difficult to maintain the sense of mission that contributed to the emergence of a distinct Jewish voice in German-American relations. Concurrently, the intermingling of political and semantic factors that gave German-American relations a special flavor in the last decades of the twentieth century has ebbed.

Quoting a weak, yet constantly present anti-Americanism as the flip side of the big-brother syndrome in the 1980s obviously no longer suffices to define the growing tendency among Germans to allow a kind of cultural anti-Americanism to surface, an anti-Americanism that builds on long-standing resentments against American culture and the American mentality but also invokes at times the American patronage of Jewish interests. The force with which so-called cultural arguments in expressions of resentment against the United States touch on older clichés is striking. At this moment, when public debates are focused on the growing distance between Europe and the United States, the elevation of cultural differences and the equation of superficial modernity, inauthentic culture, commercialization of life, and lack of shared values with America only veils the sources of these clichés. The old anti-modernist standbys, anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, have been brought together. This trend is of concern, namely the fact that the term "cultural anti-Americanism" is being used to play down the effects of new post-9/11 resentments. These arguments go deeper than the anti-Texanism that permeates much of the present critique of the Bush government. They seem to be on the semantic level where discontent with present conditions need a projection screen but they are, as history shows, political.

NOTES

1 Anson Rabinbach, "From Explosion to Erosion: Holocaust Memorialization in America since Bitburg," *History and Memory* 9 (1999): 226-55.

2 Y. Michal Bodemann, "Helmut Kohl, die Schoah und die Juden," in *In den Wogen der Erinnerung: Jüdische Existenz in Deutschland* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002), 85-8.

3 Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).

4 Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Jewish Role in German-American Relations," in *The German-American Encounter: Conflict and Cooperation between Two Cultures, 1800-2000*, eds. Frank Trommler and Elliott Shore (New York: Berghahn, 2001), 179.

5 Michael E. Geisler, "'Heimat' and the German Left: The Anamnesis of a Trauma," *New German Critique* No 36 (1985), 25-66.

6 Feldman, ibid.

REVIVING GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: A PAGE FROM THE BOOK OF GERMAN-JEWISH DIALOGUE

GREGORY CAPLAN

Germany and Europe are in the midst of a profound transition, from a politics shaped by the legacy of the Second World War to a new continental order of unprecedented unity. The political identity of an expanded European Union will be shaped in part by the ratification of a constitution and the resulting institutional reforms. It remains an open question to what degree France and Germany will accommodate themselves to the fresh perspectives and different historical memories of the EU's ten new member states; the cohesion and posture of a unified Europe will also be a function of the direction of American foreign policy.

In any conceivable scenario, Germany will have a pivotal role to play in bringing European and American policies into harmony. At the same time, after more than fifty years of couching German national interests in European terms, officials in Berlin are hesitant to articulate policy preferences that deviate from the norm of a common Franco-German agenda. With its preponderant economic strength and its substantial influence among the EU's ten new member states, Germany is nonetheless in a position to lead Europe into a revitalized transatlantic partnership. Germans have confronted the crimes of their national history more than any other NATO member, and they are less willing than ever to accept prescriptions from the outside on how to live out the lessons of that history.

When it comes to Israel, the war against terrorism, and anti-Semitism, Germany is the best friend American Jews have in the European Union. To be sure, the past three years have been difficult on all these fronts in Germany. In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, official policy and public opinion shifted from sympathy and unconditional solidarity after September 11, through military support for the war in Afghanistan (which almost brought the Schröder government down), to outright opposition to war in Iraq (which sealed Schröder's 2002 reelection). Yet even as relations between Washington and Berlin went from chilly to ice-cold, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer never tired of emphasizing the centrality of support for Israel to German foreign policy. He has also been a tireless advocate in the fight against anti-Semitism in Germany and throughout Europe. While Fischer's passion, eloquence, and personal engagement are unique, these positions constitute the mainstream view of the German political elite. German diplomats at the UN and throughout the world make clear to their Arab colleagues that these positions are non-negotiable.

The American Jewish Committee (AJC) has been adjusting for years to these transformations within German and European political culture. While President Bush after May 2002 long refused to grant Chancellor Schröder a one-on-one appointment since May of 2002, the leadership of the AJC continued to meet with him and other leading government officials to discuss common concerns and the undiminished importance of transatlantic cooperation. These discussions were partly responsible for German-American cooperation on an OSCE initiative to

combat anti-Semitism in Europe. AJC was also a vocal supporter of the campaign to bring Eastern European countries into NATO, in the belief that the expansion of the zone of peace in Europe would not only promote stability, but also serve Jewish interests by encouraging these states to deal directly with Holocaust-related issues. The AJC is planning to open a Transatlantic Institute in Brussels in the near future, a meeting place at which Americans and Europeans will come together to articulate common interests and develop means of advancing them.

For his part, George W. Bush recently became the first president in office to visit a memorial on the grounds of a Nazi extermination camp since Ronald Reagan visited Bergen Belsen on his way to the Bitburg military cemetery in May of 1985. Unlike Reagan's controversial Cold War gesture, President Bush's visit to Auschwitz was not part of an ideological effort to emphasize German-American solidarity at the expense of Holocaust memory. To the contrary, it appeared to be a calculated effort to shame Germany and other European countries into lining up behind him on the march to Baghdad. In his first stopover in Europe after the invasion of Iraq, Bush bypassed "old Europe," implicitly chiding Germans for not having learned the lessons of their own history.

Bush's trip to Poland and Russia before the G-8 summit in France put into practice National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice's maxim of "punishing France, ignoring Germany, and forgiving Russia." This posture neither served the interests of the United States, nor responded effectively to the transformation of German political culture over which Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer have presided these past five years. With the election of a Red-Green coalition in 1998, a new generation came to power–a generation that combined historical consciousness and moral certitude with a more positive and assertive national identity than the Bonn Republic had ever known. This newfound assertiveness has not always played well on the world stage, as in the aborted nomination of Caio Koch-Weser to head the IMF several years ago. But it was Schröder who prodded German industry into talks on compensation for the victims of slave and forced labor during the Nazi era, even if his stated desire to "end this campaign against German industry" rubbed some the wrong way. Under the leadership of Schröder and Fischer, Germany has also accepted more and more responsibility on the world stage, taking courageous decisions in the Balkans and Afghanistan to send troops into out-of-area combat for the first time since the Second World War.

Schröder's populist instincts and thirst for survival moved him to take an absolutist stance on the Iraq question in August of 2002, but his position reflected a public consensus that only hardened in response to the tin-eared diplomacy of the Bush administration in the subsequent twelve months. The survey on *Transatlantic Trends*, released in September 2003 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, makes plain the damage done by the diplomatic battles that accompanied American military preparations for war in Iraq. Twenty percent more Germans disapproved of American foreign policy in 2003 than in 2002, and fifty percent of Germans judged global U.S. leadership to be "undesirable." Eighty-one percent of Germans surveyed rated the EU as more central to their vital interests than the United States, up from fifty-five percent in 2002. Only nine percent chose the United States over the EU, compared to twenty percent the previous year. According to an interpretive essay released with the survey, thirty-nine percent of Germans fall into the categories of "pragmatists" and "hawks" on foreign policy, the groups most likely to support military action (as opposed to "doves" and "isolationists"). Nevertheless, the survey concludes that,

> At the end of the day, the fact that over 85 percent of Germans do not believe the war in Iraq was worth the costs reflects not only the dominance of Doves in Germany and their overwhelming rejection of war, but the Bush Administration's inability to gain anything but the most tepid support among German Hawks and Pragmatists as well.[1]

The good news is that European popular opinion prefers to see the EU as a partner to the United States, and 80 percent of the American public would like to see a stronger and more unified Europe as a strategic ally. Joschka Fischer agrees. On July 15,

2003 during a trip to the United States, Fischer noted in a television interview that, "for all Europeans, the United States are the most important ally outside of Europe. Relations between Europe and the United States are crucial, are a cornerstone for peace and stability in the twenty-first century, regionally and globally."[2]

Germany will continue to play a pivotal role in Europe and the EU, and in Jewish relations within Europe. Importantly, German policymakers will continue to look to the construction of a German foreign policy that reflects its current national interests, interests that are far less encumbered by the strategic constraints imposed by the divisions of the Cold War. For these reasons, the Bush administration's policy of "ignoring" Germany is detrimental to America's own national interests. Surveys show there is support among American, German, and European publics for a genuine partnership between the United States and Europe. The challenge for the United States is the same as that facing the Jewish voice in German-American relations–to fashion a relationship to the Berlin Republic that channels these impulses in a mutually beneficial direction.

NOTES

1 Ron Asmus, Philip P. Everts, and Pierangelo Isernia, "Power, War and Public Opinion: Thoughts on the Nature and Structure of the Transatlantic Divide," http://www.transatlantictrends.org.

2 Joschka Fischer on Charlie Rose, July 15, 2003.

THE NEW JEWISH AND GERMAN QUESTIONS AND THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

YOSSI SHAIN AND TANJA G. FLANAGAN

The last few years have thrown into sharp relief the fact that the "Jewish question" is still alive and relevant. Indeed, in many world conflicts and dilemmas, Israel and the Jews were inserted and became a focal point of controversy in civilizational issues and discord. The eruption of the "Jewish question" into the international arena is even more dramatic after a decade in which there was a growing sense that Jews had achieved a certain degree of normalization in Israel and the Diaspora.

