The State of Tension

Lukas Liebscher

Halle Foundation/AGI Intern

Lukas Liebscher is a Halle Foundation research intern at AGI in fall 2024. He is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science with a minor in Media Studies at the University of Regensburg, Germany. This fall, he is part of the Washington Semester Program at American University where he is studying international relations, public policy, and the United States. Mr. Liebscher's research focuses on transatlantic relations, foreign and security policy, and global diplomacy. Prior to joining AGI, he worked as a research assistant and later as an office manager for a member of the Bavarian Parliament, where he gained extensive experience in legislative processes, political communication, and public administration. Mr. Liebscher has been actively involved in international projects, such as Model United Nations conferences in Regensburg and New York and the Washington Summer Symposium at the Osgood Center for International Studies in Washington, DC. He has also participated in strategic scenario planning projects, gaining valuable insight into global political dynamics and strategic decision-making. In his free time, Mr. Liebscher is involved with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP e.V.) and student groups in Regensburg focused on international relations and security policy.

A Necessary Tool or a Step Too Far?

“Germany is not at war, but it is not at peace either.” Statements like this have become increasingly common in recent months. The reason lies not only in the war on Europe’s borders but also in a growing number of incidents that fall into the realm of hybrid warfare. Damaged undersea cables in the Baltic Sea, drone flyovers of critical infrastructure, damaged military barracks fences, and incendiary devices in cargo planes are just the tip of the iceberg. In the latter example, Western officials have suspected Russia behind the attacks.

These developments and the election victory of CDU Chairman Friedrich Merz in the February 23, 2025, election raise the question: How should Germany respond? What tools are available to policymakers? And are German politicians prepared to take the necessary steps?

Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius (SPD) has put more attention on Germany’s armed forces. Longstanding issues with equipment and procurement have been addressed to gradually restore the Bundeswehr’s operational readiness. But while taking much-needed steps, Minister Pistorius was constrained in part by the unwieldy three-party coalition that ultimately broke apart in November 2024 because of its inability to agree on public spending, including assistance for Ukraine. To this day, the defense industry demands planning reliability, the public seeks stability, and Europe expects a decisive German government.

One instrument that has been proposed to help fulfill these demands would be the declaration of so-called Spannungsfall (“state of tension”). One of the CDU’s leading defense experts, Roderich Kiesewetter, has publicly argued that this step would address the increasing security uncertainties confronting Germany and Europe.

Fundamental Context

In the event of a threat, the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) provides for various stages of defense that make policy tools available to the Bundestag and the federal government. These include the Zustimmungsfall (state of approval), the Spannungsfall (state of tension), and, at the highest level, the Verteidigungsfall (state of defense). Each of these stages enables access to safeguarding and precautionary laws at varying levels of escalation. The Verteidigungsfall, which can be initiated by an armed attack or the imminent threat of such, transfers command and control of the Bundeswehr from the minister of defense to the chancellor, activates conscription, and enables access to all security and precautionary laws. It also enables special regulations regarding the relationship between the federal government and the states, which normally remain untouched. The Zustimmungsfall on the other hand allows individual access to emergency laws with increased parliamentary oversight. And even though in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany neither the Spannungsfall, nor the Zustimmungsfall, nor the Verteidigungsfall has ever been declared, the Spannungsfall, which lies between the Zustimmungs– and the Verteidigungsfall, has recently been discussed as a possible response to hybrid threats in Germany. But why?

The Spannungsfall under Article 80a of the Basic Law

The Spannungsfall is potent yet not as extreme as the Verteidigungsfall and would require a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag. Once enacted, all safeguarding and emergency preparedness laws are “unlocked.” Key legislative measures, such as the Labor Assurance Act (ASG), Transport Assurance Act (VerkSiG), and Economic Assurance Act (WiSiG), and the Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Act (ZSKG), are aimed at protecting critical sectors such as labor, transport, and economic stability from collapse and putting them into “crisis mode” in the event of an escalating situation. Additionally, some of these safeguarding and precautionary laws focus on maintaining energy and transportation infrastructure to ensure resilience and operational continuity. These laws allow the federal government to implement crisis measures that are not otherwise readily accessible. In particular, conscription to military service and supporting civilian duties is automatic under Article 12a of the Basic Law and Paragraph 2 of the Conscription Law, even during the Spannungsfall. This would then apply to all men aged 18 and above, as in the Verteidigungsfall.

