Werner Kunz via Flickr
Improving Foreign and Security Policymaking in Germany
Phyllis Berry
Non-Resident Senior Fellow
Phyllis Berry is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American-German Institute. She was the National Intelligence Officer for Europe from June 2021 until March 2025. She also served at the National Intelligence Council as Acting NIO for Europe from July 2017 through April 2018, Deputy NIO from April 2018 through July 2020, and senior advisor on governance for the NIC’s Strategic Futures Group during 2015-16. She authored the European futures papers for the 2017 and 2021 NIC Global Trends reports. From late 2014 to mid-2015 she was Director for Ukraine at the National Security Council. Dr. Berry has a Ph.D. in comparative politics from Georgetown University and has taught European comparative politics, French politics, German politics, and comparative leadership.
This is the third of a three-part series addressing German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s approach to foreign and security policy and initial actions, the key issues Merz faces through the end of the year, and his efforts to reform the foreign and security policy process in Germany.
German security policy experts have long lamented the country’s lack of a strategic security culture and the government’s stovepiped policy process. Friedrich Merz has sought to address these shortcomings through his ministerial appointments, public engagements, and institutional reforms. During coalition negotiations, he reclaimed the Foreign Office for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and gained buy-in from his coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), for the creation of a National Security Council (NSC) supported by a small staff in the Chancellery. In late August, the Cabinet approved the rules of procedure for these new bodies.
There are three key dimensions to the success of these reform efforts. Most importantly, Merz will need to give life to the NSC by convening it regularly and using it for decision-making. Secondly, a more robust inter-ministerial process is necessary to underpin the NSC and ensure that ministries share information to create the basis for a systematic development and implementation of policy. Finally, Merz will have to work with his Chancellery chief and the chief of his private office, the latter of whom will be double-hatted as head of a small NSC support staff, to improve the Chancellery’s capacity to support him and the NSC as a whole and provide a degree of strategic foresight to government decision-making.
Putting Substance to Reform Proposals
The coalition has agreed to a broad mandate for the National Security Council—a committee of the federal cabinet—aimed at developing an integrated security policy that considers the relationship between external and internal threats, is based on common assessments, and goes beyond addressing immediate crises to develop a more strategic and whole-of-government approach to security. The NSC replaces the existing Federal Security Council, a cabinet committee created during the Willy Brandt chancellorship that has played a limited role largely confined to reviewing military export sales. The new NSC is led by the chancellor and includes the finance, interior, foreign, defense, economics and energy, justice, digital affairs and state modernization, and development ministers as well as the chief of the Chancellery. The federal spokesman, the inspector general of the armed forces, and the heads of Germany’s intelligence and federal police agencies also attend NSC meetings, while the chancellor can invite additional ministers as well as state-level or even foreign officials depending on the subject matter. Ministers are obligated to inform the NSC of all departmental actions that would impact German security. To prepare Cabinet meetings, there will also be a committee at the level of the state secretary, the equivalent of a deputy secretary in the United States or permanent secretary in the UK system. The Chancellery chief will head this committee.
To give life to the NSC, Merz must choose to use it. As is evident in other countries with similar bodies—such as the United States and United Kingdom—the NSC’s role depends greatly on the leader. In Germany, the constitutional principle of ministerial autonomy, strongly reinforced by the reality of coalition politics and the difference in party affiliation between the chancellor and foreign minister that existed from 1966 through this May, served as obstacles to an integrated policy process. In the past, chancellors and foreign ministers have acted relatively autonomously, with chancellors increasingly dominating key foreign policy sectors due to the rise of international summit diplomacy, their bilateral engagements, and the increased role of the European Council in EU decision-making. Foreign ministers have not necessarily followed the chancellor’s lead, while chancellors have been reluctant to rely on the Foreign Office for advice or policy implementation. Coordination between foreign and defense ministers has also often been lacking. Coalition differences have slowed decision-making, which was particularly marked during the previous SPD-Greens-Free Democratic Party coalition under Olaf Scholz, when Germany would sometimes abstain on important EU decisions, such as on the phase out of combustion engines, because of the inability of the government to come to a common position.
Merz campaigned on ending this practice, and his first step in doing so was to reclaim the Foreign Office for the CDU. He and Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul have so far spoken with one voice on key foreign policy issues. They have travelled together more often than their predecessors, particularly in the government’s first weeks. Merz’s close cooperation with Wadephul and the Foreign Office does not necessarily mean, however, that the chancellor is ready to rely on the NSC as a whole for deciding major security issues. Merz appears to prefer a more informal style of decision-making and has focused more on coordinating with his foreign counterparts than using the Cabinet or NSC to make decisions. For example, although he held the equivalent of an NSC meeting in July to discuss policy toward Israel, he decided in early August to suspend arms exports to Israel that could be used in Gaza without directly consulting Cabinet members and informing only Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil (SPD) and Wadephul just before the announcement. Merz has indicated that the Cabinet—not necessarily the NSC—will once again discuss Israel policy before EU leaders consider punitive measures on Israel in early October. How regularly the NSC meets and the degree to which the state secretary coordination committee will be used to discuss alternatives and prepare decisions will indicate how seriously Merz wants to use the NSC. In addition, the NSC needs to be supported by a more robust interagency process, not just at the state secretary level, both to formulate policy but also to implement it once decided. Germany often fails to follow up fully on new initiatives, and a more active interagency process could help to address that weakness.