Modernity, which was supposed to solve the "Jewish question" and bring normality, ultimately undermined the Jewish condition and almost brought about the demise of the Jewish people. Even today, with Jewish independence, statehood, and power, the threats and vulnerability continue to loom. By contrast, the "German question" rose out of strength and a sense of superiority, and it lingers alongside fears of its renewed domination. The question is not about German vulnerability but, rather, to what extent the world can allow Germany to exercise its strength. German unification re-ignited fears of German greatness and independent projection of its power, and brought its domestic and foreign policies under greater scrutiny. It is this position that constantly colors other actors' perceptions of German actions domestically and internationally, and it continues to feed into Germans' own self-understanding, identity, and perception of their role in European and world affairs, particularly in the Middle East.

With regard to international affairs, normalization centers on the possibility and desirability of independent German foreign policymaking. Yet, the expected return of Germany to 'normal' great power politics has not occurred.[1] The United States has continually supported and even pushed for greater German involvement and responsibility in international affairs, even over German objections that highlighted constitutionally imposed constraints and historical memory as stumbling blocks. Since the end of the Second World War, Germany has engaged in processes of self-binding and self-limiting in focusing on its economic prowess while actively inhibiting its military development and encouraging the evolution of a pacifist society. In this context, despite its technological capabilities, militaristic past, and vulnerability as the dividing line of the Cold War, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction was never an issue. Germany actively supports institutionalism, multilateralism, and increasing European integration as a means of achieving normalization. Normalization used to mean the status of full sovereignty, but since its achievement pivots on Germany's involvement in world affairs commensurate to its economic wealth and military power while at the same time remaining acutely sensitive to the fears and hesitations of its neighbors.

Today, the "Jewish question" remains intrinsically tied to the "German question" because of the strong resonance of the Holocaust in world affairs. This has consequences for a number of issues: transatlantic relations; the European role in the Middle East; European internal relations with its minorities, in particular the Islamic communities; the relationship

between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism; and the critical role of diasporas in world affairs, particularly the role of American Jewry as guardian of and voice for Jewish kinship.

The symbolism and historical memory attached to the existence of the Jewish community inside Germany today constitutes both an additional dimension as well as a common link between the above issues. The importance, stature, and meaning assigned to Jewish life in Germany by a variety of international actors have consequences for the conduct of international politics. The Jewish community in Germany, through its continued existence in the "land of the perpetrators" has gained an emblematic status that allows for its instrumentalization and involvement far beyond its actual relevance.

A “Normal” Germany in World Affairs?

Although Germany desires a larger role in world affairs, it seems reluctant, if not outright fearful, of accepting more responsibility in international affairs, especially if this greater role moves Germany out of America's protective shadow. Undoubtedly, Germany's opposition to the United States in the months leading up to the war in Iraq was qualitatively different from the French desire to part from the United States and present a distinctly French, and, if possible, European position. Chancellor Schröder's exploitation of societal concerns for political gain during the months leading up to the war in Iraq may have widened the rift in the transatlantic alliance beyond what Germany's natural instincts dictate. In many ways it was an unintended consequence of a domestic political gambit. It remains unclear whether Germany has an independent interest in the first place. For one, Germany does not have the nationalist rhetoric available to it to support and justify a larger role for itself in world affairs. Because of its past, Germany cannot fall back on notions such as "exceptionalism" or "mission civilatrice," notions that constitute the foundations of American and French foreign policymaking respectively. It is this historical memory, so engrained in German society, that prevents Germany from formulating and postulating its own grandiose vision of the international system.

Domestically, the issue of normalization centers on Germany's transformation from a militaristic, authoritarian, fascist state to a democratic, liberal, and tolerant society, one that is free of historical inhibitions. In this context, several aspects of German society were deemed non-negotiable: the absolute acceptance of democracy, a liberal approach to foreign workers and asylum seekers, and a movement towards multiculturalism—at the expense of expressions of national sentiment and pride. This vision was also in concert with the building of a united Europe as a categorical imperative with a strict emphasis on multilateralism and institutionalism and the preservation of "correct memory" through symbolic and material reparations for the victims of Germany's previous regimes. Germany's desire to be rehabilitated, to become a "good citizens" of Europe and in the world, suffered a setback in the early 1990s, when xenophobic and anti-Semitic attacks seemed to suggest that Germany's transition from a xenophobic to a (however reluctant) multicultural society had not been as successful as previously thought. German desire and need for the successful establishment of a liberal, tolerant society led to a stretching of democratic values and principles beyond what was politically and socially wise, allowing Germany to become a safe haven and, eventually, a staging ground for fundamental Muslim terrorists who preach hatred and violence against "the Jews and the crusaders."[2]

In its effort to eradicate the image of a society characterized by virulent racism and ethnic exclusivity, Germany gradually adopted the Holocaust as its official memory, with repercussions for a number of issue areas, such as treatment of foreigners, foreign policymaking, and constitutional structure.[3] It is precisely this constitutional structure that forced Germany as a reluctant host of immigrants to attempt to normalize relations with its minorities, eventually leading to drastic changes in the citizenship law. On the basis of German Basic Law, judicial activism drew two very important historical lessons. The first lesson was to subordinate state power to the rights of individuals, the second to grant those fundamental rights without respect to nationality. Yet Germany's self understanding remains tied to ideas such as German *Kultur* and *Nation*, while minority access to or influence on institutional power remains limited. Indeed, pluralism

in German society and within the political arena remains circumscribed.

It is thus questionable to what extent the strength of Germany's attempted domestic conversion and its adherence to international normative standards could delegate to Germany a role as a "moral" guidepost or ethical guide in international affairs. The issue of normalization in Germany remains controversial, not just relating to how to achieve it but, even more fundamentally, how far it can go without resulting in a serious backlash.

The German-Jewish reality can be seen as a microcosm of the larger web of political influences and processes operating in the international system. This microcosm helps us disentangle domestic politics and identity building processes from geo-political considerations, multilateral and bilateral interactions, civilizational clashes, and the politics of diaspora and kinship affinity. The Jewish community in Germany sits at the nexus of the German and Jewish questions: for Jews, the community is a constant reminder of the past and the challenges of the future. The very idea of a Jewish community in Germany still seems unthinkable for many, yet reality has prevailed, with the German Jewish community constituting the most rapidly growing Jewish community outside of Israel. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer expressed the view of many when he said that the rebuilding of the Jewish community in Germany represented its second chance, and remained a standard by which Germany would continue to be judged.

In addition, the question as to what extent Jews today can ever become Germans again is an issue that extends far beyond the Jewish community itself, reflecting the real challenges Germany and other European societies face vis-à-vis their growing Muslim minorities. In this regard, the "Jewish question" is superimposed onto the most acute minority problem facing Europe–a problem that looms large in its relations with the United States, Israel, and the greater Middle East. The threat to domestic security and international stability from the presence of millions of Muslim immigrants presents European nations with the difficult task of finding ways to integrate and assimilate peoples whose cultural background, traditions, and values are visibly different from their own and whose will and ability to integrate into their host communities remain in doubt. The relative strengths of Muslim and Jewish communities in the United States and Europe respectively–Muslims being strong in Europe and weak in the United States, and Jews being strong in America but weak in Europe–has sharpened already existing differences and helped to crystallize a growing divide in policies concerning the Middle East and the Arab world. James Kurth has argued that the proliferation of Muslim communities in Europe is likely to lead to a growing divide not only between the United States and Europe, but also within the European states themselves. In his view, the internal gap between the secular, modern part of society descendent of the European lineage and the part of society dominated by Islamic religion, poverty, and anti-Modern tendencies, will provide a fertile ground for "endemic Islamic terrorism."[4] This bleak prophecy might be an exaggeration; nevertheless, as observed in recent years, the Jews and Israel are certain to be the target of this rage.

While anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic acts are prevalent throughout Europe, in Germany any such manifestations immediately threaten Germany's self-portrayal as a country moving towards normality. In this respect as well, the "Jewish question" remains central to a German identity contained within parameters that can be traced back to the end of WWII.

Germany, Israel, and the American Jewry

Many in Europe continue to see transatlantic relations as subject to "Jewish influence" on American foreign policy and attitudes. German leaders, from Adenauer onward, would act on this perception by attempting to tighten relations between Germany and the United States through close relations between Germany and the world Jewry, focusing on the state of Israel and American Jewish organizations rather than Jewish organizations within Germany.

There certainly exists a dichotomy between the two main centers of world Jewry in their approach to Germany. Since the early 1950s, Israel has related to

Germany on two levels: bilateral relations between two sovereign states and as people to people. The strength of the friendly state-to-state interactions between Israel and Germany was essential for improving the image of a new Germany within Israel and around the world and for fostering a more normal dialogue, especially among the younger generations. In the mid-1990s, then German president Roman Herzog asked in a meeting with American Jewish leaders, "Why is it that German-Israel relations are light years ahead of Germany's links with the American Jewish community?" American Jewry is a latecomer to the process of rapprochement with the German people. The memory of the Holocaust is such a strong component for American Jewish self-understanding and infuses relations with Germany and the German people to such an extent that interaction has remained careful and more gradual.