The Spannungsfall, however, is not clearly defined in the Basic Law. Article 80a merely describes it as a state that can arise during a foreign policy conflict that “with a high probability will lead to an armed attack on the Federal Republic of Germany.” This vague formulation gives political decision-makers in the Bundestag considerable discretion in interpretation. There is no legal obligation to declare the Spannungsfall, even if objective signs of such a situation exist. Instead, the Bundestag may choose to maintain the constitutional “normal state” to avoid further escalation.

Legal and scholarly discourse sees the Spannungsfall as a flexible instrument to respond to hybrid threats such as cyberattacks, transnational crime, or terrorism. However, the question remains as to what specific events would constitute a “state of tension” under Article 80a. The fact that there is no legal obligation to declare the Spannungsfall leaves the decision entirely up to political will.

The Case for a Spannungsfall

Roderich Kiesewetter, a member of the Bundestag from the CDU and a former Bundeswehr general staff officer, sees “this political will lacking at present.”[1] He openly advocates for declaring a Spannungsfall as a potential means to strengthen Germany’s resilience. Kiesewetter argues that declaring a Spannungsfall, particularly in close coordination with European partners (especially Poland, France, and the UK), could strengthen resilience of the German public. In his view, the current German security situation is one of urgency, with a need to focus on rearmament, deterrence, and resilience-building. All of this “[…] would strengthen the entire security architecture of the Western alliance and Europe, because Germany is currently falling far short of its capabilities.” He notes that Russia is currently stockpiling newly manufactured military equipment, while Germany is reflecting on a history of disarmament that continues to hamper reform efforts within the Ministry of Defense under Boris Pistorius. “Necessary preparations cannot be made,” Kiesewetter states, “and therefore neither resilience nor rearmament is advancing.”

Kiesewetter emphasizes that the Spannungsfall is a crucial instrument for addressing hybrid threats while simultaneously enhancing societal resilience. He also highlights the necessity of refitting and renewing safeguarding and emergency preparedness laws to ensure they clearly define responsibilities and tasks in response to modern threats. He stresses that roles must be unambiguously outlined in the event of such a declaration. Kiesewetter concludes: “[…] the Spannungsfall could have an absolutely central effect on the resilience of the entire German state and its individual parts. However, I do not currently see the political will to declare a Spannungsfall. In this respect, at least as a minimum, in order to create resilience and a ‘war capability,’ as the minister of defense says, a reprioritization in the budget must be achieved and legal powers adapted to the hybrid threat situation. That is the absolute minimum.”

Conclusion

The declaration of a Spannungsfall is not an end in itself but a critical starting point for preparing German society for the multifaceted risks and vulnerabilities it faces in an increasingly volatile security environment. Its implementation would signal a clear shift toward increased preparedness and comprehensive resilience but requires a coordinated effort by political actors and the voters. Such a shift would result in tangible measures such as increased military exercises, equipment procurement, enhanced cyber defense operations, and comprehensive strategic communications aimed at building public confidence and resilience.

From a political perspective, the Spannungsfall remains a viable policy option, but it faces significant challenges. It requires a high degree of political will, a broad consensus among coalition partners, and, perhaps most importantly, the active support of the German people. Despite Mr. Kiesewetter’s strong advocacy for declaring a Spannungsfall and updating Germany’s emergency laws, the broader political landscape has yet to fully embrace these proposals. Public reluctance and the complexity of gaining cross-party support further complicate the possibility of such measures being enacted in the short term.

But given the current context, it seems highly unlikely that the Spannungsfall will become a focal point in subsequent coalition negotiations. The prevailing political calculus seems to favor continuity and cautious adjustment over more drastic measures such as the Spannungsfall. It is conceivable, however, that the Spannungsfall could gain serious traction under exceptional circumstances—most notably if a NATO member were attacked, triggering a broader European security crisis. Such an event would likely catalyze both public and political support for increased national preparedness measures. Until then, it is reasonable to expect that both the current and any future German government will avoid pursuing this option.

Nevertheless, it remains crucial to monitor the evolution of this debate, as the rapidly changing European security environment may force German policymakers to reconsider their stance. As external threats intensify and public awareness of security risks grows, the conditions for revisiting the Spannungsfall may emerge.

[1] Roderich Kiesewetter, email message to author, December 16, 2024.