Burden-Sharing or Burden-Shifting? U.S. Policy on NATO after November 2024
Speaker: Dr. Leonard Schütte, DAAD/AGI Research Fellow and Senior Researcher at the Munich Security Conference
Moderator: Mr. Jeff Rathke, President at AGI
The specter of the United States abandoning NATO looms large over the 2024 U.S. elections. Former President Trump recently reminded Europeans of his ingrained hostility toward the Alliance when he invited Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies that do not pull their weight in defense spending. While a formal U.S. withdrawal from NATO appears unlikely, a potentially imminent Republican administration would seek to fundamentally rebalance the transatlantic relationship. Given the multiple parallel threats to U.S. leadership, ballooning public debt, and an underperforming defense industrial base, even a second Biden administration would face enormous pressures to shift resources and attention away from Europe.
Drawing on interviews with congressional staffers, former officials, and experts in Washington, this webinar will address what a second Trump administration would mean for NATO, how the debate within the Republican Party on NATO is evolving, what rebalancing entails concretely, and what the Europeans need to do to put NATO on a sustainable footing again.
Dr. Leonard Schütte
Dr. Leonard Schütte is Senior Researcher at the Munich Security Conference, where he co-edits and contributes to the Munich Security Report and other publications. He holds a PhD from Maastricht University and studied in Cambridge, Oxford, St. Andrews, and Paris. In 2018-2019, he was the Clara Marina O’Donnell Fellow at the Centre for European Reform in London.
Dr. Schütte has published widely on European defense, transatlantic relations, international organizations, and geoeconomics. Recent publications include Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose? (Munich Security Conference, 2024, co-edited with Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut), Defense Sitters: Transforming European Armies in Times of War (Munich Security Conference, 2023, co-edited with Nicole Koenig), “The Show Must Go On: The EU’s Quest to Sustain Multilateral Institutions Since 2016” (Journal of Common Market Studies, 2023, with Hylke Dijkstra), and “Why NATO survived Trump: the neglected role of Secretary-General Stoltenberg” (International Affairs, 2021).
Event Summary
The transatlantic relationship is on the cusp of a new era. No matter who wins in November, U.S. strategic thinking is likely to shift away from Europe, no longer being centrally engaged in European security. It is imperative for Europe to actively respond to the possibility of a U.S. drawdown and ensure that there is no security vacuum for Russia to exploit.
Transatlantic Security Challenges and U.S. Policy Shifts
Recent developments point to three structural trends that are likely to shape U.S.-EU relations regardless of electoral outcomes. First, there is the ongoing shift in U.S. foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific, driven by the need to counter a growing strategic challenge from China. There is bipartisan agreement on the urgency of addressing China’s military buildup, particularly in naval and nuclear domains, raising the possibility of a “hot war” in the region. This strategic realignment has the potential to divert U.S. resources and focus away from Europe.
Second, demographic changes in the United States are reshaping priorities. Younger Americans are less supportive of an active global role for the United States. As the United States becomes more ethnically diverse and less Eurocentric, the focus of its foreign policy may also shift, deprioritizing Europe as the primary locus of its global engagement.
Third, perceptions of resource scarcity, driven by fiscal and military constraints, are increasingly influencing U.S. foreign policy decisions. With national debt approaching 100 percent of GDP, the United States faces mounting fiscal pressures. Concerns about military capacity, particularly in light of a potential competition with China, further limit the feasibility of extensive commitments to Europe.
The “New Grand Strategy”
The “New Grand Strategy” represents a growing consensus among Republican policymakers advocating for a reduced U.S. role in Europe. Since World War I, U.S. grand strategy has been Eurocentric. Even during the War on Terror and the rise of China, Europe remained a critical secondary theater of U.S. strategic interests, as underscored by the Biden administration’s strong response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Advocates of the new strategy argue that Europe is capable of defending itself. They propose creating a non-U.S.-centered security framework in Europe, enabling the United States to redirect resources toward China or domestic concerns. This perspective downplays the threat of Russian hegemony and views deeper U.S. involvement in Europe as a drain on resources. Support for this shift is gaining traction within Congress among figures like JD Vance and Josh Hawley and across influential think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation.
This evolving approach reflects a broader reassessment of U.S. global commitments amidst perceptions of resource scarcity and geopolitical priorities. The debate over Ukraine aid highlights these tensions, as critics of continued support often echo the arguments of the new grand strategy: the United States is overstretched, and Europe should assume greater responsibility for its security. While hawks advocating for a global U.S. role remain influential, the “Asia First” mindset is gaining momentum, even among former advocates of global engagement.
Trump, NATO, and U.S. Disengagement
In a potential second Trump administration, this shift could accelerate significantly. During his first term, constraints from key administration officials tempered his more radical ideas, but a second term could see fewer checks on his policies. Trump’s long-held skepticism of NATO and European alliances, coupled with a well-organized network of allies and think tanks, could lead to a redefinition of U.S. commitments in Europe. For Europe, these developments signal the need to prepare for a future where it must take on a far greater share of the burden for regional security.
A formal U.S. withdrawal from NATO under Trump appears unlikely due to practical and legal constraints. However, there are numerous strategies a second Trump administration could employ to undermine NATO and exert pressure on European allies.