From the early years of Israel's existence, a division of labor seemed to develop in the Jewish world: while the state of Israel is focused mainly on consolidating its security and on gathering of the diaspora into the land of Israel (*kibbuz galuyot*), diaspora Jewry (and American Jewry in particular), while supporting Israel, have assumed a greater role as spokespeople for Jews around the world. After the resounding Jewish-American failure to take strong action to save European Jews during the Holocaust, American Jewry learned its lesson and has begun to speak out forcefully on matters concerning Jewish communities under duress (in the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Syria, and Iran), the securing of Jewish religious rights in Europe and in post-Soviet communities, kinship solidarity, and the preservation of Holocaust memory. American Jewry also stands at the forefront of defining the parameters of Jewish identity, often in contention to Israel's dominating orthodoxy. The choice of issues championed by the state of Israel and the American Jewry respectively often reflects different experiences, strengths, and concerns, and these choices are by no means coordinated. The Jewish-American voice on world Jewish affairs is at times amplified by the relative weakness of an Israeli government constrained by its isolation in the international arena, as well as by uncertainties in the Israeli political system and the Middle East as a whole. This was made obvious by the pressure put on Switzerland by American Jewish organizations for restitution, while Israel chose to remain on the sidelines due to state-to-state concerns. The unique role of American Jewry in championing Holocaust memory was also in evidence during the negotiations on the enlargement of NATO, when Jewish demands regarding lessons and responsibilities from the Holocaust were part of the price extracted from Eastern European countries wanting to join the Alliance.[5] This experience demonstrates that the influence of American Jewry extends beyond the reputation merited by its past accomplishments, since it encompasses a self-realizing myth concurring in many parts of the world of overwhelming Jewish power in the United States.

Germany understands very well that American Jewish concerns for the past have implications for the perception of Germany in the minds of all Americans, and thus for transatlantic relations. Germany accepts American Jewish organizations as the guardian and voice of historical memory and the struggle against anti-Semitism. In the absence of a critical mass of domestic German Jewish leadership, Germany granted American Jewish organizations, like the American Jewish Committee (AJC), access to German policymaking on issues pertaining to democratic values, human rights, and the rebuilding of Jewish life in Germany. Rabbi Andrew Baker, the director of international Jewish affairs at the AJC, says that the AJC's public campaign forced Germany to confront its history and extend rights to Holocaust victims formerly living behind the Iron Curtain. He also argues that it is American Jewish connections to Germany that help build a positive image of Germany in the United States.[6]

Germany and the Greater Middle East

After September 11, Germany, like other Western European nations, expressed a short lived sense of solidarity with the United States, which turned within months into criticism and anger toward a perceived American hegemon bullying the world and intimidating Europe. This sentiment grew as the United States increasingly followed Israel's lead in isolating

Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat after Israel's military retaliation against the Palestinians in April of 2002. Germany's position on the war in Iraq marked another important juncture in transatlantic relations, inter-European relations, and in Europe's role in the Middle East. Schröder's populist position of a German "third way" in foreign affairs, which seemed to pay off with his re-election, also touched a raw nerve that quickly exposed German vulnerability to its own quest for normality at home and abroad. Indeed, the fact that German normality remains tied to the Jewish issue became evident in anti-war demonstrations that soon embraced anti-Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric by naming Jewish Americans as war mongers. Certainly, the sense of Germany taking "normality" too far now resonates with the German elite who are engaged in damage control. Here again, there is a Jewish component to the domestic and international agenda of Germany. As Carol Strauss stated recently, mending relations with Washington requires the American Jewish channel.[7] Joschka Fischer has been working diligently to retain his hard won trust in Jerusalem and in Washington as he tries to insert himself once again as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians. Yet despite the personal trust that Fischer may still enjoy, given European posturing and loss of influence, the European delegates, including Fischer, have been relegated to mere message carriers.

To maintain Germany's relevance in international affairs, and in particular, a voice in the post-Saddam Middle East, Germany could not continue its antagonistic stance towards the United States as part of a European "third way" powered by a French-German alliance. The short-lived German French anti-war axis threatened to take Germany beyond its self-imposed restrictions, challenging the foundations of German identity and policy. By September 2003, the perceived U.S. vulnerability in Iraq and Washington's quest for a multilateral solution led by the UN allowed Germany to mend fences with the Bush administration and join forces in propagating the vision of a democratic and peaceful Iraq in the larger context of a reformed Middle East. The German political elite breathed a sigh of relief, as mending fences with the United States is also crucial to keeping German credibility on the Jewish question. A rift with the United States, compounded with prevalent anti-American sentiments, quickly threatens to translate into rising anti-Semitic sentiments and carries the potential of distancing Germany from Israel and alienating American Jewry, the guardians of Jewish memory, and champions of Israel's security.

NOTES

1 See Volker Rittberger (ed.), *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, Manchester University Press (2001).

2 According to the BKA (the German counter-terrorism unit), several hundred Islamic terrorists operate within Germany. For more on this topic, please see "Anschlagziel Deutschland," *Der Spiegel*, May 8, 2003, at www.spiegel.de.

3 For an interesting treatment of the evolution of memory in Germany, please see Eric A. Langenbacher, "Memory Regimes in Contemporary Germany," Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University, September 2002.

4 James Kurth, "Migration and the Dynamics of Empire" in *The National Interest*, (Spring 2003), pp.10-11.

5 See Yair Sheleg, "NATO and the Jewish Question" in *Haaretz*, February 16, 2003.

6 Rabbi Baker has expressed this position frequently in our discussions.

7 Remarks made during a recent American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) conference on "The Jewish Voice in German-American Relations," Washington D.C., April 11, 2003. Carol Strauss is the executive director of the Leo Beck Institute in New York.

03

SECTION THREE
IRAQ AND THE JEWISH VOICE

AFTER IRAQ: AN OPTIMISTIC VISION OF A GERMAN-AMERICAN FUTURE?

PETER SCHNEIDER (TRANSLATED BY PHILIP BOEHM)

On her visit to the United States in spring 2003, German opposition leader Angela Merkel published an editorial in the *Washington Post* under the headline "Schroeder doesn't speak for all Germans"—and was accordingly well received in the halls of power. Of course, it is difficult to go wrong with such a statement, but it was, in essence, misleading. While voter confidence in the Schröder government has indeed dropped dramatically since the last elections, dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition's lackluster performance in domestic issues and the economy is clear. If there is one position where Gerhard Schröder enjoyed the overwhelming support of the German public, it was in his refusal to take part in the war against Iraq.

The Germans and other "old Europeans" were not the only ones to take this stand. When commentators in the United States asserted that Europe was divided on the question of the war, they were only half right at most. Throughout the "new Europe," from Spain to Lithuania, polls indicate that 70-80 percent of citizens opposed participation in the war. It was not the people of Europe who were divided on this issue, but their governments.

In the meantime, those governments not in accord with Washington are perceived as straining the alliance, of creating a deep transatlantic rift that U.S. observers like to attribute to old or new varieties of "anti-Americanism." This explanation seems insufficient and more than a little self-righteous, as it suggests that the Germans—and like-minded Europeans—had no better argument at their disposal than sheer simple-minded aversion. Of course it would be foolish to deny the existence of such prejudice, just as it would be foolish to claim that the United States is free of anti-European bias, and naturally chauvinism on any side can only make things worse. But this rationale fails to explain how the same Germans and Europeans who gave such unambiguous support to the Bush administration in the wake of 9/11 and in the war against the Taliban now oppose the invasion of Iraq with equal determination. How could it be that, in less than a year, this worldwide solidarity changed to global disapproval and mistrust? Anyone who points at Germany and cites the rampant pacifist euphoria and rabid anti-Americanism must also explain why Germans—both with regular troops and special forces—fought in Afghanistan from the very first day of the war.

In the future, politicians and historians alike will track down the pieces of the transatlantic spaceship and investigate how this fragile instrument broke apart, how the commanders, the former "partners in friendship" managed to let it happen, and whether it can be repaired. Even now we may venture a few hypotheses. The strong German opposition to the policies of the U.S.-led coalition had less to do with the war against

Saddam Hussein than it did with the way in which the Bush administration attempted to force this war on the international community. After all, who on earth could seriously oppose the project of stopping a murderous despot like Saddam Hussein?

The problem with American policymakers was that they never left any other option open except for war. No one had any illusions that the impressive U.S.-UK deployment in the Middle East meant anything but war. No U.S. president would send two hundred thousand soldiers halfway around the globe to remove Saddam Hussein and then stop and have them turn around because he had suddenly been converted by the international community. Indeed, it seemed clear that the Bush administration had its sights set on ousting Saddam from the start, and only declared the elimination of weapons of mass destruction as the primary objective in order to win over world opinion for a war that had already long been planned. In fact, until the fighting actually began, the stated objectives shifted back and forth, as spokespeople for the Bush administration kept outlining different sets of goals for the "possible war"–thereby clouding the issue. The bellicose posturing of the President Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld made the Europeans even more mistrustful, particularly following pronouncements such as, "You're either on our side in this fight against terror or on the side of the terrorists." Was this not a superpower telling its allies that, "you'd better accept what we propose or you'll suffer the consequences?" Was the Bush Administration not tacitly replacing the principle of "first among equals" with that of "first among unequals?"

As for the United Nations, it is difficult to criticize the countries who quibbled with the U.S. policy; after all, they were simply taking the official goal of the deployment–i.e., the peaceful disarmament of Saddam Hussein–literally; since it was the only objective with precedent in international law. Of course their protracted quibbling spared the rest of the international community from really having to decide whether removing Saddam Hussein was, in fact, the only viable means of achieving this goal in the long term. Meanwhile, the fact that it was only thanks to the U.S. threat of force that the inspectors were able to resume their work at all was conveniently swept under the rug. The Europeans, especially the Germans, seemed like clever stock brokers, sensing their chance on the market (a chance they had long ago written off and did not contribute to) for a moral payoff, where they would appear as angels of peace in contrast to the war-crazy Americans. Why did the Europeans not act on their own–especially since it had been proven that such threats were necessary to enforce the longstanding UN resolution? At the very least they could have offered to share the costs of the Anglo-American show of force. Then there is the question of what to think of a government such as the German one that claimed it would insist on unhindered inspections but under no circumstances would support military intervention if the inspectors were hindered.

