Germany’s Zeitenwende 2.0: This Time for Real?

Andrea Rotter

Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung

Andrea Rotter heads the Foreign and Security Policy Division at the Academy for Politics and Current Affairs of the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSF) in Munich, Germany. Her research focuses on transatlantic security cooperation as well as German and European security and defense policy. Her current research projects address the evolution of Germany’s strategic culture, the transformation of NATO in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and the link between geopolitical rivalry and space security policy.

Prior to joining HSF, she was a researcher in the Americas Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin and taught at the Chair of International Politics and Transatlantic Relations at the University of Regensburg. In 2018, she was a visiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and the American-German Institute (AGI) at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. From 2018-2022, she was a member of the Young Leaders Program of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), Berlin, and is an alumna of the International Visiting Leadership Program (U.S. Department of State) and the Manfred Wörner Seminar (GMF & German Federal Ministry of Defense). She is also a member of the extended board of WIIS (Women in International Security) Germany and heads the regional chapter in Munich.

Rotter holds a master’s degree in European-American Studies from the University of Regensburg and a bachelor’s degree in International Cultural and Business Studies from the University of Passau and Stirling, UK.

Opportunities and Challenges for Sustainable Change in Germany’s Foreign and Security Policy Amid Coalition Negotiations

For years, European and transatlantic allies have urged Germany to take on greater responsibility for European security and defense—even more so in light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which has emerged as the continent’s most severe security crisis in decades, and deteriorating transatlantic relations. The recently adopted financial package, agreed upon by the Christian Democrats, Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), and the Social Democrats (SPD) currently in coalition talks to form the next German government, signals a broad consensus for a stronger commitment and lays the foundation for a lasting shift in Germany’s foreign policy. However, several challenges remain, and if unsolved, risk undermining the present momentum, much like the widely unfulfilled ambitions of Germany’s 2022 Zeitenwende initiative.

 International commentators have not hesitated to use superlatives such as “historic,” “seismic,” and the “awakening of the sleeping giant” to describe Germany’s recent shifts in policy and their potential beneficial impact on European security and defense since the federal election on February 23, 2025. Following Olaf Scholz’s 2022 Zeitenwende speech, which announced a €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr, among other initiatives, to signify a radical turnaround in Germany’s defense policy—although it never fully materialized—the spring of 2025 once again ushered in fundamental changes.

Building on the pledge of Friedrich Merz, the likely next chancellor, to strengthen Germany’s and Europe’s defense readiness by “whatever it takes” amid rising transatlantic disagreements on Russia, Ukraine, European security, and trade, a consensus among the CDU/CSU, the Social Democrats, and the future opposition Green Party has led to significant changes in Germany’s fiscal policies: The approved package will exempt Germany’s defense spending from debt rules when exceeding one percent of GDP to address armed forces gaps and enhance civil protection. It also includes a €500 billion fund, financed through borrowing, to invest in the country’s infrastructure over the next twelve years and help revitalize Germany’s struggling economy.

Consensus on the Broad Foreign, Security, and Defense Policy Lines

Establishing a legal framework for increased investment in Germany’s military is both a necessary and long-overdue step, reflecting a broad consensus between the two likely future governing parties. According to recent opinion polls, it also enjoys strong public support amid backlash over changing the debt rules only after the election. Additionally, a recently leaked consolidated version of the working group results on defense, foreign, development, and human rights policy reveals very few disagreements in the coalition negotiations between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, indicating a shared understanding of Germany’s broader future foreign, security, and defense policy direction in contrast to greater divisions on migration and tax policies.

The document and various party leaders’ statements outline a unified perception of key threats, including Russia’s aggressive expansionism, Iran’s and North Korea’s military support for Russia’s war, and China’s efforts to undermine the international liberal order. Based on an acute awareness (and doubts) regarding the future role of the United States in European security, both parties are committed to strengthening all of Germany’s foreign and security instruments, including a capable Bundeswehr, to uphold European security through a strong commitment to NATO and the EU, while demonstrating leadership as “a pillar of support” in close cooperation with European partners. The next likely government coalition is also firmly dedicated to enhancing and continuing Germany’s military, civilian, and political support for Ukraine, ensuring Kyiv can operate from a position of strength with yet-to-be-defined material and political security guarantees for its sovereignty.

Potential for Greater Coherence in Germany’s Foreign Policy

The general agreement on security and defense, along with recent leadership changes within the SPD and the upcoming transition in the Chancellery, presents the potential for a bolder, more decisive, and more coherent German foreign policy—one that major European allies hope will restore Germany’s leadership role in Europe. This has been lacking due to years of mixed and hesitant signals from Chancellor Scholz’s government, despite its undeniable and strong support for Ukraine.

Intra-governmental disputes among Germany’s past three coalition partners in recent years have been both publicly evident and a persistent source of frustration within EU circles. These internal ministerial disagreements have often led Germany to abstain from EU decisions—a phenomenon dubbed the “German vote”—which has limited its ability to shape EU policy at a critical geopolitical moment.

The general agreement on security and defense, along with recent leadership changes within the SPD and the upcoming transition in the Chancellery, presents the potential for a bolder, more decisive, and more coherent German foreign policy.

Merz has pledged to end this practice for critical EU decisions through a more coherent, whole-of-government approach that aligns all relevant policy areas. The precise institutional framework for this remains uncertain: the SPD favors expanding the Federal Security Council, establishing a National Situation Center, and creating an interministerial crisis task force at the federal level, while the CDU/CSU advocates for a National Security Council within the Chancellery. Nevertheless, both parties fortunately recognize the need to address Germany’s deficit in strategic security research and are committed to advancing it within a comprehensive security framework.