Creating a National Security Staff Commensurate with the Name
Much attention has been given to the creation of an NSC staff, which is often equated with a “presidentialization” of foreign policymaking. In the past, the head of the Chancellery’s foreign and security policy division has been the rough equivalent of a U.S. or UK national security adviser, but his (the chief has always been male) lesser administrative status and leadership of a single Chancellery division have been seen as inadequate to addressing Germany’s security challenges. Until this year, junior coalition parties have consistently resisted strengthening the chancellor’s foreign policy support, and in previous coalitions, the foreign minister blocked the creation of a national security council. The SPD acceded this time to Merz’s proposal, probably partly due to its dissatisfaction with the dissension that marked the previous coalition and partly believing that SPD control over the finance, defense, and development ministries would protect its role in decision-making. The SPD did insist on a reference to the constitutional provision of ministerial autonomy in the NSC rules of procedure to underline the limitations on a chancellor’s ability to directly instruct a minister to take specific action.
To give life to the NSC, Merz must choose to use it.
Merz also gained SPD buy-in for the creation of a small NSC staff housed in the chancellor’s private office and headed by its chief, Jacob Schrot, who was chief of staff to Merz in the latter’s role as Christian Democratic caucus chair from early 2022 to their move to the Chancellery. The staff will have three small sections (Referate) for support, strategic foresight and planning, and situational assessments. Day-to-day management and support of the chancellor’s foreign engagements will continue to rest in the Chancellery division of foreign, security, and development policy, which is headed by career diplomat Guenter Sautter and has a staff more than three times the planned size of the NSC staff. Three other Chancellery divisions will also continue to play an important role in foreign and security policy and international matters: the economic and financial policy division, the European policy division, and the division overseeing intelligence coordination. Schrot has no authority over these divisions, whose chiefs have equal administrative rank to him. Sautter remains the key interlocutor to foreign national security adviser-equivalents, European division chief Michael Clauss liaises with the EU and EU member state officials leading EU policy, and economic division chief Levin Hoelle serves as Merz’s G7 and G20 sherpa. These officials have considerably more government experience than Schrot, whose only prior executive experience was serving as special assistant to then-Chancellor Angela Merkel’s foreign policy adviser Jan Hecker from 2019 to 2021.
The lack of a single national security adviser-equivalent raises questions about whether this new structure can produce a more fully integrated policy process. Schrot will have to work closely with Sautter and the other division chiefs to ensure that strategic planning is integrated into the day-to-day operations of the Chancellery, let alone the government as a whole. Both Schrot and Sautter have accompanied Merz on most of his foreign travel, with Claus and Hoelle also often attending. Coordination between these officials will be key to effectively addressing both immediate and more long-term strategic considerations. Such coordination will be particularly important in the drafting of an updated National Strategic Strategy (NSS), for which Schrot and his staff will be responsible for preparing for consideration by the NSC. The first NSS was drafted in the previous government’s Foreign Office and completed in 2023, with differences between the Foreign Office and Chancellery delaying its completion for several months. Merz said the initial NSS was a solid first effort but wants the update to more clearly prioritize security challenges and provide concrete proposals on how to address them.
An additional duty of the NSC staff will be to provide strategic foresight and analysis. This is not the first attempt to provide such a capability. A planning division existed in the Brandt and Schmidt chancellorships (1969-82), but that effort generally failed due to bureaucratic resistance and the chancellor’s limited attention to the division’s work. The Foreign Office has long had a planning staff, which has regularly connected to its counterparts within the EU, NATO, and United States. Schrot has shown considerable interest in the subject, and better Chancellery-Foreign Office cooperation could advance a broader government effort. Schrot will also have to work with his Chancellery counterparts to reach out to the ministries. Just as importantly, Schrot will need the chancellor’s support to integrate such analysis into the work of the government, and while his relationship with Merz is close, Merz takes his own counsel and relies on a varying group of advisors.
It is much too early to judge the ability of these reforms to improve the substance and process of foreign and security policymaking, and the return of the Foreign Office to the chancellor’s party appears to be the most impactful change so far. Central advisory agencies and decision-making processes have always been dependent on the style and goals of leaders and the political context in which they operate. Merz will need to use the NSC to make decisions and invest time and political capital in developing a more integrated policy process for these reforms to have any significant chance of success.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