Mistakes were made on both sides but it is unlikely that the current rift is as irreparable as some pundits maintain. We should not enoble poor diplomacy, superpower arrogance, and crafty manipulation of the moral market by calling them a "structural rift" in the transatlantic alliance. Beyond the mistakes lies a genuine difference of opinion, one that the alliance must be able to withstand. With the rebuilding of Iraq now underway, the Germans–who have had respectable reasons for standing aside thus far–will be urgently needed, and it would be shortsighted to reject their help out of vindictive anger.

WIDENING THE GAP: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES, AND ISRAEL BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR IN IRAQ

ANDRIAN KREYE

At a recent dinner party in New York the conversation turned nostalgic. The German and American guests had all grown up in the 1960s and 1970s and compared childhood milestones. They discovered that each of the Americans had taken school field trips to chocolate factories when they were about nine or ten years old. A native New Yorker marveled about endless lines of chocolate bars in Hershey, Pennsylvania. A Californian reminisced about the fascinating machinery that injected cream filling into Hostess Cupcakes. Both remembered the youthful awe these wonders of dessert-making technology instilled.

The Germans had also gone on school trips at that age, although the locales were quite different. As part of their curriculum, they had to take tours of concentration camps like Dachau and Bergen-Belsen. There they were shown film clips about the Third Reich, the Second World War, and the Holocaust. They stepped into rebuilt barracks and saw the remaining gas chambers and ovens.

Visiting a former concentration camp might be a traumatic event for a child, but it is intentionally so. A nine-year-old can neither understand the chains of historical events leading to disaster, nor grasp a number like "six million dead." But after watching the gruesome black and white images followed by a walking tour of the buildings and grounds, the exhibit of a few shoes and personal belongings from the murdered bring a tangible reality to the horrors of this period in Germany's past.

Four generations of young Germans have now seen these stark reminders of a time not so long ago. These early moments of realizing the consequences of dictatorship and war are imbedded in their subconcious forever. Those visits to the camps are also the root of a pacifist reflex that is continually reinforced by history classes, literature, and films focusing on wartime Germany. It was the pacifist reflex that helped to widen the gap between Germany, the United States and Israel during the latest Intifada and the war in Iraq. The rest of the world, however, seems to be unaware of this pacifism. Germany's criticism of Israel's tactics and its opposition to the war in Iraq are perceived as being part of a greater European sentiment, a sentiment that echoes the grim dynamics of anti-Semitism. One can find plenty of evidence of both anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism in Germany. Jürgen Möllemann, the chairman of the North Rhine Westphalia chapter of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), openly played with anti-Semitic notions during the campaigns for the elections in 2002. German

justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin also caused international furor in 2002 by comparing George W. Bush to Hitler. There was also a heated debate about Martin Walser's new novel *Tod eines Kritikers*, in which he attacked Germany's best known literary critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who is a Jew. None of these incidents had any positive results, however. Möllemann's rightwing populism marginalized the FDP in the elections. Däubler-Gmelin was forced to step down. Walser will be forever tainted with the stigma of being an anti-Semite. Although these cases served as proof of anti-Semitic sentiments in Germany, anti-Semitism is not as big a problem in Germany as it is in some eastern Europeam countries, where radical rightwing movements are gaining political influence. Anti-Semitism is also a problem in France, where a liberal stance towards radical elements of the Muslim population has resulted in harsh prejudice against Jews.

In fall 2002 a conference at New York University sought to explore the parallels of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism in Germany and Europe. At this conference, Moshe Zimmerman, historian at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, remarked that 99 percent of Israelis had never heard the names Möllemann, Däubler-Gmelin, or Walser. In the eyes of Americans and the Jewish communities in the United States, however, the mood had been set.

It is easy to see why criticism of Israel can be perceived as having anti-Semitic undercurrents. As Ian Buruma wrote in his essay "How To Talk About Israel," the European left-wing is almost relieved to be able to express dislike of Israel after the Six Day War, when many leftists took up the cause of the Palestinians. The continuing solidarity of the German left with the Palestinians is further muddled by their dogmatic pacifism. Israel's right to self-defense almost never plays into the debate. In the face of almost daily suicide attacks "war is bad" seems like an oversimplistic mantra and is indeed an unreflected reaction.

The same reflex came into play prior to the war in Iraq. U.S. spin doctors made it appear as if Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had used the looming war in Iraq to fuel anti-American sentiment just to win the elections. Quite the contrary was the case. Like all politicians, Schröder merely reacted to polls that told him what his people demanded—no support for a war in Iraq. Schröder's stance is not surprising in light of public opinion and the fact that the German *Grundgesetz* (constitution) clearly outlaws any comittment of German troops abroad.

The Iraq war admittedly also gave rise to populist forms of anti-Americanism. The enormous success of the books by filmmaker and left-wing demagogue Michael Moore can be seen as evidence of those sentiments. In the context of a German mass readership, the function of Moore's Stupid White Men is to reinforce anti-American stereotypes hiding behind an American author's humorous and valid criticism of his own government. Those stereotypes have been perceived as ugly echoes from the past, since anti-Americanism is driven by many of the same dynamics that have fueled anti-Semitism for centuries. It begins with the infamous fear of a money driven cosmopolitan culture, as echoed in conservative local politicians' recurring warnings about the "Americanization" of German cities. Then there are the conspiracy theories such as the books about the U.S. government's possible involvement in the 9/11 attacks, books that are widely read in German leftwing circles. Even the archaic momentum of scapegoating can be found in the protest generation's use of the United States as the symbol of a corporate capitalism, even though the same capitalism is praticed in Europe.

The main force behind this outburst of anti-American fervor, however, remains the reflexive pacifism of young Germans. They see their opposition to any military operations in the Middle East (regardless of whether they are carried out by Israel or the United States) as proof that Germany is indeed a model citizen of the international community. In their minds

there is no room for a more refined debate about military interventions. Although even the left in the United States can clearly differentiate between wars against "utopias" like Cuba, Vietnam, and Nicaragua, and wars against "dystopias" like Nazi Germany, Serbia, and Iraq, Germany's dogmatic rejection of war as a last resort appears self-destructive. The war against terror is one such example. While the United States clearly used the war on terror to pursue its own interests, it is, however, in the interest of all states to confront this new threat. However, neither the American nor the European publics understand the meanings and consequences of different forms of terrorism. It might have been useful to diffuse these differences in America in the interest of spin control but, in Europe, the resultant confusion just hardened the pacifist reflex. If the secular state terrorism in Iraq or the nationalist Palestinian terrorism fueled by fundamentalist fervor and outside funding are presented as one and the same–an apocalyptic international terrorism bent on wiping away modernity and secular life from this planet, then even a superficial debate about the Middle East becomes impossible. Both the United States and Germany have stubbornly kept to their chosen paths of foreign policy. The United States waged a unilateral war that might signal the end of an international community under the auspices of the United Nations. Chancellor Schröder, whose coalition government almost fell after he committed German troops to Afghanistan, declared that even with a UN mandate, German cooperation in Iraq would be impossible.

In his now famous essay "Power and Weakness" Robert Kagan described the United States as having a realist view of a Hobbesian world and accused Europe of hiding behind their luxurious state in a Kantian paradise of peace and security. The Iraq war might have cemented these respective positions. Both are rooted in almost opposite experiences. Both sides will have to learn now to neither fear nor disrespect the other's. This is the only way to a middle ground.

NEO-CONSERVATISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

JACOB HEILBRUNN

When American troops rumbled into Baghdad, it was not because they were after oil. Nor was it because a "merchants of death" industry wanted to test its high-tech weaponry. It was because of something else–a small band of ideological crusaders known as neo-conservatives succeeded in winning the support of President George W. Bush.

Nothing has raised more hackles at home and abroad than the startling resurgence of the neo-conservative faction in the Bush administration. The one thing both the left and elements of the right have in common is a hatred of the neo-conservatives for creating an American empire that protects Israel. "The conservative movement has been hijacked and turned into a globalist, interventionist, open borders ideology," fulminates Patrick Buchanan in *The New York Times*. "It is not the conservative movement I grew up with." Buchanan has founded an entire magazine, *The American Conservative*, in which contributors such as columnist Robert Novak denounce neo-conservatives for subordinating American foreign policy interests to the security of Israel.

On the left, Paul Krugman agrees that, "this war with Iraq is largely the brainchild of a group of neo-conservative intellectuals who view it as a pilot project." Jason Epstein decries the neo-conservatives using similar language in the *New York Review of Books*, George W. Bush is described as "the callow instrument of neo-conservative ideologues, obsessed since the end of the Cold War with missionary zeal to Americanize the world … Should the United States … persist in the crusade … the unforeseeable consequences can be imagined only with horror." According to Michael Lind in *Salon*, "the foreign policy of the world's only global power is being made by a small clique that is unrepresentative of either the U.S. population or the mainstream foreign policy establishment." This view is widely held abroad as well. French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin has reportedly uttered similar concerns to national assembly legislators, attacking a "pro-Zionist lobby" that runs American foreign policy.

Since the late 1960s, neo-conservatism has been the most influential intellectual movement in American history since the Progressive Movement. Its origins can be traced to the sectarian anti-Stalinist Trotskyists of the early 1940s who turned into Cold War liberals, such as Irving Kristol. By the late 1960s, these liberals found themselves adrift in a Democratic Party that had repudiated the internationalist, anti-communism of Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy. They continued to espouse a crusading anti-communism until the Berlin Wall fell and created a successor generation in Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Michael Ledeen, and others. While the left went into a state of intellectual shock, the neo-conservatives waged a war of ideas to transform the United States into an empire.