Recognizing the urgency of enhancing Germany’s strategic capabilities is critical for a coherent foreign policy and a stronger Europe, likely surpassing the remaining differences among the coalition negotiators, such as the potential integration of the Development Ministry into the Federal Foreign Office, and addressing ongoing contentious issues, including those related to Israel and Gaza. While foreign policy signals from the incoming government have so far led observers to be cautiously optimistic, significant challenges remain for Germany to fully correct the shortcomings of the 2022 Zeitenwende.

Laying the Financial Groundwork for Sustainable Change

Among these challenges, responsibly allocating the financial resources now made available through the relaxation of debt regulations will remain crucial. In 2024, Germany spent two percent of its GDP on defense for the first time in over 30 years, thereby meeting NATO’s defense target with a €72 billion defense budget—comprising both the regular defense budget (€51.95 billion) and contributions from the special fund (€19.8 billion). However, this arrangement was not sustainable: The regular budget was expected to stagnate in the medium-term financial plan, and according to the Federal Ministry of Defense, the special fund was projected to be depleted by 2027. As a result, by 2028, Germany would have faced an annual investment shortfall of at least €30 billion just to maintain the two-percent target, let alone reach the three or three-and-a-half percent currently being discussed within NATO.

It’s Not All About the Money: Addressing Germany’s Military Capability Gaps

Prioritizing defense spending is thus a positive development that will help close critical capability gaps within the Bundeswehr. Given the foreseeable depletion of the €100 special fund, the Ministry of Defense has hitherto focused on prioritization and smaller-scale procurements to address the most urgent deficiencies. However, these measures have proven insufficient to make Germany truly “war-ready,” as called for by Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who has a strong chance of remaining in office.

Severe capability gaps persist in Germany’s maritime, air, and land forces and logistics, with particular shortfalls in air defense systems, ammunition, and long-range missiles. A recent study has indicated that due to Germany’s massive disarmament over past decades and the current sluggish procurement pace, it may take up to 100 years for the country to regain the 2004 level of armament in key weapon systems. Addressing these issues will require years of sustained effort and significant changes to Germany’s procurement processes and organizational mindset, which are hinted at in the coalition documents but will have to be tested in practice.

Given the demonstrated strategic importance of industrial capacity in modern warfare, as seen in Ukraine, incentivizing Germany’s defense industry to expand production capacities and contribute to strengthening Europe’s defense-industrial base remains a significant challenge. The negotiating partners aim to address this issue—albeit in a somewhat vague manner—by promoting key technologies and fostering civil-military cooperation, particularly in dual-use technology.

Diverging Approaches to Strengthening Germany’s Military Forces

Germany’s significant commitments to NATO’s eastern flank, exemplified through the recently launched permanent brigade in Lithuania, emphasize the critical need for the next government to significantly expand the Bundeswehr in order to address evolving security challenges. Even today, with 181,174 active soldiers, Germany falls significantly short of the Bundeswehr’s personnel target of 203,000 by 2031. According to NATO defense plans and Bundeswehr Inspector General Carsten Breuer, Germany requires a growth potential to maintain at least 460,000 soldiers and reserves for combat readiness. Achieving this would require adding approximately 100,000 active troops. While both the CDU/CSU and SPD agree on the need to expand the Bundeswehr, they are divided on how to achieve this. The CDU/CSU advocates for reinstating compulsory military service as soon as possible, backed by high-ranking Bundeswehr officials, whereas the Social Democrats prefer a voluntary model akin to the Swedish system to grow the Bundeswehr.

Shaping Germany’s Strategic Culture and Increasing Societal Resilience

Finally, the next government must take decisive steps to prepare the German population for the evolving security landscape and the measures required to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. Overall, a growing majority of Germans acknowledge the fundamental changes in Europe’s security environment and support greater defense investment—even through debt—while also advocating for a stronger European defense capability more independent of the United States. Yet, while there is broad consensus on the principle of assuming greater responsibility, support for concrete, actionable measures remains more reserved. Germans generally endorse NATO membership and alliance-related defense commitments, but support declines when it comes to specific actions, such as providing military assistance to Baltic allies in the face of Russian aggression, the Bundeswehr’s deployment in Lithuania, or participation in Baltic air policing.

While the war in Ukraine has heightened awareness of security and defense issues, a significant information gap remains between the general public and the security policy community.

A March poll, conducted after the fallout between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, found that 60 percent of Germans would likely or definitely refuse to defend their country by force of arms in the event of a military attack—underscoring a significant gap between public sentiment and the defense-ready mindset urged by political leaders.

Shifting this mindset requires both the will and commitment of political leaders and active engagement from civil society. Leaders must go beyond adhering to traditional boundaries set by Germany’s historically rooted restraint in defense matters and leverage their authority to bridge the gap between strategic culture and the pressing demands of realpolitik.

Closing the Security Information Gap

There is an urgent need to foster open and honest security-related discussions, free from partisan divides, and to place security policy more prominently at the center of societal discourse. While the war in Ukraine has heightened awareness of security and defense issues, a significant information gap remains between the general public and the security policy community. Addressing this gap effectively requires prioritizing coherent communication as a core strategic element, ensuring coordination across ministries, and articulating political measures clearly, with messaging tailored to specific audiences.

This will become more crucial as Germany continues to be a primary target of Russian hybrid warfare, particularly disinformation campaigns, while necessary and at times painful cost-saving measures to consolidate the government budget risk fueling extremist, populist, and pro-Russian political forces on the fringes, underscoring the need for a proactive and well-communicated security strategy.