One likely approach would involve continued public criticism of European defense spending. This could include conditioning the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause on European nations meeting specific defense spending thresholds, a proposal gaining traction among some of Trump’s advisers. Additional tactics could include limiting voting power for underperforming allies, imposing tariffs on nations not meeting defense targets, or skipping NATO summits to signal disengagement.
Material actions, particularly troop withdrawals, represent an even greater threat to NATO’s stability. It is plausible that Trump would initiate a drawdown of U.S. forces in Europe. Such moves could escalate to base closures or the permanent redeployment of critical systems to the Indo-Pacific, aligning with Trump’s broader strategy to prioritize competition with China.
The primary risk lies not in a formal NATO withdrawal but in the creation of a security vacuum in Europe. A reduction in U.S. troop levels and enabling capabilities could weaken European deterrence against Russia, leaving NATO’s eastern flank particularly vulnerable.
Recommendations for European Response
Europe must shift its strategy from attempting to preserve the status quo with the United States as the leading security provider to proactively adapting to the evolving U.S. grand strategy. Efforts to placate the United States with minor increases in defense spending, token gestures like deploying ships to the Indo-Pacific, or reiterating Europe’s dependence on U.S. security are unlikely to resonate in Washington. Instead, Europe take decisive steps to address its own security needs.
A practical response would be to launch a “burden-shifting initiative” that outlines how Europe plans to gradually assume greater responsibility for its defense. This plan should include significant increases in defense spending, efforts to replace critical U.S. systems deployed in Europe, and long-term reforms to strengthen NATO’s European capabilities. Institutional changes, such as appointing a European Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), could signal a willingness to take the lead in regional security. By proactively shaping this transition, Europe can mitigate the risks of a disorderly or abrupt U.S. disengagement.
Failure to act could lead to two potential scenarios that Europe must avoid. First, a future “America First” president, frustrated with perceived European dithering, might announce a rapid U.S. withdrawal from NATO. Second, a conflict in the Indo-Pacific, such as a Chinese attack on Taiwan, could force any next administration—regardless of party—to rapidly redeploy military resources from Europe to Asia. In either case, Europe would face severe security challenges if it remains unprepared.
Announcing a bold burden-shifting initiative at the upcoming NATO Summit would send a strong signal of Europe’s commitment to addressing these issues. Such a move could generate goodwill among the “America First” camp, reduce the risk of dramatic U.S. actions, and better prepare Europe for a potential Indo-Pacific crisis. Ultimately, Europe must recognize that the existing NATO framework is unsustainable and act before these changes are imposed by external forces.
Discussion
Defense spending is a consistent issue within Europe and is something that both Democrats and former President Trump have expressed frustration about. The expected contribution of 2 percent of GDP for NATO member countries has turned into the minimum expected amount, not the objective. In the coming years, the U.S. demand for increased defense efforts on a European scale (regardless of who is president) will only increase.
NATO’s Article 5 does not specifically state what is required from states regarding collective defense, and there are serious doubts as to if the United States would be willing to honor Article 5 in the way that it is conventionally understood in a second Trump presidency. There is a concept of a “Dormant NATO”: a NATO that does not enlarge, does not include the United States, and shifts the burden of conventional deterrents to Europe while keeping nuclear deterrents in place. It is unclear how this could be implemented. This concept was introduced by a think tank, and while the Trump administration has previously shied away from think tank recommendations and other forms of ‘conventional wisdom,’ the impact of these recommendations should not be ignored, even if the administration does not act on them. The work coming out of conservative think tanks will help shape public opinion in the case of a second Trump presidency. The cabinet picks will be a better indication of the direction of Trump’s security policy.
Regardless of what occurs between the United States and NATO, the EU and NATO need to engage in closer cooperation, especially in procurement. The European defense industry has struggled significantly due to lack of funding and a high focus on prioritizing national forces. The EU and its member states need to incentivize joint procurement to ensure a higher level of efficiency and create a procurement plan outlining specific systems to acquire and implement. The main obstacle is funding these plans—the idea of defense bonds on the European level is gaining traction in EU member states as a solution to this funding problem. Significant EU defense reforms are paramount to execute these suggestions. Germany will need to assume a central leadership role both in transatlantic cooperation and European coordination, as it has the biggest economy in Europe and has a significant defense base. Alongside Poland, it provides the most conventional deterrence in Europe.
Trump has criticized the amount of aid sent to Ukraine, and there is no guarantee that he would continue large aid packages. Support for Ukraine is slowly declining, and members of the Republican party want to stop the funding. It is important that Europe takes on the responsibility to support Ukraine, as Ukrainian and European security go together.
There has been criticism of European spending levels for decades, but the tone and urgency has changed. Some Americans believe that the only way to show the seriousness of the issue is to change the threat perception, which would include withdrawing support. Europeans need to signal, particularly to the Republicans in the United States, that they are serious about defense and change how they communicate this to the world. Europeans need to accept the transition from burden-sharing to burden-shifting. Defense planners will need to start thinking about timeline, systems, and concrete milestones that will usher in the change in European security. What Europe needs is an ambitious, concrete plan to shape the debate on the future of European security and prepare for what is to come from the next American presidential administration.
This event is supported by the DAAD with funds from the Federal Foreign Office. It is part of the Road to Election series, a collaborative transatlantic initiative that fosters dialogue in the lead-up to the pivotal 2024 U.S. election.