Neo-conservatism not only espouses ideas but it is, in part, the product of the campus wars of the 1960s. Key to the movement was the April 1969 black militant uprising at Cornell University. The armed radicals occupied Willard Straight Hall, the student center. During the standoff, a number of professors, including Allan Bloom, Walter Berns, and Donald Kagan, believed that the Cornell administration was selling out to terrorists. As Bloom put it at the time, the episode was "an entirely new thing in American universities, a complete capitulation under firearms

to a group of students who have a program for transformation of the university. Once a show of force has been made and it has been established who has the power, the group that has won is in command. The resemblance on all levels to the first stages of a totalitarian takeover are almost unbelievable." In short, Bloom saw the United States as heading in the direction of Weimar Germany. Their disciples agreed. The United States, they believed, was paralyzed by the failure of liberal elites unable to deal with a radical, anti-democratic upsurge coming, not from the right, but the left. They believed that a self-confident United States would lead to freedom abroad and restored patriotism at home. Democracies had failed to confront Nazi Germany in time–now they could not flinch from the battle against the Kremlin. Fukuyama's "The End of History" was the ultimate statement of the neo-conservative credo after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The triumphalism, however, proved premature. When the new threat of radical Islam emerged, Wolfowitz and others saw a new totalitarian threat that had to be confronted, not in the future, but immediately.

Neo-conservatives are fond of citing the maxim of Richard Weaver–"ideas have consequences." They themselves exemplify it. The godfathers of the current neo-conservative movement are Leo Strauss and Albert Wohlstetter. Strauss could scarcely have been a more unlikely apostle of a political movement. A refugee from Nazi Germany, he was born in Kirchhain, Germany in 1899. He served briefly as an interpreter in Belgium during the First World War before resuming his studies in philosophy. His emergence as a leading scholar of ancient philosophy coincided with the collapse of the Weimar republic and he could hardly remain immune to the parallels between Weimar and the collapse of Athenian democracy. In 1934, he emigrated to England, a country he came to venerate for its tradition of classical liberalism. Early on in his stay in England he regarded as "the most important fact" that … "I saw Downing Street, the seat of the greatest power of the world–much, much smaller than the Wilhelmstrasse. I had a very strong impression." Strauss' hero was Prime Minister Winston Churchill. By 1938, he had landed a position at the New School for Social Research (along with other émigré philosophers like Hannah Arendt) and stayed for a decade before leaving for the University of Chicago.

Strauss developed a school of thought that holds that the pre-modern philosophers are superior to the Enlightenment ones. The great books of western philosophy, so the argument goes, are esoteric works with one meaning on the surface and a deeper meaning hidden in the text; only a small elite class is capable of properly deciphering their encoded messages, namely the Straussians. Philosophy became stripped of its dangers, at least to its practitioners. Strauss' school of thought was aimed at reforming society and led to a liberal ideology of progress upon which the founding principles of American democracy were based. To Straussians, the rise of the New Left in the 1960s was confirmation of the moral and intellectual collapse of liberalism, and Strauss's students attacked its fruits. Allan Bloom ended up popularizing Strauss' ideas in *The Closing of the American Mind*. Another Strauss student, Leon Kass, a doctor and medical ethicist, has become an influential figure in the conservative war against cloning and stem cell research.

Albert Wohlstetter was another figure who has played a decisive role in shaping the neo-conservative movement. Perhaps the most influential strategist of the second half of the twentieth century, Wohlstetter may also be one of the least studied. If Strauss supplied the intellectual scaffolding for confronting totalitarianism, Wohlstetter provided the tools and strategy. Unlike Henry Kissinger, Wohlstetter never sought the public spotlight. However, he may turn out to have been more influential in shaping American foreign policy. Born in 1914, he earned a master's degree in mathematical logic from Columbia University in 1938. After the Second World War, he became the country's most influential nuclear strategist. His admirers included Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, Robert Bartley, and Margaret Thatcher. His most prominent protégés today are Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz (who earned his doctorate under Wohlstetter). Wohlstetter stressed the need to build-up nuclear forces in order to provide a flexible response to Soviet aggression. After joining the RAND Corporation in 1951, he wrote a paper that prompted the Strategic Air Command to base bombers far from the Soviet Union so that they could survive a first strike. Wohlstetter was largely responsible for the hawkish, interventionist approach that *The Wall Street Journal* took under Bartley's editorship during the Cold War, an approach that continues

today. In the 1970s, Wohlstetter took the lead in denouncing the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and in promoting the need for a ballistic missile defense. This cause has since become a central plank of GOP foreign policy.

Neo-conservatives first attained power in the Reagan administration. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Elliot Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, among others, occupied prominent positions in the administration. William Kristol worked as Vice President Dan Quayle's chief of staff, feeding the perception that the neo-conservatives were behind the scenes–Machiavellian manipulators of their credulous, nominal superiors.

In the 1990s the neo-conservative movement remade itself. William Kristol launched the *Weekly Standard* and the *Project for a New American Century*. Other neo-conservative friendly organizations include the Washington-based Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, the Middle East Forum, and the Hudson Institute. To read and follow the numerous initiatives backed by neo-conservatives, such as the Iraqi Liberation Act, is to see how the stage was set for America's return to a bellicose foreign policy. Numerous articles and books adumbrate the neo-conservative vision. Far from hiding their ambitions, they publicized them. The most telling development was the de facto alliance between neo-conservatives and liberals on the issue of intervention in the Balkans. Wohlstetter, Perle, and Wolfowitz all championed intervention as did liberal outposts such as the *New Republic*. Neo-conservatives and liberals, animated by human rights concerns, lambasted Clinton for not acting sooner–it was an adumbration of the shift that has taken place among liberals such as Christopher Hitchens and Paul Berman. Both have moved toward neo-conservative positions in the war against Islamic totalitarianism.

George W. Bush's presidency might have seemed inhospitable to neo-conservatives–many, after all, had supported John McCain's candidacy–but Bush soon proved surprisingly receptive to their overtures. During the 2002 presidential campaign, he spoke of the need for America to be "humble" and to avoid nation-building. His appeal was to the traditional Republican aversion to foreign commitments. Since 9/11, however, Bush has followed the opposite course. He has given Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon *carte blanche* to attack the Palestinians and he has aggressively moved to construct what increasingly looks like an American empire. The intellectual firepower for constructing that empire has been supplied by the neo-conservative movement. Long before Bush had even thought of attacking Iraq, Kristol's Project for a New American Century had distributed a manifesto signed by Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, calling upon the United States to "challenge regimes hostile to our values and interests" and to construct "an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles."

Neo-conservatives, or those sympathetic to their thinking, inside the Bush administration now include Rumsfeld (a former member of the Committee on Present Danger), Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith, Michael Rubin, Elliott Abrams, and Lewis "Scooter" Libby. Outside agitators include William Kristol, James Woolsey, and Richard Perle. David Frum, who coined the "axis of evil" expression, was a long-time neo-conservative and served as speechwriter for Bush. Vice President Cheney also installed other neo-conservatives, including Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas J. Feith, at the Pentagon. Indeed, after 9/11, Cheney was deeply influenced by scholar Bernard Lewis, who urged him to support an attack on Iraq as a means of democratizing the Middle East. Cheney has taken the lead in opposing the more cautious Secretary of State Colin Powell.

The neo-conservatives have moved from theory to practice, from articles and books to grasping power and influence in the corridors of Washington. In the aftermath of the Iraq war, neo-conservatives face their greatest crisis as doubts mount about whether Iraq, let alone the rest of the Arab world, can become democratic. Given the stamina of the movement over the decades, however, an obituary for it would be wholly premature.

04 SECTION FOUR ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE DANGERS OF TOTALITARIANISM

THE SHIFT IN ANTI-SEMITIC RHETORIC AMONG THE POST-WORLD WAR II GENERATIONS

FRANK MECKLENBURG

As the eyewitnesses of the Holocaust die out and are no longer available as authorities of actual events, the German genocides of World War II turn into chapters of history to which the postwar generations relate as researchers producing their own results of investigations and creating new mythologies, legends and folklore. A topic of the symposium, "Anti-Semitism, Anti-Zionism, Anti-Americanism" presumes a certain degree of equivalence between these concepts.

Peter Schneider, one of the participants, talked about two forms of anti-Americanism, the naïve or stupid type and the other, serious, intelligent, and informed kind of anti-Americanism. But it is not possible to apply this distinction to anti-Semitism, certainly not in Germany. A naïve, non-political anti-Semitism can no longer claim innocence or stupidity, it is no longer acceptable and no longer believable. Anti-Semitism today is not the same as anti-Semitism in 1930 when a "Holocaust" was not imaginable. And in a similar fashion there is no more "stupid" anti-Americanism after 9/11, particularly when we look at how the events of 9/11 resonate in the current public debate in Germany, where polls showed that 70 percent of the population believed that the attacks on the World Trade Center were created by the U.S. government, an opinion or folklore that are legitimized through prominent display in the German weekly *Der Spiegel* and in late night talk shows on German television.

But before talking about generational shifts in dealing with anti-Semitism, another significant change needs to be taken into account, that is, the shift that came with the reconfiguration of the German political landscape in 1989. The East-West polarity did not disappear but changed colors, resulting in what is considered the "good Germany" versus the "bad Germany" as well as "old Germany" versus a "new Germany", that is, where we place anti-foreigners, neo-Nazis and anti-Semites. The convenient designation of "good" West and "bad" East is one of the mythologies created for political purposes. For the propagandists of the new national identity, however, those terms have been useful figures of speech, because they created a new dominant discourse that is best represented by the term *Leitkultur* (dominant culture).

This essay will focus on the generational aspect of how Germany today is dealing with the legacy of the Holocaust, particularly with regard to its relationship to Jews. Probably the most significant advocate of this new discourse is Martin Walser, insofar as his age group represents the generational bridge between those for whom the Holocaust is history and the generation of adults who were eyewitnesses, whether they were perpetrators or bystanders. Walser's message is, "you Jews, leave us alone, your moral claims have run out, Auschwitz is history." This is obviously Martin Walser's sense of history, his desire for a final accounting, the famous "*Schlussstrich*" that enables a return to some normalcy. But his is also a

message conveyed to younger generations in Germany, where it is met with varying responses. It is fair to say that the majority of Germans, at least those who care, follow, and participate in the rising and ebbing debates feel disgust and disbelief, asking themselves why Walser really has said the things he said. For those who want to hear it, however, such a message, is loud and clear; Martin Walser says it for "us"—and he has done so repeatedly, not only in his "moral bludgeon" (*Moralkeule*) speech after receiving the most prestigious German book award, but also more explicitly in his novel about the killing of a Jewish critic. The killing in the book is meant to be some kind of practical joke, but in fact it is no joke. All sides, including Walser himself, understood very clearly that his statements can only be understood in one way in Germany. A German audience can have no other association with the killing of a Jewish critic than the Holocaust. What was Walser thinking?

Not too long after the Walser affair died down, FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann asserted that Israel and "the Jews" are all the same. Describing Möllemann, the BBC noted, "he is perhaps best known in recent years for his outspoken criticism of Israeli leaders and a prominent German-Jewish broadcaster, and for championing the Palestinian cause" (BBC News, Thursday, June 5, 2003). A few years earlier, Ignaz Bubis, president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, had a similar experience when as a German he was identified with Israel simply because he was Jewish. This willful ignorance, when displayed by German public figures, sends a clear message to the German people. The message is particularly clear when this scenario is viewed from outside Germany, and is often met with disbelief by many Germans—again those who do care about these questions at all—most of whom cannot understand that outsiders still look at them as if their history will not go away. History does not disappear, no matter how much one might wish it would.

The omnipresence of history becomes very clear when we look at the current "Germans-as-victims" debate, especially Jörg Friedrich's book, *The Fire* (*Der Brand*). The book details the Allied carpet bombings of German cities at the end of the Second World War. Friedrich's language seems to equate the victims of the Holocaust with German war victims by claiming popular innocence and simply by virtue of making this comparison. Friedrich's book appeals to all generations of Germans, and this appeal has translated into market success although the resonance is different with the younger and the older generations. Friedrich allows the older generation to dip into their hidden memories. This is underlined by the recent TV series by Spiegel Television. Put together from World War II color footage, *What is the Color of War?* (*Welche Farbe hat der Krieg?*), and the Channel 2 television show by Guido Knopp, *The War of the Century* (*Der Jahrhundertkrieg*), also feature prominent and less prominent Germans who experienced the war as children and teenagers. One segment is titled *The Fire Storm* (*Der Feuersturm*) and shows the destruction of German cities at the end of the Second World War in color from rare footage. The recent debate about the expulsion of Germans from Eastern territories at the end of the war featuring Social Democratic intellectual Peter Glotz, also emphasizes the notion of Germans as war victims. Friedrich proposes in his book that the Nazi community of Germans (*Volksgemeinschaft*) was reinforced by the bombings which, in a way, forged a new bond among German war victims. These victims now remind younger Germans not to forget what happened to the German population during the war and prescribe remembrance. There is no mention in the book about the larger context, that "the other victims," the first victims of the German genocide machine. This is, of course, not the unanimous opinion in Germany.

Frank Bajohr, historian at the Hamburg Institut für Sozialforschung, has found other reactions in his research which contradict Friedrich's thesis. Friedrich is only the latest example of those to promote the old Nazi lore about the "tightening solidarity" in the final war years. Bajohr found that the *Volksgemeinschaft* was falling apart during the bombings. The bombings dissolved the myth of strength and invulnerability and created envy and divisiveness between those Germans who lost their homes and possessions and those who escaped unscathed. Moreover, the blame for those bombings was put on the Jews, either because the same fate that befell the Jews in 1938 and was coming back to haunt the Germans, or, because the bombings were a plot of the international Jewish conspiracy. The shift from the "Jews-as-victims" to the "Germans-as-victims" and then further to the "Jews-as-perpetrators" already took place in 1944 and Jöerg Friedrich and Guido Knopp are rehashing something that had been repressed for the last sixty years. It all comes back to the old German saying, "It's all the fault of the Jews" (*Die Juden sind an allem Schuld*), a belief that is transposed to the conflict in the Middle East. It is not the government in Israel that is criticized–all Jews that are to be blamed. Such a verdict is simply anti-Semitic.

THE GERMAN LEFT VERSUS ANTI-SEMITISM

SUSANNAH HESCHEL

For many years, it seemed that the German Left was dogged by an intractable dislike of Judaism, a dislike most often expressed as disdain for the religion and its alleged nefarious influences. The Old Testament, it was said, had a "warrior God" who promoted violence and, in the most egregious argument, Nazism was made analogous to Judaism because both demanded obedience to commands, whether of God or Hitler.

While the extent of anti-Jewish attitudes on the Left are not to be underestimated, it seems that the situation is changing. A strong critique of anti-Semitism and an identification with Jews (and even with Israel) is emerging within the German Left. In spring 2002, there were two demonstrations in Berlin—one was pro-Palestinian, the other pro-Israel. The pro-Palestinian demonstrations were led by a collection of left-wing groups and critics of globalization, as well as Palestinian solidarity groups. In the pro-Israel demonstration, however, there was something startlingly new-leftists and radical leftists who condemned the critics of Israel and even expressed their solidarity with the Israeli government. Some of the demonstrators stemmed from a new group, the Antideutsche Kommunistinnen, and others were inspired by the work of Hermann Gremliza, editor of the journal *Konkret*.

The German Left has a political legacy that promotes policies that support the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish state as well as an absolute commitment to its security. The Left views Zionism with far greater skepticism, both in its classical and in its newer, pseudo-religious forms. This is a contradiction that has not been worked out on the German Left. Those who believe the Jews need a strong state, with all the necessary apparatus that guarantees their security, present it as something "the world owes Israel" after the Holocaust. Yet they often reject Zionism—the nationalism, "chosenness," and exclusively Jewish cultural nature of Israel as well as the religious claims that have grown stronger since 1967. Is this rejection of Zionism an aspect of anti-Zionism or anti-Semitism? What is striking about the newly emerging pro-Israeli left is its analysis of anti-Semitism. For instance, it argues that the European Union's lack of strong support for Israel has stimulated a growing anti-Semitism in Europe; and that the majority of Palestinians have embraced an anti-Semitic and *völkish* liberation struggle whose goal is the murder of Jews and the destruction of the state of Israel. The criticisms of Israel in the mainstream press are also exposed by the German Left. For example, *Die Zeit*'s statement that Israel is playing with fire in refusing to make peace with the Palestinians, because it takes its biblical claims more seriously than a compromise with the Palestinians, is characterized as a projection onto Israel of German "master race" fantasies. *Junge Welt*, the Antideutsche Kommunistinnen point out, has called Israel an apartheid state, while the *TAZ* employs the old stereotypes about biblical ruthlessness ("eye for an eye") to "explain" Israel's alleged intransigence. Germany's stance against Israel and in support of the Palestinians, this new Left argues, is legitimated by the fascist language of the "right of self-determination of every *Volk*."

Such harsh critiques should not obscure the sources of the discomfort with Israel that have often prevailed within the German Left, such as the sincere effort by many to take seriously the lessons of the postwar era. Hartmut Lehmann has pointed out that German

Protestantism promoted a special role for the Germans in God's plans, such that nationalism could easily be understood as a secularized theology of chosenness.[1] If German history were part of a *Heilsgeschichte* (salvation history), the unified German nation would be something sacred, a body politic directly guided by God. Biblical theology offered no viable tools to resist race theory. While Germans are certainly not the only people who used the concept of the "chosen people" to attain their political ends, the aftermath was a particular shock for them. To affirm Israeli nationalism, especially with its religious claims, seems to affirm for some Germans on the Left, precisely what led Germany into disaster. With their tremendous sensitivity to the dire consequences of nationalism, the German Left worries that affirming Israeli nationalism implies a failure to confront the evils of their own nationalism. Moreover, is a German to conclude that nationalism, even "chosenness," is acceptable and safe when practiced by Jews and not by Germans? Is that not in itself racist?

Germans, like many Jews, often say that they have a duty to give unconditional support to the existence of the state of Israel, regardless of who is running the government. Such unconditional demands are, however, unrealistic and are not helpful.

What is not present in Germany today, however, is the exploitation of the mood and rhetoric of the "fear of an invisible enemy" to develop a revival of classical anti-Semitism, or the kind of anti-Semitism found today in parts of the Muslim world. For centuries, as Gil Anidjar has pointed out in a recent book, Christian Europe defined Jews as the enemy within, Arabs as the enemy without, and defined its own Christian existence by reference to them.[2] Given the role that Arabs have historically played as the enemy, it is no wonder that viewing the Arabs today as a military enemy, an external threat, is so plausible today, and an alliance in the United States between the Christian Right and the Jewish and Israeli Right is so much easier to forge.

Today, fear is everywhere, endlessly exploitable. As George W. Bush stated, "We know that they are there, but not where they are." There is fear in the United States and Europe of becoming like Israel, a country where terrorism is a part of daily life. How easy it would be to revive the old motifs of the hidden, dangerous Jew, ready to destroy society from within. Yet such a revival has not happened, especially not in Germany, which is remarkable.

It is useful to compare this situation with a country like Indonesia where, James Siegel notes, there are no Jews and there is uncertainty over precisely what a Jew really is or where Israel is located, but where the words "Zionist" and "Jew" are conflated to describe feelings of fear and a looming, invisible menace. Siegel continues: "The absence of the Jew means that he can never be directly addressed ... The word 'Jew' in Indonesian indicates a menace. No form has been found for it. Jews are not specters, but the threat of specters to come."[3] Nothing comparable prevails in Germany; the Jew is not the uncanny, nor is Israel.

One of the most remarkable features of German life is its lively intellectual forum. The exchange of ideas is not limited to universities, but occurs in the press, on television, and at lectures and conferences in which the public takes active part. Indeed, this is one reason Germany is so attractive to many young Jewish-American intellectuals. It is in the public forum that the most important moments in the postwar struggle against anti-Semitism have taken place, from the *Historikerstreit* to the Fassbinder controversy, from the Jenninger Affair to the Martin Walser affair. If Jews are to intervene, they are best advised to enter that public framework bearing ideas and arguments, and exert their influence. Before 1933 Jews helped bring German intellectual life into being; now they have the opportunity to engage in it with a sophisticated discussion of their goals as Jews of the Diaspora and of Israel. In Germany like nowhere else in the world, there is an opportunity for serious intellectual engagement, and the Jews should take full advantage of it.

NOTES

1 Hartmut Lehmann, "The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German Nationalism," *German Studies Review* 14:2 (May 1991), 261-274.

2 Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

3 James T. Siegel, "'Kiblat' and the Mediatic Jews," *Religion and Media*, ed. Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 302.

JEWISH VOICES, TOTALITARIANISM, AND THE LONG CENTURY

JEFFREY HERF

There is no such thing as a unitary "Jewish voice" in American politics, other than what one might infer from what is arguably a growing anti-Semitic global discourse. There are many different Jewish voices. One of those voices or, rather, traditions is that of liberal opposition to totalitarianism, past and present. Yet in the debate leading up to and during the war in Iraq of 2003, it become apparent that some Jewish voices drew lessons from Europe's twentieth century totalitarian era, putting us at odds with much of European opinion (with the exception of the British government) and much liberal and left-liberal opinion in the United States. It is this consistent opposition to totalitarianism–be it fascist, Nazi or Communist in Europe's twentieth century, or in the form of the secular Baath Party in Iraq or the Islamic fundamentalism of Al Qaeda-that partly defines a liberalism that, while not defined as "Jewish," has had prominent Jewish advocates.

In Germany, the link between Holocaust memory and contemporary opposition to American military power contrasts with some of the German responses to the wars in Balkans in the 1990s. It was then that Joschka Fischer and other veterans of 1968 such as novelist and essayist Peter Schneider and Frankfurt Green Party leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit, made the argument that the memory of the Holocaust placed particular responsibility on Germany to intervene in order to stop ethnic cleansing and mass murder in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. In the United States, similar views were expressed by Leon Wieseltier and other editors at *The New Republic* as well as by liberals such as Stanley Hoffmann and Anthony Lewis in *The New York Review of Books* and *The New York Times*, respectively.[1] Jewish and non-Jewish liberals on both sides of the Atlantic used the word "appeasement" to criticize European governments, the first Bush administration, and then the Clinton administration for failing to intervene militarily to stop the ethnic cleansing campaigns of Slobodan Milosovic. How, these authors asked, could the memory of Auschwitz justify a policy of non-intervention in the face of mass murder? It seemed as if the "Jewish voices" in this country linking domestic liberalism and foreign policy were speaking the same language as that of the German Foreign Ministry.

This meeting of minds ended over the issue of Iraq and, at least as far as popular opinion was concerned, over how to respond to the Palestinian terrorist campaign launched against Israel beginning in fall of 2000. Disagreement over Iraq centered on the controversies about the degree of threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. Another important reason behind the difference of opinion between the American and British positions in the United Nations, and those of France, Germany, and Russia lies in a different view of the relevance of Europe's totalitarian era to the Iraq issue and the

problem of weapons of mass destruction in dictatorships outside Europe today. The French barely mentioned the links between the French fascism of the 1930s and 1940s and Michel Aflaq, the ideological inspiration of Iraq's Baath Party.[2] In Germany and Europe generally, arguments concerning the relevance of lessons of the era of appeasement of Nazi Germany found few supporters as critics stressed the obvious differences while ignoring obvious similarities between the two situations. Critics of the Bush administration on both sides of the Atlantic gave short shrift to the plausible argument that the mix of dictatorship, international terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a contemporary variant of what is sometimes referred to as "reactionary modernism," was becoming the primary security issue of the twenty-first century, changing the subject instead to accusations of unilateralism.[3]

Prominent Jewish intellectuals have been among the key figures describing and denouncing totalitarianism in all its forms–fascist, Nazi, or communist. This tradition includes Hannah Arendt's *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Raymond Aron's *The Opium of the Intellectuals* as well as a tradition of the democratic left in Western Europe and the United States that focused attention on the anti-Semitic purges in the Soviet Union in the 1950s and the anti-Zionist campaigns that began in the 1960s and ended in the 1980s. Since the 1960s, *The New Republic* and its publisher Martin Peretz have comprised a distinctive Jewish voice, one that found its themes in support of Israel and in opposition to the mix of anti-Zionism and anti-Americanism of the new left, both in Europe and the United States. Josef Joffe, now an editor of *Die Zeit*, drew similar conclusions. During the era of detente, when criticism of the Soviet Union became unfashionable in liberal circles, both Raymond Aron and Walter Laqueur renewed their critiques of Soviet totaliltarianism, with Laqueur also denouncing the traditions of terrorism attached to it.[4] In the United States, the 1980s saw a distinctive set of Jewish voices, spanning a spectrum from liberalism to neoconservatism, expressing support for the NATO deployments during the euromissile dispute in the pages of *The New Republic*, *Partisan Review*, and *Commentary*. Faced with a choice between the Atlanticism of West German conservatives, centrist liberals, and right-wing Social Democrats, on the one hand, and the neutralism and pacifism of the western European left most American Jewish liberals opted for supporting the former.

In the wake of the collapse of the Oslo process, the Intifada launched by the Palestinian factions against Israel, as well as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002, the tradition of liberal opposition to totalitarianism is experiencing a resurgence. As Paul Berman argues in *Terror and Liberalism*, the more terror was inflicted on Israeli civilians, the more some segment of opinion in Europe seemed to blame the Israelis and their American ally for having brought these crimes upon themselves.[5] Moreover, in Al Qaeda's attacks on capitalism, modernity, and the Jews, Berman and others recognized echoes of the totalitarian messages of the last century.

In the contemporary context, the distinctive tradition of Jewish intellectuals described above is distinguished from other currents of liberalism in two ways. First, it accepts the need for a Jewish state and for military strength in a dangerous world. The Zionism of this tradition does not rest on religious arguments but, rather, on the history of the twentieth century and the recognition that anti-Semitism will be with us for some time to come. Without military power and a state to call their own, Jews around the world remain at the mercy of those who are militarily stronger. The Holocaust is the most extreme lesson in the unavoidability of power politics.

Second, this tragic and disillusioned liberalism believes that there are times in history when ideological fanaticism becomes the crucial driving force of movements and states. At such times, it is necessary to take seriously what such movements and states say and write. Their words operate both as deeply held convictions as well as cleverly manipulated political instruments. Visions of a world transformed by violence, fueled by a hatred for liberal democracy, and possessing an open and virulent anti-Semitism do link the totalitarian era of Europe's mid-twentieth

century to our own day. It was one thing for Europeans of the 1930s to underestimate fascism and Nazism but quite another for us to assume that the adversaries of the United States, Israel, and Europe as well, do not mean what they say.

The victims of twentieth century totalitarianism number in the millions, and most of these victims were not Jewish. The Jews, however, had the unfortunate distinction of being the most despised by Hitler and also by Stalin. The totalitarian era is not over and the United States must take the lead, as it did in the twentieth century, in confronting and defeating it. The twentieth century, if viewed only through the prism of the history of European communism, was indeed a short one, beginning in 1914 and ending in 1989. Yet, first in the Balkans in the 1990s and now in the form of the secularized fanaticism of the Baath regime in Bagdad, Al Qaeda, and Hamas, twentieth century totalitarianism is experiencing an afterlife outside of Europe. When we place Europe's totalitarian heritage into the context of contemporary global politics, we should speak of a long, rather than the short century.[6] Jews have no monopoly on the memory of Europe's era of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism. Indeed, such memory has become a component of general western modernity. As much as the language and geography of totalitarianism have changed, our vivid and terrible memories of the Europe's twentieth century require that we take them seriously. We must confront and defeat the threats to liberal democracies posed by this second, and now globalized, chapter in the history of totalitarianism and of reactionary modernist ideas and regimes.

NOTES

1 For *The New Republic* on Bosnia, see Nader Mousavizadeh, ed., *The Black Book of Bosnia : The Consequences of Appeasement* (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

2 Samir al-Khalil, *The Republic of Fear: The Inside Story of Saddam's Iraq* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).

3 Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

4 Walter Laqueur, *A Continent Astray: Europe, 1970-1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Raymond Aron, *In Defense of Decadent Europe* (South Bend: Regnery/Gateway, 1979; translation of *Playdoyer pour l'europe decadente* (Paris: Laffont, 1977).

5 Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 2003).

6 Jeffrey Herf, "What is Old and What is New about the Terrorism of Islamic Fundamentalism," *Partisan Review*, Winter 2002, LXIX, No. 1, pp. 25-32; "Die Appeaser," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 11, 2003; "Die Linke und der Irak Krieg," *Die Welt*, July 14, 2003.

05

SECTION FIVE
OVERVIEW

THE JEWISH VOICE AT AICGS: A TWENTY-YEAR HISTORY

LILY GARDNER FELDMAN

The previous essays have amply demonstrated the multi-vocal nature of the Jewish dimension in German-American relations, a reality that is reflected in the programming of AICGS. From its inception through its twentieth anniversary, AICGS has consistently played three roles in this field: as an agenda-setter by shaping an intellectual and public discourse on German-Jewish relations; as a venue by providing a space for the expression of Jewish voices; and as a forum by facilitating exchange among the various parties.

AICGS has featured German-Jewish issues in all aspects of its work: fellowships, seminars, workshops, conferences, and publications; across functional areas: Research Program, Public Affairs Program, and Humanities Program; across disciplines: politics, history, culture, anthropology, sociology, and law; and across professions: academics, politicians, policymakers, journalists, and community leaders. Consistent with its multi-layered approach, the Institute has often collaborated with other organizations in the United States, for example the American Jewish Committee, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung, the Deutsches Historisches Institut, and the Leo Baeck Institute. Over one hundred scholars and speakers from the United States, Germany, and Israel have been engaged in programs and projects at AICGS (see Appendix).

German-Israeli Relations and Beyond

Already in its first year of programming, before the wave of scholarship and public interest generated by Bitburg in 1985 and the *Historikerstreit* in 1986, the Institute hosted a seminar on "Israel's Place in West Germany's Middle East Policy" with Lily Gardner Feldman, at the time the Institute's first fellow, and Andrei Markovits, long-time member of the Institute's Senior Advisory Council. This focus on Israel, which mirrored the reality of how the German government dealt with the past from 1949 until the mid-1980s, continued in the 1990s at AICGS but widened its horizon, by comparing the German-Israeli "special relationship" with growing ties between Germany and American Jewry. Comparison as a way to highlight both uniqueness and patterns was extended during the Institute's second decade in work that set the German-Israeli partnership in the larger setting of Germany's efforts at "reconciliation" with France, the Czech Republic, and Poland. In line with the Institute's original distinctiveness of dealing with the two Germanies, in the early 1990s the Institute sponsored research on the neglected topic of relations between the GDR and Israel.

The Institute's first seminar on this terrain in 1984 recognized the larger context of Germany's Middle East policy, an emphasis that continued later with discussions about German companies and Libya, Germany, and the Gulf War, Germany and the Middle East peace process, and, most recently, Germany and the war in Iraq. Whether directly or indirectly, those efforts to understand the challenges to postwar German foreign policy either separately or in the framework of the European Union have touched the issue of Germany as a "tamed power" due to its Nazi history.

"Confronting the Past" (*Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit*) was the theme of one of the Institute's first workshops, in 1986, that examined whether and how literature in the two Germanies dealt with Nazism. Since then, the Institute's various programs have addressed this fundamental issue of the past's imprint on contemporary Germany through a variety of media: film, monuments, literature, war crimes trials, domestic politics and policy, German unification, foreign affairs, and "collective memory." Again, the GDR has provided an additional focus, for example in the work the Institute supported on "divided memory" of the Nazi past in the two Germanies, and on anti-fascism as a "foundation myth" of the GDR. Most recently, AICGS has sponsored research on the notion of "competing memories" and the highly actual topic of whether Germans were both perpetrators and victims.

American Jewry and the New Triangle

Israel was the main interlocutor for official confrontation with history in the Federal Republic's first three decades, but by the mid-1980s Germany began to make room for another Jewish voice, that of organized Jewry in the United States. This initiative, which pre-dated Bitburg, was manifested in the presence of a diplomat at the German Embassy in Washington, whose main mandate was to build relations with the American Jewish community. German political leaders at this time approached the Institute for information about the genesis of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, which had been chartered by a 1980 Act of Congress, and for evaluation of the planned Museum's political and community significance.

As the American Jewish Committee (AJC) both responded to official overtures and initiated its own exchanges with German societal and political actors in the mid-1980s, it also looked to the Institute for intellectual input into its programs with both the Federal Republic and the GDR. In the last twenty years, the American Jewish Committee has emerged as the most active and institutionalized Jewish group in the United States regarding Germany, with the opening of an office in Berlin representing the height of such institutionalization. This major initiative in Germany was occasion for a 1997 inaugural conference in Berlin on "The Jewish Dimension in German-American Relations: Perceptions and Realities," which the AJC organized in conjunction with AICGS and Amerika Haus. David Harris, the AJC's Executive Director, has suggested that the Holocaust means American Jewry and Germany are "joined at the hip." Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has lauded the AJC's role in the transatlantic dialogue as a "bridge of understanding." He has also welcomed the AJC's role as Germany's advocate in the Jewish community worldwide.

The Institute itself had recognized the proliferation of players in German-Jewish relations at the beginning of the 1990s when it began to examine the opportunities and tensions in the triangular relationship among Germany, Israel, and the American Jewish community. A series of conferences in Washington (1991), Berlin (1992), and Jerusalem (1993) on "German-Jewish Reconciliation? Facing the Past and Looking to the Future" focused comparatively on changing identity in each of the players, on the three sets of bilateral relationships comprising the triangle, and on the dynamics of the triangle itself. One of the conclusions of this conference triad was that American Jewish and Israeli interests were not identical, in part because of the non-governmental nature of the former and the need for a raison d'état in the latter. One could even speak of competing Jewish voices on the issue of who was the appropriate guardian of the past in dealing with Germany.

Jews in Germany

The conferences also sought to understand the complexity of German-Jewish relations and to reach beyond the triangle formulation by examining the political, social, and cultural relations between Germans and Jews in Germany. This attention to German Jews coincided with the beginning of a new era for the community, marked by greater visibility and political engagement due to changed leadership, and by

numerical growth and internal transformation due to the Cold War's end. The topic of German Jewish identity was not entirely new to AICGS; already in 1987 it hosted the rabbi of the tiny East German community. Then, in the mid-1990s the Institute augmented specificity by analyzing second-generation Jews in Germany, by comparing Jewish "survival and revival" in Berlin and New York, and by identifying the connections between German modernism and Jewish identity. By the beginning of the new millennium, the Institute helped broaden even further our understanding of Jewish identity by introducing research on "minority culture" in Germany and on "diaspora cultures" in globalization.

Critical and Contending Voices

The AICGS two-decade search for comprehensiveness in analysis of German-Jewish relations has meant the inclusion of topics that have generated heated debate: Bitburg, the *Historikerstreit*, the Jenninger *Bundestag* speech, public opinion polls revealing anti-Semitism and xenophobia in Germany, the Goldhagen book, and the Bubis-Walser controversy. Ever cognizant of the value of multiple voices in the German-Jewish dialogue, in the last twenty years AICGS has tried to engage, raise, and direct those voices to stimulate discussion and to avoid cacophony. In the final analysis, many voices and open exchange will help to ensure remembrance of the past—the centerpiece of German-Jewish relations.

APPENDIX

PARTICIPANTS IN AICGS PROGRAMS ON GERMAN-JEWISH RELATIONS SINCE 1984 INCLUDE:

Leslie Adelson
David Anderson
Shlomo Avineri
Andrew Baker
Michael Berenbaum
Deidre Berger
Hans-Henning Blomeyer Bartenstein
J.D. Bindenagel
Norman Birnbaum
Michael Bodemann
Leon Botstein
Jörg Bremer
Michael Brenner
Jan Herman Brinks
Henryk Broder
Micha Brumlik
Ignatz Bubis
Josef Burg
Ian Buruma
Greg Caplan
Daniel Cohn-Bendit
Ernst Cramer
Jonathan Czaplicka
Horst Dahlhaus
Jürgen Daniel
Dan Diner
Irene Dische
Norma Drimmer
Freimut Duve
Lawrence Eagleburger
Warren Eisenberg
Amos Elon
Mark Epstein
Marc Fisher
Alexander Freund
Henry Friedlaender
Saul Friedlaender
Wolfgang Gibowski
Sander Gilman
Atina Grossman
Niels Hansen
Jeffrey Herf
Arthur Hertzberg
Robert Hertzstein
Noah Isenberg
Josef Joffe
Anton Kaes
Saul Kagan
Anetta Kahane
David Kamenetzky
Mario Kessler
Jürgen Kocka
Stefan Kramer
Björn Krondorfer
Eric Langenbacher
Claus Leggewie
Mordechai Lewy
Robert Jay Lifton
Deborah Lipstadt
Robert Gerald Livingston
Charles Maier
Michael May
Frank Mecklenburg
Yohanan Meroz
Ernest Michel
Bowman Miller
Wolfgang Meinicke
Hans Mommsen
Andreas Nachama
Benjamin Navon
Amnon Noy
Robin Ostow
Jeffrey Peck
Anson Rabinbach
Lynn Rapaport
Karen Remmler
Eric Rentschler
Monika Richarz
Ernestine Schlant-Bradley
Karl-Heinz Schneider
Peter Schneider
David Schoenbaum
Julius Schoeps
Daniel Schorr
Tom Segev
Rafael Seligmann
Shlomo Shafir
Zalman Shoval
Marc Silberman
David Singer
Jonathan Skolnik
David Sorkin
Shimon Stein
Alan Steinweis
Frank Stern
Fritz Stern
Herbert Strauss
Sylke Tempel
Angelika Timm
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